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ABSTRACT 
 
MICHELE M. EASTER:  ―Some sort of larger force at work‖: Meanings and implications of 
genetics for women with eating disorders. 
(Under the direction of Peggy A. Thoits and Andrew J. Perrin) 
 
 Recent research supports the idea that genes play a role in the development of many 
complex psychiatric and behavioral disorders, including eating disorders. Although no genes 
have been linked to anorexia or bulimia nervosa, heritability estimates from twin studies have 
been described in scientific and popular literature.  Genetic causation may compete with 
other causal narratives that implicate individual choice, family problems, and cultural norms. 
In this dissertation, I treat genetic ideas as newly available ―cultural tools‖ for individuals to 
use as they manage identities, organize action, and conceptualize their own behavior and 
condition.  Through semi-structured interviews with fifty women who have a history of 
anorexia or bulimia nervosa, I describe their understandings of genetic causality for this 
complex disorder and its implications.  Half the sample was currently receiving treatment 
(recruited from a hospital-based clinic); the other half had recovered (self-reported and 
recruited through a mass email). 
Chapters 3 and 4 illuminate respondents‘ understandings of eating disorders and their 
causes before the idea of genetic influence is brought up as a topic of discussion.  In Chapter 
3, I present the complex, dynamic causal models put forth by respondents and their 
perceptions of their own ambiguous, ambivalent agency in carrying out eating disorder 
behavior.  Respondents spoke of eating disorder causation in ways that were not reducible to 
biological, ―environmental‖ (e.g., social, cultural, familial factors), nor ―individual‖ (e.g., 
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psychological, agentic) factors and frequently involved elements of all three in interaction 
with each other over time. I illustrate this dynamic interactive causation by highlighting three 
complex causal factors frequently cited by respondents:  valorization of thinness, coping 
responses, and repetition over time. The language respondents used to describe eating 
disorder behavior suggested that they held complex notions of agency; the disorder and its 
constitutive behaviors were not simply ―chosen‖ but there was nevertheless some role for 
agency or quasi-agency.   
In Chapter 4, I focus on respondents‘ understandings of eating disorders and 
responses to specific terms describing eating disorders.  There was consensus that eating 
disorders were problems, but disagreement about whether they were psychological problems, 
mental illnesses, brain diseases, physical illnesses, or choices.  As respondents discussed 
whether and why a given term was appropriate (or not) for eating disorders, they revealed not 
only how they thought about eating disorders but also how they defined the terms presented.  
I summarized their reactions to all five terms with an index of medicalized term endorsement 
and found that respondents who were currently in treatment and those who had received 
more extensive treatment endorsed more medicalized terms. 
In Chapter 5, I examined respondents‘ initial reactions to the idea that ―some say 
there are genetic causes‖ followed by their more considered speculations about how genes 
could play a role.  Most respondents had already mentioned genetics in relation to eating 
disorders before I brought it up.  There were negative and positive initial statements and 
reactions about genetics. Some respondents found the idea implausible and characterized 
genetic explanations as simplistic and deterministic, with an inadequate role for 
environmental causes.  Others thought it made sense and expected that it would remove 
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blame and stigma from people with eating disorders and offer hope for new genetically-based 
treatments. People who had earlier endorsed medicalized views of eating disorders were 
more likely to hold ―positive‖ initial views about genetics, as were people with more or 
current experience of treatment.  Respondents‘ genetic theories allowed a great deal of room 
for agency and environmental influence. Most respondents found genes specifically ―for‖ AN 
or BN less plausible than genes ―for‖ something more general, such as personality type or 
addictive tendencies. I identified four ways that respondents combined genetic and non-
genetic influence and rank-ordered theories according to how much conceptual ―room‖ they 
allowed for non-genetic forces to shape an outcome, arguing that genes ―for‖ AN or BN 
offered the least room and genes ―for‖ body type the most.      
Chapter 6 addresses the perceived implications of genetic causal ideas for people with 
eating disorders.  In response to hypothetical scenarios involving genetics, most respondents 
perceived genetics to medicalize eating disorders by increasing their resemblance to other  
less contested diseases, by making treatment by healthcare professionals seem more 
necessary, or by raising expectations for biologically based treatments. In general, 
respondents interpreted genetic influence to imply less personal responsibility for the eating 
disorder, which in turn had a number of implications for their agency and future action vis-à-
vis eating disorders.    
 vi 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 
 Thank you to the many people who helped me to complete this dissertation and 
degree.  I am grateful to my committee and acknowledge specific contributions by co-chairs 
and members in alphabetical order.  Since entering the doctoral program in Sociology at 
UNC-Chapel Hill six years ago, I have deeply appreciated Andy Perrin‘s consistent support, 
encouragement, and advice as my chair for master‘s thesis and co-chair for dissertation. I 
have very much admired and benefited from co-chair Peggy Thoits‘s patience, compassion, 
and commitment, all of which were clearly in evidence while commenting on long drafts, 
participating in long meetings, and continuing to provide guidance even after moving to a 
new institution. To Cindy Bulik I am indebted for exciting and productive interdisciplinary 
exchanges with clinicians, psychology researchers, and geneticists, as well as practical 
assistance with my study.  It is hard to overestimate the impact of Gail Henderson on my 
graduate education and future career; she believed in me, invested in me, and helped me 
develop in ways I did not know were possible.  I am grateful to Sherryl Kleinman for asking 
challenging questions at the early phases of this project in several lengthy email exchanges, 
and for her guidance about writing.  I appreciate Debra Skinner for generously and 
consistently sharing her expertise, experience, and anthropological orientation, and for 
helping me think about what comes after graduate school. I also thank all study respondents 
and members of the research and clinical teams at the hospital-based clinic where I recruited 
patients.  
 vii 
 
 I was honored and aided by financial support that made it possible to complete this 
dissertation research and finish my degree in six years.  Two grants enabled me to pay 
respondents for their participation, to purchase equipment, and to have interviews 
professionally transcribed: Smith Graduate Research Grant (UNC-CH graduate school, 
$1000), Dissertation Research Award (Center for Genomics and Society at UNC-Chapel 
Hill, $5000).  In addition, I received modest monetary and/or logistical support for data 
collection from the UNC-CH Departments of Psychiatry (Eating Disorders Program) and 
Social Medicine.  The F. Ivy Carroll Interdisciplinary Research Scholars Fellowship 
supported me for a semester while writing the dissertation proposal. I was also supported 
through teaching assistantships from the Department of Sociology and research assistantships 
with the Center for Genomics and Society and the Department of Social Medicine.  In 
addition, I am grateful for monetary assistance for dissertation-related travel and training 
from the Center for Genomics and Society, Department of Sociology, the National Science 
Foundation, and the European Neuroscience and Society Network. 
  Mark provided alternative ways of looking at things and encouraged me to take 
breaks. Thank you also to April, Anna, Sage, Jonathan and my mother and father. 
 viii 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LIST OF TABLES ……………………………………………………………………..… xiv 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ………………………………………………………………………. xv  
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS …………………………………………………………… xvi 
 
Chapter 
 
  I. GENETICS AND THE MEDICALIZATION OF  
      A CONTESTED ILLNESS …………………………………………………….……… 1 
 
Medicalization of eating disorders ……………………………………………….….. 3 
 
Contestation despite medicalization ………………………………………… 9  
 
Re-conceptualizing medicalization ………………………………………… 14 
 
Heightened medicalization of eating disorders …………………………….. 20 
 
Genetics and the complex causes of eating disorders ……………………………… 23 
 
Medicalization and geneticization on the ground: Studying people 
with eating disorders ……………………………………………………………….. 31 
 
Lay geneticization of eating disorders? ……………………………………………. 36 
 
Hopes and fears about geneticization ……………………………………………… 39 
 
 Hopes for simple genetic explanations …………………………………….. 44 
 
 Fears about simple genetic explanations ………………………………….... 47 
 
 Hopes and fears about complex explanations ……………………………… 55 
 
Other possible responses to genetic explanations ………………………………….. 60 
 
 Summary of Chapter 1 ……………………………………………………………... 66 
 
  II. METHODS AND SAMPLE ………………………………………………………….70 
 
Sample. …………………………………………………………………………….. 70 
 
 ix 
 
Rationale for sample design ………………………………………………... 71 
  
Eligibility criteria …………………………………………………………... 73 
  
  Recruiting respondents ……………………………………………………... 75 
 
 Conducting interviews ………………………………………………..........  77 
 
Achieved sample ……………………………………………………..…….. 79 
 
Reflections on sampling approach ……………………………………......... 81 
   
Interview guide …………………………………………………………………….. 85 
 
Strategies for analysis ……………………………………………………………… 93 
 
Demographic characteristics of sample ………………………………………......... 94 
 
 
  III.  COMPLEX CAUSATION AND AMBIGUOUS AGENCY:  
         PERCEPTIONS OF HOW AND WHY EATING  
         DISORDERS DEVELOP………………………………………………………….. 100 
 
Approaching the categorization of causes …………………………………………101 
 
Common, complex, and compound causes ……………………………………….. 103 
 
 Valorization of thinness …………………………………………………... 103 
 
 Stressors and responses: Eating disorder as coping ………………………..111 
 
 Repetition over time: Maintaining and intensifying the eating disorder…...114 
 
Selected causal factors: Compatibility with genetic ideas …………………………120 
 
 Biological characteristics …………………………………………………..123 
 
 Dispositions ……………………………………………………………….. 124 
 
 Morally charged environmental forces: Abuse, trauma, injustice ………... 129 
 
 Gender consciousness …………………………………………………….. 131 
 
Uncertain agency in eating disorders ……………………………………………... 133 
 
 Non-agentic language and concepts ………………………………………..136 
 x 
 
 
 Agentic language and concepts ……………………………………….…... 139 
 
 Quasi-agentic language and concepts …………………………………….. 144 
 
 Reasons for the co-existence of agentic and non-agentic language ………..152 
 
Compromised agency: Managing impressions of eating disorders ………………..155 
 
Summary of Chapter 3 ……………………………………………………………..163 
 
 
  IV.  UNEVEN, UNCERTAIN MEDICALIZATION: PERCEPTIONS OF   
         EATING DISORDERS …………………………………………………………… 165 
 
Terminology for eating disorders …………………………………………………. 165 
 
Eating disorder as a problem? ……………………………………………………...166 
 
Eating disorder as a ―problem with society or culture‖? …………………………..169 
 
Measuring medicalization: Reactions to five terms ………………………………..171 
 
 ―Psychological problem‖? ………………………………………………....173 
 
 ―Mental illness‖?  ―Brain disease‖? ………………………………………..178 
 
 ―Physical illness‖? …………………………………………………………195 
 
 ―Choice‖? …………………………………………………………………..197 
 
Overall endorsement of medicalized terminology ………………………………....221 
 
 Univariate analysis ………………………………………………………....222 
 
 Bivariate analysis …………………………………………………………..224 
 
Summary of Chapter 4 ……………………………………………………………..226 
 
  V. THEORIZING GENETICS: MAKING CONCEPTUAL “ROOM”  
       FOR NON-GENETIC INFLUENCES ……………………………………………...229 
 
―Positive‖ and ―negative‖ about genetics: Respondents‘ initial reactions ..………..229 
 
 Overview of positive and negative reactions ………………………………230 
 
 xi 
 
 Positive about genetics ……………………………………………………..232 
 
 Negative about genetics ……………………………………………………235 
 
 Predicting responses to genetics: Bivariate analysis ………………….........243 
 
Genes ―for‖ what?  Respondents‘ theories about genetic influence ………….........247 
 
 Genes ―for‖ anorexia or bulimia nervosa …………………………………..252 
 
 Genes ―for‖ eating disorders generally or eating-related problems ………..256 
 
 Genes ―for‖ addiction and addictiveness …………………………………..260 
 
 Genes ―for‖ a specific mental illness or related trait ………………………264 
 
 Genes ―for‖ non-specific psychopathology ………………………………..267 
 
 Genes ―for‖ non-pathologized traits ………………………………….........271 
 
 Genes ―for‖ visible physical characteristics ………………………….........278 
 
Not by genes alone: A preference for complexity and indeterminacy in  
genetic causation …………………………………………………………………...284 
 
 Respondents preferred general categories and indirect causation …………284 
 
 Making conceptual ―room‖ for non-genetic influences ……………………288 
 
Summary of Chapter 5 ……………………………………………………………..294 
 
 
  VI. “SOME SORT OF LARGER FORCE AT WORK”: PERCEIVED      
         IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND  
         SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY………………………………………………………297 
 
―Legitimized as an actual disease‖: Genes heighten the  
medicalization of eating disorders …………………………………………………299 
 
 Genetics inspire medical concepts and terminology …………………........302 
 
 Genetics place eating disorders in the domain of health professionals ……310 
 
 Genetics suggest biologically-based treatments …………………………..318 
 
 
 xii 
 
 Contrasting themes: How genetics might not medicalize  
eating disorders …………………………………………………………….318 
 
Genes vs. choice:  Genetics and perceptions of control and  
responsibility for behavior …………………………………………………………321 
 
―Not something I chose‖: Implications of genetics for  
perceptions of individual control and responsibility ……………………….323 
 
Now what? Implications for agency and future action …………………….337 
 
 Medical control …………………………………………………….341 
 
 Paradoxically-improved individual control ………………………..343 
 
 Adjusting to helplessness …………………………………………..347 
 
 Losing control through overvaluation of genetic power …………...349 
 
 Using genetics as an excuse to abandon control …………………...358 
 
Genes vs. environment: Genetics and perceptions of  
environmental causation …………………………………………………………...364 
 
 ―You can kind of choose to ignore culture‖: Environmental  
causes less powerful than genes ……………………………………………364 
 
Consequences of removing focus from environmental factors …………….366 
 
 Bad consequences: Society and family ―off the hook‖ …………….366 
 
 Good to remove focus from society and family...…………………..371 
 
 Ambivalence about removing focus from family.………………….372 
 
Brief reflections on genetic explanations for agency and  
future action regarding environmental factors ….………………………….374 
 
 Summary of Chapter 6 ……………………………………………………………..379 
 
  VII.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS …………………………………………..380 
 
 Summary of the main findings ……………………………………………………..380 
 
Geneticization and medicalization reinforce each other  
in eating disorders ………………………………………………………….381 
 xiii 
 
   
Perceived implications of genetics for respondents resemble  
those mentioned by experts ………………………………………………...382  
 
Beyond ―simple‖ and ―complex‖ genetic models ………………………….386 
 
 Contributions ………………………………………………………………………387 
 
  Medicalization and geneticization …………………………………………387 
 
  Changing cultural repertoires of accounts …………………………………394 
 
Limitations of the study ……………………………………………………………397 
 
 Directions for future research ……………………………………………………...399 
 
 
APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDES……………………………………………………402 
 
REFERENCES …………………………………………………………………………...407 
 
 xiv 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
1.1  Medicalization status as a convergence of two dimensions:  
       Pathology and biology …………………………………………………………….........16 
 
1.2  Genetic explanations for a complex psychiatric disorder:  Hopes and fears  
       about simple and complex explanations ………………………………………………..44 
 
2.1  Respondents‘ diagnosis, recovery and treatment status …………………………...........80 
 
2.2  Demographic characteristics of sample ………………………………………………...95 
 
2.3  Eating disorder severity and symptoms for women with AN or BN …………………..97 
 
4.1  Endorsement of five terms to describe eating disorders ………………………………172 
 
4.2  Reasoning about whether eating disorders are mental illnesses  
       and brain diseases ……………………………………………………………………..180 
 
4.3  The finer points of choice I:  Distinctions made by respondents  
       rejecting ―choice‖ ……………………………………………………………………..200 
 
4.4  The finer points of choice II:  Distinctions made by respondents  
       ambivalent about ―choice‖ ……………………………………………………………209 
 
4.5  Endorsement of medicalized terminology: Index and ordinal variable ………….........223 
 
4.6  Endorsement of medicalized terminology by treatment experience variables ………..225 
 
5.1  Initial reaction to the idea of genetics playing a role in eating disorders ……………..245 
 
5.2  Respondents‘ theories of the outcomes that genes could be ―for‖ ……………………251 
 
5.3  Respondents‘ theories of gene-environment interplay………………………………..289 
 
6.1  Implications for direct control over behavior given a genetic influence ……………..340 
 xv 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
1.1  Two views of behavior genetics (reproduced from Hamer 2002) ……………….......... 27 
 
4.1  Decision tree for conceiving of choice and eating disorders ………………………… 220 
 
5.1  Combinations of specific conditions theorized to arise from a genetic  
       predisposition for general psychopathology …………………………………………..268 
 
5.2  Room for non-genetic influences in genetic theories …………………………………293 
 
6.1  Genetics and the medicalization of eating disorders:  
       Findings using two definitions ………………………………………………………..301 
 
6.2  Themes related to genetics and perceptions of individual control  
       and responsibility ……………………………………………………………………..325 
 
7.1  Genes, behaviors, and responsibility in three different kinds of conditions…………..393 
 
 
 
 
 xvi 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
AN = Anorexia nervosa 
 
BN = Bulimia nervosa 
 
R-AN = Recovered from AN 
 
R-BN = Recovered from BN 
 
T-AN = In treatment for AN 
 
T-BN = In treatment for BN 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
GENETICS AND THE MEDICALIZATION OF A CONTESTED ILLNESS 
 
 
Research tells us that anorexia nervosa is a brain disease with severe metabolic effects on 
the entire body. While the symptoms are behavioral, this illness has a biological core, with 
genetic components, changes in brain activity, and neural pathways currently under study. 
(Letter from Thomas R. Insel, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, to National 
Eating Disorders Association, October 5, 2006) (Insel 2006). 
 
As one who has battled the eating disorder bullshit, I don’t like all this ‘explaining away by 
genetics, etc.’ stuff at all.  I’d be willing to bet the vast majorities of [cases of eating 
disorders] are birthed by our cultures [sic] hatred of all women weighing over 100 pounds. 
The genesis lies here. The blame goes here. (Blog comment posted by ―Kim‖ in response to 
science reporting about genetics and anorexia nervosa, March 16, 2006) (Kim 2006). 
 
The purpose of this study is to find out whether and how women diagnosed with 
eating disorders incorporate genetic information into their self-understandings and their 
understanding of the causes, controllability, and treatment of the disorder. Eating disorders, 
such as anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, are characterized by extreme attention to body 
image, weight control, and eating behavior. Psychiatric researchers argue that these 
conditions are caused by genetic factors in combination with environmental factors such as 
family dynamics and culture, rather than by genes or environment alone. Clinicians expect 
that genetic information will become more important in the understanding and treatment of 
psychiatric disorders generally. However, there is little knowledge of how people diagnosed 
with psychiatric disorders understand and use the idea of a genetic basis for their disorders. 
As genetics are increasingly connected to a wide range of diseases and disorders, 
people‘s conceptions of them are likely to change.  The process of coming to see more and 
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more diseases, disorders, and even character traits as based in genetics has been termed 
―geneticization‖ (Lippman  1991a).  Geneticization resembles the process of medicalization, 
familiar to sociologists, in which a condition or behavior comes to be defined and treated as a 
medical rather than a moral or other kind of problem. Geneticization is likely to further the 
arguably incomplete medicalization of eating disorders because it places biology, rather than 
psychology or culture, at the earliest phase of the disorder. It is not known whether people 
with eating disorders are aware of the discourse about genetic factors nor what it means to 
them.  Because academicians, clinicians, and others identify positive and negative aspects of 
geneticization, it is important to find out whether people diagnosed at some point with AN or 
BN share their hopes and fears, and/or introduce new ones.  Thus, my study is concerned 
with how people ―living under the description‖ (Martin 2007) of an eating disorder use and 
resist medical, biological and genetic explanations in making sense of their disorder and 
themselves. Such explanations can be seen as materials in the cultural repertoire, or ―tools‖ in 
the ―cultural toolkit‖ (Swidler 2003), for actors to use or not.  This project diverges from 
other studies of medicalization because rather than observing a society‘s shift toward a 
medicalized or geneticized conception of a category of behavior, I focus on how individuals 
use – or do not use – medical or genetic cultural materials. This focus on individual agents 
reflects the idea that culture is negotiated and recreated by individuals rather than monolithic. 
This study contributes to our understanding of the meaning and consequences of 
genetic discourses for explaining a psychiatric disorder.  Eating disorders, though already 
officially medicalized, have been further defined in medical terms by emphasis on their 
biological, and especially genetic, causes. This study demonstrates how people with eating 
disorders incorporate genetics when they talk about themselves and their disorder.  This 
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broad research question comprises several sub-questions: Will respondents mention genetics 
at all, before I ask them about it? Will their understandings of genetic influence be simple or 
complex? Will they contest or accept the idea of genetic causality, or will it be ambiguous? 
How will they reconcile it with other possible causes and risk factors?  Do they use genetics 
to manage their identities as people diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder?  Through semi-
structured interviews that include broad questions about the causes, controllability, treatment, 
and the nature of eating disorders, along with more specific questions about genetic and other 
causal factors, my study will shed light on the uses and meanings of genetics for people with 
a disorder that is undergoing greater medicalization and geneticization.    
  
1.  MEDICALIZATION OF EATING DISORDERS 
 
In this study, I argue that genetic explanations are increasing the ongoing 
medicalization of eating disorders. ―Medicalization‖ is the process in which a condition or 
behavior comes to be defined as a medical disorder (Conrad and Schneider 1992, Conrad 
1992, 2007).  Medicalization depends on how information is interpreted and used by social 
and political actors (Conrad and Schneider 1992).   Conditions that at one time were not seen 
as medical – addiction, menopause, senile dementia, and eating disorders –  are now 
frequently treated as medical disorders.  Some conditions have been demedicalized over 
time, such as homosexuality and masturbation, but Conrad asserts that medicalization has 
generally increased over time.   
Medicalization is a social and political process in which medical professionals, 
consumers, pharmaceutical companies, and others promote medical definitions for particular 
conditions.  Many studies of medicalization concern the transformation of normal healthy 
human conditions, such as menopause or baldness, into treatable disorders. Other studies 
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address the transformation of negative or deviant behavior from ―badness to sickness‖ 
(Conrad and Schneider 1992), from moral failure and deviance to illness.  From this 
perspective, eating disorders fall into the negative and deviant category because they involve 
behaviors that depart from contemporary conceptions of healthy and normal because they are 
unusual (purging), extreme (restricting food to the point of emaciation) and entail negative 
physical effects including starvation, disability, and death. Anorexia nervosa (AN) has the 
highest mortality rate of any mental illness, with 5.6% of people with AN dying each decade 
from starvation, cardiac arrest, or suicide (Sullivan 1995, Herzog and Eddy 2007).  Bulimia 
nervosa (BN) has a similar mortality rate (Crow et al. 2009), involving serious cardiac, 
dental, and gastrointestinal consequences (Herzog and Eddy 2007) and, as in the case of Terri 
Schiavo, ultimately coma (NEDA 2005). The prevalence of AN, BN, and binge-eating 
disorder (BED) for adult women in the U.S. and western Europe is 0.9%, 1.5%, and 3.5% 
respectively (Hudson et al. 2007). A greater percentage of the population has eating disorders 
that do not fit into these three categories or are below the diagnostic threshold for them 
(Hoek and van Hoeken 2003, Berkman et al. 2006). 
Eating disorders have been medicalized in their classification in several editions of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (e.g., DSM-IV, APA 
2000a) and medical treatment, but I argue that the current geneticization of these disorders 
provides cultural materials that further the conception of them as biologically based.  I am 
concerned with eating disorders as diagnosable psychiatric disorders, rather than with the 
continuum of disordered eating that extends into the ―normal,‖ such as calorie-counting, 
crash dieting, eating too much, and feeling fat when one is at a healthy weight.   
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Eating disorders have not always been seen as psychiatric disorders.
1
  Joan Jacobs 
Brumberg describes the shift of people with AN ―from sainthood to patienthood‖ in the U.S. 
over the 19
th
 century (2000: 43). At the beginning of this shift, ―fasting girls‖ were treated as 
miraculous and spiritual because they seemed to survive without food, suggesting the young 
woman‘s divine rather than earthly nature. By the end of century the spiritual explanation 
was discredited and replaced with a diagnosis of physical disease (Brumberg 2000, also see 
Silverman 1997 for a description of AN as a treatable disorder as early as 1689).  AN thus 
went from goodness to sickness, though arguably there was an interim period of ―badness‖ as 
some people with AN and their families were accused of defrauding those who paid to view 
the miraculous fasting girls.  AN was temporarily labeled ―hysteric apepsia,‖ but ―apepsia‖ 
assumed an inability to digest food and ―hysteria‖ assumed involvement of the uterus, and so 
this term was replaced in 1873 by ―anorexia nervosa‖ to describe a lack of appetite related to 
the central nervous system, rather than an inability to digest (Brumberg 2000). (―Anorexia‖ is 
also a miscategorization, except in advanced stages, because most people with AN do not 
lack appetite but rigidly control it.)  Since the 1930s, psychiatrists began to use 
psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic approaches more often, sometimes focusing on sexual 
repression or family dynamics (Brumberg 2000: 217-228), particularly the girl‘s relationship 
with her mother (Vanderven and Vanderven 2003). In the last several decades, psychological 
                                                 
1
Assessing the changing perception of eating disorders over time presumes eating disorders to be objective 
medical entities, with changes in perception due to different cultural lenses rather than changes in eating 
disorders themselves.  Such a perspective assumes a universal, biological essence beneath various socio-cultural 
constructions. Yet some have argued that eating disorders may be ―culture-bound‖ syndromes restricted to or 
produced by Western modernity (see Swartz 1985, Banks 1992, Keel and Klump 2003) or defined too narrowly 
using Western criteria (Lee 2001).  However, it is probably fair to interpret eating disorders over the last few 
centuries in the West as one phenomenon, as long as cases fulfill contemporary diagnostic criteria, even though 
the experience of AN over that time has changed to include behaviors such as excessive exercise (see 
discussions in Gremillion 2002 (footnote 3), Gooldin 2003, Fabrega and Miller 1995 for further information). 
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research on eating disorders has focused on the contributions of family and culture, including 
exposure to images of very thin women (Striegel-Moore and Bulik 2007).   
Eating disorders have been successfully medicalized by most criteria for this process.  
Conrad describes these as follows:   
The key to medicalization is the definitional issue. Medicalization consists of defining 
a problem in medical terms, using medical language to describe a problem, adopting a 
medical framework to understand a problem, or using a medical intervention to 
‗treat‘ it.  This is a sociocultural process that may or may not involve the medical 
profession, lead to medical social control or medical treatment, or be the result of 
intentional expansion by the medical profession.  Medicalization occurs when a 
medical frame or definition has been applied to understand or manage a problem….‖ 
(Conrad 1992: 211, emphasis mine).  
 
Conrad focuses on how a problem is defined rather than who defines it (medical 
professionals) and with what purpose (professional power) and consequences (social 
control). His definition thereby expands on previous definitions (Strong 1979, Davis 2006) 
and theoretically opens the study of medicalization to include studies of non-medical 
professionals and how they use medical terminology.
2
  I rely on his expansive definition in 
this paper and do not presume that medicalization is necessarily tied to professions, power, or 
social control.  By both the narrow and expansive definitions, eating disorders have been 
medicalized: they are officially under medical jurisdiction, there are medical interventions, 
and medical terminology is used to describe them.   
The inclusion of eating disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM), the official classification of psychiatric disorders by the American 
Psychiatric Association, exemplifies both medical terminology and medical jurisdiction over 
eating disorders.  ―Eating disorders‖ were introduced into the third edition of the DSM in 
                                                 
2
 The definition was expanded to recognize that patients can drive the medicalization of their conditions, as with 
fibromyalgia (Barker 2002, 2008), and that some conditions become quasi-medical even if not treated by 
medical professionals, such as alcohol codependency and even child abuse (Conrad 1992, Pfohl 1977, Van 
Wormer 1989). 
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1980 (Kashubeck-West and Mintz 2001, APA 1980), replacing the category ―feeding 
disturbance‖ from the second edition (APA 1968, see APA 1980: 383). ―Eating disorders‖ 
comprised anorexia nervosa, ―bulimia,‖ pica, and rumination disorder of infancy; in 1987, a 
revised version of the DSM used the current term ―bulimia nervosa‖ (APA 1987). The 
diagnostic criteria for anorexia nervosa (AN) continue to be revised, but as of 2000 the DSM-
IV Text Revision (DSM-IV TR) listed them as follows.  Criteria A through D all must be 
present for a diagnosis: 
A. Refusal to maintain body weight at or above a minimally normal weight for age 
and height (e.g., weight loss leading to maintenance of body weight less than 85% 
of that expected; or failure to make expected weight gain during period of growth, 
leading to body weight less than 85% of that expected). 
B. Intense fear of gaining weight or becoming fat, even though underweight. 
C. Disturbance in the way in which one‘s body weight or shape is experienced, 
undue influence of body weight or shape on self-evaluation, or denial of the 
seriousness of the current low body weight. 
D. In postmenarcheal females, amenorrhea, i.e., the absence of at least three 
consecutive menstrual cycles… (APA 2000a: 589) 
 
Currently there are two types of anorexia nervosa as defined by the DSM-IV-TR: the 
―restricting type,‖ in which there is excessive food restriction and no binge-eating or purging, 
and the ―binge-eating/purging type.‖  
For bulimia nervosa (BN), the DSM-IV-TR describes binge-eating followed by 
―compensatory‖ actions, such as vomiting, and use of laxatives, enemas, or diuretics (in the 
―purging type‖ of bulimia nervosa), or fasting and excessive exercise (the ―nonpurging 
type‖). These are the criteria for BN: 
A. Recurrent episodes of binge eating. An episode of binge eating is characterized by 
both of the following: 
(1) eating, in a discrete period of time (e.g., within any 2-hour period), an amount 
of food that is definitely larger than most people would eat during a similar 
period of time and under similar circumstances 
(2) a sense of lack of control over eating during the episode (e.g., a feeling that 
one cannot stop eating or control what or how much one is eating) 
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B. Recurrent inappropriate compensatory behavior in order to prevent weight gain, 
such as self-induced vomiting; misuse of laxatives, diuretics, enemas, or other 
medications; fasting; or excessive exercise. 
C. The binge eating and inappropriate compensatory behaviors both occur, on 
average, at least twice a week for 3 months. 
D. Self-evaluation is unduly influenced by body shape and weight. 
E. The disturbance does not occur exclusively during episodes of Anorexia Nervosa. 
(APA 2000a: 594). 
 
More than half of people diagnosed with eating disorders do not fall into either BN or 
AN, but in a residual category ―Eating Disorder Not Otherwise Specified‖ (EDNOS) 
(Fairburn et al. 2007).  This includes people who meet all but one criterion for AN or BN, 
and those who binge-eat without purging, a behavior that is under study and may become its 
own category of ―binge-eating disorder‖ (BED) in the next revision of the DSM (APA 
2000a: 785-787). 
Inclusion in the DSM alone is sufficient evidence for medicalization according to 
Conrad‘s definition above. But eating disorders also have physical consequences and some 
are treated medically through hospital-based inpatient or partial hospitalization programs. 
Compared to other psychiatric diagnoses such as schizophrenia, biology and medicine are 
unambiguously involved because AN produces starvation, which visibly affects the body 
(Estroff 2007, personal communication). Starvation also affects the mind. Regardless of what 
led to the starvation, even those who do not advocate biological origins for the disorder 
incorporate biology to explain later stages of the disorder, as with the concept of a physical 
―addiction to starvation‖ (Brumberg 2000: 32-33, Bordo 1997: 102).  The initial goal of a 
hospital-based treatment is medical stabilization (Bowers et al. 2004: 353) because starvation 
can lead to life threatening complications that are not solved by eating alone. Hospital 
programs include medical personnel, laboratory testing, and medical interventions, such as a 
nasogastric tube if the patient is forcibly fed.  The first goal is to restore weight: ―In an 
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inpatient or partial hospitalization setting, food is the patient‘s primary medicine.  Sometimes 
it is the only medicine‖ (Bowers et al. 2004: 354). This ―nutritional rehabilitation‖ involves 
close monitoring of caloric intake and body weight by a registered dietician.  The treatment 
team also includes psychiatrists, who may prescribe psychiatric medications for some 
patients, and psychologists, social workers, occupational therapists, or recreational therapists. 
As the patient gains weight, she or he engages in the emotional and cognitive work required 
to change eating behaviors through cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and other approaches 
(Bowers et al. 2004).  
1.1 Contestation despite medicalization   
Despite their institutionalization in the DSM and frequent treatment by doctors in 
hospital-based clinics, eating disorders, like most other psychiatric disorders, also seem 
incompletely medicalized compared to diseases such as cancer. Giles suggests that eating 
disorders are ―contested illnesses‖ much like chronic fatigue syndrome (2006: 466). The 
marginal status of eating disorders is evident in at least four ways: inadequate insurance 
reimbursement, fluctuations in their definition, the kinds of methods used to treat them, and 
skepticism by the lay public about their medical status and particularly their biological 
origins.   
Eating disorders are included in the current DSM, but insurers do not consistently 
reimburse for them and when they do it is often inadequate (Kalisvaart and Hergenroeder 
2007).  The epigraph from Thomas R. Insel, Director of NIMH at the beginning of this 
chapter illustrates this aspect of contested medicalization, as well as the role of consumers as 
―engines‖ of medicalization (Conrad 2005).  The quoted letter was posted on the website of 
the advocacy group, National Eating Disorders Association (NEDA), presumably as a 
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resource for families to use in their fight to obtain reimbursement from insurance companies. 
The letter was so important that it was featured in the title of the link to the ―Parent, Family 
and Friends Network‖ with the title ―Ask an Expert, Voices of Hope, Dr. Insel NIMH letter‖ 
(emphasis mine). A second link to the letter itself summarizes its significance: ―A Letter 
from Thomas H. Insel, MD NIMH director states anorexia is a ‘brain disease’‖ (NEDA 
2002, emphasis mine). Insel composed the letter in response to a request from the advocacy 
group for ―a statement that underscores that eating disorders are brain diseases and that 
appropriate treatment can work‖ (Insel 2006). One blogger put it this way:  ―Note to insurers: 
All the recent research on eating disorders shows a strong genetic and biological component 
to the disease. The suffering of those with anorexia is real and based in biology. Pay up--or 
have the suffering and deaths of children on your corporate conscience‖ (Brown 2006). 
A second reason for the marginal status of eating disorders is that the DSM criteria 
and labels are not stable and mutually exclusive. A recent review by psychiatric researchers 
summed up the situation:  ―The eating disorder diagnoses remain best construed as open and 
falsifiable diagnostic constructs in need of further scientific study… rather than discrete 
disease entities that have been discovered in nature in their true form‖ (Wonderlich et al. 
2007: 167).  As mentioned above, the DSM-IV-TR lists three types of eating disorders: AN, 
BN, and EDNOS. The DSM criteria and categories for eating disorders have been revised 
several times since 1980 and are expected to be revised again for the DSM-V. Clinicians and 
scientists note a lack of discrete division between anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa 
because people alternate between diagnoses; indeed having AN is a risk factor for developing 
BN (Herzog and Eddy 2007, Tozzi et al. 2005). In addition, the residual category ―Eating 
Disorder – Not Otherwise Specified‖ (EDNOS) accounts for at least half of all eating 
 11 
 
disorder diagnoses (Herzog and Eddy 2007, citing Fairburn and Bohn 2005). This lack of a 
―specific diagnosis‖ contributes to denial of insurance coverage (Striegel-Moore and 
Wonderlich 2007). Some researchers advocate that this residual category be differentiated 
into binge-eating disorder, purging disorder, and folded into expanded definitions of AN and 
BN. The fluctuation of DSM categories, the large residual category, and the crossover of 
individuals from one category to another may make eating disorder diagnoses seem less 
―real‖ and, therefore, less medical than other disorders.   
Third, eating disorders do not currently have a standard pharmaceutical treatment.  
Biologically based treatments, primarily re-feeding, are part of the treatment for eating 
disorders if a person has significant weight loss, cardiac arrest, or electrolyte imbalance; ―re-
feeding‖ lasts many weeks in the hospital, may (rarely) involve the use of feeding tubes, and 
is monitored by medical doctors.  However, the psychological features that caused these 
physical problems are not usually treated biologically. For AN, ―no drug as yet exists that 
effectively treats the core features of the disorder: body image disturbance, obsessionality 
and perfectionism, and extreme anticipatory anxiety‖ (Kaplan and Noble 2007: 138).  For 
BN, fluoxetine (Prozac) has been approved by the FDA, but pharmacotherapy is not the 
primary method for treating any eating disorder (LaVia 2007, Berkman et al. 2006).  
Cognitive behavioral therapy is considered to be the most effective treatment for BN, and is 
used for treating all eating disorders in many hospital units.  Individual and family therapy 
are also used along with occupational therapy, relaxation, and other modalities (Bowers et al. 
2004).  These approaches are not incompatible with biological causation, but they do not 
connote biological treatment the way a pharmaceutical intervention would.  By contrast, a 
―brain disease‖ suggests structural problems, biological pathways and biologically-based 
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treatment such as pharmaceuticals or surgery. I argue that the current lack of biologically-
based treatment contributes to the perception that eating disorders are less biomedical than 
other disorders.
3
  Similarly, although medical monitoring and giving food – the ―primary 
medicine‖ (Bowers et al. 2004) – are clearly biological, to some extent these address the 
consequences of the eating disorder rather than the eating disorder itself.  Clinicians and 
researchers see appetite and weight ―dysregulation‖ as key components of AN, such that the 
disorder has core biological components.  However, some biological components are clearly 
the effects of starvation and malnutrition, and can be distinguished from the eating disorder 
itself: altered brain function, abnormal blood pressure, heart rate, electrolyte imbalance, 
dehydration (APA 2000b: 5-6).  From this perspective, food and monitoring are part of 
medical stabilization, which is a prerequisite to treating the eating disorder through CBT and 
other psychotherapies for a patient who is severely underweight.      
Fourth, there is evidence that the public, including academicians, does not always 
view eating disorders as medical disorders or as brain diseases.  As Conrad notes,  
in most cases of medicalization of deviance, public acceptance ‗lags behind‘ 
professional and bureaucratic support.  The public remains more skeptical about 
medical designations than do professionals, especially in the cases of alcoholism, 
opiate addiction, and homosexuality. This skepticism provides a reservoir of potential 
support for future challenges to medical deviance designations. (1992: 271). 
   
This ―reservoir‖ of alternative views is evident in survey data:  A British survey found that 
over a third of the general public thought people with eating disorders had ―only themselves 
to blame‖ (34.5%) or were ―able to pull themselves together‖ (38.1%). Respondents blamed 
people with eating disorders for their conditions less than those with alcohol and drug 
                                                 
3
 Viewed from the perspective of biologically-oriented researchers, this would be a side-effect of the ―trap‖ of 
face validity (Bulik 2005: 335, 2006): the strong face validity of social and familial causation discourages 
research into biological causation, thereby preventing the development of biologically-based treatments, and in 
turn reinforcing the sense that eating disorders are not biologically caused.  
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addictions, but more than those with panic attacks, depression, schizophrenia, and dementia 
(Crisp et al. 2000, also see Holliday et al. 2005b, Stewart et al. 2006). If a condition is 
volitional, it is less like a disease and suggests a non-medical view of the disorder. In 
addition, it is common for clinicians and advocates for eating disorders to lament the 
widespread perception that eating disorders are volitional, reflecting vanity or character 
flaws, rather than a disease for which the person is not responsible (e.g., Holliday et al. 
2005b, Keel and Klump 2003, Bulik 2004,  Stewart et al. 2006).  The consequences of eating 
disorders may be physical, but those consequences are seen as the result of a volitional 
choice.  I include in the ―reservoir‖ of skepticism non-medical academic explanations of 
eating disorders that also oppose the medical interpretation of eating disorders and use 
alternative terminology. For example, a feminist sociologist writing about eating disorders 
consciously resists medical terminology:   
I avoid using the term eating disorder because it categorizes the problems as 
individual pathologies, which deflects attention away from the social inequalities 
underlying them (Brown 1985). However by using the term problem I do not wish to 
imply blame. In fact, throughout, I argue that the eating strategies that women 
develop begin as logical solutions to problems, not problems themselves. (Thompson 
1992, footnote 1, citing Brown 1985)  
 
Hepworth (1999) writes, ―My aim is to challenge the dominant conceptualization of AN as a 
psychopathology… [that is] separable from the social practices through which it became 
defined‖ (pp. 3-4). 
In this proposal, I assume that eating disorders have been medicalized, following 
Conrad‘s definition, and I use the term ―disorder‖ in accordance with the dominant 
medicalized understanding of AN, BN, and EDNOS.  When I describe eating disorders as 
having been medicalized, I am not doubting that they are harmful, serious, ―real‖ disorders 
but describing their current conceptualization (see Brown 1995, Conrad 1992: 211-213). My 
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purpose is to understand how people are thinking about genetic explanations of their 
conditions. The term ―disorder‖ is appropriate for this project because I focus on women who 
have been formally labeled as having an eating disorder by DSM criteria. I recognize that I 
am using a term that some scholars and people ―living under the description‖ of AN or BN 
may not accept. Because of this, my interview guide avoids terminology that assumes a 
medical understanding.  
1.2 Re-conceptualizing medicalization   
The case of eating disorders clarifies the underlying logic of the medicalization thesis, 
specifically the idea that even after a diagnosis has been institutionalized it can be further 
medicalized.  Certainly analysts recognize ―degrees‖ of medicalization (Conrad 1980) and 
acknowledge a continuous rather than dichotomous process, but usually these continua are 
applied to conditions that have not yet been institutionalized. Yet Conrad notes that genetic 
and neuroscientific discoveries not only ―reaffirm‖ the medical status of a mental disorder, 
but can render it ―more highly medicalized‖ (Conrad and Schneider 1992: 281). This idea has 
received little study. In studies of medicalization, the classification of a disorder as medical 
and its treatment by medical professionals comes at the end of the story, rather than being a 
point of departure as it is in my study.   
In order to make sense of eating disorders as undergoing further medicalization, I 
propose that medicalization can be conceptualized as having two converging dimensions: the 
pathological and the biological.  The pathological dimension ranges from healthy and normal 
to sick, while the biological dimension ranges from phenomena that are not clearly biological 
to those that are (see Table 1.1).  A psychiatric condition may be considered ―sick‖ even 
without a biological cause or treatment. Because psychiatric diagnoses are not equivalent to 
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―brain disease,‖ the two dimensions can be usefully disentangled to describe the location of 
eating disorders along a continuum of the medicalization process.  The cells of Table 1.1 are 
separated by dashed rather than solid lines to convey that the dimensions are continuous 
rather than categorical. 
I believe Table 1.1 (below) is a clarification of, rather than a departure from, the 
thesis of medicalization as advanced by Conrad.  Clearly medicalization occurs when a 
phenomenon is pathologized into a treatable disorder by the medical profession, and this is 
the explicit focus of those who study medicalization.  However, there is less clarity about 
whether it must also be perceived as biological, even though the word ―medical‖ is often 
taken to mean physical or biological.  As Conrad states,  ―Medicalization doesn‘t require 
specific claims about cause, although the assumption is often biological; certain medicalized 
problems like child abuse make no biological claims whatsoever‖ (2000: 329).  For example, 
child abuse and its effects were medicalized by virtue of using medical-sounding words like 
―syndrome‖ (―battered child syndrome‖) and identification of the syndrome by radiologists 
and pediatricians (Pfohl 1977).  However, battered children were not necessarily medicated, 
treated by psychiatrists, nor thought to have acquired the syndrome through biological 
origins; medicalization need not be biologization.   
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Table 1.1.  Medicalization Status as a Convergence of Two Dimensions: Pathology 
and Biology. (Lighter cells denote greater medicalization than darker cells.)  
 Biological status  
Pathological status Biological Not clearly biological 
Sick Biological AND pathological 
(e.g., Cancer, diabetes, ―brain 
disease‖) 
Psychiatric diagnosis (e.g., 
Social Anxiety Disorder 
listed in the DSM) 
Lay formulations: 
(e.g., Fibromyalgia, Chronic 
Fatigue Syndrome as physical 
rather than psychological 
conditions)  
Lay formulations: (e.g., 
alcohol codependency by 
family members of 
alcoholics is seen as a type 
of behavioral disorder) 
Undesirable state, 
negatively deviant, in some 
cases the person’s fault 
Undesirable physical states (e.g., 
obesity, baldness, short stature, 
erectile dysfunction may be 
treated medically) 
Character flaws, problem 
behaviors (e.g., drug use, 
frequent sadness may be 
medicated) 
Normal, healthy Genetic predisposition for 
anything ―undesirable‖ or ―sick‖4 
(e.g., genetic predisposition to 
ovarian cancer makes someone a 
―pre-patient‖) 
Personality traits (e.g., 
shyness may come to be 
treated as Social Anxiety 
Disorder) 
 
Normal physical states or 
conditions (e.g., menopause, 
childbirth can be treated 
medically) 
Superior Health or Ability Enhanced physical abilities  Enhanced cognitive abilities 
(e.g., intelligence, memory),  
 
 
In Table 1.1, medicalization occurs with movement from darker to lighter cells. 
Conditions listed in a cell may have moved there recently or may be on their way to a new 
cell. Movement upward reflects increased pathologization and arrival in the top row requires 
official classification as a disorder or disease. The top row includes clearly biological 
conditions in the left cell (e.g., infectious disease, cancer, heart disease) and conditions that 
are not clearly biological in the right cell (psychiatric disorders).  As psychiatric disorders 
come to be seen as biologically caused, they move to the left (e.g., autism, schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder). Although psychiatric disorders in the top right cell have been officially 
                                                 
4
 Only appears on the biological side because genetic predisposition is biological by definition. 
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classified as such by the DSM, this classification does not mean that symptoms, origins, or 
treatment are necessarily biologically based; ―Whatever its original cause, [a disorder] must 
currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological 
dysfunction in the individual.‖ (APA 2000a: xxxi)5 For some readers, inclusion in the DSM 
may be tantamount to biologization because of the biological orientation of the psychiatric 
profession (Luhrmann 2000, Horwitz 2002). However, in Conrad‘s work, medicalization is a 
matter of degree, and even a DSM category can have its medical status heightened, 
―furthered‖ or ―reaffirmed‖ by the discovery of a genetic origin.6  To move leftward, a 
condition would need to be described or treated as ―biological‖ in some way – perhaps 
because it is located in a bodily organ (e.g., ―brain disease‖), or is thought to have a 
biological cause (e.g., neurotransmitter abnormality), or is treated with medication (e.g., 
Prozac). The division between biological and ―not clearly biological‖ is not absolute, just as 
the division between physical and mental is not (APA 2000a: xxx). Biological conditions can 
have social causes, for example. Horizontal and vertical movement may take place over 
centuries, as when the dominant, widely-shared meaning of a condition changes, or in a 
single clinic visit, as when a person comes to redefine her symptoms in terms of misfiring 
neurotransmitters. This table is meant to illustrate that medicalization is a continuous process 
                                                 
5
 Horwitz offers this observation however: ―Although diagnostic psychiatry is officially agnostic about the 
variety of factors that lead people to develop mental diseases, the medicalized system of classification it uses 
emphasizes underlying organic pathologies… Although many mental health professionals continue to locate the 
origins of psychological problems in disturbed childhood relationships with parents, the study of the biological 
foundations of discrete mental disorders has gained unquestioned primacy in the profession of psychiatry.‖ 
(2002: 3)  Horwitz bases this on the greater attention to biology in the psychiatric profession as a whole, not the 
DSM per se. 
 
6―Perhaps new genetic associations with more marginal psychiatric disorders like obsessive compulsive disorder 
or attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder could provide evidence for claims of further medicalization, although 
it would depend on how the evidence was used‖  (Conrad 2000: 326 ), ―With the advent of the Human Genome 
Project… it is very likely that more genetic grounds of mental disorders will be uncovered… This, of course, 
very likely will lead to a reaffirmation of the medicalization of madness‖ (Conrad and Schneider 1992: 
281,emphasis added.) 
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with two dimensions. When a condition moves up or to the left, it is more medicalized than 
before, and when it fits into the top left cell its medicalization is complete, within the scope 
of this project.   
Case studies of medicalization fit into this conceptual table. The example of 
homosexuality illustrates the two dimensions.  Homosexuality once occupied the top right 
cell because it was classified as a disorder by the DSM, but was not viewed as biological in 
origin.  When it was removed from the DSM, it moved downward into the other categories 
along the right column: unofficially ―sick,‖ flawed, or healthy depending on the observer.  
With recent studies suggesting a genetic origin for homosexuality (Hamer 1993), it becomes 
biologized and moves leftward, again depending on the extent to which a genetic origin is 
embraced. It is important to note that a genetic causal attribution does not move a condition 
up the table along the pathologizing dimension: a genetic explanation biologizes but does not 
necessarily pathologize homosexuality because blue eye color is also thought of as genetic 
without being a disorder (Conrad 2000).  Case studies of women‘s health illustrate how 
healthy, normal conditions – childbirth and menopause – moved upward along the left 
column over time as they were increasingly treated by medical professionals using medical 
procedures or prescription medication, thus coming to resemble disorders more than normal 
life events (Riessman 1983). PMS moved into the top row when it was classified as a 
psychiatric condition in the DSM-IV (Figert 1996, though in the DSM-IV-TR it is listed as 
awaiting further study, APA 2000a: 771-773); its origins in the menstrual cycle are clearly 
biological so it could occupy or approach the top left cell.  In the case of Attention Deficit 
and Hyperactivity Disorder, behavior that was once seen as deviant moved upward to 
become a psychiatric diagnosis (Conrad 2006). Enhancement, in which normal human 
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qualities are improved or altered, is reflected in the bottom row, labeled ―super-healthy‖ or 
―better than well‖ (Conrad and Potter 2004, Kramer 1993, Elliott 2003).  By the very 
existence of a category of ―better than well,‖ characteristics that once seemed normal and 
healthy – balding, shortness, shyness (Conrad 2007) – are medicalized because they are no 
longer the least pathological state. Other examples are provided in the cells of the table, and 
the case of eating disorders will be described momentarily.   Although cases can be fit into 
the cells of Table 1.1, the point of the table is to illustrate movement across a continuum and 
only the top right cell has specific criteria for entry. 
My formulation overlaps with and differs from two other sociological models of 
medicalization:
7
 Adele Clarke et al.‘s (2003) recently introduced concept 
―biomedicalization‖ and Phil Brown‘s (1995) tabular presentation of the ―naming and 
framing‖ of  medical disorders. Clarke and colleagues focus on transformations in U.S. 
medicine rather than how behaviors and conditions are defined.  Their addition of the prefix 
―bio-‖ to ―medicalization‖ is not related to my emphasis on biology as a dimension of 
medicalization: ―We signal with the "bio" in biomedicalization the transformations of both 
the human and nonhuman made possible by such technoscientific innovations as molecular 
biology, biotechnologies, genomization, transplant medicine, and new medical technologies. 
That is, medicalization is intensifying, but in new and complex, usually technoscientifically 
enmeshed ways‖ (p. 162). ―Bio‖ for Clarke connotes contemporary biotechnology and 
―technoscience,‖ and while this includes geneticization (p. 169), Clarke‘s focus is on 
technical interventions such as predictive genetic testing, gene-based interventions such as 
                                                 
7
 It also overlaps with and differs from numerous models that address individual understandings of disease, such 
as the distinction between clinician-defined disease and patient-defined illness (Kleinman 1988). Because I am 
concerned here with perceptions at the societal level rather than the individual level, I do not discuss them here. 
But such models are certainly relevant to how individuals use medicalized and geneticized cultural materials, 
which is discussed later. 
 20 
 
pharmacogenomics, and even gene therapy. Because these are changes in medical practice 
rather than redefinitions of problems, they are only distantly relevant to this project.   
Brown (1995) captures the varieties of social construction in medicine along two 
dimensions which define a four-fold table: ―biomedical definition applied or not‖ to a 
condition, and ―condition generally accepted or not accepted as a biomedical entity‖ (40). He 
does not focus on psychiatric conditions and how they may seem less or more medicalized 
depending on a biological etiology or treatment.  He does acknowledge that some conditions 
have a biomedical label despite not being ―generally accepted‖ as medical conditions, for 
example, chronic fatigue syndrome, late luteal phase dysphoric disorder (LLPDD or PMS), 
and chronic pain syndrome.  However, these biomedical labels were not official medical 
labels and would perhaps be better labeled ―bio-medicalizing.‖ My conception of 
medicalization differs from Brown‘s because I focus explicitly on biological rather than 
―biomedical‖ concepts, on official rather than ―generally accepted‖ labels, and view the 
process of medicalization as more complex than does Brown.    
1.3 Heightened medicalization of eating disorders  
The place of eating disorders in the table has changed over time and, I suggest, is in 
the process of changing now.  Table 1.1 provides a framework for understanding these 
changes. When extreme abstinence from food was seen as evidence of a holy nature, eating 
disorders might have been in the bottom right cell as superior health because the saint‘s 
abstinence from food was a form of positive deviance.  When eating disorders were seen as 
negative and deviant they moved upward in the right column, and when viewed as disorders 
they reached the top row: close to the left cell if attributed to a problem with digestion or 
reproductive organs (Brumberg 2000), closer to the right cell if attributed to family dynamics 
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or patriarchy.
8
 Currently, by virtue of classification in the DSM, they are in the top row, if we 
assume that medical classification reflects a dominant understanding.  A dominant 
understanding is not the only understanding. In some current contexts – the modeling 
industry, the dance profession – self-starvation and purging may be statistically normal 
behaviors, and among those few who aspire to get AN, so-called ―wannarexics‖ (Bauman 
2007), these behaviors may even seem ―better than well.‖ However, eating disorders, like 
other psychiatric disorders, are arguably ―not clearly biological‖ for the four reasons noted 
above: they are commonly seen as volitional rather than as having a biological origin, the 
most effective treatment is CBT, the diagnostic categories shift, and insurance 
reimbursement is less than adequate. Like AN and BN, other psychiatric disorders appear to 
be moving in a biological direction as well (Horwitz and Wakefield 2007, Luhrmann 2000).   
For eating disorders and other psychiatric diagnoses (top right cell), discovery of 
biological causation, the location of the disorder in the physical brain, or the use of 
biologically based treatments would strengthen the claim to biological status, and thus a more 
complete medical status (Mizrachi 2002). There is recent evidence of a push to move eating 
disorders to the left, more biological side.  The letter from Insel in the epigraph illustrates the 
importance of biology in making the case for a medical definition of psychiatric disorders. 
Rather than AN having effects on the biological brain and body as a result of starvation, it is 
a ―brain disease‖ with a ―biological core‖ which suggest biological causes. The inclusion of 
genetics places biology at the very earliest possible point of a causal chain. Insel was urged 
to issue this statement by a leading advocacy group (NEDA, described earlier).  The idea of 
                                                 
8
 This table would need additional dimensions to accommodate these three concepts as well:  that eating 
disorders are a normal response to a pathological society (Hepworth 1999, Thompson 1994), that ―problems in 
living‖ are wrongly described as mental illnesses (Szasz 1960), and contestation over environmentally-defined 
conditions such as ―black lung‖ (Brown 1995).  
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mental illness as a ―brain disease‖ is most famously disseminated by the National Alliance on 
Mental Illness (NAMI), an advocacy organization, which asserts that ―[j]ust as diabetes is a 
disorder of the pancreas, mental illnesses are medical conditions that often result in a 
diminished capacity for coping with the ordinary demands of life‖ (NAMI 2008).  According 
to a leading geneticist of eating disorders, sociocultural explanations for eating disorders 
divert attention from potential biological explanations, with bad effects in her view: ―The 
face validity of these [sociocultural] explanations has inhibited our progress due to a burden 
of plausibility. The sheer convenient believability of sociocultural explanations has 
influenced research directions and hindered recognition of the seriousness of eating 
disorders‖ (Bulik 2004: 165, Bulik 2005).  This suggests a rationale for promoting biological 
explanations; in contexts where sociocultural reasons are not taken seriously, those who want 
eating disorders taken seriously would do better to frame them as biologically based.  Unlike 
many critics of pharmaceutical companies, some researchers and advocates for people with 
eating disorders regret that the lack of a standard pharmaceutical treatment prevents 
companies from making the case to the public that eating disorders are real illnesses through 
their advertising campaigns:  ―[a]t this time AN is unable to realize such ancillary benefits 
from the emergence of effective psychotherapies‖ (Stewart et al. 2006, also see Conrad 2005 
on the ―drivers‖ of medicalization).  
The perception of a genetic cause for eating disorders would also push eating 
disorders to the left of Table 1.1, thereby helping to medicalize them.  Geneticization, a 
process similar to medicalization, in which a condition comes to be described and understood 
in terms of genetics, is the focus of this study.   
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2. GENETICS AND THE COMPLEX CAUSES OF EATING DISORDERS   
 
To prepare for discussion of the geneticization of eating disorders, why it matters and 
what it might mean to people with eating disorders, I review expert accounts of the genetics 
of eating disorders, those elements that are relevant to this project, and what people with 
eating disorders might know about them. The genetic explanation for eating disorders is part 
of a complex causal model that includes culture, gender, family, personality, and other 
factors.  This complexity makes the study of eating disorders particularly interesting because 
people may grapple with how to reconcile multiple, potentially conflicting causal 
explanations and how to understand their implications.   
Including genetics in complex causal models helps scientists explain why people who 
share other risk factors do not always go on to develop eating disorders. These causal models 
do not presume that a genetic explanation is the only explanation but also include 
environmental triggers, risk factors, and protective factors. Those scientists who promote the 
idea of a genetic cause do not tend to think of eating disorders as Mendelian ―genetic 
disorders‖ like hemophilia or Huntington‘s, but disorders with complex genetics, like 
diabetes or alcoholism. Genetic influence has been established through twin studies, though 
scientists have not identified which genes are important, which aspects of eating disorders 
might be heritable, and how various eating disorders are related to each other.  Indeed, 
genetic findings may alter current disease classifications (Faraone 2002). 
Based on twin studies, in which identical or ―monozygotic‖ (MZ) twins are compared 
to fraternal or ―dizygotic‖ (DZ) twins of the same sex, researchers have concluded that there 
is evidence in support of a genetic component to eating disorders (Bulik 2004). Classic twin 
research design compares MZ and DZ twins to assess whether the former are more 
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commonly concordant (that is, whether they have the same phenotypes or outcomes) than the 
latter. Such twin studies theoretically hold environment constant because twins are raised in 
the same household. Monozygotic twins share 100% of their genetic material;
9
 heterozygous 
twins share on average 50% of their genetic material.  This ratio of 100/50 or 2/1 provides 
the basis for the estimate of ―heritability,‖ or the genetic contribution to the variance 
observed. This method has produced estimates of heritability ranging from 48-76% for AN, 
50-83% for BN and 41% for binge-eating disorder (Striegel-Moore and Bulik 2007). It is 
important to note that these heritability estimates are based on Western samples only. 
Western rates of eating disorders are higher than non-Western rates, suggesting that 
sociocultural factors matter a great deal.  If a twin study included both Western and non-
Western twins, or twin pairs in which one was raised in the West and the other not, it is likely 
that the environmental contribution to the variance would be higher because there would be 
greater variability on that key independent sociocultural variable.  Some researchers argue 
that AN is ―more genetic‖ than BN because some diagnosed with AN have had no exposure 
to Western culture (Keel and Klump 2003).
10
 
                                                 
9
However, recent studies show that even monozygotic twins may differ genetically because of ―copy-number 
variation,‖ a type of ―structural variation‖ in which the number of copies of DNA segments varies (Bruder et al. 
2008).  The existence of copy number variation among MZ twins suggests that when their phenotypes are 
discordant, it cannot be attributed only to the environment but may also be genetic. 
 
10
 Some scholars criticize the assumptions of twin studies and cast doubt on their claims.  These criticisms come 
not only from social scientists, who are arguably motivated to resist biological explanations (e.g., Horwitz et al. 
2003a), but also from geneticists who use different methods (e.g., Wahlsten 2007).  The validity of this project 
does not depend on the validity of twin studies and therefore I do not evaluate them here. In a recent example, 
sociologist Allan Horwitz and colleagues cast doubt on one of the essential assumptions of twin studies: the 
―equal environment assumption‖ that MZ twins do not have more similar environments than DZ twins in ways 
that matter for the outcome studied.  If this assumption were violated, it would suggest that the greater similarity 
of monozygotic twins could be due not only to genetic but also to environmental similarity.  In their study of 
depression and alcohol abuse using a twin sample that was more diverse than other twin samples (the National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, a.k.a. Add Health) they found that key social environmental variables 
– spending more time together, having friends in common – were more similar for identical twins than for 
fraternal twins and that they explained some or all of the variance in outcomes.  Horwitz suggests that estimates 
of genetic heritability take ―credit‖ for social environmental causes. (Horwitz et al. 2003a, and their critical 
exchange with Freese and Powell 2003, Horwitz et al. 2003b)  Some geneticists also criticize the assumption 
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Most chronic diseases and psychiatric disorders are thought to have complex genetic 
contributions, as opposed to Mendelian or no genetic contributions. Chronic diseases such as 
obesity, diabetes, and heart disease are thought to have complex genetic explanations (what I 
refer to as ―complex genetics‖).  Most cancers are thought to have complex genetics, despite 
some subtypes of breast, ovarian, and colon cancers being linked to specific individual 
genetic variants.  Behavioral and psychiatric disorders such as alcoholism, autism, 
schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder, eating disorders and many others are also 
thought to have complex genetics. Complex genetic explanations involve multiple genes, 
interactions between genes, possible gene-environment interactions, and environmental 
factors that confer protections or risks for a disorder.  In the early 2000s many geneticists 
came to the conclusion that despite evidence that genetics played a role in many disorders, 
the inability to find ―the gene for‖ those disorders suggested that single genes were unlikely 
to account for the observable outcomes or ―phenotypes‖ they studied.  Many scientists 
became skeptical that new genetic ―main effects‖ would be discovered, because findings 
would have been replicated by now if single genes were indeed causal factors (e.g. Hamer 
2002).  In the last two years, however, the hope of finding single genes has been rekindled 
because new study designs, large-sample Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) and 
then ―re-sequencing‖ or NextGen technologies enables the testing of tens of thousands of 
genes and identification of unexpected genes, rather than being limited to ―candidate‖ genes 
                                                                                                                                                       
that variation can be partitioned into genetic and environmental components at all because if genes and 
environment interact then the genetic and environmental contributions are not discrete and cannot simply be 
added together. In addition, critics argue that several additional assumptions are unwarranted: that there is no 
selective placement of step-siblings (in adoption studies), negligible gene-environment correlation, and the 
equal environments assumption criticized by Horwitz (Wahlsten 2007, Perrin and Lee 2007). For counter-
arguments see Freese and Powell 2003, Loehlin 1992, Rowe 1994: 38-40.  Some researchers argue that the 
equal environments assumption for eating disorders is warranted because eating-disorder-related variables are 
not more likely to be shared by MZ twins than DZ twins (e.g., Klump et al. (2000), see discussion in Bulik 
2004: 170ff). 
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identified earlier (WTCCC 2007, Frayling 2007, ten Bosch and Grody 2008).  In one sense, 
these large studies represent a paradigm shift in genetic research because of their immense 
scale, but they also are a return to an older conceptualization of genes directly linkable to 
disorders. In the following I discuss a previous paradigm shift, in which the search for single 
genes gave way to a search for complex explanations involving environmental variables.  
Complex genetic models for behavioral and psychiatric phenomena involve the brain 
as a mediator of the effects of multiple genes and environmental factors. Below is a figure 
comparing the ―old‖ and ―new‖ models for behavioral genetics (Hamer 2002, featured by 
Schaffner 2006). This figure illustrates a recent paradigm shift in behavioral genetics.  The 
―old‖ genetics expected to find a single gene for the phenotype under study (Model A in 
Figure 1.1 next page). This model is also referred to as the ―gene for‖ model or the one-gene-
one-disorder, or OGOD model. The ―new‖ genetics for behavioral disorders theorizes many 
intermediate and interacting variables, all of which act through the brain at some point 
(Model B in Figure 1.1). The new paradigm is characterized by gene-environment 
interaction, expectation that large numbers of genes will be involved, and the greater role of 
neuroscience.   
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Figure 1.1. Two Views of Behavior Genetics (Reproduced from Hamer 2002: 71) 
 
 
 
 
Although Model B is more complex than the ―old‖ Model A, it leaves out much 
complexity too.  Model B would be an oversimplification even for behavioral geneticists if 
only because behavior – such as self-starvation or alcohol consumption -- also acts back upon 
the brain (though a behavior such as alcohol consumption might be reconceptualized as part 
of the ―environment‖ in genetics).  In Figure 1.1, this would be represented by an arrow from 
behavior back to the brain.  In AN, the behavior of self-starvation would directly affect brain 
function by depriving the body and brain of adequate nutrition. AN might also influence the 
person‘s social environment because it is likely to change activities, friends, and even her 
exposure to the ―thin ideal‖ as she may seek so-called ―thinspiration‖ from media images of 
very thin women. Behavior thus changes environment as well. Some researchers would also 
hypothesize an arrow from genes to the body and then to behavior or brain, if genes that 
impair the metabolism of alcohol or food affect behavior directly.  Social scientists would 
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likely conceptualize causation differently, paying more attention to the environment and less 
attention to the brain.  The Model B diagram is thus a theoretical model of the initial 
development of a disorder rather than how it is maintained or altered over time.   
For this dissertation, the important parts of the ―new‖ model of behavioral genetics 
are those that diverge from the ―gene for‖ model. 
1. Combinations of multiple genes or ―gene networks‖ are theorized, rather than a single 
gene.  In eating disorders, some candidate genes are thought to be related to 
perfectionism, anxiety, and perseverance. 
2. Diverse pathways may be involved.  Different genes affect the brain in different 
ways, such that a single outcome can be the result of multiple pathways (termed 
―equifinality‖). Thus many different gene and environment combinations can lead to 
a single diagnosis such as AN or BN. 
3. The brain mediates the effects of gene or environment via neurochemicals such as 
serotonin. 
4. The new model includes the environment, however vaguely or incompletely 
described. In AN, environmental risk factors include participation in gymnastics, 
ballet or any other activities that reward weight loss; exposure to the ―thin ideal‖ of 
Western modernity via media images of celebrities and models; and the experience of 
teasing about weight and shape, among others. 
In addition, a few elements that are not pictured in the diagram are important for this project 
because they may affect respondent self-understandings and understandings of the disorder: 
5. The focus on the brain as intermediary gives rise to the concept of the ―intermediate 
phenotype‖ or ―endophenotype‖ in behavioral genetics, which is a biological or 
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behavioral characteristic along the theoretical causal pathway between genotype and 
phenotype, specifically on the causal arrow between brain and behavior (Gottesman 
and Gould 2003). For example, people with AN might have cognitive characteristics 
(e.g., trouble with ―set shifting‖, Holliday et al. 2005a) or personality tendencies (e.g., 
perfectionism, Bachner-Melman 2007) that are less common in the general 
population.  Their biological relatives may have the same characteristic, without 
having the disorder. Endophenotypes are detectable only using specialized 
instruments and techniques such as experimental testing, personality questionnaires, 
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain.  These 
characteristics are not easily apparent phenotypes (pheno connotes the visibility of the 
outcome) but more difficult-to-detect endophenotypes (endo connotes internal).  In 
order to be true intermediate phenotypes, they must not be a consequence of the 
disorder. 
6. Because genotypes and endophenotypes are shared by people with and without the 
disorder, there is a continuum between normal and abnormal rather than a categorical 
difference. This aspect of psychiatric genetics overlaps with the genetics of 
personality and behavior and deconstructs dichotomous disease classifications and 
categories. Psychiatrists looking ahead to the DSM-V and future versions expect that 
genetic research will lead to the recategorization of diagnoses (Faraone 2002). 
Given these complexities, there are several ways that genes may play a role in eating 
disorders. Striegel-Moore and Bulik (2007) cite two possibilities other than the possibility 
that research may ultimately uncover a main effect of the kind portrayed by Model A in 
Figure 1.1 (perhaps through Genome Wide Association Studies).  The first possibility is that 
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genes might interact with the environment (a ―gene-environment interaction model‖), in 
which a genetic susceptibility to an eating disorder makes a difference because the person is 
exposed to an environmental risk. For example: 
[A]n individual with Genotype A might experiment with her first extreme diet, find 
the experience aversive and uncomfortable, and reject the behavior on the basis of it 
not being at all reinforcing. In contrast, an individual with Genotype B might 
experience that first episode of severe caloric restriction to be highly reinforcing by 
reducing her innate dysphoria and anxiety, providing her with a sense of control over 
her own body weight and resulting in her receiving positive social attention for 
weight-loss attempts. That individual might then adopt the behavior in a persistent 
manner because of its multiple reinforcing effects, which would then set the stage for 
the development of anorexia nervosa. (Striegel-Moore and Bulik 2007: 188) 
 
In this example, the extreme diet is the environmental trigger, possibly brought on by 
involvement in an activity in a cultural context that values weight loss. People with low 
genetic susceptibility would not develop AN even if they went on an extreme diet.  The gene-
environment interaction model has frequently been described with the memorable slogan, 
―Genes load the gun, environment pulls the trigger‖ (e.g., Bulik 2007 presentation).   
A second alternative model is that the current diagnostic constructs are merely a 
―grab bag of symptoms‖ (Striegel-Moore and Bulik 2007: 188), only some of which can be 
directly explained by genes.  There may be genetic main effects for a few symptoms, but 
these can be discovered only if the definition of the phenotype is purified and refined: 
Genetic main effects could primarily account for the core symptoms we see in eating 
disorders that have persisted throughout history— such as maintenance of low body 
weight, binge eating, and self-induced vomiting—but the pervasive culture of the 
times may have ―filled in the gaps‖ by providing an explanatory context and padding 
the definition of syndromes with environmentally mediated and contextually 
plausible symptoms. For example, the maintenance of low body weight seen in 
anorexia nervosa has been observed for centuries, and indeed, the core phenotype of 
persistent low body weight appears to have genetic underpinnings…, yet the 
psychological ―fillers‖ that have been added to create the syndrome of anorexia 
nervosa have changed over time. (Striegel-Moore and Bulik 2007: 188-9). 
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An example of a culturally specific ―filler‖ is the Western emphasis on fat phobia, which is 
not as common among Asian patients who fit the other criteria for AN (see Lee 2001).  The 
quest to refine the phenotype is interesting from a social constructionist angle; it recognizes 
the constructedness of current diagnostic categories but still seeks an unconstructed genetic 
core. Refinements are likely to change the DSM categories and therefore will eventually 
influence the conceptions of non-geneticists and lay people (Faraone 2002). 
 
3. MEDICALIZATION AND GENETICIZATION ON THE GROUND: STUDYING  
    PEOPLE WITH EATING DISORDERS 
 
The introduction of genetics as a partial explanation of eating disorders – whether a 
simple or complex model – constitutes a ―geneticization‖ of eating disorders, and, as I have 
argued, heightens their medicalization.
11
 There are many definitions of geneticization (see 
Hedgecoe 2001). I define geneticization by adapting the expansive definition of 
medicalization from Conrad above:   
Geneticization consists of defining a condition in genetic terms, using genetic 
language to describe it, adopting a genetic framework to understand it, or using a 
genetic intervention to ‗treat‘ it… Geneticization occurs when a genetic frame or 
definition has been applied to understand or manage a problem…. (Adapted from 
Conrad 1992: 211). 
 
In this section I explain how my study diverges from other studies of medicalization and 
geneticization, and blends with sociological approaches.  
My study will address the understudied concept of ―heightened‖ medicalization 
through interviews with women diagnosed with AN or BN and contribute to an emerging 
                                                 
11
It is important to note that geneticization is not equivalent to medicalization. The causal role of genetics for 
blue eyes, extraversion, high intelligence, or homosexuality does not imply pathology.  For this project, I see 
geneticization as a type of medicalization because it increases the resemblance of eating disorders to biomedical 
diseases. At the same time, I recognize that genetics can be used to de-medicalize a trait: the genetics of 
homosexuality are also used as evidence for its naturalness and normality as part of human variation (Conrad 
1997: 147, 2000).  
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empirical literature about genetics and the lay person.  Because studies of geneticization and 
medicalization are concerned with changes in the dominant view of a category over historical 
time, they tend to be concerned with official classifications, professional turf wars, and media 
representations rather than the perspectives of people with a condition. My study takes 
seriously the idea that medicalization is a continuous and negotiated process even after an 
institutional definition has been accepted at the professional and societal levels. People with a 
diagnosis provide a window into this process and how it affects those who have the most to 
gain or to lose.  
By studying people with eating disorders and whether and how they use genetic ideas, 
my approach departs from traditional sociological approaches to both medicalization and 
geneticization. Early studies of medicalization by Wootton (1959), Zola (1983), Szasz (1960) 
and Freidson (1970) focused on official medical jurisdiction.  Conrad‘s redefinition of 
medicalization, which I have adapted for geneticization, allows what might be called 
personal or individual medicalization because it does not insist on the involvement of the 
medical profession.  People may use biological and pathological terminology to describe 
their experiences even in the absence of an official medical label, and they may reject such 
terminology even when there is a medical label. Early treatments of geneticization also 
focused on the societal level (see Hedgecoe 1998).
12
   
At least one critic has argued that the expansion of medicalization to include 
individual and non-professional definitions has rendered the theory a ―complete muddle‖ 
(Davis 2006: 51).  Davis argues that medical professionals must be central to the definition of 
medicalization because ―outside the sphere of medicine, we have no way to determine what 
                                                 
12
 According to Hedgecoe, scholars of both medicalization and geneticization have tended to begin with 
polemical assumptions about the dangers of each.  My empirical study strives to avoid this assumption as well, 
as discussed in the section on hopes and fears about geneticization.   
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constitutes a "medical" term or framework‖ (54). He contends that Conrad‘s theory claims 
that the medical profession is not necessary for the process, but smuggles it back into the 
theory. For example, he notes that by Conrad‘s own definition, ―demedicalization‖ must 
involve organized opposition to the medical profession, which presupposes the medical 
profession‘s involvement (55).  Davis also objects to Conrad‘s value-neutrality about 
medicalization, preferring to reserve the term for a critical appraisal of illegitimate 
encroachment by the medical profession. In addition, Davis is concerned that studying 
individual-level medicalization distracts from the study of societal categories:  
If medicalization literally means "to make medical," then including individual-level 
diagnostic interactions in the physician's office would seem to make sense. Strictly 
speaking, that pain in my abdomen is made medical when the doctor diagnoses it as 
appendicitis… In the original meaning, new definitions shifted problem categories 
(not individual instances of those categories) to medical jurisdiction. Now "medical 
terms," "medical language," and "medical framework" are no longer limited to those 
defined and used by the medical profession. Any group or individual's use of such 
terms/frameworks represents an instance of medicalization. (53-54).   
 
For Davis, studying individual usage diverts from societal level usage. 
 
There are also strong arguments for studying medicalization by focusing on non-
medical non-professionals. Three other criticisms of medicalization literature would be 
resolved by such an approach.  According to Charles Rosenberg, there is a ―tendency to 
conceptualize medicalization as a reified, monolithic, and inexorable thing—a point-of-view 
that obscures the complex, multidimensional, and inconsistent nature of the way in which 
medical concepts and practices have laid claim to larger realms of social action and 
authority‖ (Rosenberg 2006: 408 fn.1, emphasis in original). Listening to diagnosed people 
enables the complexity and inconsistency of medical definitions to emerge, as they draw on 
multiple systems of meaning to create understandings. They may incorporate or oppose or 
recreate medical understandings, and they may not be consistent from time to time.  A 
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second critique of medicalization literature, as well as Foucaultian approaches to similar 
phenomena, is that it assumes a passive patient who simply receives medical definitions from 
more powerful others (Williams and Calnan 1996, also Conrad 1992, Clarke 2003, Moreira 
2006, Lupton 1997). This tendency has been counteracted by more recent studies that cast 
patients as agents of medicalization for difficult-to-detect conditions (such as multiple 
chemical sensitivity and fibromyalgia) (Barker 2002, 2008, Kroll-Smith and Floyd 1997) and 
as active managers of their own problems, using medicalized understandings and approaches 
if the treatments seem safe and avoiding them if they don‘t (Hislop and Arber 2003). My 
study will contribute to this area by examining how people with eating disorders use 
medicalized definitions, if they do. A third criticism is that studies of medicalization presume 
bad effects on patients and society.  By tacitly assuming that medicalization is equivalent to 
overmedicalization, and that its identification is tantamount to social critique, its critics 
presume too much (Rose 2007a, Bury 2006).  Studying lay people with a disorder lets us 
examine the complex meanings of medicalization and geneticization for people who 
experience their effects.  
My conceptualization of medicalization in Table 1.1 avoids problems identified by 
these critics as well as by Davis. It gives the medical profession an important, though not 
exclusive role (top right cell of Table 1.1); it allows for complexity, inconsistency, and 
individual agency by positing a continuous rather than a dichotomous process, and defines 
―medical‖ by specifying two conceptual dimensions, biology and pathology.  I agree with 
Davis‘s criticism that the theory of medicalization is muddled to some degree, and I believe 
my framework clarifies and extends Conrad‘s theory while taking into account some of 
Davis‘s objections.  
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My approach to medicalization and geneticization is compatible with symbolic 
interactionism, social constructionism, and the ―toolkit‖ strand of the sociology of culture.  
These approaches emphasize the role of individuals in creating meaning and a sense of 
reality, rather than the imposition of meanings by an abstract ―actor‖ such as society or 
culture.  Genetic and medical terminology and concepts can be thought of as tools in a 
cultural repertoire for individuals to use (Swidler 2003). The medical profession‘s adoption 
of genetic and medical terms for eating disorders grants the terms greater cultural power, but 
individuals may or may not use them (Schudson 1989). My focus on one cultural area – 
biomedical and genetic explanations of behavior – resembles cultural sociologist Ann 
Swidler‘s (2003) focus on the discourse of love in American culture.   
I expect that people will use genetic and medical cultural tools to accomplish goals, 
such as making sense of their condition, exculpating themselves, or providing accounts of 
their behavior to others (including an interviewer). According to Scott and Lyman (1968), an 
account is provided when there is a discrepancy between expectation and action.  People with 
eating disorders are potentially confronted with many such discrepancies:  how to account for 
having a mental illness, how to explain why they engage in behaviors that are seen as 
undesirable (bingeing, purging) or extreme (restricting), why they cannot control these 
behaviors (or do not wish to), how recovery happens, and why some people have eating 
disorders and others do not (also see Boltanski and Thévenot 1999).  Because I am asking 
questions about causality and personal experience, I expect respondents will frequently 
respond in narrative form.  Narratives can be seen as ―accounts which contain transformation 
(change over time), some kind of ‗action‘ and characters, all of which are brought together 
within an overall ‗plot‘‖ (Lawler 2002). In interviews, people are not simply reporting facts 
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but constructing their stories and identities and actively making meaning using existing 
cultural materials. If genetic ideas are cultural tools, then, are people using them, and if so, 
how, and in what combination with other ideas? 
The idea of individual-level medicalization or geneticization has much in common 
with other social science research into how patients make sense of their conditions or 
behaviors as medical problems, including mental illnesses and eating disorders.  Although 
many of these literatures do not link their work to sociological thought about medicalization 
(see Conrad 1997), they are nevertheless relevant to this project and ought not be overlooked. 
For example, studies of labeling (Phelan and Link 1999, Link and Phelan 1999) address 
whether and how individuals accept their medical labels and what the consequences are.  
Studies of illness narratives describe individuals‘ experiences of illness and medicine that 
diverge from biomedical understandings of disease and some address the extent to which 
diagnosed people incorporate official medical versions of their experience (e.g., Bury 2006, 
Kleinman 1988, see Rich 2006: 287 for a list of others). Studies of explanatory models 
(Kleinman 1980), illness accounts (Estroff et al. 1991), illness identities (Barker 2002), 
health identities (Hislop and Arber 2003), illness perception or representation (Moss-Morris 
2002), and lay understandings of medicine, science and technology (e.g. Prior 2007) also 
address such issues. 
 
4. LAY GENETICIZATION OF EATING DISORDERS? 
 
By the definition of geneticization above, eating disorders are being geneticized by 
professionals, the media, and to some extent by lay people.  Although there are no 
genetically-based treatments for eating disorders, genetic terminology, frames, and 
definitions are used to describe and understand eating disorders. A genetic contribution to 
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eating disorders is accepted in academic journals and textbooks. According to O‘Hara and 
Smith (2007), many clinicians include it in their discussions with patients.   
Genetic ideas about eating disorders are available to lay people from many sources.  
One study of U.S. newspapers found that few articles about eating disorders mentioned a 
genetic or biological cause between October 13, 2004 and October 13, 2005 (two out of a 
subsample of 90 articles in 7 U.S. newspapers, O‘Hara and Smith 2007). However in 
December of 2005, Newsweek ran a cover story entitled ―Fighting Anorexia: No one to 
Blame‖ (Tyre 2005) focusing on the role of genetics in AN among children. In addition, the 
National Eating Disorders Association (NEDA) has tried to ―spread the message about the 
powerful influence of genetics on both our physical and mental shape‖ during the annual 
eating disorders awareness week (NEDA 2008).  Recent survey results show that even some 
members of the general public without special knowledge of eating disorders have heard of 
genetic causes.  According to a poll commissioned by NEDA, 30% of the members of a 
consumer panel (n=1500) thought of genetics as one of the ―primary causes‖ from a list of 
possible causes of eating disorders, though much higher percentages cited dieting (66%) and 
the media (64%) as primary causes (GMI and NEDA 2005).  
To assess the ease with which contemporary respondents might have come into 
contact with such information, I conducted simple Google internet searches. Of the top ten 
results of a Google search using the search string ―anorexia,‖ four mentioned genetics as a 
cause. Of the top ten results using the more focused search string ―anorexia cause‖, nine 
mentioned either genetics (8) or ―inherent biological factors‖ (1).  Of the top ten results for 
the search string ―bulimia cause‖, five included information about genetics; for ―‗binge 
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eating disorder‘ cause‖, six included genetics.13 People who seek internet information about 
the causes of eating disorders are likely to encounter the idea of a genetic cause, though it 
may be overshadowed by information about sociocultural and psychological causes.  
Anecdotal evidence from a hospital-based eating disorders clinic also suggests that most 
adult eating disorder patients have heard of genetic causation before entering treatment 
(LaVia 2008, personal communication). 
Although there is reason to think that people diagnosed with AN or BN may have 
heard general information about genetics in connection with eating disorders, there are little 
data about whether they accept it and how they understand it.  Previous studies of how 
people with eating disorders interpret their condition, its causes, and treatment have not 
focused on genetic or biological understandings.  In qualitative and quantitative studies of 
perceptions of causality thus far, people with eating disorders have tended neither to mention 
nor to endorse genetic risk factors, both before one might expect people to have heard of 
genetic research (Button and Warren 2001, Nevonen and Broberg 2000, Tozzi et al. 2003) 
and after (Holliday et al. 2005b, Mond et al. 2004, Quiles-Marcos et al. 2007, Stewart et al. 
2006). Patients also did not tend to mention biological causes at all. Those asked to identify 
the causes of their eating disorders cited instead weight-related problems and interpersonal 
problems (Nevonen and Broberg 2000), loss of control and relationship problems (Button 
and Warren 2001), family dysfunction, weight loss or dieting, and stress (Tozzi et al. 2003). 
People given forced-choice questionnaires also tended to endorse psychological and social 
causal factors more than biological factors such as genetics (Quiles-Marcos et al. 2007), as is 
true for other psychiatric conditions (Read et al. 2006).  Like patients, recovered people also 
                                                 
13
Google searches for AN and BN conducted by the author on November 11, 2007, for BED December 27, 
2007.    
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did not tend to credit pharmaceutical interventions, but therapy was important for many 
(though more cited a supportive partner relationship) (Tozzi et al. 2003).  My respondents 
may mention genetics more than past respondents because of recent publicity and because I 
will ask them about risk factors in addition to causes, which are more likely to elicit thoughts 
about genetic predisposition (French et al. 2005).  
I expect that genetic explanations will be incorporated differently by different 
respondents.  Just as medical definitions are not uniformly accepted by all individuals or 
groups, people with eating disorders may differ in the ways they incorporate or reject genetic 
explanations.  The existence of a cultural tool does not compel a person to use it.  Individuals 
may reject, revise, misunderstand and ignore cultural tools that are available to them 
(Schudson 1989, Griswold 1994, Gamson 1992). In the sections that follow I explore the 
variety of ways people may use genetic cultural tools. 
 
5. HOPES AND FEARS ABOUT GENETICIZATION 
 
In this section I address the hopes and fears about medicalization and geneticization 
presented by clinicians, academics, and other commentators. I have described the contested 
medicalization of eating disorders and how genetic discoveries may help to medicalize them 
further.  I explained my focus on lay understandings of medical and genetic accounts of 
eating disorders, and speculated on the extent of geneticization of eating disorders among 
prospective respondents and how respondents‘ understandings might vary.  The hopes and 
fears of clinicians and others suggest some of the potential diversity of meanings and 
implications of genetics for respondents.   
The process of medicalization is thought to have both good and bad aspects.   Conrad 
and Schneider list the ―brighter side‖ of medicalization:  ―the creation of humanitarian and 
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non-punitive sanctions; the extension of the sick role to some deviants; a reduction of 
individual responsibility, blame, and possibly stigma for deviance; an optimistic therapeutic 
ideology; care and treatment rendered by a prestigious medical profession; and the 
availability of a more flexible and often more efficient means of social control‖ (than 
criminalization) (Conrad and Schneider 1992: 248). They also describe a ―darker side‖ of 
medicalization: the individualization of social problems, the depoliticization of deviance (i.e., 
that power is involved in defining and punishing deviance), the dislocation of responsibility, 
the assumption of medicine‘s moral neutrality, control of public debate by experts rather than 
lay people, and greater social control by medical professionals (Conrad and Schneider 1992: 
248-251, also see Wootton 1959, Zola 1983, Riessman 1983, Illich 1976, Szasz 1960, 
Freidson 1970). Like medicalization, geneticization has both bright and dark sides in 
commentators‘ views. Many of these resemble bright and dark sides of medicalization, 
reflecting the ability of geneticization to heighten medicalization (see Table 1.2 for examples 
relevant to eating disorders). Doctors, scientists, and patient advocates hope that scientific 
discoveries about the genetic role will not only contribute to improvements in the 
understanding and treatment of disease, but also remove blame from the individual.  For 
example, ―We predict that… identifying genes involved in behavioral disorders will do much 
to improve public perception and tolerance of behavioral disorders‖ (McGuffin, Riley and 
Plomin 2001).  
The ―dark side‖ of geneticization includes genetic versions of medicalization‘s 
drawbacks (listed earlier), as well as other concerns specific to genetics. The 
individualization of social problems and the depoliticization of deviant behavior become 
particularly troubling if the social arrangements that produce differences in behavior across 
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race are ignored in favor of genetic explanations of that behavior (Duster 2003, Gould 1996, 
Herrnstein and Murray 1994).  Genetic testing expands medicalization by monitoring and 
even treating those who are not sick but only genetically at risk (Conrad 2000, 2005, Kenen 
2007, Konrad 2003). Expectations for gene therapy medicalize those whose heretofore 
normal attributes might one day be genetically improved or enhanced (Conrad 2004, 2007). 
The logic of disease prevention through prenatal genetic testing and pregnancy termination 
could be a ―backdoor to eugenics‖ (Duster 2003). The dislocation of responsibility associated 
with medicalization can be extended even farther with genetic explanations of personality 
and behavior, leading to the question ―Are we free to choose to behave as we do or is it 
caused by our genes?‖ (Parens 2004: S4). And if control of public debate by experts rather 
than lay people was of concern under medicalization, it is even more so for genetics because 
the influence of genes not only seems harder to understand than other biological 
explanations, it is still in the process of being discovered.   
Going beyond medicalization, genetics introduce some unique problems. Genetic 
origins may make a problem seem permanent, uncontrollable or unchangeable and lead to 
fatalism (Alper and Beckwith 1993), though there is evidence to the contrary (e.g., Novas 
and Rose 2000). There are many other potential concerns, including essentialism, 
reductionism, genetic discrimination and privacy, but I do not describe all of them here (see 
Press 2006, Pilnick 1999, Kerr 2004, Carson and Rothstein 1999, Conrad and Gabe 1999, 
Rose 1995, Lippman 1991, Nelkin and Lindee 1995, Conrad and Schneider 1992, Riessman 
1983, Davis 2006, Henderson 2008, Duster 2003). Many concerns about geneticization 
currently do not apply to eating disorders because there are no identified genes and hence no 
predictive genetic test that exposes people to risks from genetic disclosure including 
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discrimination by insurance companies based on test results. Concerns that are relevant to the 
study of eating disorders appear in Table 1.2 and are explored in greater depth below.  
Negative features such as reductionism, essentialism, and determinism once were 
assumed and even incorporated into early definitions of geneticization (e.g., ―Geneticization 
refers to an ongoing process by which differences between individuals are reduced to their 
DNA codes…‖ (Lippman 1991a: 19, emphasis mine).  For this ―critical‖ group of writers, 
identifying the geneticization of a phenomenon constituted ―an activist‘s rallying cry, a way 
of raising public and political consciousness about the possible drawbacks of genetic 
technologies and information‖ (Hedgecoe 2001: 307). My definition of geneticization (see 
above section on geneticization of eating disorders) does not assume positive or negative 
consequences.  Many recent studies are also neutral about the effects of genetics, describing 
new identities and ―biosocialities‖ related to identified genes (Atkinson et al. 2007, Gibbon 
and Novas 2008, Glasner et al. 2007, Schaffer et al. 2008), theorizing a cultural shift toward 
―somaticization‖ of personality (Rose 2007a, 2007b, Vrecko 2006), and strategizing about 
how best to integrate genetics into clinical practice (e.g., Richards 1993, Marteau 2004, 
Senior 1999, Parrott et al. 2004, Smith 2007).  My definition and approach follow Hedgecoe 
and others by avoiding these assumptions, though my study is partly motivated by concerns 
about negative consequences. 
My study examines how people with eating disorders actually use genetic concepts 
and whether they think about some of the hopes and fears that have been articulated by 
academicians.  While they may not have the same understanding or concerns as these 
experts, the hopes and fears expressed in academic literature suggest some hypotheses for 
what they might bring up and a sense for what might be at stake.  
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It is important to note that most of the literature about hopes and fears addresses only 
simple genetic explanations. Ideas about genetic explanations ought to differ depending on 
whether genetic causation is understood in the older simpler way or in the newer more 
complex way (Figure 1.1 above).  Although genetic explanations for eating disorders are 
complex, they may be oversimplified by those unfamiliar with the science, particularly if 
messages about genetic influence do not also emphasize that environment matters. Thus, 
Table 1.2 (next page) outlines hopes and fears that may apply to simple and complex 
understandings of a complex genetic causal model for eating disorders. One goal of this 
study is to learn how complex explanations are understood and used by lay people. Table 1.2 
does not exhaust the possible meanings of genetic explanations for people with eating 
disorders. After I describe each cell of Table 1.2, I suggest additional details and variations 
that I expected to emerge in interviews.   
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Table 1.2.  Genetic Explanations for a Complex Psychiatric Disorder: Hopes and Fears about 
Simple and Complex Explanations 
 Simple genetic explanation  
for complex disorder 
Complex genetic explanation  
for complex disorder 
Hopes  Remove blame for individual and 
family 
 Remove stigma for individual and 
family 
 Improve family‘s ability to cope with 
the eating disorder of a family member 
 Draw attention to an understudied 
disorder by increasing perception of 
severity 
 Make insurance reimbursement more 
likely 
 Provide some or all of the benefits 
from a simple genetic explanation 
(see cell to the left) 
 Promote a balanced and accurate 
understanding of what can and 
cannot be controlled by the person 
 Encourage greater awareness of 
environmental causes and how to 
avoid them 
 Harmonize with common sense 
understandings of disease 
causation 
Fears  Exacerbate stigma 
 Add new kinds of stigma 
 Increase determinism and fatalism 
about prevention, treatment and 
recovery 
 Decrease plausibility of and 
commitment to non-biological 
treatments.   
 Promote biological reductionism 
 Decrease attention to non-genetic 
causes (e.g., sexism, trauma) 
 Provoke a reaction against any 
biological or genetic explanations 
 Provide some or all of the harms 
from a simple genetic explanation 
(see cell to the left) 
 Increase confusion through the 
proliferation of causes, risk factors, 
protective factors and 
environmental triggers 
 Increase distance between lay and 
expert understanding 
 
 
5. Hopes for simple genetic explanations   
The benefits of a simple explanation for eating disorders are listed in the top left cell 
of Table 1.2: Removal of blame and stigma, improving coping, and underscoring the idea 
that the disorder is serious and worthy of insurance reimbursement. People seeking treatment 
may be aware of these potential advantages and use genetic ideas accordingly.  
Less blame and stigma for individuals. The main source of stigma for people with 
eating disorders is that they are held personally responsible for their disorder.  Unlike people 
with schizophrenia, they are not stigmatized for being dangerous (Crisp et al. 2000, Mond et 
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al. 2006, Holliday et al. 2005b, Corrigan et al. 2002), though in one study survey respondents 
say they ―pose a greater danger to others‖ than people with asthma or those with no known 
disorder (Stewart et al. 2006).  Many advocates for eating disordered people and the 
medicalization of eating disorders expect that more focus on genetics as opposed to social 
and cultural factors and personality will reduce the blame assigned to the sufferer and her 
family (O‘Hara and Smith 2007, Tyre 2005, Duffy and McElhinny 2007). According to 
attribution theory, a genetic or other biological explanation removes blame from the person 
and should reduce stigma.   Some studies show that disorders attributed to a biological cause 
are perceived to have a less controllable onset and to elicit greater pity and less anger from 
others compared to disorders that are not (Weiner et al. 1988, Corrigan 2000, Meiser et al. 
2005). A study of nursing students found that those told of a genetic cause were less likely to 
hold the eating disorder patient responsible (Crisafulli et al. 2008), though medical 
professionals in training may be more likely to accept the biological and genetic causal 
explanations than the general public, which tends not to (Read and Harré 2001).  For some, 
the idea that one‘s disorder is genetic might make one better able to take action because one 
does not have to accept all of the blame for it (Herman 1993).  Genetic explanations for body 
size rather than one‘s eating behaviors might be appealing for people with eating disorders, 
as well (e.g., the ―embrace your genes‖ campaign, NEDA 2008).  People with eating 
disorders who perceive themselves to be overweight may find a genetic explanation for their 
body size is helpful for destigmatizing their weight (Cordell and Ronai 1999, Martin 2002). 
These strategies would work best in a context of wide public awareness and acceptance of a 
biological rather than volitional model of causation. For people who are afraid of being 
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stigmatized as vain (as with AN or BN) or as having no willpower (BED), an eating disorder 
diagnosis may remove barriers to seeking treatment (Stewart et al. 2006).   
Less blame and stigma for families. The idea that eating disorders are genetic also 
relieves the self-blame of families, enabling them to make positive changes that help the 
affected person recover.  Parents who have a child with a mental illness tend to blame 
themselves, ―What did I do [or not do] to have caused this?‖ (Austin and Honer 2007). 
Anecdotal evidence supports the idea that families of people with eating disorders respond 
positively to the idea of a genetic influence: it reduces anxiety and guilt for parents who felt 
they must have done something wrong, allowing families to conclude ―If I didn‘t cause it 
then I can help it go away‖ (Flanagan 2008, personal communication).  A woman who 
recovered from AN expresses it this way: ―Perhaps the impulse to blame, in fact, diverted 
essential energy and attention from the real business of recovery. Mothers who subscribed to 
Vogue might play a hand in some cases of anorexia, but according to Strober they no more 
‗caused‘ the problem than chilly temperatures caused pneumonia. Nor did anorexics ‗choose‘ 
this infuriating and dangerous behavior – any more than they could snap out of their genetics 
on command‖ (Liu 2007: 23).  
Disorder taken more seriously. Several eating disorders researchers hope that a 
genetic cause will prompt people to take the disorders more seriously (Bulik 2004, Stewart et 
al. 2006, Holliday et al. 2005b, Duffy and McElhinny 2007). Stigma in eating disorders 
works differently than for other psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia: a perception of 
greater severity
14
 is expected to reduce stigma rather than exacerbate it (Mond et al. 2006). 
Eating disorders may be seen as volitional, and not potentially fatal conditions (Bulik 2004).  
                                                 
14
 Severity was measured with questions about how distressing it would be to have the condition, whether it is 
seen as a passing phase, whether the respondent ought to be able to ‗get over it,‘ and ‗how severe‘ the condition 
is (Mond et al. 2006:523).  
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For example, in a survey of female college students, about 30% said that they had at least 
occasionally felt it ―might not be too bad‖ to have AN and 37% at least somewhat admired 
the ability of someone with AN to lose weight (Mond et al. 2006).  Surveys on other 
psychiatric disorders show that a biological or genetic cause makes them seem more serious 
or severe (Phelan 2005, Phelan et al. 2002, Phelan et al. 2006, Kuppin and Carpiano 2006). 
To the extent that eating disorders are contested as illnesses (Giles 2006), severity can 
validate the existence and importance of the disorder. The widespread perception of severity 
could encourage more research attention and lead to improved treatment options and 
prevention. Finally, a simple genetic explanation for an eating disorder might also convince 
insurance companies to fully cover treatment for eating disorders because the disorder would 
be seen as ―biologically based,‖ a criterion for coverage by insurance companies in several 
states (Kaiser Family Foundation 2004).   
5.2 Fears about simple genetic explanations   
Some of the potential concerns about genetic explanations for eating disorders are 
listed in the bottom left cell of Table 1.2.  Some are negative aspects or implications of the 
hopes described above.   
Increased stigma. Genetic causal attribution could lead to increased stigma, making 
people reluctant to embrace it.  The optimistic predictions of attribution theory are not borne 
out in studies of stigma for people with schizophrenia; indeed a recent review contends that 
―biogenetic causal beliefs and diagnostic labelling by the public are positively related to 
prejudice, fear and desire for distance‖ (Read et al. 2006: 303).  As noted before, in a study 
of the geneticization of deviant behavior, Phelan (2005) found that when deviant behavior is 
attributed to a genetic cause, it seems more serious, life-long and chronic (also see Phelan et 
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al. 2002, Hagger and Orbell 2003, Bennett et al. 2008).  Although the perception of severity 
may assist the goal of medicalization and increased attention, as some hope, the fact that it is 
internal to a person may also add stigma.  Phelan presented vignettes about people with 
mental illnesses and experimentally varied them so some gave genetic and others non-genetic 
causal attributions for a condition. This study aimed to compare attribution theory, which 
would predict reduced stigma by absolving the sufferer of responsibility and blame, with 
genetic essentialism theory, which would predict increased stigma by making the disorder 
seem more severe and persistent and making the person seem categorically different from 
other people.  Phelan found more support for the theory of genetic essentialism than 
attribution theory. Read and Harré describe similar findings in their (non-experimental) 
survey: endorsement of a biological or genetic cause was correlated with negative attitudes 
toward mental illnesses (2001). Attribution of behavior or mental illness to a genetic cause 
suggests an external locus of control even though genetics are internal to a person (Weiner 
1985, Maher and Kroska 2002).   An inherited disorder also implicates biologically related 
family members and produces a desire for greater social distance, particularly for younger 
relatives of those affected (Phelan 2005).
15
 Although in the case of eating disorders, the 
perception of severity may actually reduce rather than exacerbate stigma, these pessimistic 
findings ought to be taken into consideration. 
Hard to reconcile with non-biological treatment.  Although the perception of severity 
may draw positive attention toward eating disorders, it may lessen confidence in the 
treatments commonly available for eating disorders.  People in treatment may struggle with 
                                                 
15
 Other concerns arise for disorders that are linked to specific genes, if these genes are also linked to more 
stigmatized disorders. Genotypes may give rise to multiple outcomes, known as ―multifinality‖ and 
―pleiotropy.‖ This is the case in smoking behavior; genes identified for it are also implicated in addictive 
behavior and psychiatric disorders thereby conferring additional stigma (Caron et al. 2005, Shields et al. 2004). 
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how to reconcile the idea of a genetic cause with the psychotherapeutic treatments they are 
receiving.  If they feel therapy is helping, a genetic cause may seem implausible or 
threatening.  Survey respondents who attributed mental illnesses (schizophrenia or 
depression) to genetics found biological and hospital-based interventions more plausible than 
other treatments (Phelan et al. 2006 reporting on the 1996 GSS and the ―Genes, Disease, and 
Stigma‖ vignette experiment, Kuppin and Carpiano 2006). Most troubling, in Phelan et al.‘s 
vignette experiment, respondents who were told that a mental illness had a genetic origin 
were more pessimistic that mental health professionals could help (2006). Given that most 
treatments for eating disorders are non-biological therapies – cognitive-behavioral, family – a 
―gene for‖ eating disorders renders these implausible.  It would be harder to justify the effort 
and expense of engaging in such therapies if the ―real‖ cause were genetic and 
neurochemical.  Pharmaceutical treatments targeted to a gene-related biological pathway 
would be most logical (Striegel-Moore and Bulik 2007).  Some may even hold out for gene 
therapy. But clinicians rely heavily on non-biological methods of treating eating disorders. 
My study will uncover whether respondents think about these issues and whether it might 
affect their commitment to particular treatments.  There is a danger that the primarily non-
pharmaceutical treatments for eating disorders will be perceived as ineffective by virtue of a 
genetic attribution for a disorder. The worst case scenario is that people with eating disorders, 
their families and insurers forego non-biomedical treatments that might have helped. 
Fatalism about prognosis. A related concern among critics is the idea that a genetic 
cause may lead to determinism and fatalism about long-term prognosis (Alper and Beckwith 
1993).  Phelan found that survey respondents (non-patients) who were given a partially or 
completely genetic explanation for ―Anne‘s‖ mental illness were more likely to endorse this 
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statement: ―In your opinion, Anne will probably continue to have problems like the ones I 
described for her whole life‖ (Phelan 2005: 313). Mehta and Farina (1997) found that a 
biological cause made a disorder seem more fundamental, real, and immutable (see also 
Corrigan and Watson 2004). Similar findings apply to physical illnesses (Senior et al. 1999, 
French et al. 2005).  This is a problem because if a complexly caused disease is seen as 
inevitable it will discourage action that might have helped, including the biological and 
hospital-based treatments that seem most plausible.  A woman recovering from AN wrote 
that ―powerlessness is the most dangerous thing an anoretic [sic] can hear. It grants license, 
exoneration‖ (Hornbacher 2006: 131).  However, people with lifelong genetic conditions and 
those with a high probability of becoming sick do not necessarily become fatalistic about 
treatment, as they may be able to manage the condition even if they cannot cure it (e.g., 
Novas and Rose 2000, Skinner et al. 2003, Kenen 2007) or to maintain uncertainty about 
what the future holds (Whitmarsh et al. 2008).  In addition, knowing about a genetic 
predisposition may only change perceptions of how to control a disorder, not whether control 
is possible (Marteau et al. 2004). On the other hand, AN is not necessarily experienced as a 
problem that needs controlling or managing: it may feel like a part of the self rather than an 
unwanted ―condition‖ or ―disorder‖ (Rich 2006, Hornbacher 2006).  If a genetic cause 
connotes permanence it may discourage people from working on it. 
Reductionism of self, behavior and will. The perception that genes are the source of 
behaviors and the self challenges everyday ideas about human identity and agency.  In the 
case of eating disorders, a simple genetic model implies that a gene directly causes the 
behaviors of bingeing, purging, and restricting. If people with eating disorders are not 
familiar with the complex model of genetic causation, they may wonder how a gene can 
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cause a behavior and what their own role in the behavior would be. They may doubt their 
ability to go against genetic ―will.‖ Even if genes are seen as the source of personality traits 
that in turn produce behaviors, it is still challenging. Genetic explanations for behavior may 
suggest a genetic ―essentialism‖ that ―reduces the self to a molecular entity, equating human 
beings, in all their complexity, with their genes‖ (Nelkin and Lindee 1995: 2) or 
―neurogenetic determinism‖ (Rose 1995).  If eating disorders are often experienced as part of 
the self, and even ―a crucial part of self‖ (Surgenor 2003: 711, Rich 2006, Hornbacher 2006), 
and if eating disorders are genetic, perhaps the self will be seen as genetic too.  As Kendler 
notes, a physical condition is something that you have (―I have allergies‖) whereas a 
personality trait is something that you are (―I am introverted‖).  Psychiatric conditions are 
not clearly one or the other: ―Am I schizophrenic or do I have schizophrenia?‖ (Kendler 
2006, Parens 2004).  The reductionism of a genetic explanation for behavior, personality and 
self may be disturbing and contribute to fatalism. 
Loss of individual responsibility. A genetic causal attribution could also affect one‘s 
sense of responsibility.  Although the relief from blame and responsibility is clearly desirable 
for reducing stigma, there are potential downsides. As one woman recovering from both AN 
and BN wrote of her recovery, ―It is not a sudden leap from sick to well. It is a slow, strange 
meander from sick to mostly well. The misconception that eating disorders are a medical 
disease in the traditional sense is not helpful here. There is no ‗cure.‘ A pill will not fix it, 
though it may help. Ditto therapy, ditto food, ditto endless support from family and friends.  
You fix it yourself‖ (Hornbacher 2006: 284, emphasis mine).  Kendler notes that after 
publishing about the genetics of alcoholism he received a letter that asked, ―How dare you 
give my Aunt Diana yet another excuse to say that drinking is not her fault!‖ (Kendler 2006, 
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also see Caron et al. 2005 on nicotine addiction). In court cases, defense attorneys offer 
genetic explanations to change the jury and judge‘s sense of the defendant‘s culpability 
(Farahany 2006).  If genes seem to produce behavior directly, or indirectly when mediated by 
personality, how does one understand behavior aimed at getting better?  Is that genetic too, or 
does a non-genetic ―part‖ of the self exert control over the genetic ―part‖?  Knowing about 
one‘s own genetic risk for genetic disorder appears to impose new perceived responsibilities 
(Hallowell 1999, Novas and Rose 2000, Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2008); there is evidence that 
this logic may be extended to genes for behavior as well, such that people are held 
responsible for controlling their own personality tendencies (Condit et al. 2006).  Might 
people wonder whether the very ability to gain such control is also ―genetic‖?  These 
questions are philosophical and recall discussions of free will; they are also folk theories of 
the self and agency. People who have rejected a medical (biological and pathological) 
explanation of their eating behavior may accept a genetic explanation of their personality and 
behaviors.  
Less attention to cultural causes. Simple biological and genetic explanations could 
additionally divert attention from important environmental factors, including enabling and 
constraining conditions. Cultural explanations of anorexia and other eating disorders usually 
focus on thinness as the ideal body type for women (Striegel-Moore and Bulik 2007). Those 
who explain eating disorders using a biomedical model often recognize that socio-cultural 
factors are important to explain why eating disorders are more common in Western countries, 
among higher economic classes, among women, and at certain historical periods (Brumberg 
2000, Striegel-Moore and Bulik 2007). Eating disorders have been called ―culture-bound 
syndromes‖ (Keel and Klump, Swartz 1985, Banks 1992), meaning that they appear only in 
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some cultures and not others, and anthropological studies demonstrate the influence of 
Western cultural influences and media on eating disorder symptoms in Belize (Anderson-Fye 
2003) and Curaçao (Katzman et al. 2004).  The greater prevalence of AN and BN among 
women compared to men, and the increased incidence of eating disorders in recent decades 
also provide evidence for culturally based explanations (Striegel-Moore and Bulik 2007).  
Genetic explanations of eating disorders could conceivably threaten cultural and political 
explanations by shifting attention away from them (Lippman 1992, Duster 2003). The second 
quotation from the beginning of this paper illustrates the potential of genes to exculpate 
culture and power: ―…I don‘t like all this ‗explaining away by genetics, etc.‘ stuff at all.  I‘d 
be willing to bet the vast majorities of Eds [sic: cases of eating disorders] are birthed by our 
cultures hatred of all women weighing over 100 pounds. The genesis lies here. The blame 
goes here‖ (Kim 2006). Environmental risk factors, ranging from exposure to images of very 
thin women in the media to participation in cheerleading or dancing, would be overlooked in 
a simple ―gene for‖ model. This might inhibit individual and collective action to change 
social and cultural contributors to the disorder.  
Depoliticization of eating disorders. Feminists connect the thin ideal and other 
cultural messages about women‘s bodies to capitalism and patriarchy to explain eating 
disorders. ―Anorexia is an attempt to resolve at the level of the individual body the 
irreconcilability of individuality and femininity in a bourgeois patriarchal culture‖ 
(MacSween 1993: 252).  According to one woman who recovered from BN, whose essay 
was included in an edited collection of ―voices from the next feminist generation‖ (Findlen 
1995), ―gaining weight and getting my head out of the toilet was the most political act I ever 
committed‖ (Chernik 1995: 81).  ―Diet culture‖ disempowers women: ―we keep on 
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shrinking, starving away our wildness, our power, our truth‖ (Chernik: 83). Feminists and 
others would likely resist genetic explanations as a way to obfuscate the true cause, dis-
empower feminist critics, and turn a political problem into a personal affliction (Orbach 
1986, Wolf 2002, Bordo 1993, Brown 1985, Thompson 1994, Chernik 2001).  Genetic 
explanations would likely be seen as a new way in which biology is used to justify gender 
inequality (Lorber 2004 [1993], Fuchs-Epstein 1988, Fausto Sterling 1992).  If a labeled 
disorder is in fact a reasonable response to a problem of living (Thompson 1994, Karp 1996, 
Szasz 1960), the emphasis ought to be on the problem of living rather than the individual‘s 
genes or biology. As Karp put it in his study of depression, ―Medicine nearly always 
interprets illness as a reflection of individual physical pathology and rarely as a normal 
response to pathological social structures… [hyping] medication as the cure for depression 
[would be] both scientifically arrogant and politically retrograde.‖ (Karp 1996: 80, italics in 
the original). If Westerners, particularly Western women, endure ―pathological social 
structures‖ without recognizing them nor realizing that change is possible, genetic 
explanations would serve to naturalize such structures, divert attention from alternatives and 
inhibit social movements to change them (Eagleton 1991, Berger and Luckmann 1967). 
Family problems blamed on individual biology. Simple genetic explanations could 
also divert attention from the family (though not its genes) and prevent a full understanding 
of an individual‘s illness. Genetic explanations for mental illness tend to remove blame from 
parents (Phelan 2005, Austin and Honer 2007), which is clearly positive in ways discussed 
earlier. However, in an internet chat with the author of the Newsweek cover story that 
focused on the genetics of AN (Tyre 2005), a participant recovering from AN expressed 
concern that genetic explanations could absolve the family:   
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I know that these articles on anorexia are focusing on biological predispositions to it.  
…  It bothers me because it seems that parents could read this and feel releaved [sic] 
of any responsibility and not examine there [sic] own behaviors. … [S]houldn't 
parents not just focus on "fixing" the child and seeing the child as the problem but 
also to examine that maybe the child is an indication of a larger family problem?  
…I'm just afriad [sic] these articles will foster misunderstanding and further the 
stigma that the child is somehow "defective" all on his/her own‖ (Wocester 2005).   
 
A simplistic model of genetic causation could discourage parents and family members from 
examining their own behaviors and participating in family therapy.  (Parents might blame 
themselves for passing along the genes, however.) 
Rejection of any explanation involving genetics. For those who are already convinced 
of and committed to social and cultural causal models, a simple genetic model runs the risk 
of provoking a reaction against models that include biology or genetics in any way. The 
oversimplification of the ―gene for eating disorders‖ model would prevent respondents from 
recognizing that genetic causal models for eating disorders also include environmental 
causes.  Genes could thus be interpreted to mean ―NOT environment,‖ taking on their 
meaning from what they lack or ignore.
16
  The simple inclusion of genes in a causal model 
could, if oversimplified, prompt a backlash against genetic explanations generally as 
implausible and reductionistic. For those who hope that genetic research will lead to life-
saving discoveries, such a backlash would be a negative consequence of the 
oversimplification of genetic causality.      
5.3 Hopes and fears about complex explanations  
The hopes and fears about simple genetic explanations may or may not apply to 
complex genetic explanations.  Many of the fears about medical, genetic and biological 
                                                 
16
 This idea is illustrated by Swidler‘s (2003) observation of how giving flowers to secretaries during 
Secretaries Week can be semiotically recoded to diverge from the meaning desired by florists: that the employer 
values the secretary.  ―A national secretaries union, publicizing a ―Bread, Not Roses‖ campaign, might shift the 
code, pressing bosses to enter labor negotiations during National Secretaries Week and making flowers without 
a raise a sign of contempt.‖ (164). 
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explanations of behavior center around reductionism: reifying complex human behavior to a 
syndrome or disorder, ignoring causes other than individual-level biological ones, casting 
doubt on individual agency and responsibility. These concerns may not be such a problem if 
genetic factors are only part of a ―multifactorial‖ explanation.   
One possibility is that a complex, partly genetic explanation would produce effects 
that are ―in between‖ those of a fully genetic or non-genetic explanation. The same 
advantages or disadvantages might hold for complex explanations, but to a lesser extent than 
for simple explanations: somewhat less alleviation of blame, sense of severity, or fatalism, 
for example. However, Phelan (2005) found that when survey respondents were presented 
with a partly genetic explanation, as opposed to a fully genetic or non-genetic explanation of 
a vignette character‘s condition, it did not produce ―part‖ of the effect of a fully genetic 
explanation. That is, a partly genetic influence was not always in between the non-genetic 
and the fully genetic (but she does not report which way it tended to go).  As Phelan put it, 
―A partly genetic explanation does not simply work like a weaker dose of a purely genetic 
explanation.  This finding, combined with the fact that the partly genetic explanation was the 
one most likely to be accepted by respondents, suggests that the public‘s ideas about gene-
environment interactions should be studied‖ (Phelan 2005: 317).  
Some argue that a multifactorial model might actually increase the perceived 
importance of environmental factors. Shostak argues ―that the promise of the study of gene–
environment interaction is in its direction of scientific, biomedical, and public health 
attention simultaneously inward, towards the gene/genome and the interior of the body, and 
outward, towards particular practices, places and the exposures they contain and enable‖ 
(Shostak 2003: 2328, emphasis mine).  The idea that genes only matter in certain 
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environments could draw more attention to those environments, in part because the effect of 
those environments are newly ―visible at the molecular level‖ (p. 2338). Alternatively, gene-
environment interaction models may enhance the importance of both genes and environment. 
The interaction need not be theorized in a way that prioritizes genes; models can have 
environmental factors as independent variables and genotypes as moderators of the 
relationship with phenotype (e.g., Figure 1 in Caspi and Moffitt 2006). 
Some hope that if a complex genetic explanation is the most accurate model for 
disorder causation, it will prevent frustration and promote the best outcome for people with 
eating disorders.  Action would be taken only in the areas where it is most effective, 
responsibility would be apportioned only where justified.  A person with an eating disorder 
could not only be absolved of blame, more knowledgeable about risk factors, and better 
positioned to avoid relapse. With new genetic knowledge may come new obligations and 
responsibilities (Novas and Rose 2000).  Genetic counselors could help explain the meaning 
of genetic influence to affected people (though such counseling is not usually available) 
(Austin and Honer 2007).   
It is also possible that in the future, consumers will be helped by information about 
their genetic risk profile.  There is no identified ―gene for‖ eating disorders, nor (most likely) 
single genes for the eating disorder phenotypes as currently constructed, but profiles based on 
multiple genes may be developed. Such genetic profiling is already available for some 
complex conditions through direct-to-consumer marketing, complete with interpretations of 
one‘s level of risk (Harmon 2007, Gollust et al. 2003).  It is not likely that physicians will 
offer predictive testing for psychiatric conditions because it will have little power to predict 
outcomes (Hamer 2006, Feldman 2006).  If multiple genes are identified as causal factors for 
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mental illnesses, they are more likely to be useful in understanding the etiology of diagnosed 
cases and identifying the most appropriate treatment.  For example, if there are two 
theoretical pathways to an outcome, one involving a genetically-based problem with 
dopamine and the other with serotonin, a genetic test could identify which is relevant for a 
specific patient and point to the relevant pharmaceuticals (Hamer 2006).  Yager envisions 
that, in the future, predictive genetic tests could warn those at risk away from particular high 
risk environments, such as gymnastics teams (Yager 2004). Although some environmental 
causes may not be any easier to change than genetics (Parens 2004), others could be 
ameliorated through individual or collective action.  There are practical benefits to the 
complex causal model, if it is an accurate portrayal, though some of the benefits are 
contingent on identifying and replicating associations with actual genes.   
Complex genetic explanations harmonize with common sense understandings of the 
importance of both nature and nurture.  A nationally representative survey taken in the U.S. 
in 1997 found that when asked about diverse conditions and traits, a plurality of people said 
that most of them were ―somewhat‖ determined by genes, as opposed ―not at all,‖ on one end 
of the spectrum, or ―completely‖ and ―mostly‖ on the other end.  Eating disorders were not 
among those listed, but some that were – alcoholism, mental illness, neurotic behavior – may 
be similar enough to provide some guidance about what might hold in the case of eating 
disorders (reported in Singer et al. 1998).  Similar results were found for a range of mental 
illnesses in the General Social Survey in 1996, suggesting that a multifactorial model makes 
sense to many people (Link et al. 1999). These survey findings are consonant with qualitative 
studies about genetic causation for a variety of health conditions (Condit et al. 2006, Condit 
2004, Parrott et al. 2003, Lock et al. 2007). Lay people view causation as having both genetic 
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and environmental components, rather than seeing one or the other as the sole cause.  
However, people who can do this for cancer or heart disease may not do so for eating 
disorders, given that survey respondents do not typically endorse biological causal factors for 
eating disorders (Stewart et al. 2006, Holliday et al. 2005, Quiles et al. 2007). Some 
observers note that laypersons may acknowledge genes and environment but have trouble 
integrating them into a single model.  Condit found that ―participants cite examples of people 
who smoked and did not get cancer, or of people who have a family history of cancer but do 
not get sick, or who do get sick and do not smoke. No participants account for such variation 
by noting the interaction of genes and behavior or environmental factors. No one says, for 
example, ‗she smoked and didn‘t get cancer, but that is probably because she did not have a 
genetic susceptibility.‘‖ (Condit et al. 2009, also see French et al 2005). Yet it would not be 
surprising to hear someone say, ―He smoked all his life and didn‘t get cancer – I guess he has 
good genes‖ (Perrin 2007, personal communication).  Recently an eating disorders survivor 
put it this way:  ―Here's what happens: I'm highly sensitive and I'm a perfectionist. If you 
take a person like me and if you flood me with fashion model [images], then culture plays a 
really strong role in triggering an eating disorder that might otherwise be latent" (Gura 2007). 
I think this is an accessible account and am curious to see if it is widely shared. 
Despite evidence that a combination of both genetic and environmental influences 
makes sense to non-experts, there is nevertheless reason for concern about the increasing 
complexity of expert discourse. This is also true with regard to predictive testing for 
complexly caused conditions.  As Condit writes, ―[g]iven the difficulties involved in 
explaining the implications of a single genetic test, communicating the implications of 
having, for example, two risk-conferring alleles and two non-risk conferring alleles for 
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hypertension or skin cancer or osteoporosis will certainly be challenging‖ (Condit 2007: 
819).  In addition to genetic risks, there are also environmental triggers, risk factors, and 
protective factors.  For psychiatric conditions, unlike skin cancer or osteoporosis, genetic 
susceptibility may be theorized in terms of cognitive and personality traits, adding further 
complexity.  Information and even visual renderings of genetic influence on psychiatric 
disorders presented in scientific articles are daunting for nonspecialists, even those with a 
post-graduate education (e.g., Figure 2 in Gottesman and Gould 2003), and genetic 
discoveries are expected to change diagnostic definitions for mental and physical illnesses. 
Yet many articulate a need for the public to be well informed enough to provide a challenge 
to expert authority, to point out ―when the emperor has no clothes‖ (see an overview in Kerr 
et al. 2007).  Sociologists of medicalization have been concerned about the potential 
expansion of social control through medical intervention: interventions into certain behaviors 
are often justified in the name of health (e.g., Conrad 2007).  But even when there is 
consensus that a condition is indeed medical, professional commitments and disciplinary 
interests may motivate causal accounts and ought to be tempered by public oversight, which 
requires understanding of what experts are saying. 
 
6. OTHER POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO GENETIC EXPLANATIONS 
 
 The hopes and fears about simple and complex genetic explanations for a complex 
multifactorial disorder, outlined on Table 1.2 and described above, do not exhaust all 
possible reactions to the geneticization of eating disorders. They primarily reflect the 
thinking of academics and clinicians. There is reason to believe that respondents will add 
additional variation beyond that described in Table 1.2.  Their characteristics and 
experiences, such as education and length of illness, may have a bearing on how they think 
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and talk about eating disorders. I suggest three additional points to consider:  (1) people who 
do not think of eating disorders as psychiatric disorders or even as problems will likely think 
of genetics differently,  (2) people may make sense of genetic causation in ways that are not 
adequately captured by the terms ―simple‖ and ―complex,‖ (3) people may see implications 
for the genetics of personality beyond those suggested by experts, particularly because eating 
disorders can feel agentic and empowering to the person experiencing them.   
First, those who do not see eating disorders as medical problems may use genetic 
―cultural tools‖ differently than those who do. Table 1.2 reflected hopes and fears for the 
geneticization of a condition that is understood by experts to be a multifactorial psychiatric 
disorder.  I focus now on anti-medical perspectives from people with AN and the lay public, 
not feminist anti-medical perspectives described earlier. Some people with AN do not see 
themselves as having a problem or medical disorder.  As Fairburn and Harrison note (2003: 
407), ―…in anorexia nervosa there is a sustained and determined pursuit of weight loss and, 
to the extent that this pursuit is successful, this behaviour is not seen as a problem. Indeed, 
these patients tend to view their low weight as an accomplishment rather than an 
affliction…‖ (citing Vitousek et al. 1998). People with ―typical‖ AN believe they are too fat, 
whereas those with ―atypical‖ AN assent to a medical definition because they realize they are 
too thin and would like to control their symptoms (Yager 2004 citing Strober et al. 1999). 
Thus, those with ―typical‖ AN may not see their eating behavior as a medical disorder or at 
least express confusion about it.   
Studies show that people with eating disorders often resist medical understandings 
(Giles 2006, Fox et al. 2005), even when they are in treatment (Warin 2004, Rich 2006) or 
recovered (Shohet 2007, Button and Warren 2001, Weaver et al. 2005). In the internet-based 
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pro-anorexia or ―pro-Ana‖ movement, participants embrace anorexia as a lifestyle that 
provides control, stability, and a sanctuary to cope with social, psychological, and cultural 
problems (Fox et al. 2005). According to another study of pro-Ana website users, the non-
medical stance is not necessarily consistent: ―even users themselves are unsure as to whether 
they are ‗celebrating‘ their EDs, whether anorexia is a life-style choice, a medical condition, 
an illness, or a positive or a negative experience‖ (Giles 2006: 464). Even those who do try to 
preserve an anorexic identity are conflicted about it, feeling both empowered and potentially 
destroyed by it (Rich 2006).  Unlike disease advocacy groups that strive to convince others of 
the medical status of disorders like fibromyalgia and environmental illness (Barker 2002, 
2008, Kroll-Smith and Floyd 1997), pro-Ana groups seem to argue for the non-medical status 
of the behaviors. In Giles‘ study of pro-Ana websites, contributors to the site discussed 
medical diagnoses without pathologizing them. For example, one contributor with the 
residual diagnosis EDNOS (Eating Disorder Not Otherwise Specified) lamented being ―too 
much of a failure to earn a concrete diagnosis‖ (2006: 470). Moreover, it was common to 
distinguish between real and ―wannabe‖ anas or ―mias‖.  The very existence of 
―wannarexics‖ –  teenagers who strive or claim to have anorexia (Bauman 2007) – 
underscores the prevalence of non-medical views. Others may reject the classification of 
their eating behavior as a disease or mental illness but nevertheless feel that it is a problem 
(Button and Warren 2001). 
Genetic explanations for a behavior may carry a different meaning if that behavior is 
not pathologized.
17
  How would someone who somewhat embraces her eating disorder view 
                                                 
17
Although my study links geneticization and medicalization, respondents may not link genetic explanations to 
medical statuses.  As noted earlier, genetic origins can be used to normalize and naturalize behaviors, thereby 
de-medicalizing them as in the case of homosexuality (Conrad 1997: 147). Sankar and colleagues likewise 
found that genetic causal attributions had a variety of positive and negative consequences. For example, 
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information about genetic causal factors? She might resist a genetic cause if it seems to 
pathologize her behavior. Others might accept a genetic explanation for AN without 
perceiving pathology; genetic explanations for height and intelligence do not suggest 
pathology in and of themselves. Still other questions are raised: if anorexia is perceived as an 
achievement, how will genetics be incorporated?  Whether a genetic origin medicalizes 
behaviors or not, it would demote their ―achievement‖ to something programmed rather than 
chosen (Kendler 2006, Press 2006).  This may particularly trouble those who view their 
disorder as a precious source of control (Bruch 1994), or a form of ascetic religious practice 
to control the body (Banks 1992) because the genetic body would be in control of the self 
and its behavior rather than the reverse.  It seems possible also that such people might 
medicalize bingeing and purging but not food restricting, which seems more controlled, 
―pure,‖ moral, and of higher status to some people with eating disorders (Burns 2004, Giles 
2006, Hornbacher 2006). 
In a medical context, patients‘ disagreement about whether they have a psychiatric 
disorder is typically deemed denial, a lack of ―insight‖ and symptomatic of the disorder 
(David 1990).
18
  Estroff et al. state, ―Despite the dominance and authority of biomedical 
paradigms…, the nature and meaning of psychiatric disorder remains contested, particularly 
by those so diagnosed.‖ (1991: 332, Read and Harré 2001). As a sociologist I am more 
                                                                                                                                                       
deafness due to genetic causes could provoke envy by those whose deafness was due to other causes, because 
genetically deaf people had deaf family members who were supportive and understanding of their condition 
(Sankar et al. 2006). In the writings of clinicians, scientists, and advocates for eating disorders, the concept of 
genetic origins supports a medicalized understanding and is largely assumed to benefit patients. Genetics may 
signify something quite different to respondents, as might medicalized understandings more generally.  
 
18
 ―Lack of insight‖ is arguably quasi-medicalized through application of the term ―anosognosia‖ (Estroff 2005, 
Albee 2004).  Lack of ―insight‖ denies a place for alternative views and contestation: ―it contains within it an 
immediate value judgement: insight is either full/good or lacking/poor, with the implication that the latter is 
always inferior or undesirable‖ (White et al. 2000: 501). 
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interested in how people talk about the disorder and will treat alternative views of 
medicalization as contestation rather than as symptoms of illness.
19
   
Second, interpretations of genetic influence may go beyond the simple or complex 
models outlined in Table 1.2.  Respondents may understand genetics in other ways consistent 
with lay models identified in other studies (Henderson and Maguire 2000). For example, they 
may interpret heritability to mean the percentage of a person‘s behavior that is due to genes, 
and therefore how culpable the person is (Farahany 2006). They may interpret it as the 
percentage of cases due to genes, rather than the percentage of the variance explained by 
genes for a specific sample, leading to the conclusion that cases of eating disorders are either 
solely genetic or solely environmental (Goldstein 2006, Poyastro 2007). While researchers 
expect that ―[s]ome proportion of individuals may have a highly genetic form of AN, some a 
highly environmental variant, and, in others, AN may result from interactions between 
genetic and environmental influences‖ (Bulik et al. 2007: 265), the above lay interpretation 
would be a misunderstanding.  It is also possible that people will not find genetic factors 
salient or plausible based on their personal or family history (Shiloh 2006, Walter 2004, 
Cappella et al. 2005).  Some may alternate between wholly genetic and wholly 
environmental explanations depending on the context of the conversation, and their tolerance 
for cognitive dissonance.  Condit found that people grappling with gene-environment models 
sometimes alternate between the two, perhaps reflecting two unintegrated ―separate discourse 
‗tracks‘ or neural networks‖ corresponding to gene discourse and environment discourse 
(Condit et al. 2009; 731).   
                                                 
19
 However, I will not go so far as to conceptualize treatment as a form of social control or surveillance (Vogler 
1993, Bell 2006) though certainly the ―micro-politics‖ of therapy and involuntary commitment are important 
(Surgenor et al. 2003, Surgenor 2003). Although such an emphasis on social control and power is compatible 
with the theory of medicalization, I am more concerned with how the condition is defined by patients and how 
those definitions relate to their views of appropriate treatment. 
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Third, people with eating disorders might generalize geneticized understandings of 
personality and behavior in the context of a mental illness to normal personality and 
behavior. They may be aware of the continuum between ―normal‖ dieting or body concerns 
and ―abnormal‖ eating disorders (Haworth-Hoeppner 1999).  If they link the genetics of 
personality to eating disorders, they may also be aware that others with that personality type 
do not necessarily have an eating disorder. My study could assess lay understanding of the 
following intriguing prediction by Conrad:  
Recent discussion of ‗shadow syndromes‘ (Ratey and Johnson 1997) contend that 
quirky behaviors may actually be mild mental illnesses that are tied to genes.  Here 
illness and behaviors are seen on a continuum: one or two altered genes give you a 
little disorder; perhaps three or four create a serious personality problem; and seven 
give you a full-blown illness.  If geneticists found actual evidence to support the 
‗shadow syndromes‘ conception, it is possible that the psychiatric net would widen 
and medicalization increase. (2000: 326).   
 
This idea is related to endophenotypes (discussed earlier) and there is strong evidence for it 
in autism research (e.g., ―broad autism phenotype,‖ in which parents of autistic children 
display autistic-like behavior, Losh and Piven 2007). Respondents might geneticize the 
personalities of others, especially family members who are genetically related to them.  They 
may identify personality traits and medicalize them, perhaps to reduce the distance between 
themselves and those considered healthy or normal.  Geneticists have investigated the 
heritability of the ―big five‖ personality traits (OCEAN: Openness to Experience, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism) (e.g., Loehlin 1992), but 
how do lay people respond to the idea that genes are responsible for their personalities?  It 
seems unlikely that many lay people have thought about this issue deeply.  Individuals with 
eating disorders are more likely to have done so and are therefore an interesting population to 
study. 
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7. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 1 
The main questions that will be examined in this dissertation are as follows.  Do 
respondents interpret genetic influences to suggest more medicalized conceptions of eating 
disorders?  Do respondents whose thinking is already more medicalized find genetics more 
appealing and plausible than other respondents? What do respondents see as the positive and 
negative implications of the idea that genes play a role in eating disorders, and do these 
correspond with those identified by professionals and academics (summarized in Table 1.2 
above)?  Finally, how do respondents imagine genetic influence, and how do they combine it 
with other influences, if they do?  
This study has both theoretical and practical applications.  It contributes to 
medicalization theory by addressing the understudied idea of heightened medicalization and 
by defining its dimensions. If medicalization is a continuous process, it may well continue 
even after a diagnosis has been included in official medical classifications such as the DSM.  
An illness that is contested prior to inclusion in the DSM may continue to be contested 
afterwards. This appears to be the situation for many psychiatric disorders, judging from the 
lack of parity in insurance coverage for mental illnesses and widespread non-medical 
perspectives that persist despite campaigns to frame psychiatric disorders as ―brain diseases.‖  
In my proposed reconceptualization of medicalization theory, if a psychiatric disorder is 
described as biological it will heighten the medicalization of that disorder.  My study will 
illuminate how people with AN or BN grapple with the idea of genetic and other biological 
and non-biological causes, in particular how these relate to medicalized and  non-medicalized 
concepts of their disorder.   
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My focus on people diagnosed with a disorder and how they use medical and genetic 
concepts as cultural tools is also innovative for studies of medicalization.  I draw on the 
assumptions of cultural sociology and symbolic interactionism to theorize medicalization at 
the individual level.  Medicalization has tended to assume a top-down model of cultural 
transmission, in which professionals propagandize medical definitions and patients accept 
them. Recent thinking in cultural sociology and classic ideas from symbolic interactionism, 
emphasize the importance of individual agents in the construction of reality, including 
medical reality.  My interviews with current patients and recovered people sheds light on 
how individuals use medical, biological and genetic concepts to account for their eating 
disorders and related behaviors.  
My findings will contribute to a growing literature about how lay people 
conceptualize complex genetic causality.  Not enough is known about how people interpret 
genetic influence when it is one of many factors. Some may ignore them or find them 
irrelevant, but they may nevertheless have a concept of what genetic influence means.  For 
those who use genetic concepts (either with or without prompting from me), there are at least 
two genetic narratives they may draw upon, corresponding to the simple and complex models 
of genetic causality described earlier (Figure 1.1). One is the simple deterministic model: ―I 
had the gene so I got the disorder.‖ Another is the more complex susceptibility model in 
which both genes and environment matter: ―I was susceptible and then I was exposed to X so 
I got it.‖  Both models are simple compared to many sociological approaches, including life 
course and symbolic interaction, but their differences are crucial, as genes are often thought 
of in simple Mendelian terms.  Of particular interest with eating disorders is the idea that 
media imagery and other sociocultural factors contribute to the disorder.  How will 
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respondents make sense of these many potential factors? Will they reject genetic causality, 
sociocultural causality, or find ways to integrate the two?     
This study also breaks new ground by examining perceptions of complex genetic 
causality for eating disorders, which has not been done before. Medical explanations of 
genetic influence for a multifactorial physical disorder are already complex compared to 
those for a genetic disorder.  For a multifactorial psychiatric or behavioral disorder, the 
symptomatic behaviors are often assumed to be under the person‘s control, such that 
additional questions about free will or agency, individual responsibility and personality arise 
with such disorders.  How do respondents think about the idea of a genetic source or 
influence for behavior that others, or even they themselves, perceive to be volitional?  
Respondents may use genetic cultural tools to manage their identities by lessening 
responsibility, blame and stigma.  Those who do not accept a medical definition of their 
behavior may reject genetic accounts as pathologizing that behavior. The negative and 
positive implications of genetics as expressed by clinicians, academics, and others may or 
may not be relevant to diagnosed people, and this cannot be known without empirical 
research.  My sample design, described in Chapter 2, includes variation in recovery status 
and diagnosis, which may also help to generate hypotheses about individuals‘ endorsement 
or rejection of medicalization and geneticization of AN and BN. 
In addition to the theoretical applications already described, my findings will have 
practical applications. They may be useful to clinicians and others who communicate genetic 
information. In order to communicate effectively with patients, clinicians will find it useful 
to know how their patients understand and feel about genetic factors.  As noted by Crisafulli 
and colleagues (2008), ―prior to beginning any wide scale campaign highlighting the role of 
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genes in AN, it is important to consider potential unintended consequences of doing so and to 
present the message in a way that safeguards against them‖ (p. 338, also see Spriggs et al. 
2008). Health messages are more successful if they can build on existing knowledge and 
address beliefs about illness (e.g., Parrott et al. 2004, Shiloh 2006, Leventhal et al. 1984). In 
the future, clinicians will be increasingly using genetic information in their practices, whether 
simply mentioning genetic risk factors or testing genes in order to target pharmaceuticals 
(APA 2008). Because discoveries about the genetics of eating disorders are likely to be 
covered in the media, even those providers who do not subscribe to a biomedical model will 
need to address genetics, if only to answer their patients‘ questions.  People with eating 
disorders, whether diagnosed or not, will likely hear about genetic risk factors through the 
media, internet and patient-oriented literature.  With regard to practical applications, my goal 
is to identify concerns or understandings that could affect beliefs and actions related to 
treatment and recovery. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
SAMPLE AND METHODS 
 
 
So little is known about how people with eating disorders think about genetic 
causality that exploratory work is needed first, and such work is best done using qualitative 
interview methods. Open-ended questions enable respondents to use their own words and 
categories rather than being restricted to a set of response options that may not apply.  A 
flexible interview guide permits respondents to speak at length about relevant topics 
unanticipated by the interviewer. My research questions can thus be answered best using 
qualitative methods.   
 
1. SAMPLE 
 
I interviewed 25 women who were currently in treatment for AN or BN and 25 who 
had recovered (self-reported).  Those undergoing treatment were recruited through one 
hospital-based eating disorders program, and those who had recovered were recruited via a 
university-based informational mass email system.  The sample was designed to compare 
those who have recovered with those who have a current diagnosis, and those with different 
diagnostic histories. To maximize comparisons among respondents, I assessed severity by 
asking about current or past experience with inpatient, partial hospitalization, or residential 
treatment for their eating disorders. 
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1.1 Rationale for sample design 
 I divided the sample between currently diagnosed and recovered people because the 
experience of recovery could make a simple, deterministic model of genetic causality 
implausible. If there were a simple, deterministic “gene for eating disorders” how would 
recovery have been possible?  Compared to people currently diagnosed with an eating 
disorder, I anticipated that recovered people would be more likely to articulate a complex 
model of genetic causality, in which environmental factors interact with genetic propensity 
and the disorder can be overcome. It was also possible that recovered people would simply 
conclude that they must not have had “the gene” at all.   
Because severity could affect whether respondents think a genetic causal explanation 
applies to them, and therefore whether they grapple with complex or simple genetic causal 
accounts, I asked all respondents about hospitalization (inpatient or partial) for an eating 
disorder or attendance at a residential treatment center for eating disorders.  This proxy for 
severity was more relevant to AN than BN; people with severe cases of BN may not receive 
insurance reimbursement for such programs because their bodyweight is not dangerously 
low.  The subsample of currently diagnosed women was more likely to have experienced 
such programs compared to recovered women (72% and 28%, respectively; see Tables 2.2 
and 2.3 in the last section of this chapter).  
I sampled for two diagnoses, AN and BN, because different disorders may inspire 
different ideas about genetic causality.  Stigma may be different for people with different 
disorders.  To the casual observer, an emaciated person with AN is already “discredited” 
based on appearance, whereas a person of unremarkable weight who has BN is only 
“discreditable” (Goffman 1974).  People with different symptomatic behaviors may also 
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think differently about stigma, as bingeing, purging, and laxatives may seem more deviant or 
embarrassing than restricting and exercising too much. (However, because bingeing and 
purging may be part of both disorders, a comparison of diagnoses is not necessarily a 
comparison of behaviors.)  These differences in perception and experience of stigma may 
have a bearing on how people think and feel about genetic (and medical) explanations and 
how motivated they are to accept them.  
AN and BN occasionally overlapped but were not difficult to distinguish for 
respondents in my sample.  Because current or past diagnosis of AN does not exclude a past 
diagnosis of BN or vice versa (Tozzi et al. 2005), a neat comparison of the two is difficult to 
implement. Most (34 of 50) respondents in my sample only reported experiencing one, and 
those (16 of 50) who either self-reported both, or reported BN but also had a lowest lifetime 
body mass index (BMI
1
) under 18.5, did not differentiate between them enough for me to ask 
the same questions for each disorder without the interview becoming tedious.  A sampling 
method that insisted on diagnostic purity would have been flawed conceptually because such 
purity is not characteristic of eating disorders. To take one example, it would be difficult to 
find a recovered person who had “AN-only,” because she is likely to have been diagnosed 
with an EDNOS at some point during her recovery as there is no category for “AN in 
remission” (Bulik 2007).  
The comparison of disorders should be seen as a comparison between people who 
saw their diagnostic histories as “primarily AN” or “primarily BN.”  During telephone 
screening (described further below), I asked if they had ever received the other diagnosis, and 
                                                 
1
 BMI is a measure of body fat based on height and weight and has four categories (Underweight: BMI ≤18.5; 
Normal weight: BMI =18.5-24.9; Overweight: BMI = 25-29.9; Obesity: BMI≥ 30). BMI is calculated based by 
multiplying lowest weight in pounds and dividing by squared height in inches (703*weight)/inches
2
. (NHLBI 
[no date]) 
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if so, whether one affected their lives more than the other.  This simple, subjective 
assessment grouped people into categories of primarily AN and primarily BN, rather than 
exclusively one or the other.  This screening question did not force a choice between 
disorders, nor did it restrict the interview to a single disorder. Although the question about 
whether one disorder has more affected their lives can be interpreted in several ways (e.g., 
which have they had the longest, which was the most difficult, which has had the most 
consequences), I left it to respondents to define for themselves. 
 Sampling for disorder overlapped to some extent with severity, operationalized as 
time spent in inpatient, residential, or partial hospitalization treatment for eating disorders.  
Insurance reimbursement and American Psychiatric Association practice guidelines are based 
in part on bodyweight, such that a patient with low weight is more likely to be given inpatient 
or partial hospitalization treatment (APAb 2000). Because a criterion for AN is low weight, 
people with AN are more likely to have received such treatment.  Outpatients may have AN, 
BN, or EDNOS, though only those with AN and BN were eligible for my study.   
1.2 Eligibility criteria 
  To be eligible, respondents with a current eating disorder diagnosis had to be female, 
18 years of age or older, and in treatment for an eating disorder.  In addition, program 
personnel verified whether they met criteria for either AN or BN
2
 within the last 6 months 
and whether they were medically cleared for participation (the latter applies only to 
inpatients with AN). I focused female respondents for three reasons: males with eating 
                                                 
2
To expand the pool of potentially eligible people, I relaxed criteria for both disorders by including the 
following types of respondents:  women who met all criteria for AN except loss of menstruation and women 
who met all criteria for BN except that binge eating and vomiting or other compensatory behaviors occurred 
one time per week instead of two times per week. According to the DSM-IV-R, these subjects would have been 
classified as EDNOS, Eating Disorder – Not Otherwise Specified. Cynthia Bulik guided the choice about which 
criteria to relax.  
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disorders are rare enough that they would be difficult to recruit in sufficient numbers to 
represent them fairly without extending the period of data collection, their experience of 
stigma is likely to be compounded by the perception of their disorder as “female,” and 
genetic studies of eating disorders have focused on females. To be eligible, recovered 
respondents had to be female, 18 years of age or older, must have been diagnosed with AN or 
BN (or both) at some point in their lives, and must have had no active bingeing, purging or 
very low bodyweight for the last three years (Von Holle et al. 2008). Because some people 
can be considered recovered even with consistently low bodyweight or with an occasional 
lapse into purging, I described all cases of marginal eligibility to an eating disorders expert 
(Cynthia Bulik) and excluded some respondents.
3
  
Patients in the hospital-based program are normally placed in one of the three 
“stepped” treatments – inpatient, partially hospitalized, and outpatient - depending on the 
assessment of the treatment team. In addition, the eating disorders program considers people 
involved in certain “treatment studies” to be under its care.  Individuals who begin as 
inpatients can progress to partial hospitalization and then outpatient treatment according to 
the treatment team’s assessment of their needs.  There are ten beds for hospitalized 
inpatients, and their length of stay is 30-45 days, depending on their weight gain and other 
progress and depending on the limits placed on treatment by their insurance programs. Up to 
12 day program patients attend clinic programs Monday through Friday, from 8:15 am to 
6:30 pm. Outpatients and people involved in treatment studies come to the clinic for specific 
appointments. In part because the inpatient and day program are more likely to admit women 
                                                 
3
 Three women were never officially diagnosed but were told by a healthcare provider after the fact that they 
most likely had the disorder. One may never have been told by a healthcare provider. Three women had 
engaged in symptomatic behaviors or gone below a BMI of 18.5 for a short time during the last three years.  
Two women were currently at a BMI of 18.5 or slightly below but had been at that weight for decades. One 
women was at a BMI under 18.5 because of other recent physical and psychiatric conditions. 
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with AN, I also recruited women with BN through a treatment study (See Table 2.1, next 
section).  In addition, I recruited and interviewed five men with AN or BN and two women 
with binge eating disorder (BED, a diagnostic category currently under research 
investigation) for theoretical contrast purposes, but results from these seven interviews are 
not presented in this dissertation. 
1.3 Recruiting respondents 
Data collection was completed in April 2009.  I recruited recovered respondents 
through mass email first (May 22, 2008) and then recruited respondents currently in 
treatment (early June 2008). Interviews with recovered respondents and those in treatment 
for AN were completed mid-September 2008; interviews with respondents with current BN 
were completed in March 2009.  (Five men with AN or BN, and two women with BED were 
interviewed by April 2009.) Interviewing inpatients and partially hospitalized people posed 
logistical challenges and it was necessary to coordinate with clinic staff to arrange interviews 
that did not interfere with program activities.  
I did not know patients’ names unless they contacted me directly or through the clinic 
staff.  I did not have access to patients’ medical records or other information about their 
medical history.  I attended three treatment team meetings in order to learn about the clinic, 
staff and procedures.  During these meetings, staff people referred to patients by first name 
only and provided information about their physical and mental health and recent events or 
concerns. My purpose in attending the meetings was to learn about clinic life in general 
rather than to know about specific cases.  I did not attend these meetings once I began 
interviewing patients.  My notes on these early meetings did not include patient names so I 
am not aware if I heard about patients at a meeting whom I later interviewed as respondents.   
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When recruitment started, I announced my study to clinic staff prior to meetings to 
explain my study and facilitate recruitment. I did not attend treatment team meetings after 
having made the announcement in order to avoid violating patient and subject confidentiality 
by hearing information about them. Patients were informed that I would not attend treatment 
team meetings about them, nor have access to their medical records, nor discuss their 
answers with providers or others. I attended a meeting of clinical researchers nearly every 
week for more than a year to stay in contact with research and clinical staff, which greatly 
facilitated recruitment. 
Respondents from the hospital-based clinic heard about the study at the clinic. These 
prospective respondents were involved in inpatient, outpatient, partial hospitalization 
programs or treatment studies for BN and BED.  Prospective respondents saw a study flyer 
posted on a research bulletin board or heard about the study from clinic staff.  The flyer 
included information about eligibility requirements and study participation and the name and 
contact information of the clinic research coordinator, and later, me (after the research 
coordinator position was vacated). Clinic personnel gave me names and contact information 
of eligible women interested in learning more. I then contacted the prospective respondent to 
screen for eligibility, answer questions, and, review the consent form and arrange for an 
interview. Interviews with inpatients and day program patients were scheduled with the 
assistance of the nursing staff and took place on site. I arranged interviews with all 
outpatients and treatment study participants.  Consent forms were hand-delivered to the 
inpatient and day program units, and mailed or emailed to all others. 
Recovered respondents learned about the study through the university-based 
informational mass email system. This mass email was sent to female students, faculty, and 
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staff who had not opted out of receiving informational emails (the system enabled filtering by 
gender).  The subject line of the email read, “Have you recovered from an eating disorder?” 
and the body of the email read, “If so, I would like to hear your ideas about eating disorders 
and what causes them.” The email included information about eligibility requirements and 
study participation, as well as my contact information (email address, mail address and 
telephone number), and a URL (www.unc.edu/~mmeaster/recovered) for a copy of the 
consent form. Those who were interested contacted me by email, mail or telephone to 
provide their name and contact information. I contacted prospective respondents to answer 
questions, review the consent form and arrange for an interview. Respondents who had not 
been able to download the consent form from the website were mailed or emailed a copy. 
There was a risk that respondents would become distressed because of the interview.  
Some harms were minimized by recruiting currently diagnosed respondents through a 
treatment program to be sure they had a professional with whom to talk about their feelings. I 
gave currently diagnosed and recovered respondents a list of resources before beginning the 
interview so all would have somewhere to turn if they needed support after the interview. 
Although some respondents cried, none wanted to terminate the interview nor expressed 
plans of self-harm. Indeed, many respondents seemed to enjoy the interview. Thankfully, the 
Safety Protocol describing my plans in case a respondent spontaneously reported plans or 
thoughts of self-harm was never implemented.   
1.4 Conducting interviews 
I have “outsider” status among eating disordered respondents, which had advantages 
and disadvantages.  I have not had an eating disorder, so there may have been less rapport or 
trust than for an “insider.”  Because the clinic permitted and facilitated recruitment, 
 78 
 
respondents may have perceived me as an authority figure connected to the clinic, 
particularly if I were older than them. As a result, they may have avoided disclosing some 
attitudes and activities because for fear I would report them to staff (Rich 2007 reports a 
similar experience).  I took care to tell respondents during the consent process that I would 
not share their information with clinic personnel, except if they had plans or thoughts of 
harming themselves or others. My outsider status may have caused me to overlook or 
misunderstand some meanings that are based on shared knowledge, experiences, and even 
vocabulary (Rich 2007, Gremillion 2003).  This disadvantage was also an advantage because 
it caused me to notice and ask questions about taken-for-granted meanings, thereby 
transforming them into objects for analysis. In addition, I tried to give respondents the sense 
that they were experts helping me with my project. This would have been more difficult if I 
were an eating disorder patient or clinician.  I feel that my outsider status as sociologist was 
preferable to that of a psychologist or social worker because patients would be more likely to 
tell me things that differed from clinical accounts. These personal characteristics, as well as 
my female gender, white racial identity, and participation in a doctoral program, probably 
affected how respondents talked to me, what they emphasized, and what they thought 
required explanation or not. Differences between interviewers and respondents can increase 
discomfort and uncertainty at first but they can also open spaces for new understandings as 
rapport is established (Reinharz and Chase 2003). 
Interviews lasted 1½ -2 hours, were digitally recorded (with respondents’ explicit 
permission) and professionally transcribed with identifiers removed. Interviews with 
outpatients and treatment study participants were held in two private offices on campus to 
guard the confidentiality of patient participation and the information provided. Scheduling 
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took treatment needs into account; interviews were not scheduled immediately before therapy 
in order to avoid tiring patients. For inpatients and day program patients, interviews took 
place in private locations within the clinic (e.g., activity room, kitchen) during clinic hours of 
operation. All inpatient interviews took place during 2-hour blocks of free, un-programmed 
time. Because there was no free 2-hour block of time in the day program during clinic hours, 
respondents in this program missed up to one hour of occupational or recreational therapy as 
a result of participation in my study.  Recovered people were interviewed at a private 
location of their choosing, usually one of the two private offices on the University campus.    
Participants were paid $40 cash for their participation. Some interviews lasted up to 
two hours, resulting in a payrate of approximately $20 per hour depending on how long the 
interview was and whether the respondent had to pay for parking. Most interviews were 
between one and two hours but a few lasted longer. After completing the interview, I gave 
respondents the EDE-Q (Eating Disorders Examination Questionnaire), a self-administered 
paper-and-pencil questionnaire assessing eating disorder symptoms.   
1.5 Achieved Sample 
 In Table 2.1 (below), recovered respondents are grouped according to their primary 
diagnoses (self-reported at time of interview) and respondents in treatment according to their 
current diagnosis as understood by me at the time of recruitment (with one exception
4
) 
Several respondents reported experience with both AN and BN but interviews normally 
focused on one. (See Tables 2.2 and 2.3 in the last section of this chapter for more detailed 
information about respondents.)  Some self-reports of BN were at odds with diagnostic 
criteria.  A few said they had BN but had never binged and a few others reported BN in 
conjunction with very low bodyweights that could have met criteria for AN.  I suspected that 
                                                 
4
During the interview Claire said she had AN-BP rather than BN and so was reclassified as AN 
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several who claimed to have a history of both AN and BN may have used the word “bulimia” 
to mean bingeing and purging; if these behaviors accompany low bodyweight they would be 
classified as AN according to the DSM-IV. (Confusion about BN was apparent even among 
people in treatment, as when a visibly emaciated woman on the inpatient unit approached me 
to volunteer for my study, because she heard I was recruiting people with BN and thought 
she would qualify.)  I did not attempt to “correct” these self-reports.  A few recovered 
respondents had very high scores on their EDE-Q symptom questionnaire; perhaps clinicians 
would determine some to have a current eating disorder (such respondents may have been 
helped by information I provided to all respondents about local and national resources). 
Table 2.1:  Respondents’ Diagnosis, Recovery and Treatment Status (N=50)  
Frequency (Percentage) 
 Primarily AN  Primarily BN  Total 
Recovered    14   (56)   11   (44)   25 (100) 
In treatment   13   (52)   12   (48)   25 (100) 
   Inpatient     9     0     9 
   Day program     2     2     4 
   Outpatient     2      0     2 
   Treatment study     0   10   12 
Total   27  (54)   23 (46)   50 (100) 
AN= Anorexia nervosa, BN=bulimia nervosa 
 
Of 38 who responded to the mass email recruiting recovered women, 24 were interviewed.  
Eight were ineligible either because they had never been diagnosed with AN or BN, or 
because they were not recovered.  Two screened eligible but declined to schedule an 
interview. Four others were never screened; 1 declined before screening and 3 were lost to 
follow-up. Of the 24 who were interviewed, 9 did not meet every screening criterion but 
were included because in the judgment of an eating disorders specialist their self-report 
indicated recovery (described above and in footnote). I included one additional interview, 
which had been conducted as part of a course in qualitative methods, for a total of 25 
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interviews with recovered respondents. This respondent went through a second consent 
process, answered additional interview questions, completed the EDE-Q, and received the 
$40 incentive payment.  
The total number of potentially eligible people for recovered and currently diagnosed 
samples is unknown.  The recruitment email for recovered women went to 12,717 women’s 
email addresses (4933 employees, 7784 students) and may have been forwarded to others.  
For people currently in treatment or in a treatment study, there is no estimate of the number 
of potentially eligible respondents because the number of patients and their length of 
involvement in the program varies and the eating disorders program does not have these data.    
1.6  Reflections on sampling approach 
Sampling from a clinic population has advantages and disadvantages. There are many 
people with eating disorders who have not been diagnosed (Keski-Rahkonen et al. 2007), and 
many who engage in disordered eating but are below the threshold for a diagnosis.  There is 
evidence that only a minority of people with eating disorders ever seek treatment (Stewart et 
al. 2006; Fairburn et al. 1996, Keski-Rahkonen et al. 2007).  All of my respondents received 
a diagnostic label at some point and received some kind of treatment, making them different 
from the universe of people with eating disorders or disordered eating (with one exception, 
see earlier footnote in the section “Eligibility criteria”).  In addition, because clinical 
populations are likely to include more severe cases than the general population with eating 
disorders, my sample of people currently in treatment is “biased” toward severity. Such 
respondents are more likely to have other psychiatric problems, such as depression and 
anxiety (with AN and BN), and substance abuse (with BN and the bingeing-purging subtype 
of AN) (Lilenfeld 2004), along with their eating disorders: in psychological parlance, there is 
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high “comorbidity” in clinic populations.  People who have multiple disorders or illnesses are 
more likely to seek or find themselves in treatment than those with only one. Because 
eligibility for my study is based on current or past diagnosis, it is more likely to include 
people with other psychological problems. This over-representation is known as “Berkson’s 
bias” (Lilenfeld 2004: 184).  I did not exclude people with comorbid conditions.  An 
advantage of these biases is that my respondents were more likely to have thought about 
medical terms and genetic information. This is important to my study, as I am interested in 
precisely how these medical concepts are used (or not) by people with eating disorders.    
Sampling through the program had fewer disadvantages than some alternative 
sampling strategies.  A snowball sample, which starts with one person and uses her social 
network to locate others with eating disorders, also has disadvantages: respondents who are 
talking to each other about their eating disorders are likely to have similar ideas.  Eating 
disorders are rare enough that using a sampling frame such as a phonebook would be 
inefficient, and the condition is sufficiently stigmatized that approaching potential 
respondents by telephone could feel threatening and jeopardize the openness needed for 
qualitative interviews.  An alternative approach would be to advertise widely in the 
community or on the internet to reach a more diagnostically diverse population.  This 
approach has disadvantages too: respondents may not have an eating disorder and there is 
little information about the greater population from which respondents self-selected. In 
addition, for all of these alternatives there would have been a greater risk of harm to 
respondents because they may not have been receiving treatment. If some respondents find it 
difficult or even psychologically “triggering” to talk about the interview topics, it is better 
that they have a therapist or other clinician readily available to help.   
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My goal is to generalize theoretically, rather than statistically, from my sample 
(Weiss 1994).  My study will produce concepts that are theoretically generalizable, by which 
I mean concepts that are useful not only for understanding this sample but also the processes 
of medicalization and geneticization on an individual level (as opposed to a societal level) 
and from a lay perspective (as opposed to an expert perspective).  I do not make assertions 
about the distribution of views of genetics within the wider American population, people 
with eating disorders, people who have received hospital-based care for their eating 
disorders, nor even people who received care at this particular clinic. My sample is not based 
on probability and I cannot generalize statistically to a population.  Respondents will 
represent some of the variety of perspectives of clinic patients and those who are similar to 
them. As noted above, a clinic sample enabled me to focus on people who definitely have 
eating disorders, who are in the care of a therapist, and who are likely to have grappled with 
the idea of eating disorders as medical, i.e., as pathological, biological, or both (See Table 
1.1, Chapter 1).  In the hospital-based clinic from which I drew most respondents, the idea of 
genetic causal factors was not completely new to patients. According to the clinic director, all 
patients heard about the idea of a genetic causal factor for eating disorders from patient 
literature or clinic staff, and according to the clinic psychiatrist, most had already heard about 
the idea before arriving at the clinic.
5
  Although treatment did not involve individual genetic 
information, patients recruited from the clinic were more likely than the general population to 
                                                 
5
 These statements ought to allay concerns about the potential for harm in asking people with eating disorders 
about genetics. Indeed, according to one of the clinic psychologists, “Patients are more agitated by the food cart 
arriving than they would be about these questions.  I really don’t see anything in the interview that would be 
distressing, even taking into consideration the fact that our patients often can take offense at benign content. 
 The only negative reaction I have ever gotten when discussing genetics is that some patients say that they think 
it is irrelevant to their personal experience of the disorder.” This quote and other statements were personal 
communications to me but are not cited in order to avoid unnecessarily revealing the identity of the clinic.  
 
 84 
 
have heard about genetic causality from their therapists or the patient handbook.
6
 I consider 
this to be an advantage because people who are familiar with genetic and biological 
explanations are more likely to have thought about the issues in diverse ways than those who 
are not.   
My clinic sample was designed to contain diagnostic sub-groups because their 
experiences may lead to different viewpoints about eating disorders, medicalization, and 
genetics. As mentioned earlier, the experience of AN and BN may be different with regard to 
stigma.  In addition, I expected respondents to vary in their endorsement of a medical model. 
Although all respondents have been diagnosed and treated for an eating disorder at some time 
and therefore exposed to medicalized accounts and narratives, they may yet resist 
medicalized understandings, as noted earlier.  Even eating disorders therapists resist some 
medical language by avoiding the term “patient,” as I observed at a treatment team meeting 
prior to beginning data collection.   
I also expected respondents to vary in their views by severity of illness. Some 
recovered and currently diagnosed respondents were treated in an inpatient, partial 
hospitalization, or residential treatment program.  Participation in these programs is an 
imperfect proxy for severity because it also reflects access to treatment. If genetic causal 
attributions connote greater severity, a respondent with a mild case may conclude that genetic 
influence was irrelevant for her.  Those who are more severely affected may also feel that 
they have less control over the disorder, making a biological explanation more plausible.  
                                                 
6
 For example, the informational “module” given to inpatients with AN lists “family/genetic factors” first in its 
list of causes and explains that “Some of the family factors are genetic and some are due to the environment.  
For example, a family history of an eating disorder, depression, or alcoholism may have a genetic contribution.  
On the other hand, other factors, such as being harmed by other people, physically, sexually or emotionally are 
environmental factors” (p. 3 of clinic handbook for patients with AN, not cited in order to avoid revealing 
clinic’s identity).   
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Because severity could affect whether a genetic causal explanation seems relevant, it could 
affect how the respondent grapples with complex or simple genetic causal accounts.  
Only diagnosis (AN vs. BN), severity (hospitalization or residential treatment vs. 
outpatient), and recovery status (recovered vs. not) were part of the sampling design.  
Understandings about genetics and perceptions of geneticization could also vary by 
socioeconomic status and education; better educated people may be more likely to endorse a 
biological model of mental illness (Karasz 2005). Because the clinic accepted Medicaid there 
is a higher chance of variation in SES than found in a private clinic.  My sample was not 
designed to contrast socio-economic status and other demographic variables; I anticipated 
there would be enough diversity in the clinic sample for systematic comparisons of these 
subgroups.   
2. INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Qualitative methods can reveal unanticipated findings and investigate meanings and 
understandings of interview themes more fully than quantitative methods, but often must 
sacrifice uniformity of question wording and ordering in order to do so (Weiss 1994). To 
illustrate why qualitative methods are appropriate for this project, I explain why I considered 
and abandoned the idea of using the revised Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ-R) for this 
project. This questionnaire is based on Leventhal’s self-regulatory model (Leventhal et al. 
1984) and includes standardized questions with a fixed set of response options to assess 
perceptions of illness and has been used to study perceptions of eating disorders.  This 
questionnaire includes subsections that are relevant to this project:  causality (including the 
item “hereditary – it runs in my family”), control over symptoms, and expectations about 
treatment (Moss-Morris 2002). However, this questionnaire was not created specifically for 
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eating disorders and contains a number of inappropriate items.  For example, the causal 
subscale asks respondents their level of agreement on a 5-point Likert scale with 18 causes, 
many of which make sense for disorders such as cardiovascular disease or cancer, but not for 
eating disorders. Some items are nonsensical for eating disorders (smoking, pollution in the 
environment), and others are indicators or outcomes of eating disorders: “diet or eating 
habits”, “my own behavior” and “my emotional state” (IPQ-R). Not surprisingly, this causal 
subscale was found to have low internal consistency in a study of eating disorders 
perceptions (Stockford et al. 2007). To make the IPQ-R questionnaire more relevant to AN, 
Quiles (2007) added a subset of eight eating disorder specific causes, such as “media 
influence” and “need to be perfect.”  However, even this improved version is still a 
standardized fixed response questionnaire and would not allow me to understand the 
meanings and consequences of these causes for respondents, much less discover 
unanticipated themes. Standardization of questions would threaten validity at this exploratory 
stage (see Schaeffer and Maynard 2003 for a discussion of standardization).   
The order of questions asked in the interview guides was flexible, with one exception 
(see Appendix for interview guide).  If a respondent spontaneously brought up genetics 
before I asked about it, I asked general, non-directive probes, rather than following up with 
questions about genetics that appear later in the guide.  These later questions would have 
introduced concepts of genetic causality that might have affected their answers about other, 
non-genetic topics.  A few respondents knew ahead of time that there would be questions 
about genetics.  At least one inpatient reported having heard about the interview from other 
inpatients who had already participated, and one recovered person did as well. For most 
interviews, I asked questions in the order of the interview guide (see Appendix). 
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The guide was flexible in the wording of questions to adjust to what respondents told 
me. As Charmaz has written, “Questions must both explore the interviewer’s topic and fit the 
participant’s experience” (2003: 315).  In interviews, I was sensitive to the respondent’s own 
view of her eating disorder and avoided imposing a different view through my vocabulary.  
Before the interviews, I was concerned that some respondents might object to the term 
“eating disorder”, but this did not happen.  With all respondents, I tried to elicit their 
perspectives and avoid terminology that could influence their answers or reduce rapport.   
My interviewing technique was not as flexible as some other qualitative approaches.  
If qualitative and quantitative methods are on a continuum, my approach was toward the 
structured, quantitative end.  Because my analysis (described below) involved a direct 
comparison of respondents’ answers to specific questions, I was less inclined toward 
flexibility than some qualitative researchers.  I wanted everyone to answer most of the 
questions, except for probes designed only to fill out an incomplete answer.  In addition, 
because this project was primarily about the meanings of genetic explanations for behavior, I 
introduced these concepts in a later part of the interview even if they were not already part of 
the respondents’ consciousness.  
The interview was in eight parts. The following description of the interview guide is 
based on the guide for currently diagnosed patients; the version for recovered people is in the 
past tense.  (The interview guide submitted with the dissertation proposal was shortened to 
generate an average interview of about an hour and a half.) 
(1) Background questions.  To begin the interview, I asked respondents easy-to-
answer questions about their age, education, etc.  I confirmed with the respondent her 
diagnosis and asked if she had ever received any other eating disorder diagnosis.  While these 
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were short-answer questions and ran the risk of “training” the respondent to give short 
answers to future open-ended questions, they were useful for establishing rapport at the start 
of the interview. In subsequent sections the wording of questions and the use of probes let the 
respondent know that longer answers were preferred.  
(2) Personal experiences with eating disorders, with attention to causality.   This 
section began with very general questions asking the respondent for her thoughts about what 
AN (or BN) is, and how it began for her.
7
  I was as non-directive as possible in eliciting this 
history in order to get at the respondent’s own narrative of illness.8 These general questions 
also helped the respondent start talking about her experience in general terms and provided 
jumping-off points for questions about causality.  I asked respondents what they thought 
were causal factors, risk factors, or contributing factors, and why the eating disorder started 
when it did.
9
  I asked if she thought she had been at risk for an eating disorder compared to 
other people she knew; previous research on genetic causality suggests that this framing of 
                                                 
7
 I found this to be a better opening than two alternative strategies, one that was too broad – “tell me about your 
eating disorder” – and the other that seemed at odds with most respondents’ experience – “how do you talk 
about your eating disorder to other people.” Many avoided talking about it with others, as might be expected 
with a psychiatric diagnosis.  Because the reasons why a person might want to hide their disorder are relevant to 
the stigma and conceptualization of eating disorders, I worked this question in when it felt more comfortable to 
do so.   
 
8
 Narratives are “interpretive devices, through which people represent themselves, both to themselves and to 
others” (Lawler 2002: 242).  Many of my research questions implicitly involve narratives because they are 
about causes and how they influence outcomes.  Eliciting a narrative early in the interview, before any specific 
questions about cause, enabled me to minimize my influence on the narrative created. Despite such efforts, 
patients being interviewed are giving accounts of their own behavior for particular audiences (including the 
interviewer) and may be motivated to talk about some things and hide others. Their sense of what is a socially 
desirable and convincing account was likely influenced by their impressions of me. 
 
9
 These two questions are adapted from Arthur Kleinman’s questions for uncovering explanatory models 
(1980). Several of these questions assume that respondents would agree they have a problem, which may not be 
the case for people with AN. I do not claim that these questions necessarily uncover explanatory models 
because respondent answers are also a way of accounting for themselves in a particular interview situation 
(Scott and Lyman 1968, Estroff et al. 1991, Young 1982, Groleau et al. 2006), and/or “constitute an imaginative 
attempt to find a legitimate and meaningful place for [the disorder or disease] in their lives” (Lawton 2003, 
describing Williams 1984).  I have adapted the original questions to make sense for eating disorders and to 
encourage respondents to think not only about cause but also risk factors, which are important in 
conceptualizing genetic causality and may not be elicited with standard questions about cause (French et al. 
2005). 
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the question is more likely to elicit ideas about genetics than exclusively causal language 
(French et al. 2005).  To get at causality in yet more ways, I asked whether the eating 
disorder could have been prevented, and whether there are things that make the eating 
disorder worse or reoccur. I did not introduce specific contributing factors (e.g., genetics, 
gender) until later in the interview.  During this part of the interview, I elicited the broad 
outlines of the respondent’s experience with treatment, the number of times she had been 
hospitalized (if any), and information for calculating the lowest BMI for respondents with a 
history of AN. 
 (3) Perceptions of eating disorders In this section, I elicited the respondent’s 
perceptions of eating disorders as well as her sense of others’ perceptions of eating disorders. 
Because the respondent may not have had a medicalized understanding of her condition, I 
asked how she felt about having had an eating disorder, and (later in the section) whether and 
how eating disorders had been a problem for her.  A question on preferred terminology was 
included but yielded little because respondents were comfortable with the official 
classifications (e.g.,  “anorexia”).  To get at self-presentation, I asked how she tended to 
explain it to others when she had to, and if she preferred not to, why.  I inquired about others’ 
reactions, including unwanted reactions, wrong ideas and stereotypes about eating disorders.  
I asked how she would ideally want people to understand eating disorders. 
(4) Reactions to specific ideas about eating disorders  Here I asked respondents to 
react to seven different ways of viewing eating disorders. The respondent was told that some 
options might seem obviously true or false and her honest reaction was requested.  I asked, 
“How do you react to the idea of [AN/BN] as a...” and inserted the following terms one at a 
time:  psychological problem, mental illness, brain disease, physical illness, choice, lifestyle, 
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and problem with our society or culture.  I probed their reactions to mental illness, brain 
disease, and choice in particular, to find out what aspects of the eating disorder made these 
terms appropriate or not.  I then inquired about whether there were other ways of thinking 
about eating disorders that seemed accurate and followed up about models they had 
mentioned that were not among the seven (such as addiction). I asked how they themselves 
preferred to think of eating disorders and whether their views had changed over time. Last, I 
asked those with a diagnosis of AN if they saw BN any differently, and vice versa.     
 (5) Specific causes. This set of questions focused on specific causally relevant areas 
that respondents may not have mentioned before: gender, biology, and genetics.  I began by 
surfacing any remaining ideas about causality before introducing specific ideas, by asking if 
there were any other important causal factors, even if they were not personally relevant.  I 
asked, “are some kinds of people more likely to develop eating disorders than others?” and, 
“are there some situations, settings, and environments that make people more likely to 
develop eating disorders?” Following this, I asked for more of their ideas about social and 
cultural causes, introduced already as one of the seven models of eating disorders, and asked 
specifically why more women and girls develop eating disorders compared to men and boys.  
Before asking about genetics directly, I told the respondent, “Some say there are 
biological causes, where something in your body or brain could make you more likely to 
have [AN/BN],” and asked what they had heard.  This question was designed to bring to the 
surface any thoughts about genetics before asking the same question again, this time 
specifying “genetic causes, where something about your genes could make you more likely 
to have [AN/BN]”.  I asked for their reaction to this idea, probing for negative or positive 
emotional reactions, and how plausible or relevant it seemed. I explained that I had several 
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more questions about genetics and reassured them that I did not expect them to know correct 
answers but was interested in their best guesses about how genes might be involved in eating 
disorders.  Would everyone with those genes develop [AN/BN]? Does everyone with the 
disorder have those genes? What makes more sense, genes for [AN/BN] specifically, or 
genes for something more general that influences it? What would the more general thing be?  
I also asked for their reactions to the idea that genes could affect one’s temperament or 
personality, making [AN/BN] more likely.  All questions about genetics as a causal factor 
were framed as hypothetical and under investigation in order to minimize geneticization of 
eating disorders by my research (Brunger & Cox 2000, as cited by Cox & Starzomski 2004). 
(6) Hypothetical scenario 1:  Media campaign. To elicit ideas about the implications 
of genetic conceptions, I asked respondents to imagine there were a media campaign to 
promote the idea that genetics play some role in the development of eating disorders.  I said 
that this might involve posters saying “Genes matter for eating disorders” and asked what the 
reaction might be. I probed about possible good or bad effects for people with AN or BN. 
(7) Hypothetical scenario 2: Test for genetic predisposition. In this section I focused 
on the complex model of genetic causality, in which genes predispose a person to eating 
disorders.  This section came last, after I had already explored fully the respondent’s ideas 
about genetic causation with minimal influence from me.  This section enabled exploration of 
the meaning and implications of genetic susceptibility or genetic risk factors. In order to 
make the conversation less abstract, I asked respondents to imagine that there were a test to 
assess their genetic predisposition, and consider whether they would want it.
10
  In the 
                                                 
10
 A flaw of this question is that it does not accommodate an important lay theory of genetic causality in eating 
disorders, namely that genetics may predispose them to a broad range of disorders, of which AN and BN are 
only one possibility.  Asking them about a predictive test for AN or BN would suggest genes that are 
specifically linked to one of these disorders. Thus, while the question had been designed to get at complex 
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preamble I provided explicit information to discourage a deterministic view:  “Because both 
genes and environment play a role, it is not likely that a genetic test could ever predict 
whether a person will develop an eating disorder. There is no test at this time. But for a 
moment let’s say you could get a genetic to find out if your genes made you more likely to 
develop [AN/BN]. Would you want to know?”  They were then asked if they would prefer to 
find out they did or did not have a genetic predisposition.  I then asked them to imagine that 
they found out they had been at a high genetic risk for an eating disorder and how this would 
change their and others’ views on eating disorders, including causes, treatment, recovery, and 
genetic family members, and responsibility.  
(8) Closing questions  To conclude the interview with a general question that was still 
relevant to interview themes, I asked, “If you were giving advice to someone with [AN/BN] 
about how to think about it, what advice would you give?”  I followed by asking what kind 
of research they would be interested in learning about and what advice they might have for 
treatment providers.  I concluded with a few questions to assess the interview questions and 
how they felt about the interview. 
After every interview, I administered the EDE-Q questionnaire to assess eating 
disorder symptoms.
11
 In sociology, the self-report of diagnosis by a healthcare provider 
would be sufficient to describe my sample, but to make my research potentially useful to 
psychologists and other clinicians, I provided objective information about eating disorder 
symptoms of both currently diagnosed and recovered people (Bulik 2008, personal 
communication).  I chose the self-report paper version rather than the in-person interview 
                                                                                                                                                       
causality by focusing on the probabilistic nature of genetic influence, it inadvertently channeled genetic 
causality into a narrow “gene for” model, albeit probabilistic. 
 
11
 This questionnaire was originally included as an appendix but removed because making it publically available 
could detract from its utility as a clinical instrument.  
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version (Cooper and Fairburn 1987) because stigmatized behavior tends to be more 
accurately reported when the mode of data collection distances the interviewer and 
respondent (Lyberg and Kasprzyk 2004 [1991]). The self-report also enabled me to avoid 
taking the role of clinician (Kleinman 1980). Because the questionnaire reflects a 
medicalized view of eating disorders that could influence respondent answers, I administered 
it after the interview was over. Several respondents ran out of time at the interview, 
completed it apart from me, and returned it to me later by mail.  I informed respondents that 
they could skip any uncomfortable questions in the in-person interview and questionnaire.  In 
a study comparing the EDE (Eating Disorder Examination) administered by a clinician with 
the self-administered EDE-Q questionnaire, the self-administered version had higher reports 
of binge eating and concerns about shape, though this may be because self-reporters had too 
expansive a definition of what constituted a binge and loss of control (Fairburn and Beglin 
1994). A recent assessment of the EDE-Q found that it had satisfactory internal consistency 
(Peterson et al. 2007) The EDE-Q has 36 items and takes less than 15 minutes to assess 
frequency and severity of key eating disorder symptoms. (See Table 2.3 and discussion in the 
next section for more information.) 
3. STRATEGIES FOR ANALYSIS 
I analyzed transcripts and my own fieldnotes in several stages. The first stage of 
analysis was note-taking during review of transcripts and fieldnotes for accuracy and to 
remove identifiers. When transcripts and fieldnotes were entered into N6 (QSR 2002), I 
began coding, that is, I identified and tagged material relevant to my research questions.  I 
also coded material that seemed important even if it did not relate to my original research 
questions. In addition, I coded simple information such as demographics, answers to yes/no 
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questions, the location of structured questions in the transcripts, and whether genetics were 
mentioned spontaneously before I asked about it. While coding I also created theoretical 
memos to record surprising observations, new hypotheses, and ideas for future coding. 
At the second stage I compiled or disaggregated these codes into categories. I 
reviewed codes for consistency when an exact count was important, as for statistical testing 
(e.g., the index capturing endorsement of medicalized terms for describing eating disorders in 
Chapter 4). I collapsed some specific codes into broader thematic codes (e.g., coding to 
describe how respondents spoke about “mental illness” and “brain disease”, also in Chapter 
4).  I also approached analysis by considering one code, or a single section of the interview 
(e.g., all reactions to the term “psychological problem,” in Chapter 4, or all material after 
genetics were introduced, covered in Chapters 5 and 6), then categorizing common or 
conceptually important sub-themes without formally coding or counting them. 
At the third stage, I examined whether selected codes and categories were correlated 
with other codes, categories, or respondent characteristics.  For example, I present statistical 
analyses using Stata (StataCorp 2007) of whether people who are currently in treatment are 
more likely to endorse medicalized terms (Chapter 4), and whether people who endorse 
medicalized terms are more likely to have a positive view of genetics (Chapter 5).  
 
4. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE  
 
Demographic characteristics of the achieved sample of 50 women are summarized in Table 
2.2 below. 
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Table 2.2. Demographic Characteristics of Sample.  Frequency (%) or Mean (standard 
deviation) (range)  N=50  
 All Recovery status Diagnosis 
 (n=50) Recovered 
(n=25) 
In 
treatment 
(n=25) 
Anorexia 
nervosa 
Bulimia 
nervosa 
Age: mean  
   (min, max) 
32.7 (12.8)  
(18-64) 
36.0 (12.6)  
(20-58) 
29.4 (12.4) 
(18-64) 
35.8 (14.4) 
(19-64) 
29.1 (9.7) 
(18-52) 
Race/ancestry/ethnicity  
   White/European desc. 
   Black/African descent 
   Asian descent 
   Hispanic/Latino  
 
42 (84) 
  4   (8) 
  2   (4) 
  2   (4)  
 
22 (88) 
  2   (8) 
  1   (4) 
  0   (0)  
 
20 (80) 
  2   (8) 
  1   (4) 
  2   (8) 
 
24 (89) 
  1   (4) 
  2   (7) 
  0   (0) 
 
18 (78)  
  3 (13) 
  0   (0) 
  2   (9) 
Education 
   H.S. dipl or less 
   Some college/Assoc. 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Some grad./Master’s 
   PhD or MD 
 
  2   (4) 
19 (38) 
  8 (16) 
18 (36) 
  3   (6) 
 
  0   (0) 
  8 (32) 
  3 (12) 
13 (52) 
  1   (4) 
 
  2   (8) 
11 (44) 
  5 (20) 
  5 (20) 
  2   (8) 
 
  2  (8) 
10 (37) 
  3 (11) 
12 (44) 
  0   (0) 
 
  0   (0) 
  9 (39) 
  5 (22) 
  6 (26) 
  3 (13) 
Marital 
   Single 
   Married/partnered 
   Divorced/separated 
   Widowed 
 
31 (62) 
15 (30) 
  2   (4) 
  2   (4) 
 
11 (44) 
12 (48) 
  2   (8) 
  0   (0) 
 
20 (80) 
  3 (12) 
  0   (0) 
16   (8) 
 
16 (59) 
  8 (30) 
  1   (4) 
2   (7) 
 
15 (65) 
  7 (30) 
  1   (4) 
  0   (0) 
Children  
   None 
   One or more  
      # Children (range) 
 
39 (78) 
11 (22) 
   (1-5) 
 
17 (68) 
  8 (32) 
(1-5) 
 
22 (88) 
  3 (12) 
(1-3) 
 
20 (74) 
  7 (26) 
(1-3) 
 
19 (83) 
  4 (17) 
(1-5) 
Employment status 
   Unemployed 
   Employed 
   Retired 
   Disabled 
   Primarily a student 
 
  4   (8) 
23 (46) 
  2   (4) 
  3   (6) 
18 (36) 
 
  0   (0) 
16 (64) 
  0   (0) 
  1   (4) 
  8 (32) 
 
  4 (16) 
  7 (28) 
  2   (8) 
  2   (8) 
10 (40) 
 
  2   (8) 
10 (37) 
  2   (8) 
  3 (11) 
10 (37) 
 
  2   (9) 
13 (57) 
  0   (0) 
  0   (0) 
  8 (35) 
Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding 
 
The mean age of respondents was 33, with recovered people and those with AN tending to be 
older (36 for both groups) than those in treatment and those with BN (29 for both groups).  
My sample was predominantly white (84%) and relatively well-educated (58% had a BA or 
above).  Recovered respondents tended to have attained a higher level of education than 
those in treatment; the modal category for recovered respondents was “some graduate school 
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or master’s degree” (52%) and for those in treatment it was “some college or associate 
degree” (44%). Over half of respondents were single, and those in treatment were 
disproportionately so (80%) compared to those who had recovered (44%).  Most respondents 
had no children (78%), but more recovered people had one or more (32%) compared to those 
in treatment (12%).  With regard to employment, a plurality of respondents were employed 
(46%), with more recovered respondents employed (64%) than those in treatment (28%).  
Other than age (noted above), demographic characteristics were not markedly different for 
those with AN compared to BN.  
 Table 2.3 illustrates respondent characteristics related to eating disorders, subdivided 
by recovery status.  Respondents were fairly evenly distributed among four categories 
describing treatment history, ranging from little or no treatment to two or more highly 
structured programs (such as an inpatient stay or residential treatment facility).  Recovered 
respondents had gone through less treatment than those currently receiving treatment; the 
distribution of responses for the two groups are nearly reversed.  This inverse relationship 
was statistically significant (p=.017, Fisher’s exact test) and it will therefore be difficult to 
distinguish and interpret the effects of either variable in bivariate analyses. Those with AN 
compared to BN were more similar with regard to treatment, though those with AN had more 
often been involved in two or more highly structured programs (41%) compared to those 
with BN (13%) (not shown, and I do not present other characteristics subdivided by 
diagnosis because the symptoms of those with AN and BN are already known to differ).   
Most respondents reported a body mass index (BMI) below 18.5 at some point in their lives 
(71%) and this did not differ by recovery status, though the mean lowest lifetime BMI for 
those currently in treatment was lower (14.10) than those who had recovered (15.38). As 
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would be expected, assessments of current symptoms using the EDE-Q instrument showed 
lower scores for recovered respondents than those in treatment (see legend of Table 2.3 for 
further information on the EDE-Q).  This difference by recovery status was apparent in all 
four subscales (dietary restraint, eating concern, shape concern, and weight concern) and 
measures of self-reported behavior (vomiting, laxative use, diuretic use, “exercising hard,” 
and binge eating).   
Table 2.3.  Eating Disorder Severity and Symptoms for Women with AN or BN (n=50) 
Categorical variables: frequency (%); Continuous variables: usually Mean (S.D.) (range)   
 All (n=50) Recovered 
(n=25) 
In treatment 
(n=25) 
Treatment experience* 
   Little or no treatment 
   Outpatient treatment 
   One structured program 
   Two or more structured prog. 
 
10 (20) 
15 (30) 
11 (22) 
14 (28) 
 
  7 (28) 
11 (44) 
  4 (16) 
  3 (12) 
 
  3 (12) 
  4 (16) 
  7 (28) 
11 (44) 
BMI<18.5 ever in lifetime** 
   No 
   Yes 
      Mean lowest BMI (S.D.)     
     (range) (Yes answers only) 
 
14 (29) 
35 (71) 
   14.76 (2.39)  
   (8.92-18.29)   
 
  6 (25) 
18 (75) 
   15.38 (1.81) 
   (11.37-18.29) 
 
  8 (32) 
17 (68) 
   14.10 (2.79)     
   (8.92-18.29) 
EDE-Q (last 28 days)*** 2.86 (1.76) 
(0.43-5.86) 
1.50 (1.18) 
(0.43-5.05) 
4.23 (1.01) 
(1.61-5.86) 
   Dietary restraint subscale  
 
2.41 (1.94) 
(0-6) 
1.22 (1.27) 
(0-5) 
3.60 (1.77) 
(0-6) 
   Eating concern subscale 
 
2.12 (1.83) 
(0-5.75) 
0.64 (0.85) 
(0-3.2) 
3.61 (1.23) 
(1.2-5.75) 
   Shape concern subscale 
 
3.51 (1.91) 
(0.25-6) 
2.00 (1.43) 
(0.25-6) 
5.02 (0.81) 
(3.25-6) 
   Weight concern subscale 
 
3.42 (1.87) 
(0.25-6) 
2.13 (1.54) 
(0.25-6) 
4.71 (1.14) 
(2-6) 
   Vomiting 
     No 
     Yes 
        Median # times            
        (range)**** 
 
37 (74) 
13 (26) 
15   
(1-425)  
 
25 (100) 
  0 (0) 
N/A 
 
12 (48) 
13 (52) 
15  
(1-425) 
   Laxatives 
     No 
     Yes 
        Mean # times (S.D.)  
       (range) 
 
43 (86) 
  7 (14) 
4.86 (3.58)  
(0-10) 
 
25 (100) 
  0     (0) 
N/A 
 
18 (72) 
  7 (28) 
4.86 (3.58)  
(0-10) 
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   Diuretics  
     No 
     Yes 
        Mean # times (S.D.)   
       (range) 
 
48 (96) 
  2   (4) 
8.00 (4.24)  
(5-11) 
 
24 (96) 
  1 (0) 
  5 
N/A 
 
24 (96) 
  1   (4) 
11 
N/A 
   Exercising hard 
     No 
     Yes 
        Mean # times (S.D.)  
       (range) 
 
33 (66) 
17 (34) 
10.41 (8.19) 
(1-25) 
 
20 (80) 
  5 (20) 
10.00 (8.28)  
(3-20) 
 
13 (52) 
12 (48) 
10.58 (8.52)  
(1-25) 
Episodes of binge eating  
       Mean score (S.D.) 
       (range)  
 
1.22 (1.85)  
(0-6) 
 
0.36 (1.04)  
(0-5) 
 
2.08 (2.10)  
(0-6) 
AN=Anorexia nervosa, BN=Bulimia nervosa, S.D.=standard deviation 
*Treatment experience variable based on interview coding, rather than a standard question with fixed response 
options. “Structured program” refers to psychiatric hospitalization for an eating disorder (not for symptoms like 
dehydration), or participation in a residential program, or structured day program.  “Outpatient treatment” refers 
to any other kind of treatment. The “little or no treatment” category encompasses to people who were diagnosed 
only after recovering from the eating disorder, who mentioned dropping out of treatment after a short time, who 
mentioned counseling for another condition unrelated to the eating disorder, or who had just entered the BN 
treatment study as it was starting.  
**BMI was calculated based by multiplying lowest weight in pounds and dividing by squared height in inches 
(703*weight)/inches
2
.  Questions about height and lowest weight were asked of people with BN only if context 
suggested that there might have been two diagnoses or confusion about diagnosis (e.g., person who has AN 
reports having BN because of purging). N=49 because Carol was a child when she had AN and did not know 
her lowest BMI. 
***EDE-Q= Eating Disorders Examination Questionnaire.  The EDE-Q rating scheme is based on frequency 
and severity ratings ranging from 0 (feature is absent) to 6 (feature is constant/severe).
12
 The four subscales are 
listed below the EDE-Q global score, which is the total divided by four.   Dietary restraint subscale was based 
on the sum of questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, divided by 5. Eating concern subscale was based on the sum of 
questions 6, 7, 9, 15, and 34 divided by 5. Shape concern subscale was based on the sum of questions 10, 11, 
12, 13, 30, 33, 35, and 36 divided by 8.  Weight concern subscale was based on the sum of questions 14, 29, 31, 
32 divided by 4. For respondents with missing data for one or more questions on a subscale, I added values for 
the existing answers and divided by the number of existing answers. 
****There was one outlier reporting 425 on this variable. 
 
 Looking ahead to bivariate analyses in Chapters 4 and 5, it is notable that recovered 
respondents had markedly different treatment experiences from those currently in treatment.  
This most likely reflects different recruitment strategies for the two groups: those in 
treatment were recruited through a hospital-based program and those who had recovered 
received a mass email through their affiliation with work or school.  Ideally I would have 
                                                 
12
The two sets of response options for frequency were (A) 0 – no days, 1 – 1-5 days, 2 – 6-12 days, 3 – 13-15 
days, 4 – 16-22 days, 5 -- 23-27 days, 6 – every day, and (B) 0 – none of the times, 1 – a few of the times, 2 – 
less than half the times, 3 – half the times, 4- more than half the times, 5-most of the time, 6-every time.  
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recruited recovered respondents through the same clinic, but this was not possible.  
Therefore, hypothesized effects of the experience of recovery as an influence on genetic 
ideas cannot easily be assessed, if at all, because those who recovered also received less 
treatment. In addition, if those who received less treatment appear to differ in their 
interpretation of genetics, this will be difficult to interpret, because receiving less treatment 
could be a proxy either for having a less severe case or receiving less exposure to 
medicalized concepts.  For these reasons, I will qualify all claims about the effects of 
recovery status or extensive treatment experience on respondents’ views of genetics. 
 The next chapter examines the first question of the thesis, what do people with eating 
disorders believe to be the causes of AN and BN?  
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
COMPLEX CAUSATION AND AMBIGUOUS AGENCY:  
PERCEPTIONS OF HOW AND WHY EATING DISORDERS DEVELOP 
 
 
How do people account for the development of their eating disorders? The interviews 
revealed that it is not a simple matter of causes leading directly to an eating disorder.  Rather, 
respondents included complex combinations of contributors interacting over time, usually 
featuring some degree of individual control or agency.  Both of these – complex causation 
and uncertain agency – make it difficult to think of eating disorders as exclusively medical 
phenomena.   
I begin with a discussion of some challenges in coding causation for this project. I 
then illustrate complex causal accounting by presenting some of the most common ways 
people talked about the development of their eating disorders.  Subsequently I present causal 
factors that may be particularly relevant to the meanings and implications of genetic theories 
for respondents.  Because respondents discuss causation in a way that implicates their own 
agency, defined generally as the individual exerting control, making decisions, choosing, or 
taking action, I examine language that implies agency, a lack of agency, and something in 
between.  Finally, I touch upon the importance of agency as respondents consider how they 
would ideally like others to view eating disorders. Throughout this project, I will use the 
word “cause”, “causal factor”, and “contributing factor” interchangeably and to encompass 
many different kinds of influence. 
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1.  APPROACHING THE CATEGORIZATION OF CAUSES   
The categorization of causes in this chapter requires some explanation and history. 
When beginning this research, I was interested in how broad categories of causes might be 
pitted against each other: biological forces vs. social forces and individual agency.  If 
biological forces get center stage, do they push social forces to the wings, and change the 
politics of who ought to be held responsible? Do biological forces appear to remove 
individual agency?  I developed three broad codes to describe the types of causes mentioned 
by respondents: “environmental”, which included anything that was clearly external to the 
individual; “biological”, which included anything about the material body or brain; and 
“individual”, which was created to capture diverse material that was neither external nor 
biological and was located in the individual.  The latter code included statements about 
individual agency and personality, as well as thoughts, feelings, and beliefs cited as causal 
factors.  When I began coding, I already knew I wanted to capture statements about 
environmental and biological causation. I created the “individual” code after reading 
transcripts. 
I found, however, that when respondents spoke of causes they could not usually be 
categorized in this simple way.  Frequently, a causal factor implied two or even all three 
categories.
1
  For example, respondents often spoke about a felt imperative to control their 
weight as a causal factor. It was not uncommon to cite some aspect of the body as a 
contributing factor (coded as “biological”), and discuss dissatisfaction with it (coded as 
“individual”), and describe social contexts that promoted or intensified this dissatisfaction 
(coded as “environmental”).  Similarly, coping with stress incorporated elements of 
                                                 
1
 This observation may be useful in thinking through the partitioning of variance in twin studies between 
genetic and environmental contributions. 
102 
 
“individual” and “environmental” factors.  The code for “individual” included a wide 
diversity of phenomena, including psychological characteristics (e.g., low self-esteem, being 
depressed), desires or preferences (e.g., wanting to lose weight), interpretations (e.g., 
thinking that Dad left the home because the respondent was overweight), and agency. Many 
respondents thought of the eating disorder as a coping strategy or coping “mechanism” to 
deal with problems in their environment. Thus, the behaviors they adopted were influenced 
by the environment as well as some individual predilection or choice, and were combined 
into the concept of coping strategy, which cannot be reduced to either one.  Coping strategies 
and other compound causes will be described in more detail in the next section. 
Some causal factors seemed particularly likely to have a bearing on how respondents 
think and feel about genetics.  All the material presented in this chapter appeared well before 
the idea of genetic causation or other specific causal factors were introduced in the interview. 
This early material is the best view I have of their pre-existing ideas, relatively free of 
influence from me.  Some of the ideas appeared to be more fertile ground for genetics than 
others (a proposition that is tested in later chapters).  
Discussions of causation were elicited by specific questions but also occurred 
spontaneously in other sections of the interview.  All the material described in this chapter 
appeared not only before I brought up genetics, but also before I asked them to react to 
specific models of eating disorders (e.g., as mental illness) because these models frequently 
prompted respondents to think of new causes. (I refer to these questions about specific 
models as “reaction terms” and “reaction questions” as a convenient shorthand for the rest of 
the chapter.) The questions encompass themes that go well beyond some narrow definitions 
of cause. Specifically, I asked them how their eating disorder began; what causal factors, risk 
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factors, or other factors might have contributed to it; why it started when it did, why they 
might have developed the eating disorder as opposed to other people they knew, and whether 
it could have been prevented in some way.  The purpose of this breadth was to bring to the 
surface any existing ideas about biological predisposition, as well as environmental factors.   
2.  COMMON, COMPLEX, AND COMPOUND CAUSES 
Respondents‟ causal accounting included many different kinds of causal factors 
operating in conjunction with each other across time. Several said that their stories changed 
over time as they learned new things about themselves and about eating disorders.  
Sometimes they expressed uncertainty about whether something they cited was actually 
important.  In the following I present three categories of causal factors presented by 
respondents: valorization of thinness, response to stressors or other problems, and factors that 
encourage the maintenance of the eating disorder. I organized commonly-cited causal factors 
into these three categories because the categories are general enough to encompass a great 
deal of variation.  I do not report frequencies for causal factors and offer them primarily as 
background to illustrate the range and variety of causal accounting.  These also help prepare 
the reader for subsequent discussion of individual agency and lack of agency in eating 
disorders. 
2.1 Valorization of thinness 
Most respondents described concerns about their weight or size as a contributing 
factor to their AN or BN.  This was inseparable from their own valorization of thinness, and 
often closely tied to people and environments that valorized thinness. After a brief 
description of weight concern, I present in greater depth the most commonly mentioned 
contexts in which thin body size and shape were prized. 
104 
 
Almost all respondents reported a conscious desire to lose weight or avoid gaining 
weight.  For most, this desire began as a result of being overweight or gaining weight 
themselves, and was identified as one of the causes of the eating disorder because it was the 
reason to begin dieting, purging and other eating disorder behavior.  They reported being 
“pudgy”, “chunky” or “chubby” as a child and resolving to lose weight as they got older; 
some resolved to lose weight in order to avoid becoming as overweight as a parent.  Several 
talked about gaining weight as an adolescent or adult as a result of puberty, pregnancy, birth 
control pills, injury (inability to exercise), or over-eating due to stress, which prompted them 
to take action in the form of restricting, exercising, and purging.   
Some were not overweight but nevertheless came to desire weight loss.  Some 
inadvertently lost weight and then adopted it as a goal.  For example, Barbara lost weight 
because she began to play a new sport. When the season was over, she dieted and exercised 
to compensate for anticipated weight gain.  Lynn lost weight because she had very little 
money for food during graduate school.  Gillian began restricting because of a phobia about 
throwing up. As a result she lost weight and found that being smaller helped her avoid 
bullying. Willa consciously valued the extreme thinness of models and aspired toward that 
ideal, even though she was not overweight. 
The concern about weight reflected a social valorization of thinness, in respondents‟ 
estimation.  Respondents spoke about monitoring and evaluation of weight by “society” 
generally, family members, and in athletic and performing arts contexts.  Some linked it to 
gender, others did not.   
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For example, Ingrid describes the general valorization of thinness in “our society”, 
particularly among peers at her school. As someone who was “heavy” and “chubby” she 
developed a fear of food as an “enemy” because she associated it with abuse from her peers. 
… you‟re trying so hard to get away from the enemy that made you so fat. And, made 
you suffer as a result of that. And, by suffer I mean not just physiologically. But, 
emotionally. Socially. And, so forth. Fat is not fun. And, fat is not a sociable or 
likeable attribute to have. And, in our society anybody who is overweight is not 
considered worth even talking to. So, the thinner you got, the more – you would 
equate being thin with being popular. And, I was a hundred and seventy pounds when 
I was twelve years old. And, at four ten that‟s a hefty size. And so, I went on this diet 
with a doctor who – I mean I went through emotional and verbal and physical abuse 
as a child from my peers. Classroom bullying. And, all these things. … So, when I 
found something – a medium called dieting. Which allowed me in fact to feel better 
about myself. Suddenly the whole world opened to me. So, I started when I was about 
thirteen. Maybe fourteen. And, by the time I was in high school, I had reached the 
weight I wanted. I was extremely popular. My grades went up. And, gee. That‟s the 
best thing since sliced bread. Why would I want to give it up? (Ingrid, T-AN
2
) 
 
For Ingrid, “society,”  specifically her peers, judged her negatively and excluded her because 
of her weight.  By losing weight, her “whole world opened.” She equated dieting with feeling 
better about herself and being popular.   
 Most respondents described contexts that valorized thinness in ways that suggested 
that gender was important. This ranged from uncritical statements about trying to be 
attractive to men to critiques of beauty norms for women and broader critiques of patriarchy.  
Yolanda (T-BN) said that the main contributing factors for her eating disorder were “The fact 
that I was overweight for so long. And it felt so good to be skinny.”  I probed about the good 
feeling she had about skinny, and she linked it to her attractiveness to men: 
It was something that I had always been envious of and always wanted. And then I 
finally had it. And I was finally able to go to the store and pick out the clothes that I 
wanted. And think that it looked really good on me. And I was getting attention from 
boys. And beforehand I‟d always have a crush on the boy. And like, I would just be 
                                                 
2
 “T-AN” stands for “In treatment for AN.”  I will provide such brief descriptions when quoting or referring to 
respondents. “R” designates “recovered”. See List of Abbreviations at beginning of Chapter 1. 
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their friend. And I mean I was the same way. The boys that I had crushes on weren‟t 
overweight. So I was finally – I was just really, really happy. 
 
She connected her happiness about being thin to positive attention from boys, and in this 
sense it relates to gender. Other respondents cited gendered beauty norms as causal factors, 
suggesting more critical distance than the excerpt from Yolanda.  Rebecca (T-BN) spoke 
about comparing herself to media images and revising her sense of what was beautiful. 
I do kind of blame the media a little bit. Because I feel like – I didn‟t have TV 
growing up. So until I was in high school I never really watched TV. And then I 
started going over to friends‟ houses. And we‟d watch TV there. And I think it 
changed my perception of what beautiful was. Like, I‟d always had, like, a lot of 
confidence in myself. And, like, thought I was a pretty girl and everything. And then 
like, I started putting on weight. And I started seeing like, these celebrities who were 
beautiful. And they‟re like, bone thin. And so I think my perception of like, what was 
beautiful changed. And I didn‟t feel like I matched – I matched what I thought of [as] 
beautiful anymore. 
 
Rebecca‟s description suggests that she sees the celebrity version of beauty as one possible 
standard, rather than the only one.  Some linked their eating disorder to gender inequality 
more directly.  Alyce (R-BN) described puberty as a betrayal, because it meant she was a 
woman and therefore disempowered. 
Why did it start when it started? It was totally puberty. I felt betrayed by my body. 
And, I felt it was a demotion. I was always taller than the boys. Smarter than the 
boys. Faster than the boys. Meaner than the boys. Better swimmer than the boys. 
Even those five years older I could lick 'em. And, it was totally disempowering. I‟m 
still mad about it. Honestly. And, not many women will talk about it. I don‟t know. 
But, it just really sucked. All of a sudden I was like the back-up singer. Or, the 
secondary status of women just hit me like a log. And, I hated it. I hate it now. In 
retrospect I think I was conflicted. Because, part of you wants to conform. It‟s 
puberty. And, part of you doesn‟t. I was very conflicted.  
 
Having a woman‟s body was a “demotion” from her previous status as a young competitive 
swimmer, whose low bodyfat was praised by her family and doctor.  Alyce was one of 23 
who explicitly tied the eating disorder to gender in a way that was more critical than others 
such as Yolanda above. Although puberty is important, Alyce does not present it as a 
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biological event but as the inauguration of an unwanted identity as a disempowered woman. 
By explicitly connecting gendered disempowerment to the eating disorder, Alyce may be 
more critical of medicalized ideas of and genetic explanations for eating disorders. (More 
about this more gender-conscious group of 23 will be presented later in this chapter, in the 
section on causal factors that are likely to inform a respondent‟s reception of genetic ideas.) 
In addition to speaking about shared social norms, respondents spoke about specific 
people and contexts that valorized thinness.  Family members created environments in which 
thinness was valued.  Several respondents thought their parents had eating disorders or 
“eating issues” of some kind. Victoria described her mother‟s “competitiveness” with her 
about eating small amounts and being a small size: 
… she‟s a lot smaller than I am. Like, I‟m not just saying that. She really is. But she‟ll 
say things about how, like, she‟s so fat. And she like, can‟t fit into my clothes because 
I‟m small. And she‟ll, like, send me like, clothes that are obviously too small for me. 
And that just makes me feel worse too. And she‟s like, “Oh. What‟s the matter? 
Didn‟t it fit? Were they too big?” I‟m like, “No.” They were, like, size zero like, 
pants she‟ll send me or something. I‟m like, I obviously don‟t wear this size. It‟s like, 
stuff like that. I mean maybe she could. So it‟s just like, “Uh yeah.” Or she‟ll just be, 
like, competitive about eating with me. Like when I just had surgery. Like, I couldn‟t 
eat a lot at certain times. Like, at night for the surgery because I had surgery in the 
morning. It was a bunch of different procedures that they did. And,like, she wouldn‟t 
eat if I couldn‟t eat. (Victoria, T-BN) 
 
Victoria thought this kind of comparison and “competition” about body size and eating 
encouraged her eating disorder, even without explicit criticism.  Willa also describes even 
more subtle encouragement from her mother about weight loss, against a backdrop of a self-
described affluent area of the country. 
And it‟s kind of understood I guess that – I mean you‟re supposed to be beautiful and 
thin and wealthy and all that kind of thing…. My mom was very thin. And so she I 
mean never said “Oh my gosh. You really need to lose weight.” Or anything like that. 
But anytime I made it clear that I wanted – was trying to do that. It was always 
encouraged. … I mean to me moms eat salads. It was just kind of that was that‟s just 
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what you do. You grow up. And I honestly think I believed “Of course that‟s what 
you do when you become a mom.” (Willa, R-AN) 
 
Willa‟s mother does not tell her to lose weight, but through example and encouragement 
about weight loss, the importance of thinness is clear; “it‟s kind of understood.” (Clearly, 
Willa‟s description of expectations for moms is related to gender, as are many of the 
following examples of specific contexts.) 
Others reported comments from family members that were far from subtle.  For 
example, Margaret and Tammy were told they were “chunky”, Emma‟s mother declared, 
“Your thighs are starting to get big.” Fran‟s father “harped on me…and offered me five 
dollars for every pound I lost.”  Later, she married a man who monitored her weight in ways 
that were not only non-subtle but even abusive:    
He liked me thin. That was what he was used to. He had no tolerance for any extra 
weight. So, by the time I was three months pregnant. And, I wasn‟t huge. He wanted 
me to shower in the guest bathroom across the house so that he wouldn‟t risk seeing 
me with a larger stomach from my pregnancy.… I was married to him for fourteen 
years. But, he wanted to know how much I weighed every day. Did not want me 
gaining any extra weight. Even made the statement that he‟d divorce me if I got fat. 
(Fran, R-BN) 
 
Weight control was also part of Yvette‟s abuse as a child by her father. In addition she cites 
his attitudes toward her mother‟s weight, some of which happened before she was born.   
For me my biological father when I was little – he would tell me how fat I was. And 
he would tell me like basically how disgusted he was with me. And so when you‟re a 
little kid, like, you don‟t realize that your dad is crazy. And he did a lot of other – 
like, he abused me. And he‟d have me and my older brother do stuff. … it was like he 
wanted control over me and my brother. And like, my mom had said he always 
wanted her to be thin. He had always liked her being thin. And … he had always 
prided when she – taking her out when she was really thin. And they wouldn‟t do 
much when she got pregnant. He was, like, disgusted with her. And that‟s why when 
she got pregnant with me he was more disgusted. Because he had to go through 
having a larger lady again. Even though she was pregnant. Like, I don‟t know. So it 
was like, in my mind I was like, “Well if I want my dad to come back, I need to be 
thinner.” And so that was, like, my main cause. (Yvette, R-AN) 
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Yvette was thus affected not only by her father‟s abusive weight control but by his attempt to 
control her mother‟s weight. Several others also said they were affected by a family 
member‟s monitoring of another family member‟s weight, even when their own was not a 
topic of conversation.   
Many respondents described specific contexts outside the family that promoted 
awareness of size, with consequences for gaining weight. Here I describe athletic contexts. 
Several shared Deena‟s experience of body-monitoring by coaches for a variety of sports, 
including gymnastics, swimming, field hockey, and cheerleading.   
I was about ten or eleven. And, my period started. And then, that‟s when it really 
started to hit me. When my body started changing. And, like, beginning puberty. I 
really was very aware of my body changing and developing breasts. And, it was like, 
very troublesome to me. And, the gymnastics coach was very adamant about we 
shouldn‟t be too heavy. And, we can‟t be too big. We have to be very petite. And, he 
won‟t spot us. He can‟t lift us if we‟re too heavy. And so, that was very – like a fear 
of mine almost. Like, I was very afraid to gain weight or get big. And so, I was very 
restrictive of my food. (Deena, R-AN) 
 
Carly‟s bodyfat was assessed every month as part of her involvement in swim team.   This 
became more of a concern when she gained some weight due to going on birth control pills.     
I was swimming all the time. And like, I had to be a certain weight. Because we were 
getting our fat tested every month. It was called “Getting Pete'd.” Because the guy‟s 
name was Pete. And he would come in with the pinchers and stuff. And I mean I 
never thought about my weight. I was always so good about it. It was just easy for me 
to be skinny until I went on birth control. And I mean high school is when I guess 
your body is maturing and stuff. And you‟re gaining weight no matter what. But I just 
wasn‟t the weight I should be. And I don‟t know. I think I – the fat percentage tests 
and all that. Getting Pete'd. That had something to do with it. Because I was going up. 
But it wasn‟t anything like obese. It was, like, nineteen percent body fat. (Carly, R-
BN)   
 
Deena and Carly and others had their fat explicitly monitored by coaches. But even athletes 
who did not, reported disturbing effects of participation:  their bodies had been using so 
many calories while in training that their weight went significantly upward at the end of a 
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season, which contributed to the eating disorder, by their account. On the other hand, for 
Jackie, injury and withdrawal from athletics prompted her to stop appreciating her “strong”, 
“solid girl” body that had always been so “helpful” in sports, and “I kind of had to start 
seeing my body differently. And then, I wasn‟t happy with it.”   
Like athletics, involvement in performing arts also heightened respondents‟ 
consciousness of their bodies and rewarded vigilance.  Sydney described being highly 
conscious of having to fit into costumes for theater.  
And then I‟ve always been into theater. Where you do a lot of productions. And 
you‟re changing back stage in front of everybody. And you‟re getting costume 
fittings. And you‟re getting – so you‟re very aware of your body size. And when you 
get cast in a show in October that‟s not performing until January you have to stay the 
exact same size. And so that‟s just – it‟s something that‟s in the back of your mind. 
(Sydney, T-BN) 
 
Nell experienced something similar, even when she was only eight years old and would be 
expected to grow by the time she had to wear the costume. 
And so but then my mom a couple of times put us on diets. We took ballet lessons for 
example. And they would measure us for these costumes in October. And we were 
supposed to be able to wear them in, like, May. When you‟re like, eight. I mean it 
doesn‟t make any sense. And one time my older sister had gained weight and was 
unable to fit into her costume. So my mom put us on this, like, crash diet when I was 
eight years old. And other times she would sort of help make us restrict or something 
like that. (Nell, R-AN) 
 
Clearly the family is important here, along with the performing arts context; Nell‟s 
experience highlights the multiple reinforcing components of cultural messages about 
thinness.   
 There is much more that could be said about the ways respondents connected eating 
disorders and environmental contexts, particularly as they relate to gender.  I have reviewed a 
great diversity of experiences with weight in specific environmental contexts in order to 
convey an important causal factor.  This causal factor, which I have titled “valorization of 
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thinness”, encompasses the meanings of weight as adopted by the person in interaction with a 
variety of social environments. For many respondents, this causal factor is inextricably linked 
to their material weight when they began the eating disorder, illustrating the difficulty in 
separating the physical body from its interpretation by the individual as influenced by a 
social context.  
2.2  Stressors and responses: Eating disorder as coping 
 
Another complex, compound contributing factor that respondents frequently 
mentioned was stress or other problems, with the eating disorder as a response.  Most 
respondents cited stressful life events as contributing factors. Sometimes this was abuse or 
other bad treatment directly connected to bodily appearance as for Ingrid, Fran and Yvette 
above.  But more often respondents described stressors unrelated to appearance or eating. 
Under stress, respondents said they turned to behaviors that developed into eating disorders.  
I will use the shorthand “stressor” to refer to a wide range of events, from abuse and trauma, 
to breaking up with a boyfriend, to moving.  Like the “valorization of thinness” described 
above, the process of experiencing a stressor and responding to it over time cannot simply be 
categorized as an “environmental” factor. Respondents are zeroing in on their responses to 
the stressor, responses which eventually turned into an eating disorder. For this reason, I 
conceptualize the causal factor not simply as the external event but its combination with the 
individual response.  Twenty-one (at least) respondents spoke of their eating disorder as a 
way of coping with stress or difficult emotions and yet more spoke about it more generally in 
terms of responding or reacting to a situation, without specifically talking about difficult 
emotions or stress. 
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Some described serious abuse or trauma as a child, long before the eating disorder 
started.  This included sexual or other child abuse, domestic violence, abandonment, death or 
mental illness of a parent, and domestic violence.  Respondents said these experiences led to 
negative states of mind such as low self-esteem, insecurity in relationships with others, or the 
sense of having a “hole” in the heart that needed filling. For some, these traumatic 
experiences became directly connected to the eating disorder, as for Reba, who said she 
avoided sexual attention from her father by becoming extremely thin.  Often, they described 
the eating disorder as one way of coping with these negative experiences, and that alcohol or 
something else might have accomplished the same thing. Some spoke of “choosing” the 
eating disorder over another form of coping, an idea I return to later. 
Many respondents also spoke of stressful events as precipitating factors that helped 
explain the timing of the eating disorder, rather than as background stressors from long ago.  
This included traumatic experiences like rape (Joelle, Gena), and, more commonly, less 
violent stressors such as moving, changing schools, and being away from home.  A version 
of Eva‟s experience was shared by several respondents: 
I had moved from [southwestern state] when I was in fifth grade. So, I kind of started 
middle school without very many friends. I think it was a combination of, like, me 
developing faster. And, seeing that, like, a lot of the other girls were a lot thinner than 
I was. And then, not really having any close friends like I did in [southwestern state] 
before I moved. And so, I think I kind of like tied the two together. Like being thin 
and being happy. And, like, having friends and stuff. (Eva, T-BN) 
 
Amy (T-AN) spoke of family problems:  “The family was having problems. And, for me if I 
got upset, I refused to eat. It was just easier to deal with whatever I was feeling that way.” 
Jackie was troubled by her sister‟s health problems, and “used it [BN] as a coping 
mechanism. And then, all of a sudden I didn‟t know any other way to cope.” 
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Respondents turned to eating disorder behavior to deal with the stress of daily life as 
well as specific stressors.  Victoria explained, “when things are going poorly. And I‟m like, 
anxious or stressed or angry or anything. It‟s just kind of like what I go to. Either eating or 
not eating and throwing up.” Fiona said it “was a way for me to cope. That I had control of 
something in my life,” during a challenging semester at school. Zinnia described it as a 
“coping mechanism for stress” during graduate school; Emma as a “maladaptive coping 
mechanism,” Reba as an “unhealthy coping mechanism.”  
Several said that the eating disorder behavior delivered a feeling that counteracted the 
bad feelings, which was connected to coping.  Selena compared it to a “high” that enabled 
her to feel better:  “it‟s sort of like a drug. I mean whenever I have really bad stress it‟s 
almost like a crutch. Like, I can – it gives me some sort of like, brain high. I don‟t know what 
it is. But it helps me cope somehow.” Delia said the eating disorder “numbed me from pain”, 
and Karen also appreciated its “numbing effect.” Mireya felt “disconnected” and “safe” when 
she binged. Fran linked the bingeing to “suppressing” feelings, and the purging as “getting 
rid of those feelings.” Paula likewise thought of purging as a “metaphor.” 
Many respondents thought of the eating disorder as one possible way of coping. They 
said they could have tried other things.  According to Ingrid (T-AN), “anorexia is the way a 
person deals with stress in their life. Now, as long as we‟re human, we‟re all going to have 
stress. Some people deal with stress by chain smoking. Other people deal with stress by 
drinking. Other people deal with stress by anger. Arguing.” Yvette, whose father abused her 
and her brother, speculated that her brother handled his emotions with alcohol.  
Why did respondents turn to an eating disorder rather than another way of coping or 
managing unwanted feelings?  Mary thought her eating disorder was a better alternative than 
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expressing a “bad temper”: “So, it was kind of a way to control something and not hurt 
anybody.” For those who thought of it as an alternative to addiction, the eating disorder could 
seem preferable based on observations of alcoholic family members.  Some said they had 
more access to food than they did to drugs, and that being a “good girl” prevented them from 
seeking these out.  Nell spoke of having a “limited vocabulary” of ways to cope, due to a lack 
of access to people in “helping professions” rather than addictive substances:   
I didn‟t know about therapists. And I didn‟t know about social workers or anything. I 
didn‟t know that there were mentors and helping professions and all that jazz out 
there. So it was like, I didn‟t have anybody. And I didn‟t even know there was 
anybody that I could have possibly gone to. And so since there were – since I didn‟t 
know anybody I had this limited array of possibilities of ways to cope with things. 
And so anorexia was in my limited vocabulary. That was a pretty good one.  (Nell, R-
AN) 
 
Thus, for some the eating disorder was partly the product of a lack of other options or 
opportunities.  It could also be the closest at hand, because of a family member or friend who 
modeled the behavior.  Wendy thought she was “taught” or “trained” to have an eating 
disorder because her mother was “one of those compulsive dieters that is perpetually 
overweight and emotionally eats.” As she summarized, “I think that people turn to different 
things to deal with their emotions. Like a lot of people turn to alcohol. People turn to all sorts 
of things. And I think the reason I turned to food was because it was already engrained in me 
to turn to food.”   
2.3  Repetition over time: maintaining and intensifying the eating disorder  
In addition to the valorization of thinness and coping with problems, I identified a 
third general compound cause: repetition over time.  This compound general cause 
encompasses aspects of the temporal dimension that contributed to eating disorders in and of 
themselves, according to respondents.  They spoke about development of the eating disorder 
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over time, rather than a dichotomous state of either having an eating disorder or not. One 
might think about causal arrows, a list of causes on the left, with arrows leading from them to 
the eating disorder on the right. But respondents described intermediate steps entailing a 
series of imaginary arrows; recursive arrows reflecting the effects of eating disorder behavior 
on the person‟s body, sense of self, and activity in the world; and causes that matter at one 
time and not another (e.g., factors that intensify rather than incite the eating disorder). The 
beginning of the disorder is different from the middle; there is learning, development of 
routines, physical and other adaptation, and the meaning and role of the eating disorder in the 
person‟s life changes over time.  In this section I describe selected aspects of the dynamic 
process, which are related generally to repetition over time:  learning to purge, intensification 
and maintenance of the eating disorder, changing experiences of the disorder and the 
development of a “habit” that begins to feel like second nature.  Other examples could have 
been chosen; these are meant to convey the temporal dimension involved in the discussion of 
causal factors.   
 For most respondents, the development of the eating disorder was gradual and took 
on new meanings over time, rather than arriving suddenly.  To take one example, Jackie 
found herself gaining weight because an injury prevented her from working out at the level 
she had for her high school athletic teams.  She “dabbled” in and then formed a “habit” of 
purging, which was under her control for a while. 
I wasn‟t burning off nearly as much as when I was eating when I can exercise. And 
so, I started to gain weight. And, I couldn‟t exercise it off. Because, I was on 
crutches. And, one day I just thought to vomit. And, I‟d heard of – I mean I had 
friends in middle school who dabbled in purging. As middle schoolers will dabble in 
things. And, I‟d always thought it was ridiculous then. But, the first time I did it; it 
just seemed like such a natural and obvious thing to do. And, I mean the first time I 
did it, I hated it. Thought it was disgusting. Because, who really likes to throw up? 
But, it just sort of became a habit. And then, I don‟t even know when I started 
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noticing it. But, it just – I started doing it. Because, it made me feel better. Not just 
because I felt like I‟d eaten too much. I wasn‟t always binging at that point. 
Sometimes I just threw up a normal meal… And, this just kind of became my secret 
thing…. And, I kind of loved it. Because, it was just my thing. And then, it would 
stop for a couple months all throughout high school. And then, come back for a few 
months. And then, it‟d stop. But, I never really thought of it as an eating disorder. 
(Jackie, T-BN) 
 
Then, Jackie went away from home for an internship and was alone for long periods of time, 
which she associated with an intensification of bingeing and purging.    
…it kind of provided the perfect environment for bulimia to worsen. And then, I got 
in a really bad car accident. And, couldn‟t exercise anymore. And, just all of a sudden 
it went from something that I could turn to when I wanted to, to something that 
completely controlled my life. And, I mean I was restricting a lot. There would be 
days when I would only eat a cup of low sodium beef broth. And, that was it. And 
then, there would be days when I would eat a ton and a ton and a ton. And, throw up 
seven times. And, at that point I kind of realized what a problem it was. (Jackie) 
 
Jackie cites different contributing factors at different times as the eating disorder developed, 
from weight gain, practicing purging till it became a habit, feeling it was a secret thing she 
“loved”, being in an isolated environment where it began to worsen and become a problem. 
This illustrates the sometimes complex, varied, and long-term temporal dimension of the 
development of eating disorders.  
Respondents cited factors that helped maintain or intensify the eating disorder, which 
reflect the importance of development over time, rather than static cause and effect.  I include 
external, environmental factors, such as being isolated and free of monitoring, as well as a 
hard-to-categorize causal factor: the force of habit.  Some respondents felt that just 
incorporating it into their lives and having it become a habit gave it some momentum, 
because of physical or other adaptation.   
Many spoke of social reinforcement for losing weight, in the form of compliments:  
“once I got started, I did get a lot of compliments. And, I didn‟t stop… Initially my mom was 
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just like, “Well, you look very well.” And she was glad that I was able to lose weight. And, 
we went shopping together. And, like, picked out clothes and things.” (Amy, T-AN).  
Yvette‟s account was similar: 
And I had always gotten compliments about, like, being, like, pretty. But then I had 
never gotten like, “Oh. You look so thin. Oh. I‟m so jealous. You look so good in 
this.” And then my friends were all pretty tiny. And so, like, it was just like it was 
nice to be able to share clothes. And so, like, it just – that helped me I want to say as 
much causal as much as perpetuated it. Like, that was definitely like an incentive. 
(Yvette, R-AN) 
 
People may have begun restricting calories in order to lose weight or to cope with stress, but 
maintained it in part because of the positive feedback they got.  Thus, the behavior affected 
the body, which affected how people treated them, which affected how they felt about 
themselves; these may be thought of as arrows leading from the eating disorder behavior to 
the social environment or the individual, and then back again to the eating disorder behavior.  
Those who lost weight accidentally also reported compliments as an important motivation to 
continue. 
Several respondents noted that isolation, being away from family members who 
would have noticed and objected to weight loss, bingeing, or purging, made it easier to 
continue the behaviors.  “[T]here was no one around who was really sort of watching me and 
watching those changes.” (Lynn, R-AN)  Tammy described a similar experience: 
When school ended. And I was kind of – my parents worked day shift. And I was 
there alone. And I had time to exercise and not eat or throw up or do whatever I 
wanted to do in private…. And I just kind of had the privacy to have more self-
control over what I did without somebody finding out to the extent of what I was 
doing. 
 
Although several respondents complained about monitoring of their behavior by self-
appointed “food police”, many felt that if they had been confronted earlier or received some 
kind of intervention, they would not have developed the “habit”.  A habit cannot be 
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developed unless it can be repeated for a time; conditions that enabled it to form were treated 
as a kind of causal factor.  
The meanings and functions of the behaviors changed over time, as respondents grew 
to appreciate them or rely on them in new ways. Zinnia began purging as a way to 
compensate for stress-induced over-eating, then found that purging became a goal in itself. 
And so to compensate for the eating it became – I turned to different ways of purging. 
But then it became sort of – there was a time when it wasn‟t even about the eating 
anymore. I sort of got a fulfillment in the purging itself. Sort of that was one of the 
only ways I could sort of feel anything. And that became the rush. As opposed to the 
actual eating in and of itself. (Zinnia, T-BN) 
 
Lynn (R-AN) said that the place of her eating disorder in her life changed over time.  She 
said she had started because she lost weight and connected this to being more successful 
dating men. But after she married, there were new reasons to continue: 
 
[W]hen I got married, it continued. And, that really had to do with kind of me 
stepping out on my own. I married someone who my parents hadn‟t met before I 
brought him home. They weren‟t thrilled about that. And, I knew I‟d taken some big 
steps. And, I just didn‟t have – inside me I didn‟t have confidence that those were the 
right steps…. So, I think that‟s what kind of kept it going. I know kind of where it 
started. And, the thing that kept it going was kind of a lack of confidence and a 
feeling that maybe I hadn‟t made good decisions. And, I had this new relationship 
that I wasn‟t really feeling that I was being particularly successful with. 
 
Both of these examples demonstrate the changing meanings and functions of eating disorder 
behaviors over time.   
Respondents adapted to AN and BN physically by developing a new sense of what 
was normal; eating disorders became second nature and seemed to have their own 
momentum.
 3
  Several with BN described how easy vomiting became over time, to the point 
of being easier than swallowing and digesting normally.  
                                                 
3
 Isabelle used this term later in the interview when I asked her to respond to different models of eating 
disorders.  She compared it to addiction, and said “…you use it out of habit for so long that it really becomes 
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[I]t was so bad that my throat stopped knowing which way to go. From vomiting. 
That‟s pretty much the nutshell. I think I vomited – it got up to be about five times a 
day. I don‟t know if that‟s a lot or a little. But, it was to the point where I would stand 
there and think “Swallow.” And, my throat wouldn‟t know how to swallow anymore. 
(Irene, R-BN).   
 
… I had gotten to a point where I would literally – it was a mental thing. And so 
when I would see food and I would eat food I had gotten to the point where I would 
actually mentally make my – I would feel sick. And then I would throw up. It wasn‟t 
that I induced it. It would just – that was just the way it was. So that‟s why I‟m saying 
it wasn‟t something that I could just – thought that I could just turn on and turn off. 
Before I was inducing the vomiting myself by either putting my toothbrush down to 
the back of my throat or a straw or my finger or whatever. But it had gotten 
[automatic] – that‟s when I realized I really had a problem. (Vanessa, R-BN) 
 
Mireya talked about her body‟s adaptation to bingeing and purging: 
 
I think basically it just got easier and easier, like, physically to throw up. And I think 
also there‟s something about a release or just a chemical addiction to food too that it 
kind of fed into it because the more I ate the more I knew I didn‟t have to, like, digest 
it. So it‟s just easy to purge. So I think physically it just got easier…. in eating, like, 
tons of like, ice cream or sweets like, there‟s this, I think for me, something that‟s set 
off by that that just completes – like, a complete disconnect from, like, anxiety or, 
like, issues that are going on. And the, like, amount of sugar probably that I process 
or amount of, like, junk food – like, there‟s something, like, chemical there that, like, 
for me makes me want to do it again the next day. (Mireya, T-BN) 
 
She felt she developed a “chemical addiction to food”, which contributed to a cycle of 
bingeing and purging.   
Betty and Ingrid, who were in treatment for AN, also described a process of adapting 
to a new sense of what was an appropriate amount of food. 
I just didn‟t eat enough. And, I think my stomach just got small. And, over the years 
it just became a way of life. I never missed a meal. I mean, I don‟t do anything like 
that. I‟ve never tried to throw up or anything. I mean, I hate that. I just wouldn‟t have 
ever done that. But, I was real careful about what I ate. (Betty, T-AN) 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
second nature.” The concept of second nature could be linked to the idea of habitus; “nature” can be learned and 
acquired. Genetics, which correspond to what might be called “first nature” are not the only way of explaining 
persistent bodily dispositions. 
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Betty explained that she adapted physically, and soon interpreted her condition as located in 
her stomach rather than as a psychiatric problem. Ingrid explicitly compared her AN 
behavior to “living and breathing” because it had come to seem so natural. 
…[B]ecause you ignore the essential feeding mechanisms that most people would say 
if they‟re even slightly hungry “Wow. I‟m hungry.” You just think “Wow. So, I‟m 
hungry. So, big deal. We can go another day without it.” It becomes a natural life. 
Like living and breathing. 
 
The eating disorder behavior comes to seem like a “natural life”, rather than a disruption or 
departure from it. 
I have highlighted the temporal dimension in this section, because causal factors 
changed over time and the repetition itself exerted an influence. This dimension adds yet 
more complexity to the causal factors described earlier.  There are many more examples that 
could have been chosen to convey respondents‟ perceptions of the dynamism and 
contingency involved in the development of an eating disorder.  
To summarize, accounts of the development of eating disorders did not tend to draw 
on simple causal factors but complex, compound, factors interacting over time, with a role 
for the interpretations and actions of the person. The valorization of thinness, coping with 
stressors by means of an eating disorder, and repetition over time were impossible to capture 
simply as “biological” or “environmental.”  In the next section I focus only on those causal 
factors relevant to genetic understandings, then turn to the role of agency in the development 
of eating disorders. 
3.  SELECTED CAUSAL FACTORS: COMPATIBILITY WITH GENETIC IDEAS 
   
Above I have presented examples of causal factors that cannot be easily reduced into 
biological, environmental, or agentic components.  In this project I am interested in how 
respondents incorporate genetic ideas into their causal accounts. Some causal factors may be 
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“fertile ground” for genetic ideas, others may be less.   In this section I present results from a 
more focused and selective coding for causal factors according to their expected 
compatibility with genetic causal accounting. I draw from the same interview material as 
above.  I will assess whether these factors are in fact related to reactions about genetics in 
Chapter 5.  The purpose of this section is to describe how respondents speak about causation 
with regard to this select group of factors relevant to medicalization and geneticization.   
First, any account of genetic causation would have some role for the individual body 
where the genes are located - the genes are located inside the physical person somewhere, not 
outside the person. By this logic, a causal factor that is biological would be more compatible 
with genetic causation than a causal factor that is not.  If somebody talks about a chemical 
imbalance or a digestive problem that precedes the eating disorder, that would count as a 
biological factor.  Bodily appearance does not count here because it is ubiquitous and 
difficult to see as an exclusively biological factor, even though it is an aspect of the material 
body. (Discussions of body size or type, having a slow metabolism, and weight gain with 
puberty or pregnancy might be understood as genetic, but are not clearly “biological” 
because respondents relate them to social understandings of weight and gender.)  I also do 
not include physical characteristics that are developed as a result of eating disorder behavior, 
such as the idea that it became physically easier to binge and purge over time, nor digestive 
problems resulting from the eating disorder.  
Second, an account of individual causation that invokes some kind of enduring 
individual disposition would be more compatible with genetic causation than one that does 
not. By “enduring” I mean a disposition that is not described as the temporary result of a 
specific situation or event but something that persists within the individual across multiple 
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situations.  The word “disposition” is general enough to encompass both social and biological 
causation; Bourdieu used the word in connection with “habitus”4 and it is also compatible 
with biologically-based concepts. (To use “habitus” instead would presume social origins, 
thereby truncating my analysis by prejudging respondents‟ perceptions of biological 
causation as fundamentally social. My analysis is agnostic about causation.)  A person who 
says that her perfectionism, addictive personality, or tendency toward depression contributed 
to her eating disorder is citing an enduring disposition. By contrast, a person who never 
mentions a disposition might be less likely to embrace genetic causation, because she is not 
already connecting her disorder to some internal entity or force. This is important for how 
respondents might think about gene-environment interaction, as the effect of an 
environmental factor may matter more or less for certain kinds of people.   
Third, if an environmental factor is strongly linked to abuse, trauma, or injustice, 
there could be resistance or rejection of genetic causal explanations on moral grounds.  
Every respondent cited environmental causal factors. But some of these may be more at odds 
with genetic explanations than others for respondents.  For example, if someone mentions 
child sexual abuse as a reason for the disorder, she may see genetic hypotheses as potentially 
offensive or simply inapplicable to her situation, depending on how she understands genetics.  
Similarly, even though many respondents spoke of gender in relation to their eating disorder, 
some sounded more critical of it as a social problem, rather than just accepting it as a fact of 
life. These respondents may also resist or reject genetic causal explanations because they 
draw attention away from important social factors.  I now turn to each of the proposed factors 
                                                 
4
 In Logic of  Practice, sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defines the “habitus” as “systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which 
generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain 
them” (Bourdieu 1980:53). 
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in turn: biological characteristics, dispositions, morally charged environmental factors, and 
relatively greater gender consciousness. 
3.1 Biological characteristics  
About a third of respondents (n=18) mentioned biological characteristics that were 
connected to something psychological.  Ten spoke of genetic contributions, two hinted at 
such origins by speaking of conditions running in the family, and five spoke about biology 
without mentioning genetics.  Respondents mentioned biologically based addiction, 
depression, obsessive-compulsive behaviors, and low self-esteem. Some also suggested more 
direct biological contributions to AN and BN.   
So you were asking about other factors. Genetics I think is. And then I have  
four sisters and three brothers. And I believe every one of us has some  
kind of an eating – maybe not a disorder. Two have been diagnosed with an  
eating disorder. Two other sisters. But everyone has some issue around  
food and weight. No one is overweight. One sister is still quite a bit  
under-weight. So I think genetics is a big link. And then when I have  
talked with cousins I have been informed that they have – that they are  
dealing with eating disorders. Anorexia and bulimia. So I think that‟s a  
really big factor in my family. (Reba, R-AN) 
 
 Few respondents (4) brought up some physical characteristic as a contributing factor.  
Alyce mentioned that she was “sensitive” and “reactive” to food, which went along with food 
allergies.  Mary said that hormonal changes from pregnancy contributed.  Two respondents 
said that their bodies‟ tendency to lose weight rapidly was a contributing factor: Amy said 
that having a high metabolism was “part of it” and Fiona, said that her body “just dropped 
more” weight even though she was eating the same restrictive diet as her identical twin (who 
also had an eating disorder).   
 The variety of biological and particularly genetic causes will be more carefully 
explored in Chapter 5, drawing on material from later in the interview. 
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3.2  Dispositions 
Dispositions locate the problem in the individual. Even though the characteristic may 
have been acquired through interaction with the environment rather than inherent, it is a 
transposable disposition that the individual brings to new experiences, a “throughline” across 
different situations. Such a throughline means that when trying to understand behavior, one 
might see the individual as having a pattern of responding, as bringing something to the 
situation and being predisposed to interpret or react to the environment in a particular way. It 
is fertile ground for genetics because if a problem is already located internally, it is a shorter 
cognitive step to thinking of it as biological than if it were not. Dispositions are also 
cognitively closer to genetic explanations because they limit agency; an individual 
disposition may be theorized as a constraint upon choice (I couldn‟t help it, that‟s the way I 
am). 
Thirty-two respondents clearly cited dispositions as causal factors. They frequently 
mentioned more than one, including mental illnesses, and attributed them to the environment, 
biological, and unspecified other sources. Sixteen mentioned perfectionism. Several spoke of 
“type A” personality, competitiveness, “obsessive personality” or obsessive-compulsive 
behaviors.  Many spoke of generally feeling insecure and self-critical, or having low self-
esteem, “negative self-concept”, and feelings of “not being enough”.  It was also common for 
respondents to talk about insecurity in relationship to other people, such as “an “emotional 
hole” that needed filling, being a people-pleaser, not being able to “bounce back like normal 
people” from the disruption of a relationship.   
Ten of these 32 also mentioned conditions officially classified as mental illnesses in 
the DSM: depression, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive disorder, phobia, bipolar disorder, and 
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addictions based on self-report (e.g., self-descriptions of “OCD” behavior might not mean a 
diagnosis of OCD).  Discussing a mental illness was not incompatible with talking about 
personality traits.  Karen spoke about both as she described taking on more and more 
responsibilities at work and how difficult this was because of her perfectionist nature:   
I mean they just kept piling stuff on me. Because, I was a perfectionist. (She mimed 
patting papers on the table, as though to straighten them out and make them perfect.) 
And, I love to just do everything I could to make people happy. And, I got very 
stressed. Very stressed and weak. And, I didn‟t know what OCD was at the time. 
And, I was really – it really started coming in. Playing a role. I was getting – having a 
lot of rapid, just racing thoughts. And, kept thinking about things over. My desk had 
to be perfect. It was just getting really bad and out of hand. (Karen, T-AN) 
 
Personality traits and tendencies toward mental illnesses co-existed in causal accounts. 
Although mental illnesses are medicalized and personality traits are not
5
, respondents did not 
see them as incompatible.  
 People who mentioned dispositions also identified environmental causal factors.  
Having a certain personality did not preclude being influenced by one‟s environment, nor 
vice versa. Hannah spoke of her mother‟s dieting along with several dispositions as causal 
factors:  being people-pleasing, perfectionistic, “type A”.   
So, risk factors. Probably having a mother that dieted I guess would be one. And, 
having a self-perception of being chubby growing up. And, being very people 
pleasing. Wanting everyone to like me. That‟s a huge one I think. That‟s probably 
one of the top ones. I think I really just wanted – and, I was perfectionistic, too. Like 
I wanted to be the best at everything. I was already the best at violin. I was the best 
at tennis. I was getting straight A‟s. I wanted to be the best looking, too. So, 
definitely the type A. Wanting to be number one. (Hannah, R-AN) 
 
Hannah, like most respondents, listed multiple factors and did not feel compelled to choose 
among them.  Dispositions co-exist happily with environmental factors and this co-existence 
may transfer to ideas about gene-environment interaction.  
                                                 
5
 Interestingly, some did use language that suggested the medicalization of personality traits: Joelle spoke of 
being a “recovering introvert”. 
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Indeed, environment was identified as a cause of the disposition by many 
respondents.  Some located the origins of their disposition solely in their family environment, 
others in genetics, and some in both.  Deena said she was profoundly affected by her father‟s 
absence from the household when she was young: 
I always felt like I needed to impress my dad. Like, to get his approval. And, he was 
always – he‟s depressive. Depressive alcoholic. And so, I felt like I had done 
something to disappoint him. And so, I was always a perfectionist. Like top of my 
class. Best grades. I‟d always bring home all my A‟s on my report card. And, always 
like, what could I do to get his attention? And, I think that affected my eating. Very 
much. Like that whole type A perfectionist kind of mindset. (Deena, R-AN) 
 
Although Deena identifies her own perfectionism as a contributor to her AN, she attributes it 
environment by describing it as a response to a difficult situation rather than an inherent trait. 
Her attempts to get her father‟s attention and approval created a more general trait of 
perfectionism.   
By contrast, Liana suggests that her perfectionism may be related to her family‟s 
genetics and cites a variety of traits and disorders that she sees as potentially related.  
I think I had, like, a typical personality for somebody with anorexia nervosa. The type 
A perfectionism. Like, always on-the-go kind of thing. I have read in a lot of books 
that like a lot of disorders in my family. Just, like, genetics and stuff. Even if it‟s not, 
like, DNA genetic. I think it can also be, like, your personality. And, a lot of my 
family‟s – especially one side of my family is, like, really like goal-oriented. Like, 
really expects excellence kind of thing. I also have, like, alcoholics in my family. 
Panic disorders. And, stuff like that. So, I think that‟s a – kind of has impacted me 
like, just from the start. Like, I kind of was like more prone to have something. Some 
kind of disorder. And then, stress from my, like, sport, like, dance was a big impact. 
And, I think my personality as being a people pleaser. Like, I think that‟s a big 
impact. (Liana, T-AN) 
 
Liana describes genetic origins for personality and leaves ambiguous whether some of her 
family‟s influence might also be classifiable as “environmental”; a family that “expects 
excellence” could have affected her by means of its expectations, rather than having genetics 
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underlie their expectations as well as her own behavior.  (Concepts such as “DNA genetic” 
will be discussed in Chapter 5.) 
 Fifteen respondents did not cite an internal disposition as a causal factor. They cited 
many of the same factors that other respondents did, without theorizing a disposition. Rather 
than environment or genetics producing an enduring transposable disposition which in turn 
shaped actions and reactions to the environment, many of these respondents spoke about 
environment, actions, and reactions without an intervening disposition.   Environment and 
experiences were certainly important, but they provided contexts, understandings, or lessons 
rather than instilling a disposition.  (Those who did explicitly theorize dispositions also 
described the environment in these ways; the difference is in whether they talk about 
dispositions.)  They may have become “obsessed” by losing weight or been depressed by a 
situation or a relationship, but these were temporary states of mind rather than enduring 
dispositions.     
Some in this group grounded their eating disorder behavior in their own decisions and 
values, which is at odds with a medicalized understanding of eating disorders.  I provide one 
example, though it is not representative of the group of 15.  
R:  I think my biggest thing was just that I have a history of being overweight. And I 
have, like, such a fear of ever being overweight again. And I place so much value on 
being skinny. 
I:  Can you talk about that? Your fear of being overweight and the value you place on 
being skinny. 
R:  I feel like my happiness has a lot to do with my weight. And I‟m really into, like, 
fashion and everything. And I feel like everything looks good when you‟re skinny. 
And I feel like if I were overweight again, like, I would be so depressed to have to go 
buy all new clothes. And I wouldn‟t feel like anything looked good. And I would be – 
I wouldn‟t be as outgoing. Because if I were, like, trying to introduce myself 
particularly to, like, a boy or something, I would, like, automatically be thinking that 
they thought I was fat. And so I just know I wouldn‟t be happy if I was ever fat again. 
(Yolanda, T-BN) 
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Yolanda centers the eating disorder in her equation of thinness with happiness and later goes 
on to explicitly reject ideas about personality disposition: “I don‟t have an eating disorder 
because I‟m, like, concerned with being perfect or I‟m concerned with controlling something. 
I just don‟t want to be fat. I mean it‟s, like, a lot more simple for me I guess.”  She narrates 
her decisions as her own, rather than compelled by some problematic part of herself. 
By not mentioning a disposition, these respondents arguably put the focus away from 
psychological characteristics within themselves and more onto specific situations or 
relationships, lessons learned from their environments, or simply deciding for themselves 
that weight loss was necessary to be happy.  This did not mean that these respondents 
necessarily saw their eating disorders as free choices.  While some, like Yolanda are arguably 
more agentic because they describe the eating disorder in terms of free decisions to maximize 
their happiness, many sounded very constrained or compelled by their environments. I do not 
propose that this group as a whole claims more agency than those who talk about 
dispositions.   
To summarize, most respondents talked about some kind of disposition or bio-
psychological factor or both. People who spontaneously brought up biological causal factors, 
including genetics, before I asked any questions that explicitly or implicitly suggest 
biological origins, seem more likely to endorse it in the later parts of the interview (an 
obvious proposition for those who mention genetics to begin with).  It also seems possible 
that people who talk about dispositions as causal factors will connect them to genetics later in 
the interview, even if they had previously connected it to the environment.  Because all 
respondents who talk about dispositions and biological factors also discuss environmental 
factors, I would expect them to endorse complex forms of genetic influence that include 
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environment, rather than solely genetic accounts. The factors I have discussed so far could be 
ordered as follows, from most likely to embrace genetics to least likely:  biological factor > 
disposition that is not environmentally generated > environmentally generated disposition > 
no disposition. 
3.3 Morally charged environmental forces: abuse, trauma, injustice. 
Although environmental factors frequently co-exist with biological and dispositional 
elements in many narratives, here I characterize a subset of environmental factors that may 
discourage thinking in terms of biology.  If a moral or social injustice has been done, 
respondents might reject a simple genetic explanation or any role at all for genetics.  Some 
environmental conditions are described in ways that suggest moral injustice, abuse, trauma 
and the like.  As above, here I examine only interview material prior to asking about specific 
terms for eating disorders (e.g., mental illness, etc.); respondents may bring up other traumas 
and injustices later.  I speculate that if people are bringing up morally charged environmental 
causes, whether connected to gender inequality or traumatic events, they may be less likely to 
endorse simple or even complex genetic causation and more likely to identify negative moral 
implications of genetic causal explanations.  
 There is great diversity within this category, and it may be too broad narrow to 
capture environmental factors that may be crucial for genetic reasoning, if there are any.  I 
included abuse by parents but usually not bullying or teasing by peers unless I interpreted the 
respondent to think of it as abuse. I included death of a parent or spouse but not break-ups 
with boyfriends.  Many troubling and important family situations were excluded – parental 
divorce, difficult move to another country, abandonment by a parent, alcoholism, parents 
described as emotionally or otherwise dysfunctional.  I did not include having a disability or 
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being injured.  Seventeen people were classified as having abuse, trauma, or an unusually 
strong sense of injustice regarding gender in connection to eating disorders.  
Eleven people described abuse of some kind. Of these, six reported physical or sexual 
abuse as a child (Amy, Gillian, Irene, Paula, Reba, Yvette).  These and others also described 
witnessing domestic violence, sexual assault, and extreme peer bullying (e.g., Ingrid noting 
that “seven years worth of all this abuse really pretty much stifles if you ever had any self-
esteem. It doesn‟t exist anymore”).     
Two described not abuse but trauma and grief from the death of a mother (Tammy) or 
husband (Natalie), which warranted coding because these respondents brought it up 
repeatedly during the interview.   
Four spoke about gender in ways that seemed central enough to their self-
understanding to constitute a morally charged environmental cause. Thirty-two (or more) 
respondents spoke about gender in connection to eating disorders, from feminist analyses to 
less reflective statements about wanting to be thin in order to be more attractive to the 
opposite sex. The four selected here stood out as well-developed statements in which gender 
inequality was central or articulated in moral terms. Very early in the interview, Alyce (R-
BN) stated that “I feel a desire for justice… I want people not to feel ashamed like I did. I 
want people not to be targeted as being sick the way I was. I want it to be seen as more a 
rational reaction to the conflicting expectations put on people. And, unrealistic standards on 
women in particular.”  Barbara (R-AN) said she was “really passionate”, “frustrated” and 
“angry” that “powerful, powerful women” are “sitting there doing caloric charts instead of 
like, going to a political debate or things like that. And I mean I do it too. But it gets me so 
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angry that so many of us do it.”  Carol described her early experience of AN as a reaction to 
her depressed mother and restrictive gender roles. 
I was eight to nine years old. And, growing up female was not looking very good to 
me. My mom suffered from untreated depression. And so, I grew up in a Polish 
Catholic family. And, the role of the female was pretty well established. That you had 
children. And, you raised your children. And, you took care of the house….  I was 
terrified of having to fit into the role. Because, it – I think as a child I thought “Oh, 
my God. This means I‟m going to be like my mom. Which means I‟m going to be 
depressed. Which means I‟m not going to be leaving the house….” And so, I for 
some reason chose to stop eating as a way to kind of say “Help me. Get me out of 
here. Show me some other way.” It was a cry for help. I didn‟t get that help. But, for 
some reason it was what I chose to do.  (Carol, R-AN) 
 
Carol portrayed herself as “choosing” AN as a “cry for help” within an oppressive context.  
Margaret‟s experience of therapy involved getting angry, which she connected to anger about 
gender inequality:   “I stayed pissed off at the world for a while. I was becoming a feminist. I 
didn't know it.” I asked her to elaborate on the connection to feminism and she said she 
developed that understanding after studying feminism formally in graduate school. 
…to me it [feminism] seems to connect the dots. I don‟t think I had this real clear 
understanding of what eating disorders were about until I started understanding more 
about gender inequality and women‟s voices being silenced. And their feelings being 
kind of constrained to certain categories of feelings. (Margaret, R-AN) 
 
Although they are all very different, these 17 respondents may have more reason to resist 
genetic explanations than the other respondents, all of whom also brought up environmental 
causal factors. The role of morally-charged environmental forces in genetic reasoning is 
examined in Chapters 5 and 6. 
3.4 Gender consciousness  
 Some respondents displayed relatively more consciousness of gender than others as 
they spoke about eating disorders (n=23). I would expect this group to resist genetic 
explanations as a diversion from a social problem. These respondents included the four who 
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spoke about gender and were included in the “injustice” group along with 19 others. I defined 
gender consciousness expansively to include any statement that indicated any hint of critical 
distance from gendered norms of appearance or behavior. Again, I restricted my assessment 
to material appearing spontaneously before the first “reaction question”.  I excluded gender-
relevant statements about wanting to be attractive to men, being boy crazy, wanting to look 
nice, unless accompanied by implicit or explicit gender-relevant criticism of these themes.  
 Most respondents categorized here spoke about causal factors in ways that somehow 
questioned or criticized gendered norms of beauty and behavior, sometimes very subtly and 
vaguely.  Frequently they articulated themes already described above in connection with the 
valorization of thinness, the first of the three compound causal factors.  I also included 
gender-consciousness of a different sort, like that of Ingrid: 
I think my feeling is that – and, I have talked to many, many other women young and 
old who deal with anorexia. I think that the root of the problem is lack of self-esteem. 
And, the desire to be perfect. Because – or, to have a perfect figure. Or, to not eat. 
Because, the eating – it‟s a lack of self-love. And, the food is a way – if you eliminate 
the food, you learn to love your body better. Because, you don‟t like your body for 
what it represents. It either represents emotional or physical unhappiness to you. Or, 
to me. Based on sociological and psychological factors. So, for example I don‟t like 
my body because I don‟t want to look like a woman. Because, I fear the sexual 
ramifications. And, I don‟t want to be a woman in that way. I would rather be 
childlike. Nymph-like. Unisex as it were. And, not because I have a sexual preference 
one way or the other. But, because I don‟t want the responsibilities that come along 
with being a woman. I fear sexual relationships. I just don‟t really want any part of 
them. There‟s too much involved. (Ingrid, T-AN) 
 
Because respondents‟ gender-related comments have been included in previous sections, I 
will not describe them further here.  These respondents may be most resistant to genetic 
explanations of their eating disorders.   
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4. UNCERTAIN AGENCY IN EATING DISORDERS 
 In the above I described how respondents talk about causal factors, including those 
expected to be most relevant to their reaction to genetic explanations.  As demonstrated by 
several examples above, they did not always see their behavior as the end result of causal 
factors but also as in some ways as the result of their own agency. They were actively 
pursuing weight loss, finding ways to cope with stressors, and learning and practicing ways 
of purging.  It is not surprising that they would consider the role of their own agency because 
they are talking about their own behaviors, which are usually thought to be under personal 
control.  Even though eating disorders are classified as a mental illness, people who have 
them may retain non-medicalized ideas about personal volition, rather than seeing themselves 
as acting on the basis of a mental illness.  A comment from Thelma, currently in treatment 
for BN, illustrates this idea:   
R: I just didn‟t necessarily, like, feel that in control of my eating. Like, it just was 
something that just felt like it happened TO me. Or it was something that was kind of 
out of my control. Which I mean is obviously a very, like, flawed logic. 
I:  Why? 
R:  I mean of course you‟re absolutely in control of your own actions. Like, that‟s 
simple and basic. (Thelma, T-BN) 
 
In this section I examine how respondents talk about agency and their own responsibility for 
the disorder or related behavior.  This sub-section complements the previous section on 
causal factors by focusing on agency, which I do not consider to be a causal factor but 
nevertheless important to the development of eating disorders and a repeatedly-discussed 
aspect of respondents‟ experiences. Agency will return in the next chapter, when respondents 
reason about what an eating disorder is, principally whether it is more like a choice or more 
like a disease (respondents‟ understandings of what eating disorders are is the topic of 
Chapter 4). It is also related to stigma and how outside observers view people with eating 
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disorders, because for many respondents genetics help make the case that an eating disorder 
is not a choice. Stigma in eating disorders is closely tied to the perception of outsiders that 
the behavior is a choice and the person could stop if she wanted to. I examine these areas in 
greater depth when I describe how respondents would ideally like others to see eating 
disorders (in the last section of this chapter), and in Chapter 6 when I discuss the perceived 
implications of genetic causality.  
Before continuing, I address a few definitions of agency and language to talk about 
behavior.  As noted at the beginning of this chapter, I am using a broad definition of agency 
in this project to refer to the active subject, who can decide, will, choose, control and direct 
her life or some part of it, rather than as the passive receiver or product of other forces. I use 
the word agency almost interchangeably with control, choice, and volition, to convey the 
capacity for voluntary action (Marshall 1998). In this project I have tended to use the word 
“behavior” rather than “action” to refer to what people with eating disorders do, that is, 
restricting, purging, and bingeing. I understand the word “action” would imply more agency 
than “behavior” and my use of “behavior” reflects both the medicalization of eating disorders 
and the worldview of respondents as articulated in the interviews.  The politics of whether to 
use the word “behavior” or “action” are well captured by Gillian, who reflects on her past use 
of the agentic noun “plan” to describe her restricting.   
I think that especially since a lot more people are aware of it in my family. And, the 
treatment team that I‟ll be returning to at school. I think that now it‟s very definitely 
not a plan. And, if I do anything plan related, it‟s not called a plan anymore. It‟s 
called restricting. Or, it‟s called purging. Or, it’s called a behavior. It‟s not called a 
plan anymore. (Gillian, T-AN, emphasis added)   
 
Plans and action connote greater agency than behavior. If I were to use the word “action” 
instead of “behavior” I would seem to be promoting a choice-based model.  I chose to use the 
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word “behavior” (and the term “eating disorder”) because it reflects how respondents speak 
about eating disorders, even though it seems to promote a medicalized model. (I have to 
choose words in order to refer to contested concepts, but my choices implicitly silence some 
of the contestation.)   
Most respondents used language that both connoted personal agency and control and 
a lack of it when discussing their eating disorder.  The level of responsibility, agency, control 
was implied indirectly through language used and addressed directly in discussions about that 
topic.  Put very simply, their ways of talking about eating disorders – language used, models 
proposed or rejected – could be categorized by whether they implied more or less agency or 
were somewhere in between. I used three broad umbrella categories:  agentic, quasi-agentic 
and non-agentic.  These describe language, rather than distinct styles of thought held by 
respondents; I did not categorize respondents as using one as opposed to another because all 
respondents, without exception, used two or all three to describe their eating disorder.  After 
describing the three kinds of language, I will describe their frequent co-occurrence and 
suggest reasons for it.  
As above, I limited my description and analysis of this material to early sections of 
the interview, prior to questions about specific eating disorder terms. Because a question later 
in the interview asked respondents whether eating disorders can be described as “a choice,” 
language and views about agency mentioned before the “choice” question are less influenced 
by me.  
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4.1  Non-agentic language and concepts 
At least 45 people (90%) spoke about their eating disorder in terms that suggested a lack of 
agency or control over their own behavior before I asked the reaction questions.  I describe 
diverse overlapping themes below.    
I interpreted a lack of agency when respondents described the eating disorder as a 
separate entity from them: a disease, an abusive boyfriend, a demon, a monster, a voice. 
Although they might be able to “fight” or “ignore” this entity, it was distinct and therefore 
not directly controllable the way one‟s own behavior is normally thought to be. Indeed it had 
its own agency, and sometimes tried to convince the person to do things that were against her 
best interest. 
Like, I went to eat with my parents. And, like, I knew what I had to do. And, I knew, 
like, everything. Like, I knew it. And, it was like – it‟s almost like the eating disorder 
just wants to get in my head so bad that that‟s what‟s frustrating. …And, knowing 
everything that I had to do. But, still getting upset because the eating disorder was 
just getting stronger and stronger... they don‟t know, like, all the secrets and all the 
stuff that the eating disorder can yell in your ear all the time. But, then having, like, 
the logical side of me be, like, “No. You know you want this to go good. You want to 
look back and say – know that you can do this. You‟re with your parents.” And then, 
the eating disorder is like, “Well, just do what I say. And, you‟ll feel more relaxed. 
And, you‟ll have a better visit. Because, you‟ll be relaxed.” And, all this stuff. And 
so, it‟s really frustrating having to decide what to do sometimes. (Liana, T-AN) 
 
Liana contrasted her “logical side” with the eating disorder voice.  Clearly the voice is 
external to her in some way and she cannot control it. Similarly, a disease, demon, or monster 
are conceptually separate from the person and imply a separate agency. Several people 
shared Hannah‟s (R-AN) view that it should be seen as a disease rather than a choice made 
by the person: “I would want people to understand that it is like a serious illness. And, like, 
that it‟s not something that they chose for themselves.”  Again, this was said before I 
presented them with models of eating disorders to react to. 
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This separate entity was sometimes more closely tied to the self than a monster, but 
still unwanted and difficult to control.  They spoke of an “evil me” bent on destruction, 
something in me, an urge or drive, a compulsion or obsession.  Joelle, recovered from BN, 
commented that at the time “it felt like an impulse. It felt like something I had to do as a 
compulsion.” Jackie compared it to “something inside of me” and elaborated as follows: 
It‟s just I know people need food. I know that. Biology tells you that. If you‟re 
hungry, your stomach growls. But, there‟s – I don‟t want to sound like – not like a 
schizophrenic voice. But, there‟s this other – there‟s this half of me that‟s going “You 
don‟t need to eat that. You‟re ugly. You don‟t deserve to eat that.” Or, “If you eat 
that, you‟ve got to throw it up.” And, it‟s taken me a while to realize that it‟s not me 
saying that. And, it‟s a really uncomfortable thing. Because, I feel like I‟m kind of re-
meeting myself in recovery. (Jackie, T-BN) 
 
Jackie identifies a “half of me” that is “not me”; separating the eating disorder voice from 
one‟s true self is part of recovery for her.  Mary said it was scary because “you‟ve got this 
abusive thing inside you that basically wants to kill you” (in treatment for AN).  Yolanda 
talked about feeling compelled to continue eating during binges: 
it‟s like tunnel vision sometimes kind of. Like, if I get hungry. And I start eating 
something. And then I keep eating. And I keep eating. I know in the back of my head 
somewhere, like, that I should just stop eating. And I‟m full. I don‟t really need to eat 
anymore. But it‟s like a compulsion to just keep eating and eat whatever I can. And 
it‟s just something – it‟s not – habitual isn‟t the word. It‟s just kind of something that 
you feel like you have to do. So that‟s why it‟s not as simple as just stopping. 
(Yolanda, T-BN)  
 
Control could be lost not only because of something inside or a compulsion but also because 
the body itself became unruly.  As discussed earlier in connection with the development of a 
habit and a second nature, respondents described purging without agency (Irene, Vanessa).  
In a variety of ways, respondents reported that the eating disorder experience involved a lack 
of agency or a divided agency, depending on how the agent is defined (e.g., as part of the self 
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or not).  (The question of how to define and locate the agent is a theme throughout this 
project and I discuss it explicitly later.)   
I also coded a lack of agency when a respondent used language that suggested a lack 
of power over the disorder in more subtle ways. For example, Amy (T-AN) lamented that 
“it‟s frustrating because for every relapse that I‟ve had, they always end up worse than the 
one before.” Saying that she “always ends up worse” suggests a lack of control over the 
weight loss, with a passive verb tense indicating that it is not her choice.  Similarly, some 
described recovery in terms that suggested a lack of agency.  They “snapped out of it”, 
something “clicked”, and for unknown reasons it was no longer something they wanted to do. 
Many respondents also spoke of an illusory sense of control conferred by eating 
disorders.  They suggested that eating disorders could feel subjectively like they were under 
the individual‟s control, but that this was not true.  Margaret thought her AN and BN were 
under her control and part of a power struggle with her family. When she no longer lived 
with them and the behavior continued, she began to perceive a lack of control: 
Like, it was a cycle I couldn‟t break… And maybe it‟s because the people I thought I 
was doing this in opposition to were not there anymore. So it was just me. Me and my 
eating disorder (laughing). I know. I laugh. Guess what? This is not about mom and 
dad. It‟s about you and your issues with food and your body. (Margaret, recovered 
from AN/BN) 
 
What seemed at first like a response to a situation, came to seem like her own “issues”.  
Many spoke of the eating disorder going “out of control” at some point and some said this 
loss of control was a defining feature of an eating disorder; if it were in control then it would 
not be an eating disorder.  (Arguably this puts the person with an eating disorder in a difficult 
position when working toward recovery.)  
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4.2  Agentic language and concepts
6
 
On the other end of the spectrum, I also coded language and concepts that I 
interpreted to connote agency.   At least 41 people (82%) used such language before I 
presented the “reaction terms”.  Most used both agentic and non-agentic language (at least 
36). As with the above material conveying a lack of agency, there was diversity within this 
code.  Although all people coded here expressed ideas that sounded more agentic, it was rare 
for people to say they chose to have an eating disorder, and if they did there was often a 
sense that the choice was constrained or forced in some way (to be discussed in the section 
that follows this one).   
 Several described agency early in the process of developing the eating disorder.  This 
agency could be seen as part of the early phase of an eating disorder, or as something distinct 
from the eating disorder (respondents saw it both ways). They usually saw the origins of the 
eating disorder as volitional goal-oriented behavior to control weight.  Lynn, who recovered 
from AN, recalled: 
initially when it started it seemed to me like a good deal. I was like, “Yeah. I‟m 
paying attention to this. This is working. I‟m being successful. I‟m losing weight.” 
So, initially it seemed like a good thing. It was only when it really started to just take 
up a lot of space in my brain that it started to seem wrong. 
 
Hannah had participated with her mother in Weight Watchers, an organization and activity 
that assumes the importance of controlling weight and the ability of individuals to do so. 
Vanessa heard about vomiting as a weight loss strategy from her friends:  “I saw that was 
working for them. And so I took a drive. And it started working for me. So it was just 
                                                 
6
 My focus on agentic language should not be taken as a claim that respondents were currently pursuing eating 
disorders.  Only very rarely did respondents talk about choosing to have AN or BN as a current conscious 
commitment at the time of the interview.  Natalie was an exception, and some others acknowledged that a part 
of them wanted to have an eating disorder, suggesting a complex multiple agency.  
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something I continued to do.”  “Taking a drive” sounds agentic, as does evaluating whether it 
helps toward the weight loss goal.  When people describe the beginnings of the disorder, they 
are often agents striving toward a goal. (This was an important theme that I will return to 
when discussing their reactions to the idea of eating disorders as “choices” in Chapter 4.) 
 Some respondents spoke in terms that suggested that their eating disorder was a kind 
of accomplishment.  Gillian illustrated this well: 
I feel like – for a really long time there was almost a sense of not necessarily pride. 
But, more of a accomplishment. Like, I mean obviously there was accomplishment 
whenever you‟ve lost another two pounds. Or, whenever you went another day 
without eating. Or, eating a certain number of calories. But, like, even in retrospect 
you‟re almost amazed at the things you could and can do. And, like, no matter how 
logical or how much you know to the contrary, you almost think, like, “I‟m the one 
person in the world who can live on twenty calories a day. Indeterminately. (Gillian, 
T-AN) 
 
Gillian‟s and others‟ sense of accomplishment is tied to the valorization of thinness and self-
control.  When respondents spoke of it in terms of something that you can fail at, compete 
for, “make a career of”, or use as a spiritual practice, it sounded like achievement.  
Respondents tended to think of AN as more of an admirable accomplishment than BN 
because of this self-control; Gillian above went on to contrast the two.  
[W]ith the bulimia it‟s definitely there‟s not any sort of pride there… there‟s no pride 
in telling people how many calories you‟ve binged on. Or, even if you don‟t tell 
anyone [about restricting]. You can have a sort of secret pride that “Oh, God. I just 
went a week without eating. That‟s pretty impressive.” But, you can‟t be like, “I just 
ate ten thousand calories. That‟s pretty impressive.” It‟s more of a “God, I want to die 
now” feeling. (Gillian, T-AN) 
 
Though bingeing and purging were not aspired to the way restricting was, there were 
agentic features nevertheless. Some who purged spoke of it as “productive”, suggesting a 
willed action, despite feeling ashamed.  Zinnia said that unlike diuretic teas and exercise, 
with vomiting “I can see the product” which provides “satisfaction” that something has been 
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achieved. For Thelma, purging “is something that‟s productive. There‟s an immediate kind 
of, like, goal that‟s reached.”  It could be talked about in terms that imply achievement; “I got 
really good at it” (Rebecca, T-BN).   
Purging was also a skill that required practice for several respondents.  Delia 
recounted that it was hard at first, but she persisted:  “It took me a long time to be successful 
at it. Because, a lot of the time I had to put my finger – I had to force it. And, it was really 
hard. And, it hurt. And, it was painful. But, eventually I perfected throwing up.”  As quoted 
earlier, for Jackie, “the first time I did it, I hated it. Thought it was disgusting.”  But soon “it 
sort of became a habit.” Thelma described how it was difficult at first, but through trial and 
error found a way that “worked”: 
Well I mean obviously there‟s, like, a gag reflex. And your body says, like, “Don‟t. 
What‟s going on. I don‟t like this. Like, make this stop.” But I just – I don‟t know. I 
kept – just kept trying until eventually it worked. And like, whether, like, how it 
worked with different foods. And like, whether I – like if I drank a big glass of water 
before I ate or a big glass of water after I ate. Or like, drink a glass of water like, 
while I was eating. Like, how that like influenced – like, impacted it. (Thelma, T-BN) 
 
Rebecca found that ice cream was easier to purge than other foods.  For many of those who 
purged, it was something they consciously worked on until they were able to do it easily.  
Some learned about purging from friends, even receiving direct instruction. Selena asked a 
friend how she stayed so thin, “And she was like, „Well I just don‟t eat. Or if I do, I get rid of 
it.‟”  In fifth grade Gena persistently asked her friend, “How do you stay so small?” and soon 
the friend agreed to show her. 
And, I remember sitting in her bathroom. And, her literally standing over me and 
telling me how to make myself throw up. I was like, “I can‟t do it. I tried. And, this 
feels bad.” And, I thought I was doing it. And, I would just be spitting. And, I was 
like, “Nothing‟s happening.” … And, she sat over me. And, she was like, “You‟re not 
doing it right. You have to do it like this.” And, she went in the kitchen. Ate like 
some cookies. Like a bag of cookies or something. And, went back in the bathroom 
and showed me. She‟s like, “This is how you do it.” And, I said “Okay.” So, I did the 
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same thing. And then, she was like, “Well, you got to do your fingers like this.” And 
then, the older I got; I kind of figured it out. (Gena, R-BN) 
 
It was not easy for Gena to learn how to purge.  Not only did a friend demonstrate bingeing 
and purging, but she had to practice in order to figure it out.  Vanessa purged with a group of 
friends, even describing it as a pact that held them together as a group.  After her friends 
“turned me on to this idea” she began to purge along with them. 
I had some friends that could throw up at the drop of a hat. We used to kind of joke 
about it. But I mean it‟s not funny now. But we used to joke about it because 
teenagers – I had a girlfriend that could swallow something. And  
then she could throw it back up almost instantly. It was amazing. Because  
she had done it for so long. (Vanessa, R-BN) 
 
Vanessa‟s group of friends incorporated purging into their friendship, and she described it as 
a “pact” they had.   
Respondents described actively protecting the eating disorder from discovery and 
monitoring by treatment providers, family, or friends.   Eating just enough to avoid the 
nasogastric (NG) tube, or to gain enough weight to be permitted to leave the hospital, can be 
seen as evidence of calculated agency (even though healthcare providers would likely 
interpret it as part of the disease).  Amy (T-AN) described herself and fellow inpatients in 
terms that sounded agentic:  “it‟s easy for us to play games and get crafty and sneaky and try 
to play the system.”  She recalled psychiatrists‟ response to her refusal to eat during a prior 
hospitalization for AN: “they were like, „Well, we will transfer you to a psychiatric facility 
and do an NG tube.‟ I‟m like, „Well, okay. I‟ll eat just long enough to get out of here so you 
don‟t do that.‟”  Outside a hospital context, respondents report similar practices:  “So at 
home it‟s a lot of hiding things. And lying about where I‟m going to be. And stuff like that. 
And I don‟t like that. Because other than my eating disorder my mom and I have a great 
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relationship” (Yolanda, T-BN). Similarly, battles with parents who are “forcing you to eat” 
imply that the respondent has a will, which connotes agency.  
 Several spoke about agency as it related to recovery and treatment, namely that one 
could choose to recover or make choices as part of recovery.  Often this was a choice to seek 
treatment, but several recovered people also described a self-initiated process of recovery 
without treatment, which sounded very agentic.  Kathleen avoided doctors because she was 
afraid they would force her to gain weight too quickly, so she developed her own alternative 
program. 
[W]hat I did essentially was just take little baby steps… I said “…the first thing I can 
do is just stop weighing myself. I‟m not going to do that anymore.” And, that‟s what I 
did. I just stopped. And, I did not weigh myself anymore ever. And, that kind of made 
it easier to do the next step. Which was – I think the next thing was “I‟m not going to 
count any calories anymore. I‟m going to forget how many calories are in everything. 
When I look at a menu. Or, I go to get some food. I‟m not going to do that.” Which I 
did. And, it just kind of went from there. And so, it was a very gradual thing. 
(Kathleen, R-AN) 
 
Kathleen was one of several recovered people who reported recovering on their own.  Carly, 
a college student, also described what she called a “tapering off” process that relied on the 
“self-motivation” she learned as a swimmer. 
You‟re kind of like on your own. Like, you‟re in the water. Your head is in the water 
constantly. And you‟re constantly talking to yourself. And you have no one there 
yelling. You can‟t hear anyone when you‟re swimming really. So you kind of have to 
push yourself to work hard in practice and to get up at 4:30 in the morning to make it 
to practice if you really want to do it. And I guess that helped me kind of eventually 
to be like that outside the pool. (Carly, R-BN) 
 
Irene characterized herself as deciding to take a “leap of faith” that she could be happy even 
if she gained weight by stopping purging: 
I decided to let myself eat whatever I wanted to. As much as I wanted to. As long as I 
didn‟t vomit. So, that‟s kind of how I got over my bulimia. Is to just – whatever you 
do, don‟t vomit. Just eat whatever you want. And, take the risk. Take the leap of faith 
that you can be happy if you‟re overweight. (Irene, R-BN) 
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People in treatment also evidenced agency by working hard to stop behaviors, like 
Liana who described a meal with her parents (presented above).  Betty, in treatment for AN, 
described concrete skills taught as part of cognitive behavior therapy. These skills teach the 
person how to stop or challenge “automatic thoughts”, to weigh the pros and cons, to 
alternative thoughts of actions.   
…they teach you how to think things. How to – some of the skills we use are pros and 
cons. What are the pros if I do this? What are the cons if I do? And what are the pros 
if I don't, and what are the cons if I don't? …And then, we draw 
interruptions…between the situation and the thought. What could you have done to 
create a different thought? And then, if you can‟t catch it then or turn it around then, 
you might could do it after the behavior. (Betty, T-AN) 
 
Whether in treatment or not, respondents spoke about behaviors in terms that suggested they 
were agents capable of control, or learning how to be so.  
Even after recovering, the eating disorder could still be something for an agent to 
struggle against. Willa‟s commitment to recovery sounds agentic as she weighs its costs and 
benefits against AN:  
Honestly I would be lying to you if I said I just didn‟t think it still looked really good. 
But I think I‟ve just gotten to a point where I‟ve said “You know what? That would 
never be worth it.” I guess. So I know what it takes to be there. And I was so 
miserable. And so it‟s just not worth it. And so that‟s how I look at it I guess.” (Willa, 
R-AN) 
   
The ability to weigh the options and choose one suggests agency, and suggests that a 
recovered person could choose to develop an eating disorder.  
4.3 Quasi-agentic language and concepts 
Given that most respondents spoke in terms that suggested agency as well as its 
opposite, it is not surprising that most also talked in terms that were in between.  Most of 
these examples may be described as forms of constrained agency; will or volition is involved 
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but it is impaired, lacks essential information or support, or is forced or compelled by 
environmental circumstances. They are acting, which implies agency, but what they are 
doing does not feel under control or chosen.  Arguably all agency is constrained because 
nobody chooses the conditions she find herself in, or what material she has to work with.  
But what I have labeled “quasi-agency” always involves a reference to constraints or 
compulsion, whereas language categorized as “agentic” does not.  The eating disorder might 
be a way to act out against something bad and achieve something better:  a sense of control 
or power, feeling soothed or numb or euphoric, to express needs, to seek love or care or 
attention. The kinds of language presented here were difficult to categorize as either agentic 
or non-agentic because both were implied.  The lines dividing language coded as quasi-
agentic vs. agentic or non-agentic are were difficult to define precisely, but 46 respondents 
spoke in terms that I classified as quasi-agentic (92%).  The ambiguity supports the overall 
argument that agency in eating disorders is profoundly complex and confusing for 
respondents (as well as analysts). 
 Many respondents spoke of their eating disorder as a way of coping with stress, 
emotions or other problems as described in the first section about responding to problems as 
a complex causal factor.  My focus here is on coping as a type of constrained or compelled 
agency.  Deena noted that “Eating disorders is just one way that… some people choose to 
cope. Because, they don‟t know how else.”  Although she describes it as “choosing”, a 
coping mechanism also suggests constrained choice because the person is forced to respond 
to a challenging situation using whatever methods are available. In addition, as Deena says 
the “choice” of an eating disorder as a coping mechanism is made without sufficient 
information; they may be agents but they have very limited options (or “skills” in the words 
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of several respondents).  Many respondents saw their eating disorder as a flawed and harmful 
coping strategy.  Rebecca said that “it did help me cope. It just hurt so much more than it 
helped. And it got to the point more recently where it no longer helped at all. It just hurt.”  As 
she began to work on recovery she “realized that there were more healthy ways to deal with 
things.”   
Helen describes her AN as a “disease” that began as a coping strategy, then went out 
of control.  She thus implies that before the coping mechanism goes out of control, there 
must have been some individual control and agency involved.   
It‟s a very difficult disease to battle. I don‟t think that it‟s something you can will 
away. I don‟t think it‟s something that people choose to have. I really think it‟s – it 
serves as a coping mechanism in some ways. And then, it really can wind up being 
out of control. Which is what the case is with me. Or, was with me. (Helen, T-AN) 
 
Ingrid (quoted earlier) elaborated on the alternative ways of coping, including drinking, 
chain-smoking, arguing, and over-eating.   To summarize, coping involves agency but it is 
always constrained, qualifying it as “quasi-agentic” in this project.  For this reason it was not 
easily assimilated into the agentic nor the non-agentic codes.  Coping is in the space where 
the individual meets the environment, responding to external situations, drawing on learned 
skills, acting to preserve well-being but in ways that are not satisfactory.  Respondents 
frequently link coping to other themes presented below, such as gaining a sense of control via 
the eating disorder, “using” the eating disorder like an addictive substance, and “choosing” to 
express or gain something by means of the eating disorder. 
 Several respondents sounded quasi-agentic when explaining how they “chose” to 
have an eating disorder.  As with coping, such statements did not seem clearly agentic 
because the choices were circumscribed by respondents: it could be one disorder or another, 
or it was a choice made under duress.  Carol said she “chose” to stop eating as a “cry for 
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help”, Deena above talked about “choosing to cope”, Sydney “chose” BN rather than AN 
because in her family excessive restricting would not have been noticed. 
My mom has disordered eating herself. And my dad kind of encourages that in her. 
Because he doesn‟t think it‟s disordered for a woman to just eat like a tiny bird and 
never have anything caloric and to – and so to them – like, that‟s probably another 
reason I chose – or I didn’t choose. But I became bulimic rather than anorexic is had I 
become anorexic I‟m not sure they would have (A) noticed or (B) done anything. 
Because that would be normal in my house… [T]o them they thought I was trying to 
diet and I was doing it in the wrong way. (Sydney, T-AN, emphasis added) 
 
Sydney finds the word “choose” to be useful but in the end not adequate to capture the sense 
of what she is saying; “became bulimic” is less agentic. Her self-correction illustrates the 
uncertainty about agency in eating disorders. 
 Similarly, half or more said it was a way to achieve a sense of control or feeling more 
powerful (at least 24 before the reaction questions began). Although “control” and “power” 
imply agency, in context these respondents are describing a false sense of control and power 
in reaction to external events being out of control.  Claire said her AN helped her feel more 
powerful, in contrast to the powerlessness of an overweight body. 
I just always felt very powerless because of the way that I looked. Like, because of 
my extra [weight] in places. I just always felt very powerless. And then, when I 
figured out how to have power over it, I think something in my brain was just like, 
“Ah!” (Claire made a pouncing gesture with both hands.)  Like, glommed on. 
(Claire, T-AN) 
 
Reba thought of her AN as helping her to control abuse from her father: it had “a lot to do 
with my being in puberty. Trying to not be abused. And also it gave me something to feel 
like I could control. When I couldn‟t control my body changing. And developing breasts and 
hips and female features.”  Helen said her eating was “the one thing I could control. It was 
the one thing I could be good at. And, practice perfection with.”  Jackie reported that 
“whenever I would feel out of control of a situation, it was just something that I could do to 
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feel like I had control over it.”  Similarly, Hannah responded to harassment from peers at 
school by trying to find control elsewhere: 
I started to just feel like I wanted to control something. Because, I felt like I couldn‟t 
control that part of my life. And so, I think that‟s when I gradually just started. I 
didn‟t even realize it. I just started, like, cutting down on my portions. And, like, 
eating half of a sandwich instead of the whole sandwich. … dilut[ing] my milk in my 
cereal. (Hannah. R-AN) 
 
 Karen (T-AN) identified the control as a harmful illusion:  “It‟s just complete control. Where 
you think you‟re in control. But, you‟re honestly – and, actually you‟re not in control at all.”  
Gena described a “double edged sword”, which appears to confer control but does not serve 
the person. 
[J]ust the whole idea of wanting to control something. Couldn‟t control anything else. 
But, I mean it was a double edged sword. Because, no matter how hard I try, of 
course you‟re never as small as you want to be. So, this constant pursuit of perfection. 
And, finding happiness in something that doesn‟t really happen. (Gena, R-BN) 
 
As is apparent from these examples, many respondents linked the eating disorder to a sense 
of control that was illusory. 
In addition to coping and feeling in control, eating disorders were a way to achieve 
other desired ends: a way to feel more confident and positive about oneself; to receive love, 
care, acceptance, attention or admiration from others such as parents and peers; a way to fill 
an emptiness or emotional hole; among other things.  These are goals an agent might have, 
and the eating disorder was presented as a way to achieve them, albeit self-destructive.  
Controlling weight was linked to physical attractiveness, popularity, and romantic attention, 
as would be expected in contexts that valorize thinness.  For many it was more than this.  
Nell talked about it as a “desperate plea” for something, which she saw only in hindsight. 
… I had felt “I‟m hurting here. I need help here.” And nothing was getting it. So it 
might have been some sort of desperate plea for “I need to be recognized. And this is 
the only way I know how to do it.” Because I wasn‟t going to, like, go make bad 
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grades or go get expelled from school. I wasn‟t going to do anything negative. But at 
the same time it was kind of like, “I really need help here.” So there might have been 
some of that too. Even though at the time I wasn‟t thinking that. (Nell, R-AN) 
 
AN was Nell‟s way of communicating a “plea”, which might also have been conveyed by 
doing badly in school. At the time she “wasn‟t thinking that”, suggesting a subconscious type 
of agency that is recognized only after the fact.  Carol also talked about it as an “attempt to 
ask for help” and an “attempt at a solution to my pain.” Irene described it as a “desperate 
attempt at something” in reaction to her abusive mother:   
When I was thirteen or fourteen or whatever. And, saying to her “I want to drink 
those chemicals. I want to make myself vomit.” I might have said “I‟m so fat.” Or, 
something. But, I said “I want to make myself vomit.” And, she actually said to me 
“Go ahead. Do whatever you want. I don‟t care what you do.” So, that may have been 
part of – I don‟t know if I partially did it to get back at her. Like, “I‟m going to be 
really sick. Watch me be really sick.” I don‟t know. (Irene, R-BN) 
 
As mentioned earlier in reference to Fran and Yvette, being thin could also be a way of trying 
to stay connected to a parent who abandoned the family.  Thinking of eating disorders as a 
way to achieve something implies agency, but respondents felt constrained and ill-served by 
it.   
If an action directly harms or destroys the agent, it raises questions about whether the 
action was agentic. Does (or should) agency connote more than free and unconstrained action 
but also positive and self-affirming action?  I have not categorized agency according to 
whether it led to positive or negative ends; given that all respondents saw their eating 
disorders as harmful (directly addressed in Chapter 4), this would have precluded the 
possibility of agentic language to describe eating disorder behavior.  It is worth noting, 
however, that when respondents spoke about pursuing self-destruction, they frequently 
described themselves as constrained.  Sometimes this agency was not conscious and was only 
seen or attributed in hindsight.   
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 Several respondents spoke about “using” the eating disorder for many of the goals 
above. “Using” implies agency, but in context it also evokes constrained,or misdirected 
agency in these interviews.  Claire (T-AN) asserted “I think in this disorder there‟s a lot of 
fear and a lot of feelings of control over life through using food and exercise,” Zinnia (R-BN) 
spoke of using food to deal with stress, and Wendy spoke of using food to deal with 
emotions.  Just as coping by means of an eating disorder suggests compelled action within 
constraints, “using” suggests a misdirected agency, which I also interpret as a type of 
constraint because the agent lacks the option to act directly on the problem and must 
substitute alternative and harmful action (e.g., eating instead of dealing with emotions for 
Wendy).  Olga linked “using” directly to addiction: 
And I really don‟t think it‟s a food thing. I mean looking back on it I think it‟s a 
mental disorder. I don‟t think it has anything to do with food. It‟s just like, alcoholism 
probably doesn‟t have anything to do with alcohol. It‟s a tool for something. So I 
think the food is just a tool that you use. Just like later on when I was checking things. 
It‟s just something that you do to make yourself feel like you‟re in control of 
something. (Olga, R-AN) 
 
Half of respondents discussed eating disorders in relation to addictions before the reaction 
questions, and although this alone may or may not warrant classification as quasi-agentic, it 
does suggest that “using” in eating disorders is related to “using” in addiction discourse.  I 
interpret the language of “using” to be a way of underscoring the aspect of addiction that has 
to do with responsibility for behavior even though that behavior does not feel volitional to 
the “user.” 
 Several respondents (at least 11) used the word “habit” to refer to their eating disorder 
at some point before the reaction section of the interview.  Earlier I discussed the 
development of habits as an example of dynamic developmental processes. Here I focus on 
habit as quasi-agentic.  I coded it as in between agency and non-agency because habits are 
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not perfectly under individual control but commonly thought of as things that an individual 
can use willpower to break. Habits such as chewing fingernails, smoking, and over-eating are 
treated in everyday U.S. life as something that the individual is held responsible for. At the 
same time, there is the sense that they are not voluntary; through repetition over time they 
have acquired a solidity that other behaviors do not have.  This dual nature makes them 
quasi-agentic for this project.  Habits may also seem more like quasi-agency than agency if 
they are self-destructive, in addition to not being freely chosen, but this was not a criterion 
for coding quasi-agency in this project.  Several respondents described their restricting, 
bingeing, and purging as “habits” that are hard to break.  Fiona referred to “habit” in a way 
that evoked addiction (like “using”), listing it as one of the problems associated with having 
AN: “You become obsessed only with yourself and your habit.” For Gillian, “habit” 
connoted an ability to control it herself rather than needing help from others:  “I think that for 
a long time I convinced myself as much as I convinced everyone else that it was just a habit. 
And, that I could deal with it. It wasn‟t an issue. I‟d get over it. It was fine.”  Although 
Gillian no longer treated it as a habit, Thelma still thought of it that way: “If anything, I 
mostly think of it as like, maybe a bad habit. Like people bite their nails or do all sorts of 
things. And you just like, keep it to yourself. And as long as it‟s not like, hurting anyone else. 
Then it can‟t be that bad.”  Fran stated that she overcame her BN by treating it as a habit. She 
had little access to treatment and based her efforts on a book given to her by a medical 
doctor.   
And, now this was twenty-two years ago. And, the book said – it was about eating 
disorders. And, I think bulimia in general. And, it said that it was a habit. I thought 
“Okay.” I smoked some as a teenager. By the time I was twenty-one, I was smoking 
two packs a day… [Later] I quit smoking cold turkey that day from two packs a day. 
And, when I read that it was a habit, I said “Okay. I can stop.” (Fran, R-BN) 
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Taking into consideration all three types of language about agency, it was rare for 
respondents to describe their eating disorder behavior as freely chosen, despite the use of 
agentic language.  Without exception, all who used agentic language also used either non-
agentic language (n=36, 72%), or quasi-agentic language (n=37, 74%) to talk about eating 
disorder behavior.  These numbers probably underestimate the actual co-occurrence because 
I have only counted language that appeared before the first reaction question. This constitutes 
strong evidence for the idea of “ambiguous agency” in eating disorders, as represented by 
respondents in these interviews.  
4.4  Reasons for the co-existence of agentic and non-agentic language 
There are several reasons why it makes sense that respondents used a combination of 
agentic, non-agentic, and quasi-agentic language.  I will suggest three straightforward 
reasons and one that is more nuanced and interpretive.  
The first of the three straightforward reasons is that respondents experienced both 
agentic and non-agentic action at different times. Many respondents described the capacity to 
choose or control their eating disorder behavior as something that shifted over time.  Many 
spoke of the eating disorder behavior beginning with voluntary weight control goals then 
going out of control. Recovered people and others spoke of regaining the ability to control 
their behavior after treatment or as they recovered.  It is possible that these beliefs about 
control at different stages of recovery were presented by treatment providers and simply 
repeated by respondents, but respondents adopted them as their own in the interviews.  
Second, for many respondents, some aspects of the eating disorder were possible to 
control and others not.  Some, like Liana whose self-observation during a dinner with parents 
was quoted above, said it was possible to choose not to listen to or obey the eating disorder 
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“voice” but they could not choose to stop hearing it.  In a similar vein, Beth thought “it‟s 
something that you never really get rid of unfortunately. It‟s always there. You just have to 
learn to turn that voice off.”  Several respondents said it was possible to control things that 
“trigger” the eating disorder, but once triggered there was little one could do.  Claire talked 
about managing her level of stress, sleep, and exposure to “triggers”: 
…it‟s like I have triggers. And, I have, like, trigger foods. And, trigger thoughts. 
Usually what makes it worse is if I let myself get into a certain pattern of thinking. 
Or, if I don‟t take care of myself. Like, if I don‟t sleep enough or exercise enough in a 
given day. Then, I‟m more vulnerable. (Claire, T-AN) 
 
Similarly, Carly (R-BN) spoke about avoiding foods that would make her feel like she 
needed to purge:  “I kind of don‟t let myself go to the cafeteria as much. Or if I do, I limit 
myself to, like, a certain amount of food. And, like, healthy food. Because if I eat, like, 
greasy stuff or something, I‟ll feel really tempted to throw it up.”  Irene (R-BN) feels that she 
is overweight but feels cautious about exercising because “I‟m afraid. I‟m very afraid of 
becoming obsessed. And, I‟m very afraid of feeling bad about myself. Criticizing myself and 
giving myself a hard time if I don‟t stick to a regimen. So, I‟m afraid to try to lose weight.” 
She is recovered in the sense that she controls whether she throws up, but does not feel she 
can exercise without becoming “obsessed.”  Lynn (R-AN) makes sure she keeps her weight 
up:   
I never think about doing that crazy stuff anymore. And, I try to keep my weight up. 
Sometimes I wonder if there‟s something in that. If I start to drift down in my weight, 
I‟m aware of that. And, I do what it takes to stop that. And, put the weight back on. 
So, sometimes I wonder if I do have some fear about being tempted to go back to it. 
But, I never do. (Lynn, R-AN) 
 
Respondents are controlling things that might “tempt” them to restrict, binge, or purge. There 
is a clear implication that if they were tempted they would give in, so avoiding temptation 
enabled them to maintain control.   
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 A third reason why both agentic and non-agentic concepts might apply is that the 
person views the behavior differently when they are “in” the disorder as opposed to when 
they are not, such as when they have recovered.  Many respondents said that the eating 
disorder felt like a way to gain control, to feel more powerful, part of their will, an 
achievement. They carefully avoided detection by lying to others, bingeing or purging in 
secret, and concealing their weight loss behind baggy clothes.  But with the benefit of 
hindsight (or alternatively of “insight,” as medical professionals might say), they came to see 
those agentic feelings and behaviors as driven by the disorder.  By contrast, some 
respondents credited themselves with more agency in hindsight.  By saying that the eating 
disorder was a way of trying to communicate something or get needs met, a goal they were 
unconscious of at the time of the eating disorder, they suggest that the eating disorder 
reflected a type of agency (though not a conscious one).  What seems like a compulsion at 
one time can seem like agency at another. 
In addition to these three reasons, some of the apparent contradiction is likely to be 
related to the difficulty of self-interpretation: what is agentic and what is not? People are 
influenced by others‟ appraisals and internalize these views.7 Respondents are aware that 
other interpreters see eating behavior as controllable; if you want to eat you can, if you are 
purging you must want to, and over-eating is a matter of willpower.  Respondents apply these 
standards to themselves, even when they subjectively feel the behavior is out of control (as 
the quote from Thelma at the beginning of the previous section illustrates).  It was hard for 
them to understand their own agency, and even when they came to an understanding it was 
difficult to articulate in the interview.  The category of “quasi-agentic language” may convey 
this most clearly, as respondents both had and did not have control, often simultaneously.  
                                                 
7
 This classic social psychological concept is represented by Cooley‟s (1902) theory of the “looking-glass self”. 
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Many of my respondents struggled with the problem of interpreting their own agency for 
themselves and others.  This struggle is part of the experience of stigma in eating disorders, 
which I touch upon only briefly in this chapter and more expansively in future chapters, 
particularly when discussing the implications of genetic causal accounts. 
 
5.  COMPROMISED AGENCY: MANAGING IMPRESSIONS OF EATING DISORDERS 
 
[I]t‟s hard for me to tell my parents “Something inside of me is telling me not to eat 
that.” Because, they don‟t have that. So, it‟s hard for them to really understand and I 
mean believe me that there really is this thing that is keeping me – preventing me 
from eating food that I know I should be eating. (Jackie, T-BN) 
 
Perceptions of causal factors and agency in eating disorders are closely tied to 
definitions of what eating disorders are.  In Chapter 4, I focus on respondents‟ reactions to 
several terms used to describe eating disorders.  In this section I describe how they would 
ideally like others to see eating disorders, a question I asked before the material to be 
discussed in Chapter 4.  After eliciting respondents‟ theories about what caused them to 
develop an eating disorder
8
 and before asking them to react to specific models of eating 
disorders, I asked most respondents how they would ideally like others to understand eating 
disorders. Of the 45 who addressed this question, a clear majority brought up the 
compromised agency of people with eating disorders, frequently describing it in medical or 
psychological terms. They linked this compromised agency to the compassion they believe is 
warranted for people with eating disorders: it is not just a matter of choosing to behave 
otherwise. 
                                                 
8
 Here I construct the sentence in a deliberately ambiguous manner, to encompass the preceding discussion of 
causal factors as well as the role of agency.  There is both an agentic and a non-agentic sense of “develop”; one 
can develop cancer and one can develop a photograph or career.   
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Some focused on the emotions, issues, and other struggles involved in the eating 
disorder behaviors to convey that it is not simply a matter of choosing. They would like 
others to see AN and BN as the product of a compromised rather than free agency. 
I:  Well how would you ideally want people to understand anorexia? 
R:  I guess, like, everybody wants to group people together and put them in a nice 
little box. And, like, yeah, anorexia is you don‟t eat. But not everybody doesn‟t – 
chooses not to eat. Or it‟s not a choice. But I guess like, when you come down to it 
it‟s a choice whether or not you eat. 
I:  Can you say more about that? 
R:  Well, like, I can choose to pick this up or not… You can choose whether or not to 
eat it. Like, to pick it up and have food. But it‟s a mental thing. Like, we might be 
scared of it or something. So it‟s not just like a cut and dried choice. And so I wish 
people would understand that, like, the reasoning behind the not eating is not solely, 
like, just as simple as mechanically putting – picking up food and putting to your 
mouth and chewing it and eating it. Like, it‟s a lot – like, it‟s emotional and mental. 
And I just – if people could understand that, then I think it‟d be like – I don‟t so much 
think anorexia should be accepted. But I think that the reasoning behind anorexia 
needs to be accepted to be able to help them…It didn‟t help me my [adoptive] dad 
saying “Well you can just eat.” Like, that doesn‟t help. (Yvette, R-AN) 
 
Yvette‟s sentiments were shared by many respondents. It‟s not about food and simply 
choosing to eat; there are psychological reasons that others need to understand in order to 
have appropriate compassion.  Emma pointed out that “no one would do that if they felt like 
they had another option” and that it should ideally be understood as a coping strategy (like 
others whose words were presented earlier). 
That it‟s just a symptom of emotional turmoil or whatever you want to call it. But, it‟s 
a coping strategy that‟s not a healthy one. But, it‟s a coping strategy when one‟s 
having an emotionally hard time. And, it‟s complicated. So, it‟s not just a simple 
thing of eating too much and not – and then, throwing it up. I mean no one would do 
that if they felt like they had another option. But, at the time it‟s the coping strategy 
the person knows how to do. And so, I would want people to have some empathy 
about it. (Emma, R-BN) 
 
Emma, Yvette and others would like social recognition that what seems like a simple choice 
is actually more complicated because of emotional and “mental” issues.  Liana‟s description 
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of the eating disorder as something she fights against is another way of conveying the 
struggle that so few people seem to understand: 
I wish that more people would understand how hard things are for me. And, maybe 
appreciate the hard work a little better. .. I mean, like, a lot of the stuff that is really 
hard for me is, like, a natural instinct to most people. Or, is really easy to most 
people. And so, they would be like, “Well, why would I feel so proud about you for 
trying such and such a food?” Well, I mean that‟s, like, a really big deal to me. 
Because, that‟s, like, really, really fighting against the eating disorder when I choose 
to try it. And, I think it would make me feel better if more people understood a little 
better. I mean I know nobody can really understand unless you‟ve been through it. 
But, at least have some empathy. (Liana, T-AN) 
 
Many respondents emphasized their compromised agency; they are struggling, fighting, 
coping the best they can. 
Some wanted others ideally to see it in more explicitly medical terms, which also 
went along with more compassion.  In the excerpts below, Melanie used the term “mental 
illness” and “disease” and Sarah used the word “illness.” 
Well I would want them to think of it with empathy or with compassion anyway of 
that person who is in the middle of that. And not berate them or whatever. … I know 
it‟s in the DSM. I don‟t know if it‟s generally considered a mental illness or not. But I 
know it‟s in there. But mental illness in our society general. I get very frustrated with 
people who just won‟t think about it in terms of a disease that one might have or 
something. (Melanie, R-BN) 
 
Yeah. I think that seeing it as an illness is really important that people don‟t often 
view it as an illness. It‟s thought of more as something that women are doing to 
themselves rather than suffering from. So I think that thinking about it more in terms 
of people are suffering from this rather than they‟re causing it is one thing that‟s 
important. (Sarah, R-BN) 
 
The key for Sarah is that people with an eating disorder are not “causing it” or “doing it to 
themselves”. For many respondents, this is the reason they deserve compassion; if they were 
doing it on purpose then they might not. Rebecca (T-BN) preferred the terms “mental health 
disorder” and “addiction” and put it this way: “If it‟s just a behavior, I feel like people, like, 
really judge you. I don‟t know. I feel like they have a reason to judge you.” Several other 
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respondents used these words and phrases to describe it: “disease,” “complex disease”, 
“physical illness”, “mental health disorder”, “emotional and mental disorder”, “psychological 
disorder” and “addiction”.  Several cited physical effects, including feeling “yucky”, having 
heart problems, and risk of death to underscore its serious medical status. A few compared it 
to physical illnesses:  cancer, diabetes, and multiple sclerosis.  
Yet some respondents found it difficult to fully believe in a disease model, even when 
they themselves advocated it.  Later in the interview, Sarah expresses uncertainty about her 
statement quoted just above, and likens eating disorders to smoking with the idea that the 
person should be held responsible for stopping, just as patients with chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease who continue to smoke ought to be held responsible for that as a choice.  
Claire notes that she would ideally like people to think of it in terms of a disease, but that it is 
hard for her because she blames herself.   
R:  Hmm. Just as a disease the way that, like, multiple sclerosis is a disease. 
I:  How come that‟s a better way for you? 
R:  Because, it is. It‟s a disease. It‟s a disorder. It‟s a – it‟s not our fault. I‟d like for 
people to understand that. Even, like, all the girls in the program. It‟s like, it‟s not – 
it‟s not any of our faults. And, it‟s really, like, empowering to think of it that way. 
Like, it‟s not somebody‟s fault that they have cancer usually. 
I:  Tell me how it‟s more empowering you said. 
R:  Because, eating disorder patients – and, this is what I‟ve been told a lot before. 
That eating disorder patients have a lot of self-flagellation and self-guilt and self-pity 
and self-harm and all of these things. And so, it helps so much to be, like, “This isn‟t 
my fault.” And, I don‟t believe that yet. And, I think that‟s part of – that‟s like, one of 
the core reasons that I‟m struggling still. Is because I do believe that it‟s my fault. 
Like, I believe that everything about my disorder and what‟s been going on with me 
is my fault…  And, if I didn‟t believe that, then I think just in general I would have a 
healthier mind. (Claire, T-AN) 
 
Claire states that defining it as a disease rather than as her fault would help her recover. 
Paradoxically, she thinks that this removal of agency – it‟s not my fault – would empower 
her and help her recover. (This theme of empowerment through the removal of agency will 
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be explored more fully in Chapter 5.) Claire‟s reference to the hospital-based program, and to 
Overeaters Anonymous in other parts of the interview, suggest that the disease concept may 
be learned during treatment.  This is the case for Betty, an inpatient with AN.  In her 60‟s, 
she may have been less exposed to the idea of eating disorders as mental illnesses and 
explicitly states that she is learning to see her behavior in medical terms during her inpatient 
stay.     
I would want them to know that it is a disease. And, you can get over it. And, I‟ve 
never thought of it as a disease. I just thought of it as kind of a condition or whatever. 
Something you chose for yourself that you could get over if you just would. But, I 
realize it takes a lot more than that. And, surprised me to find out how much I did not 
know about all of this. And, it‟s just been like being in school to me to be here and 
learning so much. (Betty, T-AN) 
 
Elsewhere in the interview it is clear that Betty‟s changing view of her AN is not simply 
because of her presence in the inpatient unit but also the experiences that led her to need to 
be there. Yet such a re-thinking is clearly encouraged by program personnel. (In the 
statistical section at the end of the next chapter I examine relationships between treatment 
experience and medicalized discourse.) 
Another theme in answer to the question about ideal understandings of eating 
disorders was the idea that others ought to take them seriously as negative and harmful 
problems, rather than frivolous or even somewhat positive behaviors. Because weight control 
is widely perceived to be good, it may be hard for observers to take eating disorders seriously 
according to Hannah. She was worried about a friend with AN and could not get others to 
take it seriously. 
Like, everyone knows that she has anorexia. And, she is literally like, about to fall 
over dead. And, I‟ve talked to the faculty about it. Like, I‟ve talked to her about it. 
Trying to get her help. And, like, even the faculty don‟t do anything. And, like, I feel 
like that‟s ridiculous. Like, she is endangering her health. If she were an alcoholic, we 
would have no problem forcing her to get treatment. Why is it different for anorexia? 
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Because, it‟s socially acceptable to be thin. And, that‟s not acceptable to me. Like, I 
think that we need to take it just as seriously as we take drug problems. Because, it‟s 
doing just as much damage. (Hannah, R-AN) 
 
Willa said she would ideally like people to see it as “very dangerous” and “that there‟s 
nothing fun about it”, and hopes that “our culture could get to a place where it‟s just 
understood that that [extreme thinness] is so unhealthy and doesn‟t produce any happiness.”  
The perception that there could be something desirable or acceptable about it undercuts the 
idea that it is a serious disorder, and makes it more plausible that the person can control her 
behaviors.  In Gillian‟s and Reba‟s ideal scenarios, people would see that an eating disorder 
“is not shallow or attention-seeking”, and that it is “not a matter of vanity” (respectively). 
 A minority of respondents (n=5) presented an alternative perspective that distanced 
AN and BN from medicalization as serious psychological or mental disorders.  I present 
them with greater detail than others to highlight conceptual differences among respondents.   
Two grounded their answers in very similar language about eating disorders as a 
rational response to gender norms. This language resembles that of feminist analyses of 
eating disorders. Alyce (R-BN) wanted “people not to be targeted as being sick the way I 
was. I want it to be seen as more a rational reaction to the conflicting expectations put on 
people. And, unrealistic standards on women in particular.”  Alyce is clearly locating the 
problem in society‟s expectations for women, for which AN is a “rational reaction.”   
Margaret (R-AN) also sees it as a “rational response” and a “response to powerlessness” of 
women confronted with “gender inequality”, and argues that “psychologizing” about it is like 
“blaming the women.” In response to my request to clarify what she meant by 
“psychologizing”, Margaret explained: 
I think that psychologizing tends to treat the problem as if it were rooted in the 
individual nature of a human being. Of a single person. And that the problem is the 
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person. Either the way they think about the world. Or the way they feel about it. I 
think it tends to treat what I see as a social problem as more of a problem in, like, 
cognitive processing or something. That it‟s an irrational kind of behavior. That it‟s 
irrational because the person‟s not thinking properly or something. I think that it‟s a 
rational response to inequality. (Margaret, R-AN) 
 
Her critique of the “psychologized”, medicalized perspective on eating disorders resembles 
Alyce‟s in its focus on cultural constructions of gender.  
 Similarly, Lynn focuses on AN as a response to a situation, though she does not link 
it to gender inequality. She began by stating a “big caveat” that there may “may be some 
biological basis for this for some people”, but went on to say that  
I‟d say to people it‟s a sign that this person‟s not comfortable in her own skin. Or, not 
comfortable in the situation she‟s in now. And so, to me it‟s kind of a symptom of a 
discomfort. And, that person who is an anorexic should take action about the things 
that are making her uncomfortable. (Lynn, R-AN) 
 
Lynn draws a contrast between AN that has a biological basis and AN that is a response to a 
situation, and presents the solution as taking “action” to change the situation.  
 Two additional respondents ideally wanted others to understand that eating disorders 
are temporary and people with them should not be stigmatized permanently as having a 
serious mental illness.  Vanessa‟s answer distanced eating disorders from being “crazy” 
which she understood to permanently affect sanity in every respect. 
It is a problem, yes. Don‟t get me wrong. But just because a person is bulimic or 
anorexic I would not want them to equate that that person is mentally off necessarily 
in a whole sense of the picture. I mean yes. You are mentally off as far as your 
perception of self and what you‟re doing. But that doesn‟t mean you‟re completely 
crazy that you need to be put in a nut house. (Vanessa, R-BN) 
 
She contrasted this permanent craziness with more temporary conditions - addiction and “a 
phase that you‟re going through” – which to her mind were more appropriate for eating 
disorders.  Barbara‟s answer focused on her objections to other people monitoring her 
behavior, even after recovery: 
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And that‟s really bothersome. Because then they feel like they need to always kind of 
keep an eye on you. Like you‟re, like, a ticking time bomb. Some people will think 
that. And it‟s totally not the case. Like, years down the road you‟re completely able to 
be a fully functioning member of society that doesn‟t need to be watched twenty-four 
seven. (Barbara, R-AN) 
 
It was possible to criticize gendered expectations for appearance in ways that were 
compatible with psychological and medical conceptions. Indeed, most respondents did so, 
but the following two respondents are unusual because they focused on it in answer to the 
question about how they would ideally like others to understand eating disorders.  Kathleen 
(R-AN) said that to overcome eating disorders one has to “deal with the issues”, but unlike 
other more psychologically-minded respondents, she linked these issues to gender:  “It 
always seems to be a common theme that it‟s mostly girls. And, girls that have self-esteem 
issues. Which is sad. And, I don‟t like that for girls. And, I don‟t like the pressure of the 
world that we live in in America. Where everything is focused on that as a girl. It‟s all about 
how you look.” Kathleen suggests that it is the pressure on girls about how they look that 
lowers their self-esteem. Her answer has elements of the more psychologically focused 
answers above, but by linking it to a cultural context she distances it from psychology alone.  
Rebecca also combined medicalized concepts with gender, describing BN as a “mental health 
disorder” but saying it stems from self-confidence problems related to unrealistic standards 
of beauty.  
And like, what we view as beautiful today isn‟t necessarily healthy. And it‟s not real 
too. Like, I don‟t know. I, like, get angry at my boyfriend, like, for looking at 
pornography. Because I feel like, I think I can‟t live up to that standard. Like, they‟re 
plastic. They have liposuction. And how can women, like, live up to that? My mom‟s 
like, fifty-five or fifty-six. And, like, she has, like, a sagging face and she‟s wrinkled. 
But she just looks like a mom. Like, she looks like she should. And she, like, wants to 
get the face lifts and all these things. And it‟s just not natural. It puts, like, a lot of 
pressure on people to look perfect when it‟s not really the way we are. (Rebecca, T-
BN) 
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 In answering the question about how they would ideally like others to view eating 
disorders (n=45 answers to this question), the majority wanted it seen as something other 
than a simple choice, often as a mental health problem.  A minority specifically criticized 
medicalized and “psychologized” perspectives, and the remainder gave answers that were not 
clearly relevant to agency or medicalization. 
6.  SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3 
The aim of this chapter was to describe how respondents understood eating disorders 
to develop before asking them to react to specific ways of thinking about eating disorders 
(such as “mental illness”) and before presenting them with the idea of a genetic causal factor.  
The chapter had two main goals: to illustrate (1) the complex, dynamic causal models put 
forth by respondents, and (2) their perceptions of their own ambiguous, ambivalent agency in 
carrying out eating disorder behavior.    
 Causal stories were complex and dynamic and involved compound, rather than 
simple, easily disaggregated causes, suggesting that any causal story incorporating genetic 
causes also will likely be complex rather than simple (their genetic causal models will be 
described in Chapter 5). To capture common themes in respondents‟ descriptions of causality 
in eating disorders, I presented three frequently-cited causal categories:  valorization of 
thinness, coping responses, and repetition over time. These were not reducible to biological, 
“environmental” (e.g., social, cultural, familial factors), nor “individual” (e.g., psychological, 
agentic) factors and frequently involved elements of all three.  In addition to the three broad 
causal categories, I identified four, more specific causal elements that I hypothesized to be 
compatible with genetic ideas (biological factors, enduring individual dispositions such as 
personality) or incompatible (abuse, trauma, or injustice; gender inequality).  Relationships 
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of these variables to respondents‟ initial reactions to the idea of a genetic causal factor will be 
examined statistically in Chapter 5.   
 As they described causal factors, respondents also directly and indirectly addressed 
the question of their own agency in the development and continuation of their eating 
disorders.  In general, I (and they) found it difficult to simply summarize perceptions of their 
own agency. While respondents did speak in terms that connoted free agency, they always 
also spoke in terms that connoted either a lack of agency, or a constrained form of agency I 
labeled “quasi-agency.”  I offered four reasons why there might be this mix of agency, non-
agency, and quasi-agency: that agency may be different at different phases of the eating 
disorder (e.g., starts as a choice but goes out of control); that some aspects of the eating 
disorder can be controlled whereas others cannot (e.g., choosing to avoid triggers that would 
make one lose control); that in hindsight what seems like agency really was not (e.g., the 
eating disorder had taken over, but at the time it felt like a choice); and that it may be 
difficult to self-interpret behavior as simply non-volitional when one is held responsible for it 
by others (i.e., others are telling people with eating disorders that it is a choice, which makes 
them wonder).  The interpretation of agency had implications for stigma and guilt.  Most 
respondents said they would ideally like others to see eating disorders as something neither 
chosen nor easily controllable: a struggle -- or even an illness -- for which compassion was 
deserved.   
 The next chapter goes into greater depth about what respondents think eating 
disorders are.  I end with a quote from Karen, an inpatient, to convey the confusion she and 
others felt as they struggled to explain their experience. 
It‟s a disease. It‟s an illness just like a physical – well, it is a physical illness also. To 
me it‟s mental and physical. Because, it‟s physically killing you. I would like them to 
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know that it‟s not something I asked for. It‟s not something I wanted. It just 
happened. It just kind of took over me. Because of my weakness. I don‟t know. The 
stress. OCD. My childhood. Of course the guy I was dating. It just everything kind of 
just played a part in it. But, I don‟t know if it was going to – it could have came 
regardless. I mean it just could have happened. I could have started – I told you I was 
already feeling uncomfortable with my body. My self. I felt at that time just wasn‟t 
happy with me. I didn‟t have a good relationship with any – my friendships weren‟t 
that good. They all had boyfriends at that time. And, I didn‟t. Until I met this guy. 
And, I just – I was thinking to myself “Well, maybe if I put on a little weight. What‟s 
wrong with me?” Even before it really took place. So, it could be something that just 
was going to happen. I don‟t know. (Karen, T-AN) 
 
Karen says “I don‟t know” three times in this passage. She offers clearly medical language 
but is not confident that this explanation is sufficient, so she must explain how it took her 
over and why.  She points to her own “weakness”, OCD, early childhood, the relationship 
that precipitated the disorder, but also suggests it could have developed without these factors 
being present. Other respondents also expressed a lack of certainty about causation. The 
sheer number and variety of causes mentioned was a testament to the complexity of and 
confusion about causation.  As they struggle to explain why they cannot “just stop” the 
problem behaviors, some find medical concepts useful, as I have already illustrated. As I will 
show in later chapters, many will use or interpret genetics to be useful for making this case, 
though there will be dissenters.  Now I turn to their models for what eating disorders are.   
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: 
 
UNEVEN, UNCERTAIN MEDICALIZATION:  
PERCEPTIONS OF EATING DISORDERS 
 
 Based on Chapter 3, we know that these respondents conceive of causality and 
agency in complex ways. But what do they think eating disorders are? Are they diseases, 
choices, social problems, or something else?  In this chapter, I discuss their reactions to 
several terms to describe eating disorders.  First, I briefly discuss their views about eating 
disorders as a problem generally, and as a “problem with society or culture” specifically.  
Second, I examine their reactions to five concepts related to medicalization of eating 
disorders. Third, I present findings for an index of endorsement for medicalized terminology 
based on these five concepts.  I begin by considering eating disorders as a problem and as a 
“problem with society or culture” because virtually all respondents endorsed these and they 
were not included in the endorsement index.   
1.  TERMINOLOGY FOR EATING DISORDERS 
 Before turning to the series of questions about specific terms, I touch briefly on 
language used by respondents to refer to their eating disorder.  Respondents used the terms 
“eating disorder,” “anorexia” and “bulimia” to describe their eating issues, just as I did while 
recruiting and interviewing them.  No one used less medicalized terms such as “ana” or 
“mia”, (from the pro-eating disorders lexicon).  I asked many respondents if they used other 
terms besides the ones I was using, but they did not and seemed to find this question odd so I 
stopped asking it. (A less medicalized sample might have responded differently.) They 
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seldom used the suffix “nervosa” (14 out of 57 used this word at least once and of these only 
three used it more than once up to three times total).  While using the phrase “eating 
disorder” certainly reflects its medicalized status, we cannot know exactly what its meaning 
is for each respondent. The series of reaction questions will be useful for systematically 
illuminating their individual definitions of eating disorders.   
2. EATING DISORDER AS A PROBLEM? 
In order to view a behavior as “medical” it must be seen as a problem; this is the 
ground on which medicalization or some other way of thinking about problems is based.  In 
Chapter 1, I proposed that medicalization could be conceptually subdivided into 
“pathologization” and “biologization”, the first corresponding to the extent that the eating 
disorder is seen as a problem and the second corresponding to the extent that it is seen as 
biologically based. In my interviews I was careful to leave open the possibility that 
respondents did not pathologize it (see it as a problem) and avoided language to that effect 
(though by necessity I used the term “eating disorder” even though “problem” is implied by 
the word “disorder”).   
To gauge whether eating disorders were seen as a problem, I asked all respondents 
first how they felt about having an eating disorder, and then asked most respondents directly 
if it was a problem in their lives.  Without exception, all saw it as a problem.   
The problems ranged from simple statements as mild as “I didn‟t want to have it” 
(Kathleen) to long lists of bad consequences for relationships, finances, career plans, and 
physical health.  Mary, in the inpatient unit for AN described the problems as follows: 
I:  How do you feel about having had anorexia? 
R:  It‟s scary. And, something I don‟t know if I‟m ever going to get over. So, it‟s 
depressing in that sense... Just that you‟ve got this abusive thing inside you that 
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basically wants to kill you. And, it‟s just really controlling. It takes over everything. 
And, ruins relationships. 
I:  Well, what are some of the problems it has caused for you? 
R:  I‟ve basically pushed my family away. And, I pushed my partner away. We‟re 
separated. And, when I went to the [residential treatment program]. Because of 
financial issues related to the eating disorder, we had to downsize from a house to a 
townhouse. And, when I got back and went to [the day program], Angie [my partner] 
basically told me she couldn‟t handle me living there. That she didn‟t want to have to 
monitor me. So, then I basically had nowhere to live. And, I had to go live with my 
parents....  It‟s affecting my daughter now, too. She‟s been having problems at school. 
And, we‟ve actually got her seeing a play therapist. 
 
Respondents were also concerned about potential physical problems caused by eating 
disorders, including problems with bones, heart, digestion, and teeth. Almost half of 
respondents (n=at least 22) spoke of death in connection to eating disorders at some point. 
Vanessa, who recovered from BN, had purged together with friends in high school without 
thinking of it as a problem.  
And it didn‟t hit us until much later in high school what we were really doing to 
ourselves. By then for a lot of people it was a bit late. And we did lose one of our 
friends... we were all together when it – when she – she was throwing up. And she 
started bleeding. And she fell on the floor. And we had to call her mom in. And her 
esophagus had erupted or something. I don‟t remember the whole term. But she 
ended up dying...  
 
 Despite seeing eating disorders as a problem, many also saw good aspects.  This 
would be expected in recovered respondents, who can look back and note that they have 
learned from the experience. Twenty-two people said that as a result of the eating disorder, 
they were able to help or educate others about eating disorders; still others felt it made them 
better able to empathize with people who had other kinds of problems.  Some even felt 
fortunate to have gone through the experience. 
I‟m kind of glad it happened to me. Because, now I‟ve been able to turn it around. 
And, I feel extremely – you want to say blessed or lucky or whatever. That I was able 
to turn it around and get healthy. I feel like I got kind of like a second chance. 
Because, like I said. I mean there‟s many nights when I didn‟t know if I was going to 
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wake up in the morning. So, I‟m glad. Because, I‟m able to turn around and help 
people. (Deena, R-AN) 
 
Looking back at a resolved problem and finding good in it does not contradict the idea that it 
was a problem at the time.  For some the compassion extended beyond eating disorders to 
people with other kinds of problems.  
That [AN] and some other problems I‟ve had with depression in some ways have 
made me a lot more sympathetic to other people. Even though, like, if I see somebody 
who‟s in a wheelchair. I‟ve never been in a wheelchair. But it‟s like I can kind of – 
having dealt with some really difficult things I know what you‟re dealing with. And I 
can just cut people a break in my mind. And just be – I don‟t know. Just be more 
understanding and kinder and gentler I guess in my thoughts and actions to other 
people. So it‟s been a good thing. (Nell, R-AN) 
 
Although some respondents identified good aspects, as I mentioned before, every one 
of them saw eating disorders as a problem.  It may be possible to further differentiate 
between the perceived severity or importance of the problem in future analyses. For the 
present purpose of examining medicalization, it remains to be seen whether they view the 
problem in medical terms.   
3. EATING DISORDER AS A “PROBLEM WITH SOCIETY OR CULTURE”? 
Before reporting on the terms that were included in the index of endorsement for 
medicalized terminology, I briefly describe reactions to the phrase “problem with society or 
culture.”1 There was little variability; 47 of 50 respondents agreed with the idea that eating 
disorders were indeed a problem with society or culture.  It was not included in the 
medicalized terminology index because of this lack of variability and because it did not elicit 
discussion of medicalization or related themes.  As noted in Chapter 3, some respondents 
(Alyce, Margaret) resisted medical conceptions and contrasted them with sociocultural ones, 
                                                 
1
 I also excluded the term “lifestyle.” Respondents interpreted this term in different ways, often compatible with 
medicalized notions (because an illness changes what you do in daily life thereby changing your lifestyle).  
Because early answers did not address my research questions I did not consistently ask respondents about 
“lifestyle” during data collection and do not report the results. 
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but this was unusual and in any case was not elicited by the vague term “problem with 
society or culture”.   
A clear majority of those who approved of the phrase linked it to cultural norms of 
thinness. Some also thought that having a plentiful food supply could encourage eating 
disorders, because food was something that could be refused (by restricting) or wasted (by 
bingeing or purging).  Relatedly, some thought that the problem of obesity encouraged eating 
disorders because of widespread messages encouraging dieting and fitness. It may be 
possible to define and discern a more fundamentally social view of eating disorders that 
contests a medicalized viewpoint, but this sort of view was not obvious in the interviews. 
The phrase “problem with society or culture” did not elicit discussion of 
medicalization or related themes.  Indeed, they spoke about social and cultural causes in 
ways that were compatible with medicalized models held by respondents; as shown in 
Chapter 3, cultural and social pressures were already part of their causal models and co-
existed with diverse other factors.  Indeed, the hospital-based eating disorder program 
included a regular media-watching component. For Mary, an inpatient, this media component 
encouraged a critical consciousness of the portrayal of women and body size.    
Of the three who did not endorse the concept of eating disorder as a “problem with 
society or culture”, two interpreted the question to be about whether it is a problem in or for 
society. They both thought that obesity was more of a problem (Vanessa and Yvette).  In 
other parts of the interview, however, they too had spoken about pressures to be thin.   
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4. MEASURING MEDICALIZATION: REACTIONS TO FIVE TERMS 
 
In the interview, I asked respondents to respond to seven terms that could be used to 
describe eating disorders. I selected five from the seven terms presented as most relevant to 
perceptions of medicalization: psychological problem, mental illness, brain disease, physical 
illness, and choice. I chose these terms for their face validity. The first four are medical terms 
because they suggest problems for which a person would receive help in a healthcare setting 
– treatable disorders, in Conrad‟s language - as opposed to being a choice for which the 
person is held responsible, or another understanding of deviant behavior such as spirit 
possession.
2
  Three of the four terms include the words “illness” and “disease,” placing them 
in the medical realm.  “Psychological problem” is arguably the least medicalized term of the 
five. Yet it does seem more medicalized than simply the word “problem”; Isabelle made this 
case when she contrasted “problem” to “psychological problem” because the latter “attributes 
the problem to something”.  (She spontaneously compared the two; this was not something I 
asked respondents.) The last term, choice, is clearly not a medical concept; it implies that the 
person‟s behavior is subject to volitional control rather than being a condition for which one 
needs help. A clear rejection of “choice” constituted greater medicalized thinking than 
otherwise, for this analysis.  My categorization of “more” and “less” medicalized viewpoints 
depends on the assumption that all five terms are relevant to medicalized understandings. If 
this assumption is accepted, then examining respondents‟ answers will shed light not only on 
whether they have medicalized views of eating disorders (what terms seem appropriate to 
                                                 
2
 While spirit possession may seem very far from the respondents‟ worlds, some respondents referred to their 
eating disorder as a “demon”, “monster” or “entity” that speaks, yells, growls and roars.  Such externalized 
metaphors resemble spirit possession. In addition, a few respondents spoke about their eating disorder as a 
“sin”, suggesting that medicalized language coexists with other ways of talking about problem behavior.   
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them), but also how they would define medicalization for eating disorders (how they reason 
about the appropriateness of terms).    
 Table 4.1 provides an overview of respondents‟ endorsement or non-endorsement of 
medical terms.  I reversed the coding logic for “choice” because the rejection of that term 
connotes greater medicalization. The medicalized categories are shaded in Table 4.1 to 
clarify their similarity, despite different response coding.  Disagreeing or in some way 
distancing oneself from a term is sometimes a matter of interpretation, as I did not ask 
respondents to choose among response options. 
 
Table 4.1.  Endorsement of five terms to describe eating disorders. Frequency (percentage)     
Shading indicates responses coded as more medicalized  
 Psychol. 
problem 
Mental 
illness 
Brain 
disease 
Physical 
illness  
 Choice 
Agree 
clearly 
39   (80) 26   (52) 14   (28) 
   
19   (40) Disagree 
clearly 
14   (28) 
Disagree*/ 
conflicted 
10   (20) 24   (48) 36   (72) 
 
29   (60) Agree*/ 
conflicted  
36   (72) 
Total 49 (100) 50 (100) 50 (100) 48 (100)  50 (100) 
*This category included anyone who did not clearly agree (with the more medical terms) or clearly disagree 
(with the idea of choice). For all terms, this included people who endorsed both options or expressed 
uncertainty or did not know. For medical terms it also includes people who said they would need evidence, or 
distanced themselves from the presented option. 
 
The table above represents how people responded to the language presented in the interview.  
A majority agreed that eating disorders were psychological problems, and they were almost 
evenly split regarding whether these disorders were instances of mental illness. A majority 
disagreed that they should be seen as a brain disease or physical illness.  Only one third saw 
the disorder as a clear matter of choice. 
Reporting on agreement or disagreement with medicalized terminology is not the 
same as a description of a person‟s underlying view.  While in some ways acceptance of 
medical terms can be seen as a reflection of medicalization, it is more specifically a reflection 
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of medicalized terminology.  I asked respondents to react to terminology, and their decisions 
about whether the term applied reflect not only what they thought eating disorders were, but 
also what the terms mean and whether it is desirable to apply them. Respondents‟ ways of 
reasoning about terms resembled each other, even when they did not agree about whether to 
endorse them.  To illustrate how respondents thought through these issues, I now present 
their reactions to each of the five terms. 
4.1 “Psychological problem”? 
A clear majority of respondents endorsed the idea that AN or BN is a “psychological 
problem” (39 out of 49 who addressed the question).  Forty-eight people were asked to react 
to the idea of their AN or BN as a “psychological problem” and one did so without 
prompting for a total of 49. Many simply stated “I agree”, “definitely”, “that‟s true”, “that‟s 
valid” and I did not probe their thinking as much as those who said it was not. (I also probed 
more on answers about “mental illness”, “brain disease”, and “choice”).  Below I describe 
themes of respondent answers, paying special attention to respondents who did not accept the 
term “psychological problem”, as they may be the least medicalized group.   
4.1.1  Not a“psychological problem.”  Of the ten who disagreed or distanced 
themselves from the phrase, eight disagreed with it at first and two agreed with it at first but 
later amended their answers.  Most answers sounded like they were against medical views of 
eating disorders.  One very subtly distanced herself in a way that suggested the term was not 
medical enough: Delia emphasized chemical imbalance and the biology of addiction (She 
was in the inpatient unit for AN, had a very strong existing narrative about her family‟s 
genetic addictive tendencies.)   
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Three (Alyce, Victoria, and Lynn) thought “psychological problem” implied 
biological causation or serious mental illness, a premise they rejected.   
Like you‟re bipolar. Which to me it‟s more clear. There‟s a genetic thing going on in 
your brain. And, you‟re bipolar. And, there‟s something “wrong with you”, in quotes. 
But, to me bulimia is not quite like that. (Alyce, R-BN) 
 
Psychological problem I think of like, depression or, like, bipolar. And it‟s things like 
that. So I wouldn‟t put it exactly in that category. I mean I think it‟s like, more like a 
learned behavior. It might develop into, like, an addiction or like, psychological thing. 
But I don‟t know if it starts like that… like, depression and stuff I‟ve heard it‟s like, a 
chemical imbalance and things like that that are psychological. I don‟t feel like being 
bulimic is because, like, I have a chemical imbalance. (Victoria, T-BN) 
 
Lynn (R-AN), also described below said that it was an “emotional problem” rather than a 
“mental problem”; the latter would mistakenly connote “not seeing the world as it was.”   
Three (Carol, Margaret and Lynn) characterized it as a response to a problem, rather 
than a psychological problem in and of itself.  Carol (R-AN) described it as a “psychological 
response TO a problem” (emphasis hers); “It really feels to me like a psychological response 
to some problem that for some reason you choose this drastic way of trying to solve.” 
Similarly, Lynn offered: 
…to me it‟s not the basic problem. It‟s more like a symptom of some problem…. I 
think that for me and I would think for some other people – other women. It‟s that I 
wasn‟t comfortable in my life situation at that point. And, I didn‟t really know how to 
handle the changes that had happened in my life. How to handle the independence. 
How to make my own decisions and be comfortable with those decisions. So, it 
wasn‟t – anorexia gave me something that I could really control. I could control what 
I put in my body. But, the issue might have been control. The issue wasn‟t the 
food…. It was more about adaption and assertion. I guess those are terms I‟d use. 
Asserting myself. And then, adapting to the world that I‟d made by asserting myself. 
(Lynn, R-AN) 
 
Lynn‟s view is much more akin to a model of normal development into adulthood, or, 
alternatively, feminist cultural change during the early „70s (described elsewhere in her 
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interview).  Margaret‟s answer was similar, though she contextualized the problem more 
broadly; she thought of it as a response to women‟s oppression under patriarchy.  
Two felt that “psychological problem” was inadequate because the fundamental 
problem was physical, though not medical.  Melanie said that bulimia reflected a normal 
human urge to eat food because it is pleasurable, and that in a society with plentiful food 
people binged and had to compensate.  Tammy (R-AN) said the problem arose when a 
person was overweight and made to feel bad about herself.  These respondents distance 
themselves from “psychological problem” by mentioning a physical basis, but the physical 
aspect is not pathologized: it is normal human appetite in an abnormal context, and low self-
regard due to social devaluation of people who are overweight. So it is less like a psychiatric 
disorder and more like a social problem because it is not located in the individual (see 
discussions of medicalization and feminism in Chapter 1). 
Two other answers also ran counter to medicalization but could not easily be 
categorized into the above, though there were themes in common.  Paula (R-AN) stated that 
an eating disorder was a “manifestation” of a psychological problem, not a psychological 
problem in and of itself.  This answer is arguably a challenge to medicalization because the 
eating disorder is demoted to a symptom rather than a psychological problem, which would 
not warrant inclusion in the DSM.  Vanessa thought the term “psychological problem” was 
too similar to mental illness or addiction, which implied permanence and stigma,  
…you still get that “Huh. Something is wrong with you.” Kind of label. Because it 
sounds so final. Like you‟re going to wear it for a long time. But with a phase you 
just feel like – like your kid. They go through their little phase. They throw a tantrum. 
Or they turn – that‟s the terrible two‟s. It‟s a phase they‟re going through. They feel 
like – you feel like, “Okay. It‟s just something I‟m going through. But six months 
from now I won‟t have the problem.” (Vanessa, R-BN) 
 
176 
 
Her comparison of an eating disorder to a child‟s phase, the “terrible two‟s”, is diametrically 
opposed to the more medicalized responses, which sought to establish the seriousness of 
eating disorders and their deservingness of treatment. 
4.1.2  It is a “psychological problem.”  In answering the question about eating 
disorder as a “psychological problem”, many gave short answers and as noted above I did not 
probe carefully for this question.  I touch upon some themes here, though in less depth than 
for those who did not endorse the term.   
“Psychological problem” made sense to many respondents because it involved the 
mind, presumably as opposed to the physical.  They said “it‟s mental”, “it‟s all in my mind”, 
and “it‟s a mind thing”. 
And, we‟ve even in treatment learned to name the eating disorder. And, call it Ed. Or, 
whatever we want. And then, practice separation. Leading to divorce. So, that doesn‟t 
happen anywhere but in psychology. (Amy, T-AN) 
 
Willa said that she thought “the psychological is really the only issue. And when you can fix 
that the weight will follow.”  Some respondents endorsed “psychological problem” but noted 
its serious physical consequences as well, including the psychological effects of starvation 
(Ingrid and Hannah). By doing so, they implicitly defined “psychological” in opposition to 
“physical”. 
Several approved of the term because it connoted a loss of control or inability to 
simply will one‟s behavior.  Barbara describes how she still has unwanted feelings of guilt 
about eating even though she has recovered, and contrasts control with “something that clicks 
in” where you “can‟t completely break off of thinking about it.”  
I think that‟s probably the case. It began not a psychological problem. I had control of 
the situation. But by the end, like, the fact that I saw the scale at eighty and a half. 
And I was just like, “Wow. That‟s great.” Like, that‟s terrible. And it‟s something 
that clicks in like – it‟s definitely psychological. Because like, you can‟t completely 
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break off of thinking about it. Years after and I‟m recovered I still feel a little bit 
more guilty probably than the normal person if I gain weight and that sort of thing. 
(Barbara, R-AN))   
 
Liana (T-AN) had a similar definition of “psychological” which I asked her to define because 
she had already used it several times throughout the early part of the interview: “That it 
becomes a coping skill that your brain automatically depends on. And, it isn‟t a choice. It‟s 
more of a reliance kind of thing.” Yvette, recovered from AN, described having to manage 
her “brain”, and “take my brain out of this” to make herself eat when she was hungry. 
And so it was like, everything else about me knew I was hungry. But my brain was 
telling me “No. You‟re not.” And so I‟d listen to my brain. And so that‟s what I say, 
like, as I take myself out of it. Like, I take my brain out of this. Even though like, I 
know I‟m hungry. But my brain is telling me “Well you can just go another couple 
hours. It‟s almost dinner.” And so that‟s what I was saying. Like, I had to take that 
out of me. Because I mean that‟s still engrained in me. (Yvette, R-AN)) 
 
In addition, for some “psychological problem” appropriately conveyed the severity of 
eating disorders.  They explained, “You can‟t just stop”, “it‟s much more serious than people 
think,” and “It is a very serious, severe, psychological disorder.”   
Gillian specifically said that AN was psychological because it was not just 
environmental. Although she was the only one who answered in this way, I highlight it 
because it is a conceptual contrast to answers given by non-endorsers, such as Margaret, and 
illustrates the in-between status of eating disorders: neither medical disorder nor social 
phenomenon.  
I think that a lot of people think that it‟s something that the mother did. Or, that 
society did. And, I think that lots of different things can influence it. But, I don‟t think 
that the person who abused me caused my eating disorder. I think that I was – I had a 
pre-disposition for it. I think that I used it as a coping mechanism. And, I think that it 
was mental. Not environmental. And, I think that it has medical sequelae. But, I don‟t 
think that it‟s a medical disorder. (Gillian, T-AN) 
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Although Gillian was answering the question about “psychological problem”, she brings up 
issues that are salient to the other categories as well.  Her answer suggests the conceptual 
boundary work that is needed for defining eating disorders not only against a fully 
medicalized concept as “medical disorder” but also from a non-medicalized grounding in 
social influences.  The picture is made more complex by suggestions of agency (e.g., “I used 
it”).   
The themes identified above drew on several meanings of “psychological”, endorsing 
it as psychological because it was (1) mental rather than physical, (2) non-volitional, 
complex, and serious rather than a matter of choosing and controlling oneself, (3) mental 
rather than environmental. These themes were overlapping rather than mutually exclusive. 
Several of these themes will return in discussions of “mental illness” and “brain disease.” 
 4.2  “Mental Illness”? “Brain Disease”? 
 About half of respondents thought that “mental illness” was an accurate way to 
describe AN and BN (26 out of 50). Fewer endorsed the idea of “brain disease” (14 out of 
50). The rest expressed skepticism, uncertainty or disagreement about the terms, which I 
coded as less medicalized than the alternative. Because respondents used similar reasoning 
for these two terms, I developed general codes and applied them to both terms whether or not 
respondents endorsed them.  The reader will also notice some similarities with reasoning 
illustrated above for “psychological problem,” though answers to “psychological problem” 
were more diverse.   
 Most of the answers to the question about “mental illness” and “brain disease” could 
be captured by the same four codes (49 respondents received one of these codes for one or 
both answers).  These codes accommodate the finding that respondents sometimes used the 
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same reasoning to argue for and against the idea that it was a mental illness or a brain disease 
(e.g., one respondent might say it is not a mental illness/brain disease because it is possible to 
recover and another that it is one because one never completely recovers). These codes 
illuminate not only whether respondents think the specific terms apply to eating disorders, 
but also how they define those terms and, more broadly, the meanings of medicalization for 
respondents who have been diagnosed with eating disorders. The codes were based on over 
20 inductively generated codes, tentatively distilled to four general categories, then reviewed 
conceptually to make sure that any codes that were relevant to more than one category were 
subdivided and re-coded, if applicable (See Table 4.2 next page for further information on 
the inductively generated codes and how they map onto the four categories).  I provide 
approximate frequencies for these four codes. 
My choice of four general categories was influenced by my research questions (e.g., 
conceiving of mental illness as fixed or biologically based is salient to my questions on 
genetics). Respondents could receive more than one code; indeed many use a logic that ties 
these themes together, such that they may be seen as dimensions of “medical-ness”, often 
inseparable for respondents. 
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Table 4.2  Reasoning about whether eating disorders are mental illnesses and brain diseases  
General code Inductive codes on which general code is based 
Dysfunctional, severe, 
serious vs. not 
 
Delusional vs. not 
Life-threatening, serious vs. not 
Function in world vs. not 
Extreme vs. not 
In a psych ward vs. not 
Consciousness, 
choosing, or control vs. 
not 
In my control, conscious, choice vs. not  
Feels like something external to you vs. not 
Need help vs. handle it myself 
Biological origins, 
treatment vs. not 
 
Simple biological causation vs. complex causation   
Physical brain vs. not 
Neurotransmitters vs. not, chemical imbalance 
Simple biological treatment or cure vs. not 
Something you contract/catch vs. not 
Static or fixed vs. 
dynamic and 
developmental 
 
Inevitable, unavoidable vs. not 
Permanent or chronic or born with it vs. temporary 
Persistent vs. not 
Develops over time vs. birth/very young age 
Develops over time vs. happened in a moment  
Environment and experiences important  
   
 4.2.1  It is a “mental illness.”  Those 26 who agreed that an eating disorder was a 
mental illness primarily did so by emphasizing that it was dysfunctional, that the person did 
not have control over it, or that it had a biological basis (n= approximately 9, 9, and 6, 
respectively). By bringing up these themes they appear to define mental illness by these 
criteria, and perceive eating disorders to be similar. 
Respondents who discussed themes coded as “dysfunctional” spoke about a loss of 
connection to reality via delusions associated with eating disorders, though some asserted 
that there was less of this than with some other mental illnesses. With an eating disorder, 
“your views are distorted.... all you can concentrate on is food and weight” (Delia, T-AN), 
and “it consumes all your thoughts… it‟s just as severe as a lot of other ones that I think no 
one would disagree that are mental illnesses” (Eva, T-BN). Yvette and others focused on the 
distortion of body image in particular: 
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You have a different picture than anybody else has. And that was one of my main 
faults is mentally I saw myself as still that chubby little girl. Like, I didn‟t realize that 
I had gotten thinner than everybody else. All the other girls. Like, I had gotten so thin 
that it was like I didn‟t have any shape to me. But I didn‟t see that. Like, I still saw all 
the other girls and being like, “I wish I could be that thin.” Like, they looked so 
pretty. (Yvette, R-AN) 
 
Some who discussed dysfunctional themes argued that eating disorders are less dysfunctional 
than some other mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia.  Wendy reasoned about it in a way 
that suggested that by some definitions, distorted thoughts about bodyweight would 
constitute mental illness, even if hospitalization were not required.  
R: I guess because when people think mental illness you think of, like, somebody that 
needs to be in, like, a psychiatric ward or something. Or at least that‟s what I 
immediately think of. But if you think about like – if you think about it objectively 
what a mental illness is, then yeah. I guess it would be. 
I:  And what is that more objective way of looking at mental illness? 
R:  Like, just that you might have distorted thoughts about something. And maybe a 
distorted body image. Like, I understand now that I was too skinny when I was a 
hundred and three pounds. But I was really happy with my weight at that point. So 
distortion I guess in your mind would be classified to me as an illness. (Wendy, T-
BN) 
 
Ingrid (T-AN) also distinguished between people with eating disorders and those who are 
“hearing voices” or whose intelligence is impaired; “on the contrary,” she said, “anorexics 
are extremely smart. And, very, very resourceful in keeping their addiction alive.” Sarah (R-
BN) noted that compared to some other mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder, with eating disorders “you‟re not as far apart from reality that you cannot think 
about getting help.” 
 The sense that the eating disorder was not under the person’s control also justified 
classification as a mental illness. Respondents talked about the problem being in their brain -  
“there‟s problems with the way my brain is forming thoughts and reactions” (Jackie, T-BN), 
or being like an external force  - “at least for me there‟s like, another voice. And I‟ve heard it 
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compared to like, an abusive relationship… Somebody that‟s abusing you and pushes 
everybody else away and isolates you” (Mary, T-AN). Several spoke of not being able to 
choose to stop the behaviors, even when they themselves and others wanted them to. Wendy 
mentioned people who ask, “Well why don‟t you just eat?” and refuted the implied premise 
of choice: 
…if the person was healthy in their head. They would want to eat normally. But 
obviously there has to be something wrong with someone‟s head to make them want 
to not eat or to make them want to eat huge amounts and then throw them up. Like, 
those are not normal healthy things to do. There‟s some kind of illness going on there. 
And I just don‟t see how you can really make a solid argument for it not being a 
mental illness. (Wendy, T-BN) 
 
For many respondents, the lack of individual control overlapped with the sense that an eating 
disorder is a disease and dysfunctional. 
 Respondents cited or speculated about biological origins as evidence of mental 
illness. A few claimed that there was a biological origin, but most were coded here because 
biology was part of their definition of mental illness, even though eating disorders might not 
have that aspect. Petra speculated about serotonin: 
I‟ve read enough to know that there‟s like, lower levels of serotonin or higher levels 
or there‟s something in there. I think there‟s a mis-firing chemical in there that‟s not 
connected the right way. Because why can one person grow up in the same 
environment and not develop it and another person does? I think there‟s something 
mentally not connected there.  (Petra, T-AN) 
 
Rebecca wondered if scientists had “done studies to show like, chemical imbalances in the 
brain… to validate it”. Olga (R-AN) felt certain that based on her experience with medication 
for a different disorder, her AN was related to the same “imbalance”; “some sort of chemical 
thing in your brain that‟s not quite right.”  Fiona (T-AN) said it was a mental illness even 
though you didn‟t have be on medication permanently, like someone with schizophrenia. 
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 Some endorsed “mental illness” but their definition seemed to imply a static, fixed 
state; by contrast, eating disorders were more dynamic because they developed and changed 
over time in response to the environment.  This idea may not be separable from the idea that 
a mental illness is biological, because the dynamic, developmental dimension was usually 
brought up as a contrast to the biological idea.  Wendy (T-BN) said that her answer would 
depend on the definition of “mental illness,” and after talking about the possibility of 
genetics and biological definitions of illness, she emphasized that for her, BN was not this: “I 
think it‟s mostly just based in cognitive distortions. I think it‟s mostly based on 
environmental factors.”  Olga (R-AN)also contrasted a biologically based idea with 
something more dynamic “I guess whenever you say mental illness that makes you sound 
like you‟re crazy or something. I don‟t think you‟re crazy. But just like depression and 
anxiety. I would consider some sort of chemical thing in your brain that‟s not quite right. I 
would think that the anorexia is the same way. Now I don‟t think – I definitely think there are 
outside triggers for it. So it‟s behavioral too.”  Environmental factors and “outside triggers” 
appear to be connected to “cognitive distortions” and “behavioral” elements, and both are 
contrasted to a biological conception. As I note later, the four coded themes work together.   
 In general, respondents frequently reasoned about mental illness by considering its 
resemblance or non-resemblance to psychosis, where psychosis was conceived as serious, 
uncontrollable, biological, and permanent in nature.  For some, mental illness connoted 
psychosis, for others it did not.  In addition, some viewed AN or BN as like a psychosis, and 
others did not.   
4.2.2   Not a “mental illness.” Those who disagreed or were uncertain about whether 
an eating disorder was a mental illness also thought that a mental illness connoted something 
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dysfunctional (about n=11) or biological (about n=13), but believed that eating disorders did 
not meet these criteria. Those who disagreed with the idea of mental illness also tended to 
reject it because it sounded too static, fixed, or permanent (about n=11) whereas they saw 
eating disorders as something that developed and changed over time. 
Many who rejected the term “mental illness” said that people with eating disorders 
were more functional than their picture of the mentally ill.  Amy (T-AN) thought that “even 
when I do have my eating disorder present and all consuming, I‟m functioning every day”.  
Barbara (R-AN) said she “was reacting to situations completely rationally. I wasn‟t like, 
having outbursts or anything like that.” Alyce (R-BN) pointed out that unlike people with 
AN, those with BN are “not in denial. They know what they‟re doing is destructive… 
dangerous and sick… They want to stop. And, they can‟t.”  Tammy, Beth and Thelma 
thought there was a continuum or spectrum of eating disorders, and (for Tammy) only those 
with “significant anorexia who are very OCD [could be] crossing over into a mental 
disorder,” or (for Beth) people who weigh “fifty pounds and go to the hospital and they‟re 
almost dying.”  As above, the idea of psychosis informs reasoning about whether “mental 
illness” applies to eating disorders; someone who can function, or is aware that what they are 
doing is destructive, is not psychotic and therefore not mentally ill. 
Biological origins seemed to be part of the definition of mental illnesses, though like 
respondents described above they differed about whether biological origins applied to eating 
disorders or not. Like those who endorsed eating disorders as “mental illness”, there was 
uncertainty about whether eating disorders were biologically based. Other mental illnesses 
“could be caused by the wrong levels of serotonin or whatever other different hormones or 
substances you need” (Betty, T-AN), “brain chemistry and neurotransmitters” (Thelma, T-
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BN), “chemical imbalance” (Mireya, T-BN), something “organic” (Nell and Lynn, R-AN) 
located in the brain. Sydney reflected,  
it‟s very difficult for me to accept that something‟s wrong with my brain and I might 
not be normal in that sense. I prefer to think of it as a phase I‟m going through that 
sense. I prefer to think of it as a phase I‟m going through (laughing). That I‟m 
normal. I‟m just off in this little – this is something that I‟m temporarily afflicted 
with. It‟s not – when I think illness – especially in something like this where there‟s 
no pill you can pop and just get cured. I feel like that‟s something I have to live with 
for the rest of my life. And I don‟t really want to put that label on it. Because that‟s 
really daunting. (Sydney, R-BN) 
 
I believe that Sydney was laughing at herself when she said she preferred to think of it “as a 
phase”, because earlier in the interview she had criticized her parents for seeing it that way 
rather than taking it seriously.  Her discomfort with the term “mental illness” appears to be 
based on the fact that “there‟s no pill you can pop” and the stigma of mental illness. Several 
others mentioned the fact that eating disorders are not treated with medicine, implying that 
biochemistry must not be relevant. Whereas, implicitly, for mental illness biochemistry and 
pills are relevant. 
 Several who rejected the term “mental illness” did so because it implied too much 
permanence, fixity, and stability. Again, there was overlap with other themes presented here.  
With mental illness, people had to be on medication their entire lives and could never truly 
recover, or they were born with the problem which implied that they would always have it. 
Vanessa preferred the analogy of a virus because they “run their course… then you‟re well” 
(even though she did not perceive it to have biological origins).  People who emphasized the 
role of the environment in the development of eating disorders were at odds with the idea of 
permanence, which was often linked to biology. If eating disorders developed in response to 
environmental influences, then they must not be mental illnesses.  As Nell (R-AN) put it, “I 
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almost think of anorexia as a response to something that happened. Whereas somehow 
mental illness seems more like something that you‟re born with really.”   
Loss of control implied biology and dysfunction for those who mentioned it.  A 
person who is permanently dysfunctional for biological reasons cannot control her own 
behavior.  Thelma links them together, and talks about her difficulty in knowing whether to 
apply “mental illness” to her BN:  
[M]y mom is a psychiatrist. Like, that‟s her type of medicine. And so she deals with 
mentally ill people. And obviously the difference between psychiatry and psychology 
is psychiatry, like, yes she, like, meets with her patients and like, talks to them. But a 
lot of them are on medication. Mental illness is like, a chemical thing for a lot of 
people… I kind of like, changed my mind when I started thinking about it in that 
sense. Like, whether or not it’s something that you have any control over. 
I:  Can you say how you changed your mind? 
R:  I started thinking about the term, like, mentally ill in the way that, like, my mother 
uses it. And that – the connotation for that for me is people who have just, like, lost 
all touch with reality because they‟re so sick. And they can’t help it. It‟s not their 
fault. (Thelma, T-BN; emphasis added) 
 
There are many more examples of how biology, permanence, dysfunction, and loss of control 
work together.  These are dimensions of mental illness as a medicalized concept, generated 
from respondent perceptions.  Eating disorders sit uncomfortably with other examples of 
mental illness, like schizophrenia, which is often contrasted to AN or BN.
3
  It may be useful 
to think of two versions of medicalized mental illness, a weaker and stronger one, with the 
stronger one involving biology, permanence/incurability, dysfunction/being out of touch with 
reality, and loss of control.  Some equated only the stronger, psychotic version with the term 
“mental illness”; others thought mental illness could encompass weak and strong types of 
disorder.  As they talked about eating disorders and the stronger version of medicalized 
mental illness, i.e., psychosis, there was a hint of what might be at stake: the ability of 
                                                 
3
 The analogies respondents draw to other mental and physical conditions defines the conceptual boundaries of 
the disorder: it‟s like this, it‟s not like that, or it‟s like this but only in certain ways.  Using other cases to reason 
about whether your own case fits the definition is similar to casuistry in philosophy. 
187 
 
respondents as agents to work toward recovery.  To take one more example, from someone 
who endorsed the idea of mental illness, the capacity to “work on” your eating disorder 
implies that it is not permanent, nor biologically based, and not like some other mental 
illnesses. 
I mean it is a mental illness. But, I think it can be fixed. It‟s not something I don’t 
think’s permanent. I think it‟s just temporary. And, you can fix your thoughts from it. 
So, it‟s not like schizophrenia where you will have it for the rest of your life. And, if 
you don’t take your medication, it‟ll come back. It‟s something – I think anorexia can 
be fixed if you work on it.” (Fiona, T-AN; emphasis added) 
 
When respondents think through genetics, they may think it implies this strong version of 
medicalized mental illness and an inability to work toward recovery. 
4.2.3  It is a “brain disease.”Although far fewer respondents approved of the term 
“brain disease”, they used some of the same reasoning as for “mental illness”.  While “brain 
disease” may seem far-fetched to apply to AN and BN, it is a term used by Thomas Insel, 
Director of the NIMH, in a letter featured by a prominent advocacy website (as discussed in 
Chapter 1).  Only 14 respondents thought it was reasonable to call AN or BN a brain disease. 
I describe them using the same four codes as for mental illness. 
Not surprisingly, the majority reasoned about brain disease by discussing biology.  
Some talked about serotonin and other neurotransmitters, “my chemistry,” neurons “mis-
firing”, a genetic pre-disposition in which “something neurologically is different in an 
anorexic than another person that doesn‟t have an eating disorder” (Reba, R-AN). Several 
used the term “brain disease” to encompass the brain‟s reaction to eating disorder behavior.  
Rebecca (T-BN) discussed the effect upon the brain of repeated purging; “our brain models. 
So I think again initially it‟s not a brain disease. But as you repeat and repeat and repeat the 
behavior you create new synapses in the brain that are in response to these chemicals.” Mary 
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spoke about how “the brain actually shrinks” as a result of malnutrition; Nell also spoke 
about how the “brain changes” in reaction to starvation.  Irene and Ingrid endorsed the 
concept, but redefined brain to mean something more akin to the mind or the material 
component of the spirit.
4
 Thus, only a minority of respondents endorsed the idea of brain 
disease as a property of the physical brain, and a yet smaller subset thought the concept was 
more than a downstream effect of the eating disorder.  
A smaller number reasoned that the apparent permanence of their eating disorder 
made “brain disease” plausible. Selena observes that her BN behavior has been difficult to 
stop, so a brain disease would make sense. 
I think it‟s sort of some kind of chemical imbalance or disease in the DNA. I‟m not 
really sure. But because of the fact that even when I‟ve been in a place where I was 
doing better. And it seemed like I should be in complete remission. I still felt like I 
needed to purge… But because when I‟ve gotten better I still wanted to purge. I mean 
so it‟s not – I mean I could make the choice not to. But it still felt like it was out of 
my control to do that. It felt like I just had some sort of imbalance or something. 
(Selena, T-BN) 
 
Gena talked about a „glitch‟ that could explain why she felt so self-conscious about her body 
even at a very early age, and why she „keeps going back there‟: 
Because, there‟s got to be something to explain what happened when I was way 
younger. And, what happens with even the fact that I know that it‟s something that I 
shouldn‟t be doing. But, my brain keeps going back there type thing. There‟s maybe a 
glitch. I don‟t think that there‟s like, ever going to be, like, medicine for it. Of course 
there‟s no, like, eating disorder gene. Or, whatever. So, I would say yeah. But, I mean 
I haven‟t read anything about that. So, I don't know how competent I am in saying 
that. (Gena, R-BN) 
 
Both Gena and Selena bring up genetics to convey their understanding of brain disease as 
permanent.   
                                                 
4The meanings of “brain” are interesting; people often use it to mean „mind‟ but in a way that seems to 
externalize behavior; the „brain‟ is often where respondents rhetorically locate the part of themselves that is not 
obedient to their will/agency. It is a way of externalizing agency without going beyond the body.  
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 A few reasoned that because of their inability to control their own behavior, there 
must be a problem with their brain, making “brain disease” a reasonable possibility.  Claire 
said “a lot of it‟s out of my control. So, it must be at least partially mental, something wrong 
with my chemistry.” Fiona brought up genetics in answer to the question:  
I‟ve heard that about genetics and stuff like that. So, I do think that has some 
consideration. Because, it‟s strange that both me and my sister both have an eating 
disorder. Because, if one was not – if it wasn‟t somehow genetic, then the other 
person – the other twin could have probably fought not to have it. So, it‟s strange that 
both of us got it. I do think there‟s some genetic factor into it that makes it maybe a 
brain disease. Something that you can‟t control. (Fiona, T-AN) 
 
Again, there is the connection between the ability to control behavior and an origin in 
genetics or another biological characteristic. Selena‟s answer about the persistence of her BN 
against her best efforts also demonstrates the connection between the ability to control 
behavior, persistence of the behavior, and its putative biological origin. 
 4.2.4  Not a “brain disease.”  Most respondents did not endorse the idea that AN or 
BN were “brain diseases.” This included outright rejection of the term as “ludicrous” or 
“ridiculous,” as well as open-minded uncertainty about it (e.g., not having an opinion 
because it seemed like an empirical question).  Therefore this category includes some people 
who were open to the idea.  
For many, brain disease connoted something more physiological, anatomical, 
neurological and strictly physical and biological than was appropriate for eating disorders, 
which concerned the mind.  Kathleen (R-AN) summarized it well when she said “It‟s not 
physical in that kind of way”; even if there are physical components it would not be right to 
call it a brain disease.  Several said it sounded too “medical” or “clinical.” While some 
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thought of brain chemistry,
5
 most said that “brain disease” sounded like a cancerous tumor or 
other growth, a deterioration, infection, lesion, aneurism, encephalitis, virus or bacteria 
“attacking your brain”. Some linked the term brain disease to neurological conditions like 
problems with myelin sheaths in multiple sclerosis, “depletion of certain neurons” in 
Alzheimer‟s or Parkinson‟s and Jackie (T-BN) contrasted this view to one that involves 
“mental processes”: “I think brain disease sounds like it‟s a more physical thing going on 
inside your brain. Like cells attacking each other inside your brain. But, I don‟t think that‟s 
what it is. I think it‟s mental processes.” Liana (T-AN) speculated that brain disease 
suggested something that would be visible on a “scan”, which was not the case for eating 
disorders; “I don‟t think you could compare my brain to a normal eater‟s brain. And, you 
would be able to tell any difference.” Willa dismissed the idea, “when I think of brain disease 
I think of I mean just pure genetics. And so I don‟t think of it that way at all. I don‟t think 
you get like, the anorexia gene kind of thing (short sarcastic laugh).”  Gillian allowed that it 
might be possible to “have a tumor that‟s at a perfect spot in their head that makes them have 
anorexia so it is a brain disease.”   
The purely physical dimension implied a kind of treatment that many respondents 
found implausible.  If it were a brain disease, it would require surgery, radiation, a 
medication, vaccine, or some implausible “magic potion”, or other interventions that were 
incongruous with eating disorders.  Mireya linked the idea of brain disease directly to 
medicalization, and objected to it as a misunderstanding of the etiology and treatment of 
eating disorders.  
                                                 
5
 Some thought of brain chemistry in connection to brain disease and rejected the term for that reason.  Olga, 
who thought her own eating disorder is strongly related to brain chemistry, rejected the term brain disease 
because to her it connoted tumors rather than brain chemistry. 
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This is more, like, healing and about mental issues… basically what I think is like, 
that there‟s very much, like, a Western approach to, like, medicalizing everything and 
like, wanting to, like, cure. So it‟s you take a handy wipe and you clean the table and 
there‟s no more germs on it… There‟s no, like, way to completely wipe away and to 
remove something like an eating disorder. Because it‟s an action. And it‟s reaction 
constantly to your environment and to eating and your relationship with eating. And 
so it‟s, like, recognizing, like, why you did it in the first place and why you continue 
to do it. Which takes a lot of energy to think about it. Which is a lot more about 
healing, like, whatever is hurting or whatever is not resolved in your life as to why 
you continue to do a destructive behavior. (Mireya, T-BN) 
 
Some wished that it were a brain disease, because this would entail a straightforward 
treatment. Beth said that if there “some MRI evidence” or real knowledge about “chemical 
imbalance,” “I would feel like that would maybe be good news. Since that means it could be 
fixed and predicted.” Alternatively, Carly thought if it were a brain disease that meant it 
could not be fixed; in her estimation, “brain disease is where you can‟t do anything about it 
because your brain is just deteriorating.” (This theme will be part of Chapter 6 on 
implications; if it‟s biological that suggests both permanence and treatability. You  may 
always have the underlying problem but there is a treatment.) 
 Brain disease also implied too much permanence for some respondents.  As conveyed 
by the description of the four codes in Table 4.2, this broad theme encompassed contrasts 
drawn between permanence and recovery as well as those between stasis and dynamic 
developmental interaction with the environment.  Brain disease went too far toward 
permanence/stasis than some were comfortable with. Clearly these answers were related to 
the physicality of “brain disease” as well as the ability of the individual to control it. 
Brain disease to me implies that there‟s some sort of inevitability to -  like that you‟re 
born with it. That this is some sort of anatomical feature that – that‟s what I associate. 
Brain disease meaning this is something unavoidable. Not the product of a set of 
social conditions that I‟m reacting to or being influenced by. It just that doesn‟t sit 
well with me. (Zinnia, T-BN) 
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R:  I just think that to me is too medical. If it were as simple as it being a brain 
disease, well shoot. Operate. Get it out. But it‟s not. It‟s just – yeah. I feel like disease 
is too clinical. And yeah. It‟s too simple…. 
I:  And can you say more what that means to you? 
R:  A medical issue means something that is not – I mean that‟s not environmentally 
impacted. So you could be in a room with your family. Or you could be with a room – 
be with your family at home or in a room full of strangers at the North Pole. And you 
would feel and act the exact same way. And I think eating disorders are SO 
environmentally charged. Obviously being at home with my family I‟m going to 
behave very differently than at somewhere else with a bunch of strangers. Yeah. I just 
think there‟s too much of an outside impact on eating disorders and the way you 
behave and think and feel about yourself. (Sydney, T-BN) 
 
Ideas about treatment were linked to ideas about recovery; “you can‟t fully recover from it. 
Unless they go and take something out of your brain” (Yvette, R-AN). 
 It was possible to reject “brain disease” but embrace biological causation and an 
important role for environmental influence. Olga articulated a gene-environment interaction 
model, in which environment plays an important role, but only for those with a certain 
genotype or SNP (single nucleotide polymorphism, which represents a “difference in a single 
DNA building block”, National Library of Medicine 2010)  
[I]t seems like Alzheimer‟s is something that no matter where you are or what your 
situation is it‟s you‟re going to get it if you have the genetic pre-disposition towards 
it. And like I was saying again. Like being poor in India versus being in an affluent 
country like the U. S. I think anorexia would be one of those things where it wouldn‟t 
be – just because you have a certain gene or a certain SNP or whatever you‟re going 
to get it. But you have, like, a higher chance of getting it given your social 
surroundings. Your environmental factors. I mean I would look at obesity the same 
way. I‟d look at heart disease the same way. In that there‟s a lot of things in our 
environment that we could change to prevent it. But some people are never going to 
have a problem with it. And some people would have a problem with it just because 
of their genetic make-up. (Olga, R-AN) 
 
Several thought brain disease implied less individual control.  Paula, who was one of 
several who were open to the idea, speculated that it might help with stigma to think of it as a 
brain disease. 
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Can somebody show me on an MRI where there is something in the brain that‟s 
happening that then is manifesting itself in this behavior? I mean maybe it‟s possible 
that there is something going on. I mean because there‟s always sort of unexplored 
territory. And we find out that these things may be, like, a myth what we think now 
causes eating disorders. The same way that we‟ve come a long way from “Oh. It‟s 
just a bunch of girls that want to be thin.” Which was sort of like myth number one. 
Maybe – God only knows. They‟ll find, like, some kind of weird virus that causes… I 
mean they thought ulcers were caused by too much stress and coffee and type A 
behavior. And then discovered the H pylori. (Paula, R-BN) 
 
Paula says it is possible that eating disorders could turn out to have a basis in the brain, just 
as ulcers were found to be caused by bacteria, and that this would help combat “myth number 
one”, the claim that people with eating disorders just want to be thin. 
 The interconnection between biological basis and individual control is apparent in 
Gillian‟s answer. Brain disease sounds much more like a completely physical illness, 
“something that you should be in a hospital receiving radiation for” whereas an eating 
disorder can and should be “worked on” by the person with it. Gillian asserted that calling it 
a disease should not excuse the person from working on it, as they have some control. 
So, I think that it‟s – well, yes. I think it is a disease. It is an illness. And, mental 
illness implies disease. I don‟t think that it‟s – I don‟t think that you can excuse 
thinking of it – use the excuse of “Oh. It‟s a disease.” To excuse not trying in 
recovery. Like, if you say “I want to recover.” You can‟t go into recovery and say 
“But, I‟m not going to eat because of this disease. And, I can‟t help it. So, you cure 
me. And, I won‟t do anything.”… I feel like there are parts of it that you can‟t help. 
And, I feel like you do lose a lot of control over it. But, I feel like you can make the 
choice to try. And, if you‟re eating – even if you can‟t physically hold down more 
than two hundred calories a day. If you‟re trying to mentally work on your thought 
processes. That‟s still trying. And, disease sounds like you‟re not even going to work 
on your mental stuff. Because, that‟s just your disease. And, you know you can‟t help 
it. (Gillian, T-AN) 
 
Similarly, Willa connected individual control and the biological origin: 
I think the difference is for brain disease I would think of that as something that you 
have no control over. And anorexia I mean you don‟t have control over it. But you 
can go get treatment and cure it and be done one day. Whereas with the brain disease 
just kind of my impression of that is something that you can‟t just go fix. At least not, 
like, psychological treatment. And so that‟s the difference in my mind. (Willa, R-AN) 
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To summarize, if eating disorders sit uncomfortably between choice and disease, brain 
disease is too close to the disease side of the spectrum.  Mental illness was acceptable to 
more people, but even then many found it necessary to distinguish eating disorders from 
other mental illnesses that were more severe, biologically based, dysfunctional, or more 
difficult for the individual to control.  Discussing mental illness and brain disease enabled 
participants to identify contrasts between a medical concept and eating disorders, thereby 
clarifying underlying definitions of both.  Eating disorders are something that develop over 
time, and can be ameliorated or recovered from over time (though some were “on the fence” 
about whether you could fully recover or not) by means of the person‟s own effort, rather 
than the physical intervention of a doctor upon a passive patient.  Looking ahead to the 
chapters about genetic causation, there are hints that genetics are already part how some 
respondents make sense of both mental illness and brain disease. They can be viewed simply 
(e.g., Willa, Tammy) or complexly (e.g., Olga). Environmental influence and individual 
volition are at odds with a simple genetic or other biological conception.  A subset viewed 
“brain disease” as an empirical question, requiring more research; they may be similarly open 
to the idea of genetic contributions.  As suggested in the introduction to this section, the 
criteria respondents use to decide whether an eating disorder is a “mental illness” or “brain 
disease” tell us not only about how they view eating disorders, but also how they define these 
medicalized terms.  Their responses could be approached from an opposite tack and used to 
show what mental illness means: a permanent, biologically based, severely dysfunctional 
state that is not under the individual‟s control. 
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4.3  “Physical illness”?  
 Of 48 who were asked, 19 endorsed the idea that AN or BN were “physical 
illnesses”, 29 did not. Although these groups differed on whether to endorse the term, nearly 
all spoke about the physical effects of eating disorders.  I considered endorsement of the term 
to indicate a more medicalized orientation but do not present quotations from those who 
endorsed it separately from those who opposed it.  The difference consisted in whether to 
apply the term “physical illness” to the physical effects of eating disorders, which was not 
accompanied by as much deliberation as other terms elicited. 
Thirty-four focused their answers on the physical effects of eating disorders: 14 said it 
was a physical illness for this reason, 20 said it was not. Petra stated simply, “it‟s a mental 
illness that affects you physically” (coded as a non-endorsement).  Those who endorsed it 
often said that although it did not start as a physical illness, it became one over time.  
Respondents listed a wide array of specific physical effects: damaged teeth, being weak and 
fatigued; feeling ill, feeling cold, disturbed sleep, losing hair, loss of menstrual period, 
osteoporosis, electrolyte imbalances, dehydration, cardiac problems, lanugo (fine body hair), 
and death. Delia (T-AN) observed that “it does a number on your esophagus and your bones 
and your teeth and your kidneys and your liver and all your organs. It really takes a toll on 
your physical body.”  Mireya also mentioned her body‟s adaptation to BN, identifying the 
ease with which she can throw up as “really dangerous physically … [b]ecause your body 
shouldn‟t be able to do that.”  For some, “the physical is just a symptom” (Claire) and 
therefore it‟s not a physical illness; for others the symptom or effect was part and parcel of 
the disorder, warranting the label of “physical illness.” 
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Although the most important way of reasoning about physical illness was in relation 
to the physical effects of eating disorders, several used reasoning of the kind presented in 
Table 4.2 here too.  Irene rejected the idea, contrasting individual control with physical 
origins. 
So, I guess it‟s not a physical illness because it‟s in my control. Whereas cancer is 
something that happens to you. You may be able to treat it. But, you can‟t say “I‟m 
not going to get cancer.” And then, not get it. Whereas somebody could say “I‟m 
never going to vomit.” And then, in theory never vomit. They have some control over 
it. (Irene, R-BN) 
 
The implausibility of simplistic biological treatment and static conceptions that excluded a 
role for environment were also linked to physical illness:   
I think it has physical symptoms definitely. But it‟s not just a physical illness in that 
you cannot just do physical therapy or pop a pill or again is something unaffected by 
environmental or psychological factors. (Sydney, T-BN) 
 
I think it‟s more a set of actions as opposed to an actual condition of the body itself. 
A set of actions that‟s connected to sort of the mental side or the cognitive side. But 
it‟s fundamentally about sort of the actions that you – it‟s actions. Not a physical 
condition. (Zinnia, T-BN) 
 
I don‟t think it‟s a physical illness. Because I think of physical illness as, like, you 
just getting sick. And maybe throwing up because you have the flu or something. 
That‟s what I think of as physical illness. I don‟t think it‟s a physical illness. 
(Yolanda, T-BN) 
 
To summarize, a minority viewed AN and BN as physical illnesses. However, there 
was general agreement that eating disorders can result in physical health problems.  Recalling 
one of the compound causal factors featured in Chapter 3, it was the sheer repetition of eating 
disorder behaviors that resulted in physical effects on teeth, bones, esophagus, heart, and 
brain. 
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4.4  “Choice”? 
So far I have discussed how respondents view terms that connote medical conceptions 
of eating disorder. Now I turn to a non-medical conception of eating disorders: choice. 
Thinking of eating disorders as a choice places it in the volitional realm, something a person 
could stop if she or he simply decided to. A more medicalized approach would insist that 
“choice” is an inaccurate and insulting way of describing the phenomenon; diseases are not 
chosen. A less medicalized view would not object to the idea as much, and entertain the idea 
that people choose to have eating disorders. As with the other terms, I separated respondents 
into two categories, one with more medicalized views based on their committed rejection of 
the term “choice” (n=14), the other less medicalized (n=36). I classified those who said 
emphatically or consistently that it was not a choice, as having more medicalized views than 
others, even if they acknowledged that some aspects were chosen. The group with less 
medicalized views includes those who said it was a choice, or that it was both a choice and 
not a choice.  The group coded as less medicalized was more ambivalent, and occasionally 
embraced choice.  I probed extensively on the theme of choice, but classified them into these 
two categories based on their initial responses. (Answers here recall themes from the section 
on agentic language in Chapter 3.) 
1.4.4.1  Not a choice.  Of the 14 respondents who said it was not a choice, many were 
passionately emphatic about it. Because respondents‟ experience of and perceptions of choice 
in eating disorders is central to this project, I present more and longer excerpts in this section 
than for previous sections.  These excerpts represent an important subset of people with 
eating disorders. The five listed below were currently receiving treatment in the inpatient unit 
or the day program for AN or BN. 
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Oh, no. No. No. No. I don‟t think anyone with any eating disorder would ever choose 
to feel like they feel. That‟s an infuriating thing when people say that….  Because, 
they don‟t understand it. I mean who likes to throw up? Nobody. Who – nobody 
would choose to be as miserable as eating disorders make you. I mean it‟s such an 
isolating thing. You just feel completely alone. And, honestly you‟re your own worst 
enemy. It‟s miserable. I mean you should just be able to just be alone. And, be with 
your thoughts. And, just be safe. But, it‟s awful. And, I can‟t explain it to someone 
who has that mentality that it‟s a choice. Because, I mean nobody chooses any kind of 
illness. (Jackie, T-BN) 
 
It‟s not a choice. No. I mean I can‟t ever see it being a choice for anybody…. I can‟t 
see how anyone would choose to have something like this just take over. Take over 
their thinking. Their way of life. And, something that‟s destroying you. But, you can‟t 
do anything about it at the time. You feel like it‟s something that you just have that. 
And, you just got to – that‟s become – that‟s you. That‟s part of you. But, you 
struggle each day with it. Because, you worry. You got to make sure the weight don‟t 
go up. Because, if it goes up, you‟re going to have to lose more weight. You‟re going 
to have to exercise more. It‟s just like – I mean it consumes your whole life. You‟re 
existing. You‟re not living. You‟re isolating yourself from everybody but maybe your 
close family. And, it‟s like you‟re in your own little world. (Karen, T-AN) 
      
It‟s not. It‟s never a choice… That‟s probably one of my pet peeves is when people 
says “But, it‟s your choice.” And, it‟s like, “No.”… just like anybody else I think it‟s 
a choice to want to lose five pounds at the beginning. But, then I think with 
obsessiveness and with compulsiveness and rigidity. I mean I think genetics is a lot 
[of it]. And, your personality just makes it more, like, an extreme thing. Like, all or 
nothing. Like, I‟m either fat or skinny. Or, whatever. Like, I think that‟s when it‟s not 
– I mean once you – I think all normal eaters have a choice to eat a little healthier. 
But, after that it‟s not a choice. (Liana, T-AN) 
 
It‟s not a choice. Nobody would choose this. It‟s hell to live through. … [People] 
think you have the choice to eat or not eat. But you don‟t feel you have the choice to 
eat or not eat. If it was that simple, I wouldn‟t be sitting here [in the inpatient unit] for 
the seventh time. And there wouldn‟t be clinics like this for people who have this 
disease. It is not a choice. It is something that you cannot – it‟s not like you go out 
and say “Hey. I believe I‟ll get anorexia today. And drive my whole family crazy and 
make my life miserable.” It‟s not a choice. I think it‟s something that happens 
gradually over a period of time until it just snowballs into something that becomes 
what mine is today. Which is a completely horrible, nasty, terrible disease that I can‟t 
get rid of. (Petra. T-AN) 
 
I don‟t think it is at all. I think it‟s an addiction wherever you‟re at on the spectrum. 
Like a way to control your life. …[T]hat‟s the only way that I‟m going to get better. 
Is to define myself as an addict. And, I do. And, it‟s an addiction if you‟re addicted to 
not eating. It‟s an addiction if you‟re addicted to food. And, I don‟t think any 
addiction is a choice. (Claire, T-AN) 
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At the simplest level, respondents‟ reactions to the idea that it is chosen hinge on the 
following proposition:  (1) People choose positive rather than negative things for themselves, 
(2) eating disorders are negative, (3) therefore logically nobody would choose them. Petra 
and Jackie use the words “disease” and “illness” to describe eating disorders to make the case 
that nobody would choose such a thing; “nobody chooses an illness,” as Jackie put it.  Petra 
and others (not quoted here) pointed out that they would not be in the inpatient unit if they 
had a choice, and that the very existence of treatment centers proves the point.  It is hell, self-
destructive, makes you and others miserable, is not “enjoyable,” to put it mildly (as Eva did).  
(At the end of this section on “choice” I address again the presumption that choice is only a 
choice if it‟s positive, and provide an analytic table to organize some of the results presented 
in this section, Table 4.5.) 
Beyond this simple proposition, however, there are many distinctions drawn by the 
respondents above that merit a more finely grained analysis.  To organize my discussion of 
respondents who argued against the idea of choice, I present conceptual distinctions drawn 
by respondents, with illustrations of each. These conceptual distinctions illuminate their 
reasoning about choice, what aspects of eating disorders are and are not choices, or what 
might make others perceive them as such. These are summarized in Table 4.3 and examples 
of each are provided, using the shorthand title provided in the left column. (People who were 
less emphatically against the idea of “choice” also mentioned these themes along with a few 
others, see Table 4.4.) 
As they discussed these conceptual distinctions, respondents were aware that from 
other vantage points, their behavior seemed controllable and therefore a choice.  Respondents 
mentioned family members, friends, and even healthcare providers who presumed that they 
200 
 
could stop if they would just listen to reason.  As Jackie said above, “they don‟t understand 
it.”  Several respondents lamented such misunderstandings in answer to the question, 
sometimes angrily like Wendy:  “That almost makes me very angry. Thinking about again 
those stupid people I was talking about that think “Oh. Why don‟t you just stop?”  Yvette 
suggests that nobody “in their right mind” would have AN, which indicates that only people 
who are in their right mind can be said to make choices. 
I mean if you look from it, it looks like just a choice. Like, as my [adoptive] dad said 
“You can choose to eat or not.” But it‟s not – like, no one would be anorexic if it was 
just a choice. Like, I don‟t think anybody in their right mind would choose to just not 
eat and to be unhealthy and to be, like, dying or on the verge of dying. Like, I‟ve had 
people tell me that I look like I was an Auschwitz survivor. Like, no one chooses to 
get that thin who‟s in their right mind. Like, there has to be something else in the 
game. Like, definitely. (Yvette, R-AN) 
 
Petra explained, “they think you have the choice to eat or not eat. But you don‟t feel you 
have the choice to eat or not eat.” The other themes below show nuances of this basic idea, 
by breaking eating disorders down into components, some of which are or can be chosen and 
others that cannot. 
Table 4.3: The finer points of choice I: Distinctions made by respondents rejecting “choice”  
Choose actions/ 
behaviors, not 
eating disorders 
Choosing to refrain from a specific action at one moment in time 
(possible, though it is hard), but cannot “choose” to stop feeling 
compelled to do it.  
Related:  Can choose to stop behaviors; Can choose not to “listen” to the 
eating disorder but it is still there; Can choose to avoid “triggering” 
situations and prevent your own eating disorder behaviors, but not being 
able to directly stop the behaviors. 
Choosing to start 
behaviors 
Choosing to diet or purge initially, but not choosing to have it go out of 
control, for it to become an eating disorder.   
Losing choice Losing the ability to choose whether to diet, purge, etc. Not a choice 
because external or biological forces exert control over you, or because a 
habit takes you over.   
Regaining choice Becomes a choice through recovery; same action may not have been a 
choice earlier.   
Choice without 
blame 
Choices you can reasonably be held responsible for, vs. choices for 
which you ought not be.  Related: Choosing among a constrained set of 
maladaptive coping strategies 
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 Choose specific physical actions, not the eating disorder.  Respondents drew a 
distinction between choosing a specific action – eating a meal, purging – and choosing to 
have an eating disorder. Thus, virtually nobody thought people actually chose to have an 
eating disorder per se.  But they did think it was possible to choose to refrain from restricting, 
bingeing, or purging in a given moment.  They spoke of choosing to restrict or purge as part 
of the development of the eating disorder, after which they no longer had as much choice.  
They also said that even in the throes of the eating disorder it was possible to speak of 
“choosing” to eat or refrain from bingeing and purging.   
Even while experiencing an eating disorder it was possible to exert choice about 
physical actions in the moment.  
…you can physically, like, control whether or not, like, you go to the bathroom and 
purge. But, I think in the sense that you lose control it‟s more of like a mental, like, 
emotional thing. Where, like, your anxiety just gets so bad. That, like, in the moment 
that‟s the only thing you can do to fix it. (Eva, T-BN) 
 
Respondents defined the eating disorder more in terms of the “emotional thing”, the 
underlying urges or compulsions, not the physical acts.
6
  Thus, the eating disorder was there 
even if one didn‟t act upon it. Ingrid separates the choice to “listen to” the eating disorder, 
which tells her to restrict food, from the eating disorder telling her what to do, which she did 
not choose.  
I don‟t have a choice. It‟s with me all the time. I have a choice not to think about it. I 
have a choice not to restrict. But, I know that the disorder is greater than the choices I 
make. I can make the disorder. I mean I can either not listen to my eating disorder and 
go ahead and make that choice. But, the choice I have is either to listen to it or not 
listen to it. One day I may decide not to listen to it. And, I‟ll go ahead and eat. But, 
then the remorse of eating and so on and so forth. Because, the eating disorder comes 
back and says “Oh. You fat pig. Now, you‟ve got to go home and restrict.” That is not 
                                                 
6
 This is interesting because physical acts are part of the official DSM criteria for AN and BN. There is no AN 
without restriction, no BN without bingeing and purging; having the thoughts but not acting upon them would 
be a different diagnosis or not receive a diagnosis at all.   
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a choice. It is a choice in the sense I don‟t have to listen to it. But, especially if it‟s 
chronic it‟s very hard not to. It‟s very hard. (Ingrid, T-AN) 
 
According to Ingrid, the eating disorder is always there – she has no choice about that. Her 
only choice is about her behavior moment to moment.   
In treatment, patients are held responsible for their eating-related behavior; this is 
consistent with Ingrid‟s account because the eating disorder is recognized but it is separated 
from the individual‟s action in the moment.  Eva, Ingrid, and Mary (below) were all either 
inpatients or in the day program, confronted daily with three meals plus snacks. After eating, 
they and their fellow patients were “on obs” or observation, during which nobody was 
allowed to go the bathroom (to prevent secret purging). Mary expands on the theme: 
I don‟t agree with that [choice] as the cause of it. I don‟t think anybody chooses to 
have anorexia. But, there is a part that you‟re responsible for choosing whether or not 
to eat at any given meal…  I mean nobody chooses to have something that they‟re 
slowly killing themselves to do to manage stress or to cope with – using as a coping 
skill. But, once you start trying to recover, and you sit down to a meal, it is your 
choice whether or not you eat. (Mary, T-AN) 
 
As a part of recovery then, the individual is responsible for consuming meals and complying 
with other rules.  Thus, for Mary and others, it might be reasonable to use the word “choice” 
to apply to specific acts, even though other aspects of the eating disorder are not under their 
control. Presumably, Amy (T-AN) is referring to this when she says, “Once you get it, you 
can either choose to get better or not get better. That‟s the choice. That‟s the only choice.” It 
is not a choice to develop an eating disorder, but once it has emerged, choice can play a role 
in recovery. 
 As part of working on recovery, behaviors could be controlled through prevention 
and management.  Claire, below, describes the difficulty of self-interpretation. She did not 
know whether to interpret a recent binge as part of the disorder or as an indirect choice by 
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“letting” herself do behaviors that led to it.  She had recently completed the structured day 
program and was working on recovery as an outpatient.  She speculated that if she had made 
other choices, the binge might have been prevented; she struggles with how much 
responsibility she should take. 
If I choose like I did on Friday to not exercise. Which I know affects me in a really 
big way. And then, that in turn made it so that I didn‟t go and do what I wanted to do 
with the evening. And then, I didn‟t know what I was going to do with the evening. 
So, I like, ended up engaging in one of my pretty bad binge behaviors. And, I like – I 
hadn‟t done – I hadn‟t gone and been in the grocery store in a long time. And, I, like, 
went in the grocery store. And, was just, like, letting myself just look around and, 
like, fantasize about binging. And, that stuff is hard. Because, it‟s, like, it could be 
disorder. But, I also have control over it. And so, it‟s like, “Wow. You‟re just being 
really ridiculous right now.” But, am I being really ridiculous? Or, is it partially I 
can‟t help it?” (Claire, T-AN) 
 
Claire narrates her choice not to exercise as the beginning of a chain of events that led to one 
of her “pretty bad binge behaviors.”  She describes a dual agency, in which she is “letting” 
herself fantasize about bingeing at a grocery store.  She is unsure whether to hold herself 
responsible – is she being “ridiculous” -  or whether she can‟t help it, at least in part.  
Choosing to start behaviors at beginning of eating disorder.  Eating disorders did not 
begin with a conscious moment of choice, according to virtually all respondents (Willa is the 
exception).  Yet respondents recalled and acknowledged having control over their behavior at 
the beginning of the eating disorder, or before it started. 
Several made their point by mocking the idea that someone might “wake up one day” 
and consciously choose to have AN or BN.  
It‟s not like people with anorexia wake up one day and say “Okay. This is going to be 
the day that I do not eat for the rest of my life.” (Amy, T-AN) 
 
“It is not a choice….it‟s not like you go out and say “Hey. I believe I‟ll get anorexia 
today. And drive my whole family crazy and make my life miserable.” It‟s not a 
choice. I think it‟s something that happens gradually over a period of time until it just 
snowballs into something that becomes what mine is today.” (Petra, T-AN) 
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I just kind of slid into it. I was never happy about it. No. (Fran, R-BN) 
 
It‟s not something that‟s, like, enjoyable. Or, they like, wake up every day and get 
like, really excited about it. Decide I‟m going to do it. It‟s just – I guess it‟s kind of 
something that developed over time. (Eva, T-BN) 
 
The conscious decision-maker, clear-minded and free to contemplate alternatives, who wakes 
up one day and chooses to have an eating disorder is contrasted with a less conscious and 
more passive person.  Rather than a moment of decision there is a slower, more gradual 
process. In addition, such a “choice” is rendered implausible because it has such clear 
negative impacts (as noted above); such a choice suggests that the person‟s ability to choose 
is impaired thereby invalidating it as a choice.   
However, respondents acknowledged that voluntary acts of weight control such as 
dieting and purging were present at the beginning.  These acts may have been chosen, but 
this did not mean the eating disorder was. “[J]ust like anybody else I think it‟s a choice to 
want to lose five pounds at the beginning… I think all normal eaters have a choice to eat a 
little healthier. But, after that it‟s not a choice. (Liana, T-AN, quoted above)    Fiona 
describes such initial choices as the “instant”, immediate things, which are more “innocent.”  
Then such a choice “kind of twists itself” and turns into an eating disorder that is out of 
control. 
I don‟t think anyone really chooses to have anorexia. I mean I don‟t – I think it‟s 
more you don‟t choose it. It just kind of happens. Because, I didn‟t want anorexia. I 
would have never chosen this for myself. So, I think it‟s just, like, you choose the 
instant thing. Like, “Let me just lose a little bit of weight.” And then, it kind of twists 
itself. So, I don‟t think anyone willingly chooses it. It just kind of happens…. Initially 
I think you choose. I mean, like, you choose an innocent thing. But, as you start 
losing the weight, something in your brain isn‟t connecting right. And, it becomes 
obsessive. And, that‟s when you start to lose control of it. Because, it‟s no longer 
your decision. It‟s your obsession with it. It‟s an eating disorder that‟s controlling you 
more.” (Fiona, T-AN) 
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The idea of choosing to have an eating disorder is thus deconstructed by breaking the 
connection between initial acts of dieting and the eating disorder, whose hallmark is a loss of 
control and lack of choice.   Eva (T-BN) defined the eating disorder by the loss of ability to 
control such acts: “it really, like, becomes bulimia kind of like, when you lose control. If you 
still have control of it, then I don‟t think it‟s really an eating disorder.” 
Losing choice.  How did respondents go from initially being able to control behaviors 
to an out-of-control eating disorder?  Respondents had diverse theories, some more 
biological, others about repetition of behavior. The latter will be discussed when I turn to the 
more ambivalent, more choice-oriented respondents. 
Biological forces helped explain the lack of control for a few respondents. Liana 
(already quoted) brought up genetics in connection with an obsessive personality. Reba 
alludes to genetic factors (which she had already mentioned earlier in the interview), life 
stressors, and to a lesser extent her “choice” to cope by restricting (discussed later).  
According to Reba (R-AN), “It‟s not really a choice. I think I was born into this family where 
there were eating disorders that were prevalent. And I don‟t think I had much choice in the 
matter.” Fiona spoke of “something in your brain” that “isn‟t connecting right,” followed by 
the effects of extreme weight loss on the brain: 
Initially I think you choose. I mean, like, you choose an innocent thing. But, as you 
start losing the weight, something in your brain isn‟t connecting right. And, it 
becomes obsessive. And, that‟s when you start to lose control of it. Because, it‟s no 
longer your decision. It‟s your obsession with it. It‟s an eating disorder that‟s 
controlling you more. Because, things aren‟t processing as well as they used to in 
your head as you lose weight. And, that‟s where you become obsessed. (Fiona, T-
AN) 
 
The eating disorder takes control as the brain becomes impaired and the person becomes 
obsessed.  
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Regaining choice or the capacity to choose. If choice is involved in recovery, as 
several asserted, how does the person regain the ability to choose?  Fiona above spoke of 
losing the ability to choose, or to be “rational,” as partly an effect of too much weight loss. 
Logically, she also asserted that regaining weight would help restore choice.  
And, that‟s why I think that at some point you gaining weight helps you get your 
thinking processes back to make you more rational. And, I think I have experienced 
that. Because, there‟s certain things that‟s like, “Why did I do that in the past? That 
was so stupid of me.” And so, I do think that gaining weight a little bit returns – 
makes you more rational when you think. But, as you lose it, you re-lose more 
common sense. (Fiona, T-AN) 
 
With weight gain, the ability to think more rationally returns, which entails choice for Fiona.  
It probably cannot explain all of the loss of control, however, because losing weight to the 
point of affecting the brain reflects AN in and of itself (and recalls themes raised in the 
discussion of the term “physical illness”).   
Wendy had a less biological account of how choice is regained: through realizing her 
own self-worth. This realization is won through a learning process; by counteracting years of 
learning she was worth little, her self-worth will be developed or restored and a real choice 
will become possible.   
R: I think that it only becomes a choice once you learn that it‟s a choice. Like for 
instance it‟s not a choice until you realize that you don‟t have to do it anymore. And 
then it becomes a choice. 
I:  How would people come to learn that it can be a choice? 
R:  Through treatment. And through realizing that people did wrong things to them. 
And through coming to learn your own self-worth. And through coming to learn how 
to validate yourself. And that you deserve to be validated. Just learning that you 
deserve to be healthy. I think it requires a lot of treatment before you can come to the 
place where you could honestly say that it was a choice. (Wendy, T-BN) 
 
Regaining choice is clearly linked to recovery for some respondents, though my analysis did 
not assess the frequency of this perspective.  
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Choice without blame. Some respondents articulated a type of choosing that did not 
confer blame on the chooser.  The choice to begin or continue eating disorder behaviors was 
so constrained that the person could not be held responsible. Wendy suggested that even 
though by some definitions people chose their behaviors they should not be held responsible. 
You could make the case that it‟s always a choice. Because obviously it‟s always 
your choice whether or not you go throw up. Even when you‟re first starting out 
before you know any better. So I guess technically it‟s always a choice. But not in the 
sense of blame. Like, it‟s a choice in the sense that it‟s the best you know how to do. 
(Wendy, T-BN) 
 
Reba articulated a similar view about whether it was a choice:  
…maybe just in the sense of it‟s something that I picked up on early on in my starting 
adolescence that was my way of coping with life stressors. Maybe I could have 
chosen other avenues. But in that sense it was a choice maybe. That I chose anorexia 
over other ways of – maladaptive ways of coping. But for the most part I don‟t think I 
had a lot of choice. (Reba, R-AN) 
 
The sense of choice without blame could require active “work” on the part of the 
respondent.  Claire struggled with how to interpret her own behavior, and strove to find a 
way of achieving a sense of choice without blame.  It was important that she not think 
negatively about herself, because this contributed to the eating disorder.  She was more likely 
to feel negatively about herself if she saw it as a choice.   
It‟s like, I can be like, it‟s a choice and it‟s not my fault. But, that‟s something that 
I‟m still working on. But, I think I realize more now than before. I don‟t know. I can‟t 
– I have trouble drawing the line. Like, where is it a choice and where is it – where is 
it a choice and where is it, like, totally out of my control? And, I think it‟s healthier to 
believe that a lot of the negative things that I‟ve done around food are not my fault.… 
The bottom line is I need to think positively about myself. And, that‟s what OA 
[Overeaters Anonymous] is all about. Is like, “You need to think positively about 
you.” So, it helps me to think positively about myself if I think about it as a disorder 
and not my fault. (Claire, T-AN) 
 
The “bottom line” of positive self-conception was more important than assigning 
responsibility and blame.  By theorizing choice without blame, respondents ceded some 
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ground to the idea of choice while rejecting it as an adequate term to describe their eating 
disorders overall.  This difficult balancing act, between forgiveness and responsibility, is 
central to the themes of this project, and informs how respondents consider the idea of 
genetic contributions.   
4.4.2  Ambivalent or favorable about “choice” 
I turn now to the diverse group of respondents who were more ambivalent or at times 
even favorable toward the idea of choice.  This group includes people who say it is a choice, 
or that it both is and is not a choice. These ambivalent respondents did not argue as 
strenuously or consistently against the idea of choice, compared to those described above, 
whom I consider to have more medicalized understandings of eating disorders.   
Although I have categorized these more ambivalent respondents as having a less 
medicalized view, they nevertheless echoed the themes described already by those with more 
medicalized views.  The decision about whether to endorse the word “choice” seemed to be 
based on how best to frame a complex, mixed situation (e.g., Claire‟s thoughts about “choice 
without blame”).  Rather than provide quotes to illustrate the presence of each of the 
previously-described themes for this new set of respondents, I present a single quote that 
incorporates many of the themes above, by way of reminder.  
Well, at first I believe it‟s a choice. I had the choice to make myself throw up. And, I 
had the choice to start a diet. But, it wasn‟t my choice to be born into an addiction 
family. And, because of that, I got out of control. Sometimes it‟s not my choice. But, 
when I learn the skills to do something different, then I can begin to believe that I do 
have a choice. (Delia, T-AN) 
 
This account of shifting choice across the “life course” of the eating disorder does not focus 
on the lack of choice, but rather the changing levels of choice.   
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Although answers for this more ambivalent group of respondents resembled the 
others, a few new themes emerged.  The new themes are presented in Table 4.4 and each is 
closer to a view that a choice was made, compared to the group just described that rejected 
the idea of choice more definitively.  
Table 4.4.  The finer points of choice II: Distinctions made by respondents ambivalent about 
“choice” 
Nobody is forcing 
me 
It must be a choice because nobody is forcing me to do these 
things. 
Seeking something 
good 
Eating disorders are a problematic way of trying to achieve 
something good. It is a choice, but not for something negative. 
Choice that is 
constrained, not free 
It is a choice but there is something behind it, or there are very 
few options. It should not be seen as a free choice.   
Choices become 
habits 
Through repeatedly choosing to engage in this behavior, it 
became engrained and therefore less under my control. Habits are 
not really choices, though they may be the result of repeated 
choices. 
No excuses; it’s a 
choice 
Calling it a choice is appropriate because it makes the person take 
responsibility. Saying it is not a choice is a cop-out. 
 
Nobody is forcing me.  Some respondents who were more ambivalent about choice 
argued that it must be a choice because they were not being compelled by another person nor 
threat of death. This did not mean they saw it as a completely free choice, but it met a 
minimum standard for agency. 
I don‟t dispute that it appears to be a choice for most people. I mean it‟s an outside 
substance that you‟re putting into your body. You‟re the one who‟s doing that to 
yourself. Nobody‟s forcing that on you. (Isabelle, T-BN) 
 
I know that there are other ways. I know that I don‟t have to do this. That, like, I‟m 
not going to die if I don‟t do this. Or I‟m not going to – like my life is not at stake if I 
don‟t do this anymore. I feel like I make a choice. (Zinnia, T-BN) 
 
I think it is. Because I mean I know I could make the choice tomorrow to stop. And 
like, just force myself to. There‟s nothing in me that‟s like, making me have bulimia. 
Like, literally shoving my finger down my throat. Like, if I really, really needed to, I 
could stop. (Yolanda, T-BN) 
 
Well I do think it is a choice. Nobody forced me to do that or continue to do that or 
anything. So yeah. But also addiction too. (Melanie, R-BN) 
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By the logic of these metaphors, if nobody is forcing them and their life is not at stake, it 
must be a choice. This is a low bar for choice and leaves out the sense that choices can be 
constrained or compelled, which the quoted respondents also noted.
7
  
A choice that is constrained, not free. The more ambivalent group of respondents also 
spoke about constrained choices, elaborating further on the idea of choice without blame. As 
with the earlier group, the choice to engage in eating disorder behavior is constrained, 
compelled, or forced, making it not a free choice.  They accept the idea of choice to a greater 
overall extent than the earlier group, but share similar reasoning by insisting that it is not a 
free choice.  Margaret (R-AN) actually used the phrase “constrained choices,” to convey the 
effect of gender inequality on women (she mentioned having studied feminism and social 
sciences). Even if eating disorder may appear to others, and even to herself at times, as an 
individual choice, she maintained that “there‟s constrained choices that women make. There 
aren‟t that many choices. The consequences for getting heavy in society. And for speaking 
out. Being angry.”  If women cannot speak out or be angry like men, and there are also 
consequences for gaining weight, there are fewer choices available, or fewer socially 
approved choices.  “Choosing” an eating disorder is thus constrained by imperatives that 
channel the person toward some things and not others. Carly talks about pressures on people: 
I mean it‟s your choice to binge and purge. But there are usually some influences on 
you making that decision. Like some outside pressures or – mostly outside pressures. 
Which usually lead to mental or, like, inner pressures for yourself… I mean you‟re 
the one that decides.…But you usually – depending on your mental capabilities and 
                                                 
7
 Just because respondents used this logic did not mean that they believed it to be the full story.  Nell used a 
metaphor that evoked life-or-death situations, but to a different effect. She compared someone with an eating 
disorder to someone who is “under the gun”, saying that decisions made in such conditions are not conscious 
and free choices.  As she put it, “sometimes „choice‟ makes it sound as though you were free to choose. And 
that you were free to choose another alternative.”  While Nell‟s reasoning is very similar to respondents who 
clearly rejected the idea of choice, she is ambivalent overall; she began her response by saying, “It really kind 
of was my choice in that I guess I knew what I was doing and things like that.”   
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your mental strength that‟ll determine if you can find those other ways or not. (Carly, 
R-BN) 
 
“Outside pressures” produce “inner pressures” on the person, whose decisions and choices 
are influenced as a result.  Carly theorizes that some people might be able to find alternatives 
to an eating disorder, depending on other characteristics, like “mental strength.”   
 Nell thought an eating disorder could be “chosen” as a way to avoid traumatic 
memories.  This would not be a free choice because, as she says, “if I wasn‟t dealing with all 
that kind of stuff, then I wouldn‟t have to choose it.”   
[I]t‟s not a choice you would make if you didn‟t have to make the choice. If you – if 
situation wasn‟t so bad that you – that sort of like, “Well I‟m going to choose 
anorexia. Or else I‟m going to have to deal with the fact that I was beaten by my 
parents or raped by my boyfriend or something like that.” So in that way I‟m 
choosing anorexia over something even worse. But if I wasn‟t dealing with all that 
kind of stuff, then I wouldn‟t have to choose it. I don‟t know. Does it make sense?” 
(Nell, R-AN) 
 
In a situation with no very good options, the eating disorder is “chosen” but not freely.  
  
Seeking something good. As noted at the beginning of this section on “choice”, an 
important reason for objecting to the idea of “choice” is that nobody would choose something 
as bad as an eating disorder.  It makes sense, then, that those respondents who incorporate the 
idea of choice into eating disorders may think of it as an attempt to achieve something good, 
even though the results are bad.   
In a constrained situation, eating disorder behavior may be better than some even 
more negative alternative (this is similar to the idea presented by Nell above).  The idea that 
an eating disorder is a problematic way of achieving a positive goal is similar to the idea that 
it is a way of trying to communicate something or cope with something, which has been 
presented above. Although one group argued against choice more fervently, the two groups 
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raised similar themes.  Alyce offers that it may be possible that the eating disorder actually 
helps the person in a bad situation: 
… I think you have to look at the degree of pain that they‟re living with. In their 
family. And, in their personal situation. And, only in the context of looking at the 
personal pain that they‟re feeling can you assess whether or not it‟s a good choice to 
self-medicate with food or some other substance. Because, maybe that‟s a good 
choice. Maybe that‟s what it‟s going to take to keep them going until they can get the 
hell out. So, I guess what I‟m saying is sure. In some sense it‟s a choice. You have to 
look at the developmental age of onset. And, you have to look at the cost and benefit 
to the person in their situation. I mean they‟re not, like, a perfectly happy person 
choosing to binge and purge all the time. There‟s something driving that. And, there‟s 
a perceived benefit. (Alyce, R-AN) 
 
Alyce characterizes the person with an eating disorder as someone who seeks the good, tries 
to preserve herself through means that serve her in a particular situation.  Karen said it was a 
way to achieve love, not a “choice to be sick” nor “to do something detrimental.”  
And, the choice for me wasn‟t whether I wanted to have anorexia. It was kind of more 
“If I don‟t eat this, then I will lose weight. And, I‟m going to look good. And then, 
I‟m going to have – somebody‟s going to love me.” It was kind of more like that kind 
of thought process. So, it‟s not a choice to be sick. Or, to do something detrimental.... 
It‟s a choice that you kind of get a little high from it or something. Because, you get 
some kind of positive feedback I guess. (Karen, T-AN) 
 
Even for Willa, the only respondent who said she consciously chose to have AN, the 
choice was made to achieve something good, not bad.  Other respondents said they may have 
chosen something, but it wasn‟t the actual eating disorder. By contrast, Willa says she did 
choose AN, “I feel like in a way I did choose anorexia. Because I thought it was this very 
glamorous thing.” To make sure I understood, I restated it more conservatively, asking if she 
was saying she was conscious it could become anorexia and that was OK with her.  She 
corrected me saying, “No. I think it was more of „Let‟s be anorexic today.‟”  But she 
describes her choice not as self-destructive but as wanting the “good things” about AN and 
ignoring the bad ones.  
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…like, you don‟t wake up and say “Oh my gosh. I want to be in the hospital and in a 
wheelchair and weigh fifty pounds.” But it‟s wanting kind of all the, like, good things 
that come along with anorexia and none of the bad things. So in that way kind of 
striving for it. Until you get to that point where you feel like – you suddenly realize 
there‟s so much bad that comes along with it it‟s not worth it. But I could definitely 
see it as a choice. (Willa, R-AN) 
 
The group that was ambivalent or favorable toward “choice” thus theorized ways of 
understanding the eating disorder as an attempt to obtain something positive, which was 
compatible with the idea of choice. 
Choices become habits or “second nature” over time. Through repeating chosen 
behaviors, the person develops a habit, which then has its own momentum.  I discussed this 
in Chapter 3, in relation to causal factors that help to maintain or intensify the eating 
disorder, and in the section about agentic and non-agentic language.  The repetition of 
behavior was also important as respondents talked about choice, and relates to the subsection 
on “Losing choice” described above for respondents who emphasized the lack of choice in 
eating disorders.  
Respondents described how choices became habits using a variety of terms.  Some 
spoke of them as “habits”, such as Gena (R-BN): “I made that choice. However, when it got 
to the point where it was habit. And, that I could throw up without even trying. That was – it 
was no longer a choice. It was something that was completely out of my hands.” A few spoke 
of them as a “pattern” you could “slip” into (Hannah, R-AN); “I don‟t feel that once you get 
into that pattern that it‟s a choice anymore” (Olga, R-AN);   Melanie (R-BN) said it was a 
choice, “But also addiction too. Because… it becomes physical. If I don‟t have like, a Coke 
or something, I get a headache. So it‟s – initially it‟s definitely a choice. I think once you‟re 
in the throes of it it‟s more of an addiction or more of a physical thing.”  Choices could 
become something even more powerful than habit: a kind of “second nature” according to 
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Isabelle (T-BN):  “you use it out of habit for so long that it really becomes second nature.”  
Some respondents explored the process of choice becoming habit or second nature in greater 
length, and I quote them at length in the following paragraphs.  
Thelma thought her BN was a choice, but because of the “compulsion” she feels the 
choice gets “a little bit more blurry” and “harder to define.”   She explained that the sheer 
repetition of a behavior could produce a problem like OCD. 
I learned in psychology class in high school that when they were making that movie 
“The Aviator” about the OCD, like, airplane mogul or whatever that the actor … 
doing all these incredibly OCD things ended up picking it up. Like it‟s something that 
can be kind of absorbed. And that it‟s like, a real clinical phenomenon. And so I feel 
like repetitious acts kind of become, like, engrained. And so just, like, the longer it 
goes on the more of a just kind of like a – I guess I feel like I have to do it. And it‟s 
just like, it‟s like, something that‟s in the back of my brain – mind. And it‟s 
distracting. Because I can‟t – I keep thinking about it. Like, if I‟m out to dinner with 
friends. Like, it‟s distracting. And it like, prevents me from like, enjoying the people 
I‟m with and, like, having a good time. And if I just like, go do it, it‟s like, a weight 
has been lifted off my shoulders. (Thelma, T-BN) 
 
An actor playing someone with OCD developed OCD because he repeated the behaviors. She 
uses the words “absorbed” and “engrained”, which convey something external being taken in 
and becoming part of the being that took it in. These are metaphors for how history and 
experience make their way “into” the body, how social forces get “under the skin.” 
 Vanessa thought of the eating disorder as a choice initially, but that the repeated 
action of purging essentially taught her body a new sense of what is normal.  As others have 
described, purging required practice, which Vanessa sees as a choice. But choice is 
compromised after enough repetition.  
[A]fter being in it for a while it really takes you over. And it starts to control you. 
Because we don‟t have that normal tendency to just be able to sit and throw up. I 
mean regurgitate. It‟s just after time your body conforms to that upward motion. That 
it‟s okay to do this upward motion. And I think the muscles or whatever desensitizes 
to stop it. So in that instance that‟s why I say over time it takes over you. But you 
initially make that choice. … while I was in that mode and doing it regularly it 
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became easier and easier. I mean when I first started I had to stick the toothbrush 
down my throat… And you get the gag reflex. And it still wouldn‟t come up. Then 
you do it again. And you do it again. And then it comes up more. But the more I did it 
the more that it was easier. I only have to stick the toothbrush down once now. And it 
would just flow and flow and flow. And that‟s what I mean by eventually it takes you 
over. Because your body gets used to doing certain things that it didn‟t do before. 
And it says “Okay. Well that must be normal. I do it every day. So let me just go 
ahead and do it. Because that‟s what I should be doing.” (Vanessa, R-BN) 
 
Mireya talked about the fact of having binged and purged as having set a powerful 
precedent that compels present action.  She has gone over to the “other side”, she has broken 
a “code”, she has violated “normal” and even “sacred” expectations.  Here, the past 
influences the present in a different way than simple repetition.  In this remarkable passage 
she describes a kind of fall from grace, in which people obey a “code” of sharing food with 
each other and digesting it completely.  She asserts that food shared with the family ought to 
be treated differently from “crap” food from McDonalds, but she has not respected that 
distinction.   
It‟s really like a formidable force that‟s like, once, like, you break that kind of code 
that we all have is, like, we eat and then we digest and we go to the bathroom. Like, 
that‟s it. So it‟s like, once you break that code it‟s very hard to go back to something 
that‟s quote-unquote “normal”. Because you can kind of eat anything you want 
whenever you want. And you don‟t really need to, like, really eat it. So it‟s like, that‟s 
what‟s really, really for me not a choice is that, like, I‟ve already gone there to that 
other side. And I know how it feels. It feels awful and it feels great at the same time. 
And that feeling is so overpowering that that feeling will always be there. So then that 
choice sometimes is not really a choice.… [probing]…  It‟s like, you break a pact 
with your body and with, like, society in general. …Because I mean, like, everyone‟s 
like, sharing a meal together. Everyone – like, people in general. Society in general. 
And then throwing up you‟re undoing all of that experience with people. And you‟re 
basically negating all of that. … because you‟re not actually digesting your food. And 
you‟re not accepting, like, everything that came with the food. Which is preparation. 
It‟s the love. It‟s the money. It‟s the sitting down together. I mean, like, I feel like 
basically I‟ve eaten and purged everything from life. Like anything. Any situation. 
Like, nothing is kind of sacred. It‟s like sometimes like, I feel like, back in the day, 
I‟d only, like, specifically go out to eat, binge, and purge. Like, I‟ll buy like, shit. 
Like crap. Like, McDonalds or whatever. But now it‟s like, I have basically done it at 
any time, anywhere, and any place. So it‟s just like, nothing is – it‟s like, a lack of 
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respect too. And for me it‟s very important to recognize when people make meals. 
But I‟m also disrespecting it.  (Mireya, T-BN) 
 
Mireya‟s sense that she no longer has a choice is related to the power of past choices. 
Bingeing and purging has removed her from the realm of normal human beings, who obey 
natural and sacred codes, who respect the food and love provided by others.   
 Zinnia spoke of a milder version of habit based on knowing that she could satisfy 
herself in a particular way; it made sense to use a sure method rather than risk the unknown.  
Bingeing and purging satisfy her, and she sees them as choices. But because of past 
experience, the choice to binge and purge are more “attractive”, “comfortable” and “routine” 
than the alternative, so it is difficult not to choose them. 
I feel like I make a choice. But I make a choice out of – the choice is more attractive 
because it‟s become comfortable and routine in a way…  [probing] … it‟s almost like 
if you are going to a restaurant. And you are – do you want to try something new? Or 
do you go with the thing that you do? If you‟re hungry, do you go with the thing that 
may not totally satisfy the hunger and you don‟t really know what that tastes like and 
all that? Or do you go with the thing that you know what it tastes like? You know that 
it‟s going to give you this feeling and that it‟s going to be satisfying in a particular – 
you already know how it‟s going to be satisfying. And you know everything about it 
in a way. Then it‟s much more easier to make that choice.  (Zinnia, T-BN) 
 
The choice is “easier” because similar choices have been made before and their results are 
known.  
Happily, patterns, habits, addictions and even “second natures” could be reversed.  
Several respondents thought it would be possible to learn a new “pattern” and recover.  
Victoria, currently in treatment for BN, speculated that “if I, like, got in the habit of not 
always throwing up my food after I eat. Like, that would be like, learning a new pattern that I 
would be able to sustain if I did eventually live alone. But it‟s like, when I‟m so much in the 
pattern of doing that it‟s, like, hard to break the pattern on my own.” Vanessa noted that the 
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acquired second nature can be altered; “after you get away from it your body has the ability 
to go back and say „Okay. Hum. Yeah. That doesn‟t feel right anymore.‟” 
No excuses: It is a choice. Some respondents argued that it was important to take 
responsibility for the eating disorder as a choice. As noted above, many stated that behaviors 
were under the person‟s control, even if the eating disorder as a whole was not. Some 
respondents metaphorically externalized their eating disorder, as discussed in the section on 
non-agentic language, by comparing it to a monster, a demon, the “anorexia entity,” or an 
abusive husband or boyfriend named Ed.
8
 Externalizing the eating disorder implies that it is 
not a simple choice. The external force may be compelling the person to choose something, 
or may be making the choice for the person.  Some respondents thought there were 
problematic implications for thinking of their behavior in this way; claiming that something 
was controlling them could seem like an irresponsible excuse.   
 Gillian‟s discussion of choice includes the implications of choice for one‟s own 
responsibility to control behaviors such as purging and restricting. Gillian (T-AN) brings up 
Ed, and distinguishes between his and her choices and responsibility.  Even if Ed is the one 
making the choices, the person has a responsibility to become “aware enough” to realize it is 
Ed, not to listen to him, and not to let her body carry out his orders. 
…your mind is so warped by the eating disorder. That even if you make the choice to 
restrict, it‟s not really a rational choice. So, it can‟t even be considered a choice 
anymore. Because, it’s your eating disorder convincing you it‟s okay to restrict. So, 
actually I‟m going to take back what I said earlier about that being a choice. Because, 
the more that I think about it, the more it seems to me like it’s not you making a 
choice. It’s your eating disorder making a choice…. when I was in [the day program] 
                                                 
8
 The name “Ed” is a personification of the eating disorder based on the acronym e.d., as developed by Jenni 
Schaefer in her book Life without Ed: How one woman declared independence from her eating disorder and 
how you can too (Schaefer & Rutledge 2004). This metaphor makes an analogy between the eating disorder and 
an abusive boyfriend or husband, and self (or the part of the self that would like to recover) is the abused female 
partner (eating disorder : healthy self :: abusive male partner Ed : female partner).  
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– we talked a lot about the book Life Without Ed… Where Ed is the abusive 
boyfriend. And, you can‟t blame it all on him. Because, you can still try and 
challenge him in things. But, he can sound very convincing. He can be very difficult 
to distinguish from yourself. And so, I think that a lot of the times if you aren‟t trying 
to seek recovery, it‟s not because you‟re making a choice to be anorexic or bulimic or 
NOS.
9
 It’s because Ed’s making a choice for you. And, you’re not currently aware 
enough to realize that it’s Ed… I think that you can‟t just blame it all on Ed. Like, 
“Oh. I did X, X, X because Ed told me to.” Like, no. That can easily become an 
excuse. And, also like if Ed does something horrible. Like, even if it was Ed. It 
doesn’t excuse the fact that you were the one who listened to him. Like, at this one 
point over about a month I had stolen approximately five hundred dollars from my 
dad to buy pills and binge food. And, even though I can sit there and be like, “That 
was Ed’s influence.” That didn’t mean that it wasn’t me who had gone and done it. 
And, I still needed to pay my 
dad back. I still needed to accept the consequences. Like, yes. It was Ed making that 
decision for me. But, I still have to pay the consequences for his actions. Because, as 
long as he‟s living in my head. And, my body is the one carrying out what he says. In 
a way I guess I‟m listening to him. And so, I need to be punished for listening to him.  
(Gillian, T-AN, emphasis added) 
 
Sydney also thought she should take responsibility, rather than blaming it on Ed. She 
spoke of feeling helpless, because despite using “reason” and “logic” with herself about why 
she did not want to buy binge food at the grocery store, she nevertheless went ahead with the 
purchase:  “And then I‟m like, “Swipe [the credit card]. Check. Yes. In the basket.” Her 
eating disorder seemed to have a “life of its own”, because she could “reason to the stars and 
the moon” about why she did not want to buy the food, but did so anyway.  She preferred to 
see this as emotions and feelings getting in the way of logic and reason, rather than 
externalizing it as a metaphorical person like Ed.  
Because I feel like that kind of takes the ball out of my court a little. It takes some of 
the responsibility off of me to think “Oh. This is just – this is the war I‟m fighting 
against something else.” And I have to take responsibility that – but I‟m kind of 
letting it. Like, I’m letting this person in. I‟m letting him through the door. I‟m letting 
– like whatever this entity is I am making conscious decisions. And I need to take 
responsibility and say “No.” to some of these choices I’m making. And to say “Yeah. 
Right now the easier choice would be to just go ahead and do something I know is 
going to be bad. Because I know it‟s going to cause me less anxiety. I know it‟s going 
                                                 
9
 NOS means “Not Otherwise Specified”, which as noted in Chapter 1 is an eating disorder diagnosis that  
captures people who do not meet all criteria for AN or BN. 
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to be easier to me emotionally.” But I need to take responsibility and say “No.” And 
to do the harder choice. And to sit with that being uncomfortable. And to sit with 
being – and I think just making it completely separate from myself sort of absolves me 
of that responsibility in my mind and in my head. Again I know it works for other 
people. But for me personally I need to not make it separate. Because then it‟s too 
easy for me to think like, “Oh. Well this is all on that. I don’t have to do with it.” 
(Sydney, T-BN, emphasis added) 
 
In short, a small number of respondents emphasized their own responsibility for their 
behaviors (in part to aid their recovery) and as a consequence they, more than most other 
respondents, state that their dysfunctional eating was indeed a choice.   
To interpret and summarize my discussion of choice, I created a decision tree based 
on answers by both groups of respondents (Figure 4.1, next page).   All respondents agreed 
the eating disorder was a bad thing.  Normally people don‟t “choose” bad things, so this 
means that eating disorder must not have been a choice. However, in respondents‟ social 
context, eating behavior is usually perceived to be chosen and claiming otherwise might not 
be plausible; such an account might not be honored.
10
   
                                                 
10
 I will return in the concluding chapter to Scott & Lyman‟s classic definition of an account as “a statement 
made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward behavior” (Scott and Lyman p. 46).  
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 Figure 4.1  Decision tree for conceiving of choice and eating disorders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 provides an organizing framework to make sense of the diversity I found in 
discussions of choice.  This figure represents a logic of reasoning “backwards” from the 
Did I achieve a good outcome by 
behaving this way? 
YES NO 
I chose the 
behavior 
I did not choose 
the behavior 
Is this account 
acceptable and plausible? 
YES NO 
- I was sick 
- A monster/demon/Ed took 
me over (it was not me who 
chose) 
Choice must play some role, 
which means I must have been 
seeking something good 
-  the eating disorder was 
better than a worse 
alternative 
-  I chose the good parts 
-  I did not perceive the bad 
parts 
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problem behavior; the deviant behavior requires some kind of explanation, which must be 
chosen from the available cultural options.  If a medicalized account is available and likely to 
be honored by others, respondents may reject the idea that eating disorders are a choice. If it 
is not, respondents may struggle to describe how their “bad” behavior could have been a 
choice in some way, parsing aspects of the disorder that might have been reasonable to 
choose under certain circumstances.   
In summary, I divided respondents‟ reactions to the idea that eating disorders are a 
“choice” into two broad groups. Both groups mounted criticism against the idea, but one was 
more consistent and emphatic in its rejection, which I interpreted as a more medicalized 
viewpoint than that of the other group.  In their reasoning about choice I identified five fine-
grained distinctions for each group (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). These included the separation 
between “choosing” to refrain from a particular act in the moment and “choosing” to have an 
eating disorder, the meaning of  “choosing” when options are constrained and may seem 
worse than the eating disorder, and a distinction between initial behavioral choices and habits 
that become engrained. Figure 4.1 summarized and organized the material into a theoretical 
decision tree, focused around respondents‟ shared understanding of choice as involving 
action taken toward a good outcome rather than a bad one.      
5.  OVERALL ENDORSEMENT OF MEDICALIZED TERMINOLOGY           
 As is clear from respondents‟ reactions to the terms “psychological problem,” 
“mental illness,” “brain disease,” “physical illness,” and “choice,” a simple agree/disagree 
categorization is a superficial description of their thoughts.  Furthermore, reasons for 
endorsement and non-endorsement of terms were not always substantively different.  For 
example, with “physical illness” many people thought the eating disorder behaviors had 
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physical effects, but differed on whether the term “physical illness” was warranted for effects 
alone.  Similarly, with “brain disease” some referred to the effects of eating disorder 
behaviors on the brain. Effects upon the brain were consistent with the idea of a “brain 
disease” for some but not others.  Some also disagreed about whether the involvement of 
neurochemistry constituted a brain disease or not; for some “brain disease” connoted a 
“tumor” or other problem with the physical brain. Similarly, some people equated the words 
“psychological,” “mental” and “brain” and others drew distinctions among these.  Some 
assented to “brain disease” because for them “brain” entailed “mind” but others contrasted 
the two terms. Similarly, some saw psychological problem and mental illness as 
synonymous, others did not. People made different decisions about whether the proposed 
term fit that content, even when they talked about the same concepts in their answers.  
Yet, the index, described below, does capture how respondents felt about medical 
terminology.  Even if they define and apply the terms in different ways, embracing or 
rejecting a term is one way of gauging respondents‟ comfort with medical concepts.  Despite 
the complexities described above, respondents had fairly clear views of whether these 
concepts applied to their disorders. To assess the overall degree to which they held 
medicalized views, and to facilitate analysis of possible correlates, I constructed an index 
based on respondents‟ views as represented in Table 4.1. 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
To create an index, I summed the number of medicalized terms endorsed (see Table 
4.1; 1 = medicalized view, 0 = not medicalized), namely, psychological problem, mental 
illness, brain disease, physical illness, and choice. (For choice, the “medicalized” answer was 
an emphatic or consistent message that an eating disorder is not a choice.)  A total of three 
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respondents had not been asked about one of the five terms but the index was constructed as 
though they had heard the term and rejected it.
11
  
 
Table 4.5  Endorsement of medicalized terminology:  Index and ordinal variable 
Index  
(# terms 
endorsed) 
Freq. (%) Ordinal 
variable 
Freq. (%) 
0   7   (14) Low (0-1) 17   (34) 
1 10   (20) 
2 12   (24) Medium (2-3) 22   (44) 
3 10   (20) 
4   7   (14) High (4-5) 11   (22) 
5   4     (8) 
 50 (100)  50 (100) 
 
Seven endorsed no terms, and four endorsed all. The modal number of terms endorsed was 
two. Of those who endorsed only one term, it was usually “psychological problem” (7 of 10).  
Of those who endorsed two terms, the most common combination was “psychological 
problem and mental illness” (5 of 12), followed by “psychological problem and physical 
illness” (3 of 12) and “psychological problem and brain disease” (3 of 12).  Those who 
endorsed three terms more frequently combined “psychological problem, mental illness, and 
physical illness” (4 of 10) than the other terms.  Those who endorsed four terms (all but one 
term), more often excluded “brain disease” (3 of 7) than the other terms.   
 I condensed the medicalization index to a three-part ordinal variable to maximize cell 
sizes and facilitate crosstabulation for bivariate analysis of this small sample. Those who 
endorsed all terms or all but one are coded as “high”, those who endorsed two or three are 
“medium,” and those who endorsed one or none are “low.” 
 
                                                 
11
 Claire was not asked about “psychological problem” and neither Gena nor Tammy was asked about “physical 
illness.”  An alternative version that assumed missing answers to indicate acceptance was also constructed to 
check that statistical relationships were not dependent on this coding decision. 
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5.2  Bivariate analysis 
Respondents varied in the extent of endorsement of medicalized terminology. What 
might account for such variation? I hypothesize that people with more involvement in 
medicalized settings will be more likely to endorse such terminology and test this using two 
independent variables. (1) I expect that those with more exposure to highly structured 
treatment like hospitalization will endorse more medicalized terms.  This may be due to 
inculcation of medicalized concepts during treatment, or to the experience of a more severe 
disorder.
12
 Likewise, people who received little or no treatment would be less likely to view 
                                                 
12
Betty is a good example of someone who was in the process of coming to see her eating disorder in 
medicalized terms as a result of her debilitating experiences and receiving treatment from the inpatient unit. 
Betty was 64 years old and had been told nearly 30 years ago that she probably had AN “or borderline” but did 
not pursue treatment until several weeks prior to the interview; “I‟ve always thought I could fix it on my own. 
Until I just got so sick I couldn‟t take care of myself. So, that was the big difference.” She said she had not 
recognized it in herself because the descriptions of it always focused on very young women who feel pressured 
to excel and be perfect. During the interview she said she saw her eating problems as a “disease” but not as a 
“mental illness”. In the following excerpt, it is clear that her understanding of “disease” was recently acquired 
in response to events in her life and treatment experiences. 
I:  Thinking about all these different ways of looking at anorexia. How do you see it overall? 
R:  My problem? Or, just anorexia? 
I:  I guess your problem. 
R:  How do I see it? 
I:  Yeah. Like we‟ve talked about psychological problem. Mental illness.  
Brain disease. Physical illness. Choice. 
R:  Well, I think to me it‟s just a way of life that I‟ve chosen. And, I never looked at it as a disease 
until I got here. And, I didn‟t look at it as any [problem]. That I wasn‟t doing fine. Until last August. 
Except I just thought it was the antibiotic‟s fault. Or, this or that or the other. Why I didn‟t feel good. I 
just never did accept the fact that it was because I was too thin... 
Betty‟s views of anorexia continued to change post- interview, and she contacted me later to amend her 
negative answer about “mental illness”. 
R: I would like to revise my answers and say that anorexia is a mental illness.   
[I: hold on, I would like to write this down. I imagine there is more to it than that. What made you 
change your thinking?]  
R: Well this is a disease, I‟m willing to accept that. But then why wouldn‟t it be a mental illness to me. 
Because it affects every area of your life probably. I just decided I didn‟t want to go on record thinking 
it was not a mental illness because I do. (Fieldnotes, July 1 2008, square brackets indicate 
paraphrasing)   
Betty is actively redefining her experience as a result of her experience in the inpatient unit, not only her 
experience of no longer being able to take care of herself. Her wish to correct the “record” suggested to me 
that she had “learned” that “mental illness” was a better descriptor of her condition.  Viewed from one 
perspective, this could mean that she is trying to be a good and compliant patient, accepting the treatment 
team‟s perspective long enough to get out. But other parts of the interview suggest that her experience of feeling 
awful before and better now with adequate nutrition were an even more visceral form of learning and 
internalization of a medical viewpoint.   
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their behavior in medical terms because their experience was not as severe, or because of less 
exposure to medical concepts.   A four-category variable (described in Table 2.3 in Chapter 
2) was collapsed to two, representing those who had been in a highly structured program and 
those who never had. (2)  I hypothesize that people currently in treatment will view their 
condition as a treatable disorder and therefore endorse more medicalized terms.  Those who 
recovered may be less likely to endorse medicalized terms for two reasons:  they may have 
had the eating disorder before it was medicalized or they may have revised their definition 
after recovering.   
 Both hypotheses were supported in bivariate analysis.  Respondents who had 
participated in highly structured research programs were more likely to endorse medicalized 
terminology (p=.001) and those currently in treatment were also more likely to endorse such 
language (p=.005).
13
  
Table 4.6   Endorsement of medicalized terminology by treatment experience variables  
 Endorsement of medicalized terms  Signif.: 
p-value*  
 Low (0-1) Med.(2-3) High (4-5) Total  
Highly structured program 
          Never  
          One or more  
 
11 (44) 
  6 (24) 
 
14 (56) 
  8 (32) 
 
  0  (0) 
11 (44) 
 
25 (100) 
25 (100) 
 
.001 
Recovery status 
          Recovered 
          In treatment 
 
12 (48) 
  5 (20) 
 
12 (48) 
10 (40) 
 
  1  (4) 
10 (40) 
 
25 (100) 
25 (100) 
 
.005 
Total 17 (34) 22 (44) 11 (22) 50 (100)  
*Fisher‟s exact test 
 
The differences between groups are most apparent for high levels of endorsement of 
medicalized language; of the 11 in this category, all had been in a highly structured program 
and all but one were currently in treatment.  Further analysis shows that being currently in 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
13
 An alternative version of the index, re-coded as though the three respondents with missing information had 
heard the term and endorsed it, was used in the bivariate analysis with highly similar results.   Results remained 
significant when the alternative version of the index was used (p=.000 and p=.002 , respectively). 
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treatment and any experience of highly structured treatment are positively related (not 
shown, p=.004 using two-sided Fisher‟s exact test) and moderately correlated (r=.44)   
(Relationships of medicalized terminology endorsement with age, education, race, and 
diagnosis
14
 were also examined but none were significant.) 
 Experience with structured treatment in the past, or any treatment in the present, does 
increase the likelihood that medicalized terms will be endorsed by respondents.  However, I 
cannot determine from these data whether the experience of treatment encourages more 
medicalized views, or if greater severity of illness leads to medicalized views and affects 
treatment-seeking (see footnote on Betty, above).  
6. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 
In this chapter, I focused on how respondents understood eating disorders, as 
conveyed to me before I brought up genetics.  There was consensus that eating disorders 
were problems generally as well as problems with society or culture, but disagreement about 
whether they were psychological problems, mental illnesses, brain diseases, physical 
illnesses, or choices.  As respondents discussed whether and why a given term was 
appropriate to eating disorders, they revealed not only how they thought about eating 
disorders but also how they defined these terms.  A majority said eating disorders were 
psychological problems and that they had physical effects, though there was disagreement 
about whether the term “physical illness” ought to apply to effects.  Mental illness and brain 
disease frequently connoted psychosis for respondents, which entailed a permanent, 
biologically-based, severely dysfunctional state that an individual could not control alone.  
Half thought AN/BN was a mental illness but less than a third thought it was a brain disease.  
                                                 
14
 To maximize cell sizes, age was divided into two groups as defined by the median age (30), education was 
divided into two groups (less than BA and BA or higher), and race was divided by white and non-white.  
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Respondents struggled with the idea of “choice,” identifying ways that eating disorders were 
and were not chosen.  On the one hand, “choice” implied that the disorder was volitional and 
easily stopped, which did not ring true for most respondents.  On the other hand, even those 
passionately against seeing eating disorders as “choices” identified aspects that could be 
“chosen” depending on how this was defined, and I presented the distinctions they drew in 
two tables.  I synthesized their discussions of choice into decision rules governed by their 
underlying shared idea that choices are made to seek positive rather than negative outcomes.  
If eating disorders are negative, but conceptualization as non-choices or illnesses is not 
acceptable or plausible in one‟s social context, behavior can be recast as a botched choice: an 
attempt at a positive outcome that was misguided or constrained.    
Throughout my discussion of terminology for eating disorders, I divided respondents 
into two groups based on whether they endorsed medicalized terms (or rejected “choice”). I 
summarized their reactions to all five terms by creating an index of medicalized term 
endorsement, and found that some respondents rejected all medicalized terms, others 
endorsed all, and most endorsed or rejected some.  Respondents currently in treatment, and 
those who had ever been in highly structured treatment programs were more likely to endorse 
medicalized terms, though the direction of causality was not clear.  
Recalling the over-arching motivations of this dissertation as presented in Chapter 1, 
this chapter (along with Chapter 3) provides necessary background and context for 
respondents‟ views of eating disorders before the idea of genetic causation was introduced. 
While all saw AN and BN as problems, some were not comfortable with phrases such as 
“mental illness,” and endorsement of medicalized terminology varied by treatment and 
recovery status.  This variation suggests the possibility of further medicalization of eating 
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disorders, perhaps by means of genetics. In the next chapter, I explore reactions to the idea 
that genetics could play a role, including whether people with medicalized viewpoints are 
more likely to embrace this idea.  
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
THEORIZING GENETICS: MAKING CONCEPTUAL “ROOM”  
FOR NON-GENETIC INFLUENCES 
 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, respondents see eating disorders as developing over 
time with important roles for environmental influence and individual agency.  Some notions 
of eating disorders presumed certain causes, such as media messages about feminine beauty, 
and specific phrases like “mental illness” connoted biological factors.  In this chapter, I 
examine how respondents think and feel about one causal factor in particular: genetics.  I find 
that theories of genetic contributions can be fit into the complex, developmental causal 
stories described in Chapter 3, particularly if respondents theorize genes to be less 
behaviorally specific than AN or BN, causing depression or addiction. I review their initial 
reactions, positive and negative, to the idea of genetic contributions, then present seven 
theories of genetic influence that were plausible to many respondents.  Finally I reflect on 
how respondents combined genetic and non-genetic influences in their theories in ways that 
revealed a preference for complexity, indeterminacy, and recognition of the importance of 
the environment.  I touch upon the implications of genetic theories in this chapter and explore 
these more fully in Chapter 6. 
1.   “POSITIVE” AND “NEGATIVE” ABOUT GENETICS: RESPONDENTS‟ INITIAL 
REACTIONS  
 
In this section I describe respondents‟ initial reactions to the idea of a genetic causal 
factor. I introduced the topic by asking this general question: “Some say there may be genetic 
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causes for AN/BN. Have you heard this before?” The idea was presented in general terms to 
avoid specifying what the genes might be “for”.1  I consider “initial reactions” to include all 
discussion of genetics before they were asked to imagine exactly how genes might influence 
AN or BN. Thus, initial reactions include spontaneous discussion of genetics and answers to 
a variety of questions and probes following the presentation of the topic.    
The category “positive” includes people who are convinced that genetics play a role 
in eating disorders or identified positive implications; the category “negative” includes 
people who were skeptical about genetics or concerned about its implications.  People who 
said they were neutral about and open to the idea were coded according to whether they 
talked more about negative or positive themes. Those who expressed elements of both 
categories were coded as one or the other based on my interpretation of their overall answer 
(e.g., there were more positives than negatives, or they themselves summarized their overall 
reaction as positive or negative).
2
  
1.1 Overview of positive and negative reactions 
Twenty-seven respondents had an overall positive reaction toward the idea of genetic 
contributors to AN or BN and 22 had a negative reaction (one, Natalie, was non-codable 
because I could not understand her answer
3
). Those who said it was the first time they had 
                                                 
1
 This information approximates the conclusions from a twin study; genes seem to matter in some way but it is 
not clear how. 
 
2
 It may be possible to further subdivide initial reactions to capture those who were skeptical but positive (e.g., 
wish it were true but it‟s not) and those who believed in it but wish it were not true.  Respondents were not 
systematically asked to distinguish between their beliefs and feelings about genetics.  A finer-grained analysis 
could take into account the kind of reasoning used (e.g., science-based), how convinced they were (e.g., open 
but not convinced), whether they began their answers by thinking about the potential implications (e.g., „that 
would be great!‟).   
  
3
 At first Natalie (T-AN) seemed to say that she thought that doctors would probably say her sister had had AN 
also, but then emphasized the benefits of abstaining from food when undergoing stress, and how it is also a 
Christian practice she uses to clear her mind, so “abstaining from food is not such a bad thing” (so I would 
tentatively interpret this as leaning toward a “negative” reaction, because only doctors would see her sister as 
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heard of the idea tended to respond negatively (13 of 16).  Most who had heard of it before 
brought it up themselves (28 of 33), usually with a positive spin (21 of 28).   
Respondents reported hearing about genetics from a variety of sources.  Some had 
learned in psychology courses about the possibility of genetic contributions to eating 
disorders, or to other conditions that seemed similar enough to serve as an analogy, such as 
alcoholism or depression.  Several reported hearing about it from a healthcare provider, or 
inferring it from questions about family history in an intake interview; “I just assumed that 
there was some kind of connection. That there must be or they wouldn‟t ask” (Margaret, T-
AN).  Several read about it, on the internet, or in books, or articles.   
These initial reactions provide an introduction to themes developed in the rest of this 
chapter on the details of respondents‟ genetic theories. The idea of genetics was not only a 
logical proposition to be evaluated on the basis of experience or other evidence. It was also 
something people could wish and hope for because of its positive implications, or reject for 
its negative implications.  Chapter 6 will explore the implications of genetics in more detail.   
 
                                                                                                                                                       
having AN and she seems to be contesting the medicalization AN to some extent). Then she said heredity can 
establish a person‟s “constitution” and their ability to “weather things perfectly fine” vs. not, and this could 
cause depression, and “the anorexia stemmed from the depression and the anxiety and the suicidal thoughts.” I 
understood this as a general predisposition that is funneled into AN.  Then I asked what her reaction was to the 
idea that heredity could play a role in people developing AN, and she said “it doesn‟t make sense”, and goes on 
to say “on the mental aspect, yeah. I think the anorexia could stem from the depression and anxiety. As I have 
gone through this process myself, I have learned that a lot of people have dealt with suicidal feelings. And life 
has become so overwhelming that they dealt with suicidal feelings. And I don‟t know that that‟s a – that was 
something that stemmed from heredity. I think it‟s just life becomes so overwhelming for a lot of us that we just 
have difficulty dealing with life.” So it seemed like she was saying that heredity is not as important as 
environment, which sounds “negative”.  Then I asked, “So, are you saying that it does make sense to you that a 
tendency to be stressed or depressed or anxious could be hereditary? But that anorexia and suicidal thoughts 
would not really be? Is that what you‟re saying sort of?”  She said “No”. Looking back, I wish I had used the 
word “constitution” instead of “tendency to be stressed or depressed or anxious” because I was trying to get at 
the distinction I thought she made.  But further probing did not illuminate this; she went on to say “I‟m thinking 
that they could both be the reason.” I did not understand this and asked, “That they could both be hereditary?” 
and she said “Yes” which would indicate a “positive” response.  I was not sure how to understand this.  Natalie 
appeared to have cognitive difficulties but with better probing I might have succeeded in understanding. 
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1.2 Positive about genetics 
The 27 who embraced the idea of genetic contributions reasoned about it in a variety 
of ways. For about half
4
, a genetic contribution made sense based on observations of 
biological relatives; familial similarity was evidence for genetic similarity.  Mary‟s sister had 
AN, as did Fiona‟s identical twin sister.  Some, like Reba, observed multiple relatives with 
eating disorders.   
Genetics. Big time. Because I think my mother‟s mother was anorexic… my 
grandmother was always rail thin. Didn‟t eat much. Pushed food on other people. And 
her death certificate did say anorexia… And my mother while she‟s never been 
anorexic has always been self-conscious about her weight… And then I have four 
sisters and three brothers. And I believe every one of us has some kind of an eating – 
maybe not a disorder. Two have been diagnosed with an eating disorder. Two other 
sisters. But everyone has some issue around food and weight. No one is overweight. 
One sister is still quite a bit under-weight. So I think genetics is a big link. And then 
when I have talked with cousins I have been informed that they have – that they are 
dealing with eating disorders. Anorexia and bulimia. So I think that‟s a really big 
factor in my family. (Reba, R-AN) 
 
Others, like Nell, observed diverse traits in family members that she thought could be 
genetically connected to AN, perhaps by means of a “good little girl” gene: 
 
It‟s not like anorexia runs in my family. But I think there are various – people in my 
family have had problems with food. And if it isn‟t food, then it‟s like they‟ve, like, 
totally have used religion in a really weird way. So as far as I guess, like, the good 
little girl gene or whatever it is. I mean in some ways it‟s like there‟s some sort of 
something that a lot of people in my family have this problem. Some sort of related 
problem. (Nell, R-AN) 
 
It was not necessary for a family member to have been officially diagnosed with an eating 
disorder to warrant a theory of genetic contributions; connections to the eating disorder were 
possible anyway.   
For those without a family history of eating disorders, genetic contributions could 
also be plausible. Karen and Gillian (both T-AN) speculated that although they did not know 
                                                 
4
 Amy, Ingrid, Liana, Mary, Petra, Deena, Joelle, Delia, Fiona, Sydney, Fran, Nell, and Reba 
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of a family history, there may have been ancestors with eating disorders who were never 
diagnosed. As Gillian put it, “up until the 1960‟s there really wasn‟t any way of recognizing 
it.” (More often, a lack of ancestors with known eating disorders was taken as evidence that 
sociocultural context was more important than genetic factors, described later in the section 
on negative reactions.)  Some offered causal models to explain why they developed eating 
disorders even though others in their family did not.  Ingrid and Gillian compared it to color-
blindness and hemophilia respectively, suggesting a type of genetic transmission in which the 
condition was carried by other relatives without affecting them.  Alyce (R-BN) was adopted 
and did not know whether genetic relatives had AN or BN, but endorsed the idea of a genetic 
contribution; genetics had come to seem like a good explanation for many other differences 
between herself and her adoptive family.  A few respondents with no family history (Paula, 
R-BN, and Betty T-AN) concluded that genetics did not apply to them, based on an absence 
of family history, but that it might well apply to others. 
Several respondents with positive reactions took care to distance their conception of 
genetics from a simplistic, direct, deterministic model of genetic causality.  Genetic ideas 
were plausible as long as there was also room for non-genetic influences compatible with 
complex models of causality of the kind presented in Chapter 4. 
[Y]ou don‟t have a gene that says “You‟re going to be an alcoholic.” Or, “You‟re 
going to have anorexia.” I think you have a gene that says that you‟re going to cope 
with things [by wanting] immediate gratification. Which way you go is one way or 
the other. Whatever you experience the most gratification [with] first is what your 
body kind of relies on. (Liana, T-AN) 
 
For Liana, seeking “immediate gratification” was a method of coping to which she was 
genetically predisposed. Willa (R-AN), who believed that genetics played a role in her AN 
via her genetic “type A” perfectionism, rejected the idea of a gene for AN, which she had 
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introduced when answering the question on “brain disease” earlier in the interview:  “I don‟t 
think you get like the anorexia gene kind of thing [short sarcastic laugh].”  Some emphasized 
the importance of environmental contributions and the difficulty of disentangling them from 
genetic contributions in a family context.  
I‟ve heard of studies with anorexia with, like, twins and stuff like that. In my own 
family there‟s a high incidence of disordered eating. So to me there‟s some truth in 
that. But like I said. I think there needs to be more research work done to separate 
nature from nurture. Because you grow up in a household with someone who may be 
biologically related to you. But you‟re going to copy their behaviors. (Sydney, T-BN) 
 
Despite observing that four generations of women in her family had eating disorders, Sydney 
speculated that genes, though relevant, were unlikely to be the whole story because the 
experience of living with relatives who have eating disorders could create an environment 
that encouraged eating disorders.  
About half welcomed genetic explanations because they implied less individual 
responsibility for the disorder.  Several thought that genetics could help validate the sense 
that it was not simply a choice, thus they could stop blaming themselves.  Reading about 
genetics on the internet “kind of substantiated me not feeling like I caused it” (Mary, T-AN).  
Claire (T-AN) said, “It‟s comforting because it helps to support that 'this isn‟t all my fault' 
feeling.” Petra and Deena voiced similar ideas: 
if it is a genetic thing, then I don‟t feel like it‟s as much my fault. I feel like I can at 
least say that I didn‟t set out to cause this. That it is something that might be 
genetic… So it made me feel a little bit better about myself.… Not quite so 
responsible for being such a pain to everybody that they let me know that I am 
sometimes. (Petra, T-AN) 
 
… I struggled … with the whole thing of having to be this perfect person and have 
nothing wrong with me. And so, struggling with … blaming myself. And so, I guess 
that kind of, almost, as silly as it might sound, kind of made me feel relieved a little 
bit. Like, “Well, maybe it is something in my brain that I can‟t really control.” 
(Deena, R-AN) 
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It was like, “Ah. This helps explain it some.” Because, why did I do that? I didn‟t 
know. Did I want to do it? No. But, I did it anyway. (Fran, R-BN) 
 
I think that there might be [genetic contributions]. Just because I‟ve struggled with it 
so long. And I mean it felt like a runaway train. And I‟m a person that‟s sort of gotten 
what I wanted. Like, I was able to do things when I really needed to. So for me I just 
feel like it couldn‟t be that I choose to be like this. (Selena, T-BN) 
 
These respondents welcomed genetic explanations because they made sense of their 
experience and removed some of their guilt. Selena added that genetics made her BN more 
like a “physical disease” and removed some of the stigma of mental illness.   
 
But I think it is good to know there‟s a possible link. Because I think people – with 
physical disease you can see physical disease. Mental disease you can‟t see it. So 
people just assume that you‟re making it up. They think “What? What is it?” They 
think you‟re well. And so I think mental disease makes people feel very 
uncomfortable. It makes them feel like they can‟t trust you. Or that you‟re going to 
hurt them. (Selena, T-BN) 
 
Just as genetics could provide evidence that it was not under the person‟s control, the 
experience of being unable to control the disorder provided evidence that it was genetic; the 
two went together. 
Another positive aspect of genetics was hope for new, more effective medical 
treatment and preventive interventions. Genetic contributions suggested that a “pill,” “drug,” 
or other medical treatment were possible and imminent, though even positive respondents 
were often skeptical about such forms of treatment.  Some who found medication useful for 
their AN or BN, took their experience as evidence for a genetic contribution; perhaps the 
chemical imbalance targeted by the medication had a genetic origin. 
1.3 Negative about genetics 
The 22 respondents with an overall negative initial reaction to genetics as implausible 
or undesirable at times also articulated “positive” ideas like those above. Here I describe their 
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reasons for skepticism or concern, which were shared to a lesser extent with some 
respondents above as well. Many coded as “negative” said they were open to genetics if 
convincing evidence were provided, but sounded doubtful or critical of the premise.   
 A few considered genetics in the context of natural selection and evolution, and were 
doubtful that such a trait would have been preserved.   
I hadn‟t heard it before. I guess I – like, I‟d be pretty skeptical of it. Because, like, in 
Darwinism, like, survival of the fittest. Like, anorexic people wouldn‟t be as likely to 
survive. So they would be less likely to produce offspring that would also have that 
genetic defect…. I really do believe it‟s kind of a learned behavior. It‟s not something 
– it‟s not something that‟s natural. Like, you need food to survive. And to throw it up 
isn‟t natural or healthy. So it wouldn‟t be genetically favorable. (Rebecca, T-BN) 
 
Thelma also saw no selective advantage, and doubted genetics were important.  
if it‟s genetic, why would that still exist? Like, why wouldn‟t we have evolved 
beyond that because it‟s so counterproductive? Yeah. I don‟t know if I buy into that. 
(Thelma, T-BN) 
 
Several respondents were skeptical because they did not see evidence of eating 
disorders running in families.  Sarah said she had no known relatives with eating disorders, 
but felt this was inconclusive because they had also avoided exposure to environmental 
conditions that fostered eating disorders:  
I certainly don‟t have any relatives who have struggled with anorexia or bulimia that I 
know of. But I also have all male cousins and all brothers. So I don‟t know. [My 
parents and grandparents] were all very, very poor. Like, which comes back to this 
whole environmental thing of abundance and wealth [as necessary conditions for an 
eating disorder]. And I don‟t think that they could have. They certainly couldn‟t have 
been bulimic. (Sarah, R-BN) 
 
Zinnia and Vanessa both said that genetic ideas did not make sense because in a pair of 
identical twins, one might have BN and the other not, showing that it was not genetic. 
[W]hat do you do when you find the person that has the same sort of genetic code? 
They have a whole different set of behaviors. I mean you can have the same DNA. 
But one person could be – one twin could be bulimic and the other doesn‟t. So how 
do you then reconcile the two? (Zinnia, T-BN) 
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I think of it as this is just something you do to get to something you want… because 
you can have two people. A sister. Twins. And they came from the same parents. 
Identical twins or whatever. And one could live in Florida in a tropical environment. 
And one could live up North. And one could be bulimic. And one can‟t. Well if 
they‟re really twins and everything, both of them should have the disease. And that‟s 
not the case. So to me it‟s just not plausible. (Vanessa, R-BN) 
 
Vanessa had already spoken about how living in a tropical environment led to more time 
spent wearing skimpy clothing and more evaluation based on physical appearance.  
Several were skeptical about genetics even though they had family members with 
eating disorders or similar behavior.  Yvette laughed at the idea that her mother, who also 
had AN, could have “passed” the gene to her, saying “that‟s silly”. 
I don‟t think genetically my mom passed along, like, her X chromosome to make me 
anorexic or anything (laughing)…   [I]t just doesn‟t make sense in my mind that it 
could be genetically – like, I guess, like, maybe I want to think that so if I have a girl,, 
like, I‟m not passing [it] along. But I mean my mom has three kids. And I‟m the only 
one who‟s been anorexic. So it makes sense in a sense if it‟s genetically passed along 
in my mind that – I don‟t know. Like, nobody – my mom‟s mom – nobody older than 
her [in the family] was ever anorexic. So it‟s kind of like all of a sudden she has it. 
Like, that doesn‟t – it‟s like there‟s nobody before her. So I guess, like, I don‟t see it 
being passed along genetically. (Yvette, R-AN) 
 
For genetics to be a plausible causal factor, Yvette would need to observe several generations 
with AN or BN. Several respondents wondered aloud if certain relatives might have AN or 
BN, or tendencies in that direction, even without a known diagnosis.  Irene reflected that if 
there were scientific evidence of a genetic contribution to BN, she would re-interpret her 
father‟s purging behavior as genetically related to her own. 
For me I guess it would be a surprise because for so long I‟ve thought that for me it 
wasn‟t genetic. But, I would probably believe it. If there was some kind of proof, I 
would go “Well, my dad DID vomit a lot. And, duh. Yeah. It probably was genetic.” 
So, I would accept it. I would believe it if there was some proof. Because, there‟s no 
reason for me to disbelieve it. Especially since my father vomited. (Irene, R-AN) 
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Hannah (like Sydney described earlier) said that even with a family history, environmental 
factors were difficult to disentangle from genetic factors if one lived in the same household 
as genetic relatives. “[Y]ou can‟t separate out the environmental and genetic influences. 
Because, of course it could run in families if your mom is demonstrating a pattern of 
something that all your kids see. Of course they‟re going to eat like you do” (Hannah, R-AN)  
Margaret, who had several female relatives with AN, stated that because of this a part of her 
did indeed believe in a genetic explanation. But she was concerned about genetics overall 
because such explanations distract from social, particularly feminist, explanations (further 
detail provided in Chapter 6). 
The clear importance of environmental factors mitigated the acceptability of genetic 
factors in a variety of ways. Several who focused on environmental factors noted that the 
changing prevalence of eating disorders historically cast doubt on the importance of genetics.   
Well I don‟t know. To me the bulimia and the anorexia stuff doesn‟t have, like, a long 
enough history. Perhaps if it‟s gone on before. But to me things only – this type of 
thing only really started in, like, the 1970‟s. So to me that‟s not enough time for, like, 
a couple generations to be able to determine that or not. So my initial reaction would 
be I‟d be skeptical of that. (Melanie, R-BN) 
 
Similarly, Thelma pointed out that “If it‟s part of our gene pool, then why is it so much more 
of an issue now than in other times in history?”  Mireya also thought that the rise in eating 
disorders was related to an increasingly excessive amount of available food over the last 
century, which she related to bingeing: 
I don‟t think it‟s genetic. I don‟t think, like, my predecessors were bulimic or could 
have been or had traits that allowed me to be. … I would highly doubt that there were 
people in my family or in many families who had disordered eating patterns, like, to 
the extent that we have them today, like, a hundred years ago. I would hope not at 
least. I do think that, like, this is stuff in the last fifty years or eighty years … this 
plethora of, like, available food everywhere all the time anywhere at whatever price. 
And too many options. Like, too much excess … (Mireya, T-BN) 
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Carly (R-BN) thought that the cultural valorization of thinness militated against genetic 
theories: “it used to be that you wanted to be fatter in society… And I mean if people had 
those genes now, they would be – everyone would be that size.” Carly suggests that if eating 
disorders were genetic rather than due to cultural norms, there would be more consistency in 
body size across eras. 
 The centrality of environmental factors cast doubt on genetic explanations in a variety 
of other ways as well. Genes could seem irrelevant, unimportant, or incompatible with 
complex developmental narratives. For Irene, they seemed irrelevant; she already had a 
familial explanation that made sense. 
I guess because I didn‟t come from a household that was happy. And, I was not happy 
and supported and healthy emotionally. And then, became bulimic. If that were the 
case, I could see it being genetic. But, to me it was so much caused by social things. 
To me it didn‟t seem genetic. There were just so many other things that seemed to be 
leading to it. (Irene, R-BN) 
 
Irene‟s family history provided a satisfactory explanation; there was no reason to look to 
genetics for answers.  For Barbara, possible genetic factors seemed unimportant in 
comparison to environmental factors. Even if there were a genetic factor, a “societal trigger” 
would be needed, which made it a societal problem. 
I almost feel like in a way that could set people back in terms of dealing with 
anorexia. Because it‟s a societal problem. Like, maybe genetics makes it easier for 
you. It‟s like the same way people can be genetically pre-disposed to alcoholism. But 
if they are not ever around alcohol, there‟s no way they could become an alcoholic. 
And so maybe a person [is] genetically pre-disposed to anorexia. But if they were 
kept in a completely healthy environment. Like if they were – if someone‟s mother 
had anorexia. Then they moved them to, like, a remote village in, like, Central 
America. Where it‟s subsistence living. They wouldn‟t develop an eating disorder 
most likely. I think there need to at least be societal triggers. And I mean those 
societal triggers could cause it without the genetic pre-disposition. But in order for a 
genetic pre-disposition to manifest itself there has to be the societal triggers or, like, 
internal triggers or something to make it go off I think. (Barbara, R-AN) 
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Some respondents thought that genetic ideas were at odds with the idea that eating disorders 
develop over time in interaction with others in one‟s environment.  Carol (R-AN) asked, 
“you‟re born with your genetic make-up. So, what happens later on that would then make 
you not want to eat? I don‟t know. It just seems kind of bizarre to me (laughs).” If genetics 
are there at birth, why wouldn‟t the eating disorder be as well?  Zinnia shared the sense that 
experiences over time were more important than genes, and that talking about genes denied a 
fundamental reality of eating disorders, and behavior generally. 
I mean who we are and what we do and what our behaviors are I believe are all sort 
of in reaction to or in relation to with sort of our broader social world. So to say that 
something is inherent or biological implies that it‟s (holding her hands shoulder-
width apart with palms toward each other, moving together up and down as though 
defining the sides of a box) – it denies or erases that sort of set of social interactions 
that are – (rotating left and right hands at the wrist as though receiving and handing 
things off to people beside her) and exchanges that are taking place and informing 
how people see themselves or how people formulate behaviors and all that kind of 
stuff. (Zinnia, T-BN) 
 
Vanessa and Wendy both expressed discomfort with the idea that something inside oneself 
like genes could be the source of an eating disorder. They preferred thinking of the disorder 
and its causes as external to themselves, and theorized that the only plausible genetic cause 
would be mutation from environmental toxins.   
…Now maybe if somebody grows up around maybe a nuclear plant or something. 
And they have access to fumes that alter your – I mean just like Schistosomiasis and 
stuff like that. It‟s normally localized. Because your body is reacting to chemicals that 
you – or what is it? Things that are in the water that people are drinking. And it 
causes the elephantitis and stuff like that. Then to me that is a DNA kind of change. 
But it‟s being altered because of the environment. It‟s not because you were born to 
be that way. It‟s outside. So … I would say no to that. I would not say that you‟re 
born with an innate gene that says you‟re going to be anorexic or bulimic. Or more 
prone to be… I just don‟t think that – I don‟t think that my Creator would have 
created people to be disposed to go through something like this. To inflict that kind of 
bodily harm on yourself. (Vanessa, R-BN) 
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These two respondents brought up external sources of genetic mutation only to theorize how 
genes could possibly produce an eating disorder; they did not think that such genetic 
explanations applied to them, nor virtually anyone else.  
Some respondents thought genetic research and concepts distracted from some aspect 
of treatment and recovery.  Gena (R-BN) downplayed their importance: “if there is, there is. 
If there isn‟t, there isn‟t. Either way it‟s not a good idea…  Either way eating disorders would 
be something that you‟d have to work on” in order to recover. Several respondents rejected 
genetic ideas because these implied a simplistic biological intervention that was inconsistent 
with their idea of treatment.  
And if you make it entirely a genetic – if you make it a genetic disease, they‟re just 
going to prescribe drugs for it like they do for everything else in America. (Laughter) 
And I just don‟t think that‟s the way to deal with it.  (Barbara, R-AN) 
 
(Several who were more positive about genetic ideas also rejected the idea of a pill.) Two 
thought that the search for genetic causes could obscure other more important factors.  Jackie 
thought that genetic research might “waste resources” rather than focus on environmental 
factors and treatment. 
Well, I mean I just don‟t think it‟s really important to waste resources on finding out 
if it is genetic or not. Because, it wouldn‟t change the fact that it needs to be 
treated….I mean I think environmental factors are much more important. I think if 
people are aware of what environmental factors are triggers or causal. I mean I‟m 
definitely as a mom going to be really, really looking out for it. And, part of that 
could be because I carry the gene. But, it doesn‟t really matter if I do or don‟t. Just 
because, I mean, that one thing is not going to be what causes my kids to get bulimia. 
(Jackie, T-BN)  
 
Hannah used stronger language to convey a similar sentiment to Jackie‟s.   
I think it‟s stupid. I really don‟t think it matters if there‟s a genetic link. Unless 
they‟re going to be able to fix it. Which I think they could spend their money better. 
By finding ways to treat it effectively. And, yeah. They could go spend their money 
on treating dire real illnesses in infants.  (Hannah, R-AN) 
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Thus, respondents evidently felt that an overemphasis or any emphasis on genetics could 
have negative consequences. 
 Although many respondents with an overall negative view of genetics liked the 
potential of genetics to reduce responsibility and blame, which was described in the section 
on “positive” views of genetics, several identified problematic aspects.  Victoria and Thelma 
thought the relief of blame could be a “cop out” and provide an “excuse” for people who 
ought to be held responsible, even leading to fatalism about recovery. 
I think that‟s kind of – seems like a cop out to just be like, “Oh. I was just born this 
way. Like, I have an eating disorder because this is how I emerged from the womb 
(laughs). I was definitely going to have an eating disorder.” It just seems like – I 
mean I think we have, like, control over, like, our decisions. We‟re not just, like, 
victim to our genetics… I mean if that were the case, it seems kind of like, hopeless if 
it was, like, a genetic thing. Like, you‟re always going to have an eating disorder. 
(Victoria, T-BN) 
 
I feel like a lot of times in medicine – especially with things that, like, deal with food. 
There‟s an effort to, like, find science that, like, removes blame. Like, “Oh. People 
are genetically pre-disposed towards obesity.” Which is true. But at the same time, 
like, people – it definitely becomes an excuse for why, like, Americans are 
overweight. And Americans aren‟t overweight because we have bad genes. 
Americans are overweight because we eat too much. And I don‟t know. I mean I 
guess – like, I‟m not closed – completely closed minded to it. (Thelma, T-BN)  
 
Genetics could thus provide an excuse for people who want to evade responsibility for bad 
behavior, or even genuinely discourage people from believing they can overcome their eating 
disorders. These concerns about fatalism and irresponsibility suggest a negative aspect of 
genetics‟ ability to reduce perceived responsibility for behavior, and will be taken up in more 
depth in Chapter 6.  
 Respondents evaluated the idea that genetics could play a role by considering the 
logic of the claim as well as its potential implications.  With regard to the logic of the claim, 
respondents frequently reasoned based on whether other family members were known to 
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have eating disorders: the presence of relatives with eating disorders usually supported the 
claim; their absence was usually evidence against.  Respondents were categorized as more 
“negative” if they interpreted the claim of genetic influence to be simplistic and 
deterministic, deemphasizing the important role of environmental forces; the importance of 
the environment was evident to respondents and suggested that any genetic influence would 
be complex and non-deterministic. The positive implications of genetic explanations 
included a reduction in perceived responsibility for the eating disorder and hope for scientific 
breakthroughs leading to more effective treatments, but some respondents also perceived 
negative aspects to these, because genetics could be a “cop out” or provide false hope that a 
pill would soon be available. Here I have described respondents‟ initial reactions only. As the 
interview continued, respondents developed these themes and introduced new ones, to be 
explored in the next chapter. 
1.4. Predicting responses to genetics: Bivariate analysis 
 
 In Chapters 3 and 4 I proposed five variables that could affect how respondents‟ view 
genetic causal factors.  These variables were based on how respondents spoke about the 
causes of eating disorders prior to being asked about genetics.  
(1) Theorizing a biological factor 
(2) Theorizing a disposition, such as personality type or mental illness, as a causal factor 
(3) Citing a morally charged environmental factor: abuse, trauma, or injustice 
(4) Displaying relatively more “gender consciousness” than other respondents  
(5) Degree of endorsement (high, mixed, low) of medicalized terminology. 
As stated in Chapters 1 and 2, I also hypothesized that recovery status, diagnosis, and illness 
severity might also affect attitudes toward the idea of a genetic causal factor. 
244 
 
(6) Being recovered 
(7) Diagnosed or primarily talking about BN rather than AN5 (because purging is thought 
by respondents to be a learned behavior)  
(8) History of purging6 (an alternative measure related to diagnosis) 
(9) Severity measured by proxy: involvement in highly structured treatment programs 
(because greater severity of illness would increase the likelihood of a highly 
structured treatment program; as noted earlier, this variable may also represent 
education received from highly structured treatment programs and its meaning is 
difficult to interpret). (An alternative version of this variable is presented in the table 
as “9-alt” and discussed below.) 
I expected 1, 2, 9, and high values on 5 to be associated with positive reactions toward 
genetics and 3, 4, 6, and 7 to be associated with negative reactions. I also examined 
relationships between initial reaction and age, education, and race.
7
  
 I found that 1, 5, 6, 7, and 9 were significantly related to the respondents‟ reaction to 
genetic involvement in eating disorder and 2, 3, 4, and 8 were not (at the α=.05 level for a 
two-sided test, see Table 5.1).
8
  Age, education, and race were not significantly related to 
positive or negative reactions toward genetics (not shown). 
                                                 
5
 This includes respondents with (1) a history of BN only, or (2) those with a history of both but a current 
diagnosis of BN or more focus on their BN than their AN in the interview. 
 
6
 This variable includes all respondents who reported BN over their lifetime, or purging (not including purging 
via excessive exercise).  I created two versions, one based on interview data alone (n=30 with coded answers for 
“positive” or “negative” reaction) and the other including two additional respondents (n=32 with coded answers 
for “positive” or “negative” reaction) who reported vomiting, laxative use, or diuretic use on the eating disorder 
symptom questionnaire administered at the end of the interview (EDEQ).  
 
7
 To maximize cell sizes, age was divided into two groups as defined by the median age (30), education was 
divided into two groups (less than BA and BA or higher), and race was divided by white and non-white.  
 
8
 Tests of relationships for 2, 3, and 4 were not significant at the .05 level:  theorizing a disposition (p=.199 one-
sided test, .372 two-sided test), mentioning abuse, trauma or injustice (p=.578 one-sided test, 1.000 two-sided 
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Table 5.1   Initial reaction to the idea of genetics playing a role in eating disorders (N=49) 
Significant relationships are bolded, p<.05 for two-sided test 
 Initial reaction to genetics 
Frequency (Row %) 
 Significance: 
p-value*  
 Negative 
reaction  
Positive 
reaction  
Total Two-sided 
One-sided 
1. (1) Biological factor 
2.           Not mentioned  
3.           Mentioned          
 
19 (63.33) 
  3 (15.79) 
 
12 (38.71) 
15 (83.33) 
 
29 (100) 
18 (100) 
 
  .003 
  .003 
(2) Psychological disposition 
4.           Not mentioned  
          Mentioned 
 
10 (55.56) 
12 (38.71) 
 
  8 (44.44) 
19 (61.29) 
 
18 (100) 
31 (100) 
 
  .372 
  .199 
(3) Morally charged factor 
5.           Not mentioned  
          Mentioned 
 
15 (45.45) 
  7 (43.75) 
 
18 (54.55) 
  9 (56.25) 
 
33 (100) 
16 (100) 
 
1.000 
  .578 
(4) Gender consciousness
9
 
6.           Less gender cons. 
          Relatively more gender cons. 
 
10 (38.46) 
12 (52.17) 
 
16 (61.54) 
11 (47.83) 
 
26 (100) 
23 (100) 
 
  .396 
  .250 
(5) Medical term endorsement 
          Low (0-1 terms) 
          Medium (2-3 terms) 
          High (4-5 terms) 
 
11 (64.71) 
10 (45.45) 
  1 (10.00) 
 
  6 (35.29) 
12 (54.55) 
  9 (90.00) 
 
17 (100) 
22 (100) 
10 (100) 
 
  .022 
(6) Recovered 
          In treatment 
          Recovered 
 
  7 (29.17) 
15 (60.00) 
 
17 (70.83) 
10 (40.00) 
 
24 (100) 
25 (100) 
 
  .045 
  .029 
(7) Bulimia nervosa 
          Anorexia nervosa 
          Bulimia nervosa 
 
  8 (30.77) 
14 (60.87) 
 
18 (69.23) 
  9 (39.13) 
 
26 (100) 
23 (100) 
 
  .047 
  .033 
(8) Purging history
10
 
          No evid. of purging hist. 
          Purging or BN 
 
  6 (31.58) 
16 (53.33) 
 
13 (68.42) 
14 (46.67) 
 
19 (100) 
30 (100) 
 
  .155 
  .115 
(9) Highly structured treatment 
          Never  
          One or more programs 
 
17 (68.00) 
  5 (20.83) 
 
  8 (32.00) 
19 (79.17) 
 
25 (100) 
24 (100) 
 
  .001 
  .001 
(9-alt)  Four-category treatment 
          Little or no treatment 
          Outpatient treatment 
          One highly structured prog.  
          Two or more str’d prog. 
 
  8 (80.00) 
  9 (60.00) 
  4 (36.36) 
  1   (7.69) 
 
  2 (20.00) 
  6 (40.00) 
  7 (63.64) 
12 (92.31) 
 
10 (100) 
15 (100) 
11 (100) 
13 (100) 
 
  .002 
Total 22 (44.90) 27 (55.10) 49 (100)  
*Fisher‟s exact test 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
test), and displaying relatively more gender consciousness (Narrower definition: p=.444 one-sided test, p=.755 
two-sided test; Broader definition: p=.250 one-sided test, p=.396 two-sided test). 
 
9
 Broader definition used to maximize cell sizes: 23 respondents with apparently greater gender consciousness 
as opposed to 14. Similar results found for both versions of this gender consciousness variable. 
 
10
 Purging history based on interview, not the EDEQ. Both were unrelated to reactions to genetics. 
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Not surprisingly, those who had mentioned a biological causal factor (#1, often a genetic 
factor) prior to my bringing up genetics were more likely to have a “positive” reaction to the 
idea once I did.  Only three of the 19 who spontaneously mentioned biological factors were 
coded as “negative” about genetics (Mireya, Margaret, and Melanie).  Those who endorsed 
medicalized terminology earlier in the interview (#5) were likewise more “positive” about 
genetics; only one of ten who endorsed all or all but one of the terms did so was “negative” 
about genetics (Wendy). Those who endorsed one or none of the terms were more evenly 
split but tended to have a “negative” reaction.  People currently in treatment (#6) were more 
likely to have a “positive” reaction than those who had recovered. With regard to diagnosis, I 
found that respondents with BN (#7, n=23) were more likely to be “negative” about genetics, 
but when seven respondents with a history of BN or purging were added (#8, n=30), the 
relationship was no longer significant.
11
  Those who had been involved in highly structured 
treatment programs (#9) were also more likely to find genetic ideas plausible and/or 
appealing.  This pattern applies across the four categories of treatment (the non-collapsed 
version of this variable) and suggests that “more treatment” rather than only “highly 
structured treatment” promotes positive reactions to genetics.12   
                                                 
11
 Of the seven additional respondents coded as  having a history of purging but not having BN as their primary 
or current diagnosis, five had “positive” reactions to genetic ideas (Claire, Delia, Gillian, Karen and Petra), 
thereby weakening the previously observed relationship between BN and “negative” reactions.  All five were 
current inpatients or recently discharged day program patients, that is, in highly structured treatment programs.  
As observed in Chapter 4, people who were treated in highly structured programs tended to endorse more 
medical terminology to describe eating disorders. They were also significantly more likely to feel positively 
about genetic explanations (p=.001, not shown). I examined the other significant relationships described above 
and all were rendered either non-significant or conditionally significant when involvement in a  highly 
structured program was controlled for.     
 
12
 Tests of the variable subdivided in different ways revealed that the difference may not hinge on experience of 
highly structured treatment. There were also significant relationships (1) when those with more than one 
experience in a highly structured treatment program were compared to the others and (2) when those with little 
or no treatment were compared to the others.  These alternative indicator variables collapsed (1) the lower three 
categories and (2) the upper three categories, with p-values of .003 and .029 for two-sided tests, respectively. 
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 To summarize, there was consistent evidence that medical experiences or attitudes 
correlated with “positive” attitudes toward genetics. Being currently in treatment, having 
received more treatment than others, or thinking of eating disorders in medical terms 
apparently make genetic explanations more plausible and appealing. Perhaps the “positive” 
aspects of genetic concepts only apply if the disorder has already been treated or perceived in 
medical terms; respondents who see it as an illness despite others‟ skepticism might feel 
bolstered by genetic theories.  Perhaps if medical concepts do not seem applicable to eating 
disorders, genetic ideas have fewer positive and more negative implications. Yet, some 
conceptions that I thought would militate against genetic conceptions did not appear to 
matter in these analyses (i.e., displaying heightened gender consciousness or citing morally 
charged environmental factors like injustice).
13
  I conclude that if genetics “go with” medical 
conceptions, differences of opinion about genetics may reflect differences about medical 
concepts of eating disorders.  
 
2.  GENES “FOR” WHAT?  RESPONDENTS‟ THEORIES OF GENETIC INFLUENCE 
I have characterized initial responses according to the plausibility and appeal of 
genetic explanations for eating disorders. However, this window into how people with eating 
disorders initially react to my presentation of the idea of genetics sheds little light on how 
they thought genetics could work, and whether some kinds of genetic theories were more 
plausible than others.  In this section I describe theories about genetics that respondents 
found plausible enough to entertain or endorse, with special attention to what the genes were 
                                                 
13
 These were not assessed for the interview in its entirety; perhaps relationships would be different if they were.  
Coding for these concepts was limited to interview material that appeared before questions that might lead 
respondents to bring up these themes. Therefore the current coding is more likely to capture what is important 
to respondents with less influence from me.  
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“for” (e.g., what they predisposed the person to) and how these might interact with other, 
non-genetic influences to produce an eating disorder.  
As presented in Chapter 3, respondents tended to have complex, developmental 
accounts of causation.  If a question about genetic contributions was interpreted to mean that 
eating disorders were “genetic disorders” like hemophilia, most respondents decisively 
rejected the notion.  But the same question could be interpreted to encompass a more 
complex model of causation to a respondent who had already thought about genetics in 
relation to eating disorders.  Therefore, the initial positive or negative response does not 
reflect evaluation of identical content, as the meaning of genetics depended on their existing 
understandings. A respondent who assumed that my questions referred to a deterministic 
theory of AN and responded negatively on that basis might nevertheless endorse a more 
modest claim about genetic causality.   
The list of theories below masks some important differences in respondents‟ level of 
engagement with genetics and changes in their theories over the course of the interview. 
Most respondents (n=37) brought up genetics before I asked about it, and not only held pre-
existing theories of genetic contributions to eating disorders, but could even recall how their 
understanding had changed since first hearing about it.
14
  Others were hearing about genetics 
for the first time from me in the interview (but always as a hypothesis under investigation 
rather than a new discovery), and invented theories on the spot only because the question was 
                                                 
14
 This number included respondents who spoke about genetic influences on body size, personality, or other 
characteristics, as long as they connected it to eating disorders in some way.  The respondent had to use variants 
on genetics, DNA, or inheritance.  Simply mentioning a “predisposition”, “inherent personality trait”, being 
“born with” or having an “in-born” characteristic or a characteristic “running in the family” was not sufficient 
to be coded as genetic. How and when they brought it up is an interesting topic in and of itself.  For example, 
Reba brought up genetics in answer to the very first interview question to explain what eating disorders are. 
Some brought up genetics in answer to question about “mental illness” and “brain disease” as the implausible 
extreme version of a biological oversimplification of eating disorders. Not surprisingly, genetics frequently 
came up in answer to the question about whether biological factors could play a role in the development of 
eating disorders.  
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asked.  Respondents often came up with new theories as the interview progressed. For those 
who thought only in terms of simple genetic disorders, my questions about environment and 
personality often caused them to generate more complex concepts of genetic causation. Not 
surprisingly, the process of answering my questions made genetics come to seem more 
plausible to some respondents. For example, Yvette reflected at the end of the interview that 
simply by thinking about it, she had warmed up to the idea. 
…the more I thought about it. “Well it does kind of make sense. Like, it is like a 
disease so to say. And genetics affect you. Like, you can‟t really always help them.” 
And so it just – mental disorder sort of thing. Kind of like bipolar and stuff like that. 
Like, if any of that‟s genetic, then it makes sense for anorexia to be genetic. And so it 
just – like, it just – it warmed me up to the idea… I‟m definitely not like, “Oh yeah. 
It‟s genetics.” Like, I‟m just, like, not so much of a “Oh. Definitely NOT genetics.” 
(Yvette, R-AN) 
 
Even though I continually referred to it as a hypothesis that some people have, rather than a 
new discovery, my interview questions made genetics seem more plausible, apparently.  I 
anticipated this possibility and chose to exclude from the study people with current, untreated 
eating disorders because if the idea were disturbing they would not have a treatment provider 
with whom to talk about it. 
The material below draws on initial reactions to the idea of a genetic influence, any 
spontaneous discussion of genetics, and responses to the following questions.   
1. How could genes influence or help cause [E.D.]?  
2. Would everyone with those genes develop [E.D.]?   
3. Does everyone who has [E.D.] have those genes?  
4. What makes more sense to you - genes for [E.D.] specifically, or genes for something 
more general that in turn influences [E.D.]?  
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5. One idea is that genes affect temperament or personality, which in turn can make 
[E.D.] more likely. What do you think of this?  
6. If there is a genetic cause, do you think other causes would still matter? 
These questions were crafted to balance two competing priorities: to avoid introducing 
content that might influence their answers and to provide some basis for comparing the 
plausibility of different theories even when the concept of genetic contributions was entirely 
new.  For those who might only have thought of simple deterministic genetic causation, it 
was helpful to introduce the idea that non-genetic factors might make a difference, that they 
could propose genetic theories that were not “for” AN or BN, such as temperament (i.e., Q4 
and Q5).
15
   
Respondents offered diverse theories about what kinds of genes might matter for AN 
and BN (see Figure 5.1). Their theories are important because they get at what component of 
eating disorders might be biological as opposed to cultural or volitional.  As discussed in 
Chapter 4, respondents reacted to “brain disease” and “mental illness” by associating 
biological concepts of eating disorders with the idea of permanence, a lack of dynamic 
development over time in interaction with environment, and a lack of individual control. 
When theorizing about how genes might influence eating disorders, genes that are directly 
“for” AN or BN also seemed to suggest too much stasis, and too little role for individuals; 
respondents tended to prefer a less determinative role for genes. Most respondents theorized 
genetic influence that went through the brain somehow, presumably because anorexia and 
                                                 
15 Questions #4 and 5 suggest more content than the others, and I did not ask these before asking #1-3.  
Question #1 is quite broad and allows for a wide range of theories involving genetics. Question #2 examines the 
importance of environmental or other factors in the development of the eating disorder. Question #3 addresses 
whether some forms of eating disorders could have nothing to do with genetics at all. Question #4 introduces 
the idea that genetic influence need not be “for” AN or BN directly, and provides a space for skepticism about 
this idea that may not have been aired earlier.  Question #5 introduces one specific theory, the idea that genes 
for personality or temperament might indirectly make AN or BN more likely. 
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bulimia nervosa are psychiatric diagnoses (but there were interesting exceptions in which 
theorizing about genetics of the body went with resistance to the medicalization of eating 
disorders, see below).    
 In the following I describe their theories of genetic action. Table 5.2 (below) reports 
frequencies for seven theories of genetic influence on eating disorders, classified according 
to what genes were thought to be “for”, that is, the outcome or “phenotype” to which a 
genotype could give rise.   Frequencies for theories of genes “for” AN and BN are limited to 
clear endorsements of the idea rather than simply mentioning it, because so many 
respondents took my questions to imply genes “for” AN or BN. Discussing genes “for” AN 
or BN did not imply an endorsement in the same way that spontaneously mentioning 
addictiveness or personality would.  
 
Table 5.2. Respondents‟ theories of the outcomes that genes could be “for” (N=50) 
(Frequencies and percentages do not add up to 50 and 100% because respondents offered 
multiple theories.) 
Outcome or phenotype influenced by genes Frequency 
(percentage)* 
Anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa endorsed**    3   (6)** 
General eating disorders or eating “issues”  17 (34) 
One or more specific DSM diagnoses (or related traits) 22 (44) 
Addiction, addictive personality 15 (30) 
Non-specific psychopathology 28 (56) 
Personality and other non-pathologized traits  33 (66) 
Visible body characteristic   8 (16) 
* Frequencies reflect answers to questions listed earlier, not later interview material. 
**Most respondents referred to genes “for” AN or BN at some point in the interview, probably because the 
interview topic lent itself to such ideas. I did not code every occurrence; here I report on the minority that 
endorsed the idea of genes specifically for AN or BN. 
 
Respondents offering multiple theories or theories that included multiple kinds of genetic 
influences were placed in multiple categories. Almost half theorized genes for a specific 
DSM diagnosis such as depression, and when this group was combined with those who 
theorized genes for addiction it comprised two thirds of respondents (n=32, not listed above).  
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Genes for non-pathologized traits or personality traits were also popular (endorsed by two-
thirds of respondents), as were genes for non-specific psychopathology (offered by more than 
half and described in more detail later).  Next, I describe each of the seven categories and 
provide examples of causal models that incorporated them.  Along the way I briefly compare 
and contrast causal models, considering differences between the phenotypes theorized (e.g., 
pathologized or not, brain-based or not) and how causal models incorporate non-genetic 
influences (e.g., interactions). In section 3 of this chapter I will focus on respondents‟ 
preference for genes predisposing for general, broad phenotypes rather than genes 
specifically “for” AN or BN, and will draw comparisons between theories by focusing on the 
conceptual “room” they allow for non-genetic influences. Some theories were more 
compatible with complex causation and ambiguous agency than others.   
2.1  Genes “for” anorexia or bulimia nervosa 
Although Table 5.2 counts only three respondents who clearly endorsed genes “for” 
AN or BN, most respondents referred to genes “for” AN or BN at some point in the interview 
because they took my questions to imply such a theory. I did not count all such occurrences 
but nevertheless describe them here along with the three endorsers (Selena, Carol, and Fran) 
because my focus is on how people reasoned about genes “for” a given outcome, not how 
many did so.  Judging from the low numbers who endorsed the idea, some respondents who 
implicitly endorsed the idea may have spoken about genes for AN or BN simply to answer to 
my questions, rather than reporting a belief to which they felt committed. For some the 
genetic contribution was plausible for other people but not for themselves, as they had no 
relative with an eating disorder. Some entertained the idea of genes “for” AN or BN even if 
in the end they preferred a different theory.   
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Some reasoned that because genetics seemed to matter for other problems or 
behaviors, they could for AN and BN too.  Betty (T-AN) explained, “I get headaches like my 
daddy had. And, I have neck problems and back aches and stuff like my daddy had. My sister 
gets things that my mother had.” Amy (T-AN) reasoned, “over the years neuropsychiatry has 
linked depression to genes in the bodies. And, biochemistry and things like that. So, maybe 
anorexia isn‟t all that different.”   Petra argued,  
…genetically you get things from your mother and things from your dad. And you 
come up with a child who for example enjoys music or art. And they have a parent 
who is really into music or art. Is that a part of the brain that is more dominant in that 
parent? And therefore they picked up that dominant gene? So, why not? If there is a 
genetic component to an eating disorder, why couldn‟t that child pick up that little 
component in their brain? That could do it. (Petra, T-AN) 
 
As already mentioned, some people who had a relative with the same eating disorder saw that 
as evidence for AN or BN as genetic.  
A few who endorsed the idea of genes specifically for anorexia or bulimia nervosa 
reasoned from their experience of the disorders.  Selena (in treatment) speculated that a gene 
specifically for BN made more sense than for something more general like anxiety, because 
pharmaceutical treatment for anxiety did not help with bulimia: “I mean they can give me 
Xanax. They can give me anything. I still wake up and throw up.” She notes that ancient 
Romans “did the same thing” and reasoned that is “definitely” a biologically-based disease 
“in the brain”, as opposed to a learned behavior.  Yvette (recovered), though skeptical of 
genetic influences, said that if there were a genetic contribution for AN, it would be specific 
to AN, rather than contributing to AN and BN, because her experience of self-control in AN 
felt incompatible with her conception of BN and purging. (According to DSM categories, 
AN can include purging so her theory maps onto a very narrowly defined “subphenotype” of 
AN.)   
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How did genes „for” AN or BN result in an actual eating disorder?  As already 
touched upon in the description of people‟s initial reactions to the idea of genetics, some 
theorized a fairly simplistic genetic transmission. Petra spoke of picking up a “dominant 
gene” (earlier) and compared it to the inheritance of eyecolor. Ingrid expanded on her 
analogy to color-blindness:  
…you have the dominant and the recessive genes. Now, if you have two dominant 
genes from the parent that represent anorexia or represent mental illness or represent 
whatever. Versus one dominant and one recessive from the other parent. Chances are 
you‟ve got three dominant and one recessive. That child is going to be born with that 
illness whatever it is. So, that‟s how I think genes do play a part. (Ingrid, T-AN) 
 
Theorizing genes specifically for AN or BN did not mean that social and volitional 
factors were unimportant.  Some clearly thought environment and genes were important but 
did not specify how they might have worked together in their own cases.  Fran believed that 
she inherited her father‟s BN: “I would say my dad was the whole cause. From the genetics 
to his behavior towards me.”  Fran, along with Selena and Yvette above, spoke at length 
about environmental causes, but not their interaction with genetic factors; their models of 
genetic and environmental causation may have been parallel co-existing models of causation.   
Some described an interactional model of causation, with genes being “triggered” or 
“activated” by some other factor, such as the environment or one‟s own personality.16  Helen 
thought that genes might be “activated”, and “depending on the environment they may never 
be triggered.” Mary, whose sister had AN, said “there could potentially be one that 
determines whether or not you could develop anorexia. So, you‟re kind of like I said pre-
disposed to it. But, then you may never develop it unless other things line up. Like 
environmentally. Or, changes in your hormones. Or, just somehow figuring out that using 
                                                 
16
 This resembles diathesis-stress theory, in which a constitutional vulnerability is expressed when stress 
triggers it.  Although environmental triggers are more commonly theorized in academic literature, I include 
other kinds of triggers for the sake of brevity.  
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anorexia for like, stress or coping skills.” Petra also theorized that a genetic component for 
AN might “never develop” in certain environments. Amy talked about how competitive 
gymnasts genetically at risk for eating disorders could be helped by changing their 
environment, as when Olympic television coverage stopped listing heights and weights of 
athletes, which presumably constituted environmental triggers.  “Individual” factors could 
also interact with genes for AN or BN such that temperament, personality, and even agentic 
choices affected whether a genetic predisposition would take effect.  Petra mentioned 
personality traits, like being a “follower” or a “dependent” person, or someone striving “to 
always be perfect” that might make a difference in whether the genetic predisposition for AN 
would develop into AN (theories of genes for personality are described later).  Barbara spoke 
of “internal triggers,” suggesting that the person‟s thoughts and understandings could 
“trigger” AN.  Carol had a complex dynamic model of causality that included agency, 
environment, and genes for AN.  Carol integrated a gene for AN into her existing model of 
eating disorder as a way to express oneself and get needs met; she saw it as the way she, as a 
child, expressed her distress about growing up as a woman in a gender-oppressive family 
environment. 
Genes for anorexia. Like, you and I both had the same genes for anorexia. But, my 
temperament and my situation was very different than yours. And, you – when 
something wasn‟t what you needed, you were able to articulate it. You were able to 
get out of the situation. And, find ways to get your needs met. But, because of my 
temperament and situation, I wasn‟t able to. So, then out of not knowing what else to 
do, I allowed the genes to then manifest themselves as anorexia. (Carol, R-AN) 
 
Reframed slightly, Carol theorizes that genes for AN may have interacted with a combination 
trigger (i.e., passive temperament and a problem situation) to produce AN.  Carol‟s account 
also includes a passive version of action in which she “allowed” genes to manifest because 
there was no alternative. For Carol, a theory of genes specifically for AN could be part of a 
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dynamic model of causation involving agency and environment.  Margaret theorized that her 
sister was protected from developing AN because “she had other stuff going on in her life 
that she cared a lot about.”  This suggests some kind of beneficial interaction, in which the 
environment or some other “individual” factor protects against or compensates for a genetic 
predisposition.
17
   
2.2 Genes “for” eating disorders generally or eating-related problems 
Seventeen respondents theorized genes for eating disorders in general, or eating 
disorder-related food or body issues, rather than separate specific genetic contributors for AN 
or BN.  They described genetic relatives with AN, BN, obesity, over-eating, “compulsive 
eating”, being “obsessed with food,” severe dieting and “yo-yo weight”, bingeing, vomiting, 
using laxatives, hording food, showing their love with food, obsessive need to control the 
area between neck and stomach, or some other “issue around food and weight.”  This 
suggested a genetic tendency toward generic eating disorders or eating problems rather than a 
specific eating disorder.  
Helen among others theorized that a genetic tendency toward eating disorders could 
be “manifested” in one of many specific diagnoses.   
I see eating disorders as a spectrum. In the sense that you have so many different 
forms of the eating disorder itself. I mean different people exhibit it in so many 
different ways. There are people who have anorexia. There are people who have 
bulimia. There are people who have overeating syndrome. There are people who have 
eating disorder not otherwise specified. And, even with anorexia you have so many 
different types. I mean there are some people who have anorexia with binging 
tendencies. Or, anorexia with purging tendencies. And, you have bulimics with 
anorexic tendencies. And, without. So, I mean there‟s so many different forms like 
that. (Helen, T-AN) 
 
                                                 
17
 See Shanahan & Hofer 2005, for social context as compensation and its conceptual similarity to triggering, p. 
67. 
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The variety of eating disorder behaviors was captured under the umbrella category of eating 
disorders, so genes might correspond to the entire category. 
Environment was important in a variety of ways. It could determine whether the 
eating disorder developed at all, or just how “strong” it was. 
…the eating disorder is strengthened by society telling you you have to be thin. 
Society telling you to look a certain way. By pressures around you. By you saying 
that you have to do this. You have to be more healthier by exercising. You have to – 
in order to be better as an athlete you have to be thinner. Like, that type of stuff. 
Society pressures. It just kind of supports the eating disorder. (Fiona, T-AN)  
 
In Fiona‟s formulation, people with the genes had a weak version of an eating disorder that 
was strengthened by social influences. For Victoria, environmental factors could also affect 
whether the eating disorder developed or not.  Victoria, who was skeptical about genetics 
thought that they could affect one‟s reaction to environmental causes. 
…if I was born with the genetic make-up to be, like, prone to an eating disorder and 
someone else wasn‟t, then I guess I‟d be more likely to respond to those factors and 
developing an eating disorder than someone who wasn‟t….  I mean just like playing 
on a sports team in college. And just the environment there. And my coach. And I 
guess reacting to it differently whether that‟s your genetic make-up or not. (Victoria, 
T-BN) 
 
Fran (R-BN) was already familiar with GxE interaction models for AN, which she articulated 
in terms of eating disorders generally:   
They‟ve traced it to genetics. And, the offspring of the male and female. And, the risk 
you‟re at for it. Take two girls with pretty much the same make-up except for their 
parents. Stick them both in a gymnastics class. Competitive. If you‟ve got one parent 
that‟s eating disorder. And, none on this one. This one‟s going to have a higher 
tendency to have an eating disorder. This one probably won‟t. But, this one‟s much 
higher risk. 
 
Fran had learned about genetics of eating disorders from a University professor and 
presumably drew this account from a presentation she attended; she never mentioned 
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gymnastics in relation to her own BN and she did not apply this reasoning to specific 
elements of her own biography. 
What directed a genetic predisposition for generic eating problems into a specific 
eating disorder? Mireya (T-BN) theorized that people could have different reactions to the 
same common genetic denominator, which in her case she thought had something to do with 
appetite and a tendency toward eating too much.  Mireya speculated that her aunt, like 
herself, found it hard “to restrain herself and to control herself in front of food.” But the two 
dealt with the same “triggers” or “stimuli” differently; both overate, but only Mireya purged 
afterwards.  A “trigger” such as a cake might “process similarly with both of us. Maybe 
that‟s genetic. But the way that we both reacted towards how to deal with that situation is 
different. And I don‟t think that‟s genetic.” The physical reaction to food created a situation 
to which a response was required. This response could take different forms.
18
  
Some respondents used quasi-agentic language to describe the funneling of a general 
predisposition into a specific eating disorder.  Fiona (T-AN) spoke of her twin sister‟s eating 
disorder as her sister‟s “decision”, even though genetics played a role (and both attributions 
helped reduce the guilt she felt about having introduced her sister to dieting). She linked 
multiple eating disorders together by theorizing that all are centered on a desire to lose 
weight and differ only in the methods used. The desire to lose weight would apparently be 
supplied by genetics, but the way to accomplish it was chosen by the individual. 
Because, I think it might not just be anorexia. That it could be any type of eating 
disorder. Like, they could end up eating too much or too little. They could take 
another way and exercise too much. It‟s just the idea that they want to lose weight. 
But, I think the method is by our choice of how we do it. (Fiona, T-AN) 
 
                                                 
18
 This is reminiscent of other developmental explanations for disease, in which an initial “insult” is 
compensated for biologically, and this compensation/adaptation becomes part of the problem. 
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Fiona theorized underlying genetic eating problems that are channeled in different directions 
depending on individual choice. She identified several potential traits to which genes could 
predispose a person (the various possibilities are italicized).   
I think that you‟re pre-disposed to certain thoughts. Like your brain‟s wired to have – 
like my mom and her side of the family definitely have some type of eating problem. 
Because, they eat too much. And, they can’t control what they eat. They just keep 
eating. They don’t know when to stop. And, I think that there has to be something 
with our appetite that makes us that way. Something – it also could be a coping 
strategy. I don‟t know. It‟s hard to say. I just think that the possibility of developing 
eating disorder comes from genetics. But, it ultimately and it could be possibly our 
decision to whether we develop it or not. (Fiona, emphasis added). 
 
Whether and how the individual acted upon the eating disorder involved choice and decision-
making (and recalls distinctions made in Chapter 4 about not being responsible for having an 
eating disorder but being responsible for enacting eating disorder behavior). 
Helen also used agentic language and integrated it with environmental factors. “I 
think environment plays a role in how a person chooses to manifest it.” I asked her how the 
choice was made, and she elaborated in ways that are familiar from Chapters 3 and 4, in 
which choice need not entail a conscious moment of decision-making but could be the end 
result of a series of experiences: 
I don‟t know how the choices are made actually. I think if a person finds one thing 
that works for them. I think if it works for them in the moment. And, it gives them 
that – then, it does give them the positive feedback to return to it. And, I think that‟s 
actually very much random. Subject to chance. I mean if a person restricts. And, that 
does for them what they wanted it to do. Which was maybe at that day they needed to 
feel in control. And, they restrict by having that control. Then, that makes them feel 
good. So, that‟s more positive feedback for them restricting the next day. And, I think 
similarly if someone throws up. They feel this kind of cleansing, cathartic feeling. 
That could be positive feedback for them to do just that the next day. And, the next 
day. And, I think that‟s how it usually develops. It works for them one day. Then, 
they think “Well, hey. Why not? It could work for me tomorrow.” (Helen, T-AN) 
 
The choice of a behavior to try could be based on chance, then the behaviors can “work” or 
not, provide positive feedback or not (such as a “cleansing, cathartic feeling”), leading to 
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repetition of the behaviors. Arguably, Helen‟s causal model could be seen as an interaction 
between genes and experience of behavioral reward; without this experience the genetic 
predisposition would not have been realized. However, Helen discussed the experience of 
behavioral reward to explain why one kind of behavior -- restricting -- was relied upon rather 
than another, thereby leading to AN rather than a different eating disorder.  This suggests a 
different sort of interaction, in which non-genetic influences channel a predisposition in one 
direction or another, rather than triggering it.  However one interprets it, Helen‟s theory was 
compatible with the dynamic developmental theories shared by many respondents, as 
described in Chapters 3 and 4.  
2.3.  Genes “for” addiction and addictiveness 
 
 Fifteen mentioned the idea that a genetic propensity toward addiction could 
contribute to AN or BN. I describe addiction separately from mental illness to reflect the 
language used by respondents (they spoke of “addiction” rather than using the DSM-IV 
language of “dependence”). Respondents thought of AN and BN as one kind of addiction, 
and theorized general genes for addiction shared by family members who had different kinds 
of addictions.  These related addictions included alcoholism, drug “abuse” or “habit”, 
smoking, addiction to sex, gambling, prescription pain killers, caffeine, and frequent church 
attendance. 
Several respondents observed addictions to run in families with the eating disorder as one 
possible version. 
… in my experience in families I‟ve known or people I‟ve known, their dad‟s an 
alcoholic. Their granddad‟s an alcoholic. Their mom‟s an alcoholic. And, they have a 
food addiction. And, it‟s just in the family. And, the women in the family [are] more 
into the food. Men [are] more into the alcohol. But, it seems so connected to me. 
(Alyce, R-BN) 
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… I think also it‟s in part genetic, too. Not necessarily the disorder. But, the addictive 
component part of it. Because, my dad is an alcoholic. Or, was. He‟s a dry drunk 
now. But, growing up he was an alcoholic. Suspected drug abuser… And, my brother 
ended up with a drug habit of his own. I ended up with eating disorder. (Amy, T-AN) 
 
I think that because – my mom‟s side of the family has a very addictive personality. 
And, their drug of choice is alcohol [or] drugs. Every one of my mom‟s nine siblings 
has had an addiction problem with drugs and alcohol. Anorexia. Or, gambling. Or, 
some kind of other addiction. So, I believe that I got the genes to have anorexia. 
(Delia, T-AN) 
 
Respondents included a wide variety of behaviors under the umbrella of addictiveness. 
The experience of AN or BN felt to some like addiction to a substance. Reba spoke of the 
“euphoria” and “high” she feels when restricting food:  
There‟s something about euphoria that happens for me anyway it did and still does if 
I go too many hours without eating that is – it sort of keeps the vicious cycle going. 
The more I feel this sense of – this high. I want it to linger. And it – when I say it‟s a 
vicious cycle it‟s like it makes me want to keep on restricting to keep that sense of 
euphoria going. (Reba, R-AN) 
 
Amy (T-AN) also spoke of a need for endorphins and adrenalin rushes in connection to 
exercise. Willa spoke of dopamine as being involved in multiple addictions, including her 
AN:  
I would say just kind of addictive tendencies. I think of eating disorder a lot like that. 
And it plays off of dopamine in just the same way. And so I would say I mean 
anything from, like, smoking a cigarette to an eating disorder to alcoholism to drug 
addiction. And I don‟t think someone who has whatever addiction is just as likely to 
have any of the other ones. I think we all have our vulnerabilities. But it is a lot of the 
same thought processes. (Willa, R-AN)  
 
The eating disorder was described as a way to respond to the addictive urges. According to 
Delia,  
… a lot of this has to do with the need for something. The need. The urge. The 
temptation. Just like anybody who urges. They want to – they just want to indulge 
themselves with something to make them feel better. Like a hurting heart or 
something.” (Delia, T-AN)   
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Liana (T-AN) theorized that a genetic predisposition toward addiction was a predisposition 
toward a particular kind of coping by means of “immediate gratification” from a substance or 
behavior.  
Non-genetic influences over time shaped which substance or behavior the person 
would turn to. Several respondents spoke of “choosing” AN or food as their addiction.19  
How did they “choose” to enact or manifest it in one way rather than another?  Delia noted 
that her negative experience with alcoholic relatives steered her away from alcohol, and her 
involvement in cross country athletics steered her toward weight loss.  
I‟ve seen my uncles drunk when I was younger. I‟ve seen stuff happen when I was 
little because of their addiction. So, I always did think that that‟s why I became this 
way. I‟ve always felt that I didn‟t want to be like them. But, I wanted to fill the gap in 
my heart and my head that I was missing. And, I chose the food. Because, it just kind 
of at the right time. At the puberty stage. And, at the – with the running cross country 
and stuff. It just hit me at the right time. And, that‟s how I became addicted. (Delia, 
T-AN) 
 
She used choice language reminiscent of those who spoke of genes for general eating 
problems; “I just chose food instead of drugs and alcohol. Or, gambling and sex.”  Mary also 
spoke of “choosing” food instead of alcohol, prompting me to ask her how a person would 
choose. 
I guess it would depend on what their background was. For me in particular I mean I 
experimented with alcohol when I was in my twenties. And, I got a DWI. And then, 
just got my head on straight. And, stopped drinking as much as I did. And, would just 
drink a little bit socially. And, I guess for me at that point in my life having a 
daughter and having that responsibility I guess I was just thinking it would be 
irresponsible of me to be drinking. But, yet it was okay to abuse my body by not 
eating… I kind of viewed it as I could be hurting [my daughter] if I‟m drinking. 
                                                 
19 Amy expressed confusion about how to think through genetics.  If AN is just one type of addiction, there 
would not be genes specifically for it but for addiction generally. On the other hand, she had heard of specific 
genes for obesity, which she thought of as another version of addiction. If there were specific genes for obesity, 
there might be for AN too. 
I think if it – because anorexia is like an addictive type disease, it would make more sense to not say 
that there‟s a general anorexic gene. And then, it‟s kind of confusing. Because, it would make sense to 
say that there was, too. Because, there‟s like obesity genes. So, maybe yeah. But, then maybe for 
someone who started out obese. Then, that doesn‟t make sense. (Amy, T-AN) 
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Because, there could be the potential of me driving with her in the car. But, with 
anorexia I‟m just hurting myself. Not really thinking about the fact that I‟m still 
affecting all the people around me. (Mary, T-AN) 
 
Mary‟s definition of choosing involved choosing against alcohol because that could harm 
others, particularly her daughter; AN seemed more acceptable because it only harmed 
herself. As discussed in Chapter 3, this is a constrained choice because she does not articulate 
a non-destructive option; it has to be one or the other.  Liana‟s description of the 
development of AN rather than another addiction focuses on the body‟s growing reliance 
over time in one particular behavior rather than an individual choice:  
…you don‟t have a gene that says “You‟re going to be an alcoholic.” Or, “You‟re 
going to have anorexia.” I think you have a gene that says that you‟re going to cope 
with things and want immediate gratification. Which way you go is one way or the 
other. Whatever you experience the most gratification first is what your body kind of 
relies on. (Liana, T-AN) 
 
This account depends on experience and repetition over time, and resembles Helen‟s 
discussion of reinforcement of eating disorder behaviors through a positive feedback loop (at 
the end of the section on eating disorders in general).  Such accounts seem compatible with 
the complex developmental accounts presented in Chapter 3 because they have important 
roles for environmental factors, individual quasi-agency, and dynamic processes over time.
20
   
 Addiction-oriented genetic theories tended to involve a broad, non-specific need for 
some kind of gratification that was channeled into a particular direction.  The general need 
led a person to “choose” or otherwise develop a specific method of gratification, which she 
arrived at over time in interaction with “environmental” and “individual” factors (see Chapter 
3).(Some respondents held similar theories about genes for eating disorders in general, as 
described just above.) These non-genetic factors did not simply “trigger” or “activate” an 
                                                 
20
People may assess genetic explanations based on whether they already have an explanation that works. Delia 
said she had such a great childhood, so genetics make more sense. By contrast, Irene said there are so many 
environmental contributors to her BN that she wouldn‟t have thought of genetics. 
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underlying specific condition, rather, they shaped it into a particular form, such as alcoholism 
or BN.  To use a genetic metaphor, a gene for a general predisposition could be compared to 
a pluripotent stem cell capable of developing into a variety of forms rather than one pre-
determined form.  The form it took depended on chance, on choice, on environmental 
constraints and opportunities, and a host of other non-genetic factors.   
2.4  Genes “for” a specific mental illness or related trait 
Nearly half of respondents (n=22) volunteered that a genetic predisposition for a 
mental illness other than AN or BN could make some kind of eating disorder more likely. 
The eating disorder was sometimes a way of coping with the negative feelings from the other 
mental illness, recalling Mireya‟s reaction to the “stimulus” of a cake creating a problematic 
situation that required her to respond.  This general theory of genetically-induced problems 
followed by non-genetically-shaped coping introduces yet another way that genes may 
interact with the environment to produce an outcome, but with even more diversity possible 
than the “trigger” model or the “specific manifestation” model.  Usually respondents who 
theorized about genes for a specific mental illness mentioned depression, but some also 
talked about obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder, anxiety disorder and bipolar 
disorder as possible contributors. (Several brought up chemical imbalances, which I 
categorized as non-specific psychopathology, below.) I included here adjectives such as 
being obsessive, compulsive, anxious, because they alluded to specific mental illnesses even 
though they were not discussed as disorders per se. All quotes in this section referred to 
genetics even when genetics are not mentioned; respondents were mentioning other 
psychiatric diagnoses in answer to my questions about how genes could make an eating 
disorder more likely. 
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The idea of eating disorders as a way of coping (discussed in Chapter 3) was 
compatible with the idea that genetically influenced mental illness created problems that 
instigated coping. The way of coping need not involve eating, but did for those with eating 
disorders. 
Genes for something more general. It may be genes for like, depression. And, maybe 
that‟s how some people – I know, like, me. That‟s how I kind of coped with 
depression was eating. It was surrounding eating. Had a lot to do with that. So, yeah. I 
think just in general. (Deena, R-AN) 
 
Let‟s say you have a gene that causes less serotonin to be produced. And so, you are 
in a less happy mood most of the time. And so, then you‟re more susceptible to 
depression. And then, the depression makes you more likely to cope by restricting 
your food intake or something. I mean I don‟t think it can cause the disease. I think it 
makes you more susceptible to it. (Hannah, R-AN) 
 
And, like, I worry. And, I have panic attacks. And, I think a big part of the eating 
disorder is you worry. So, you need this comfort. I think alcoholism is a coping 
mechanism that people use for immediate gratification. And, I think eating disorders 
are the same. You want that immediate weight loss. I want to feel good right now. 
(Liana, T-AN)  
 
I‟m not sure that I buy it. But, there‟s this idea that genes affect whatever it is – the 
stuff that makes you happy. Dopamine or serotonin or something. And, that you 
might not be producing enough of that…. You‟re unhappy. So, what do you do with 
your unhappiness? You become anorexic. As a way to – I don‟t know. Cope. (Lynn, 
R-AN) 
 
It‟s like a chemical imbalance. Because the reason why you do it is because you have 
so much anxiety… I know that part of the reason why I do purge is because it helps 
me calm down. And then I‟m able to do my work or to do whatever I need to do. Or 
I‟m able to deal with something that seems harsh or whatever. But it helps me have a 
calming or like a soothing – it‟s very soothing. And that‟s part of it. (Selena, T-BN) 
 
Genetically caused depression, unhappiness, anxiety or worry created a problem with which 
the person had to find a way to cope or soothe herself.  The method of coping or self-
soothing was not inscribed in the genes but arrived at by agents interacting with 
environmental factors over time. These respondents tied the negative emotion to a particular 
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psychiatric diagnosis, but others, described later, spoke about addictiveness and general 
psychopathology that could manifest in a variety of ways.  
It was also possible to see the eating disorder as a “symptom” of another mental 
illness.   
 
I feel like bulimia was for me a symptom of a larger problem. Which had a lot to do 
with anxiety and depression. Which I suppose – because, it wasn‟t like I was just 
dealing with the bulimia at the time of recovery. I was dealing with what I felt like 
were larger issues too at hand. Which is I guess why I have that opinion. (Joelle, R-
BN) 
 
Joelle‟s theory may be compatible with the idea of a coping strategy. If the eating disorder 
was a way of coping with the “larger problem” of anxiety and depression, it might be seen as 
a symptom, and terminating that coping method would confront her with the original 
problem anew. 
Respondents often reasoned based on family members who shared a general trait but 
manifested it differently, recalling causal models involving genes for addiction or eating 
disorders generally.  Speaking about her family, Isabelle describes obsessive compulsiveness, 
though without specifying a diagnosed disorder. 
I think we‟re all like, a little bit obsessive compulsive. I mean for me that manifests 
itself definitely in my bulimia. I mean for my dad it‟s his running. For my mom it 
might be her commitment to work. She‟s working, like, eighty hour weeks right now. 
So I think we‟re all – we‟ve all got that trait. And, like, I growing up, like, when I was 
in school like I always wanted to do really well for myself. Like, less for my parents 
and more for myself.  (Isabelle, T-BN) 
 
Or you have some kind of gene that makes you very compulsive and very, like, 
obsessive and obsessed with like, being perfect or something like that. So maybe 
there‟s not, like, a specific, like, bulimia gene. But something that will lead to it. 
(Yolanda, T-BN) 
 
Some respondents spoke about how environment and dynamic quasi-agentic processes 
helped to “focus” the general category into an eating disorder:  
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Like maybe you get anxiety. And then, your life influences make it so you develop a 
more perfectionistic sort of anxiety as opposed to a more helter skelter anxiety … the 
influences from just the world in general. Or, your background. How you‟ve grown 
up. Can mold a very general anxiety into a more focused sort of anxiety. Like, some 
people will develop anxiety that‟s focused towards panic disorder. Some people will 
develop an anxiety that‟s focused towards obsessive compulsive disorder. Some 
people develop it focused towards an eating disorder. But, I think it all stems from 
anxiety. I think they‟re all anxious disorders. (Gillian, T-AN) 
 
Beginning with a predisposition for a wide spectrum of anxiety disorders, one‟s 
“background” or “the world in general” can “focus” or “mold” the anxiety toward eating or 
something else.  Gena also described genes for depression that left ample “room” for 
environment, learning, coping and individual choices: 
… I think personally I was born with a genetic pre-disposition for depression… 
Which caused me to not feel comfortable in my own skin. Which caused me to find 
different ways to cover up and run away from it. And, it just so happened that I met 
people and lived in a small little country bumpkin town where people didn‟t care if 
you didn‟t eat lunch… Like, you‟re not born knowing how to tie your shoes. And, 
you‟re not born knowing how to brush your teeth. I think it‟s kind of one of the things 
that you learn…. (Gena, R-BN) 
 
Genetically predisposed to depression, Gena as agent finds ways to deal with it such as self-
starvation, which nobody in her small town stops her from doing presumably because they 
are not aware of warning signs for eating disorders. She sees this development as a quasi-
agentic learning process rather than the fulfillment of genetic programming for AN or BN, 
and she notes that she could have turned to cutting instead; “you can choose to mess yourself 
up in a multiple of ways.” Thus, a predisposition to a mental disorder leads to a coping 
response, which may be abnormal eating behavior.   
2.5  Genes “for” non-specific psychopathology 
Over half of respondents (n=28) theorized genes for something  broader and more 
general than the other conditions mentioned so far.  This could be non-specific, generic 
psychopathology, a chemical imbalance or a common genetic factor for multiple specific 
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mental illnesses, addictions, and even personality types. (Genes for non-pathologized 
personality and temperament are discussed in the next section.) As might be expected from 
findings in Chapter 3, these causal models left ample room for non-genetic influences; genes 
did not dictate what kind of behavior or disorder would be “activated” or “manifested” over 
time as they interacted with other forces. 
Some specified the diverse mental illnesses to which such a predisposition could give 
rise.  Most who mentioned multiple specific disorders spoke of depression and anxiety, but 
OCD, PTSD, bipolar disorder, and addictions were also mentioned. (See examples in Figure 
5.1.)  For some, this general genetic predisposition could also manifest as a temperament or 
personality, suggesting that the genetic predisposition affected a continuum from normality 
to pathology rather than a discrete category of mental illness.   
  
Figure 5.1.  Combinations of specific conditions theorized to arise from a genetic 
predisposition for general psychopathology 
Gillian: depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
Ingrid: depression, manic depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder 
Liana: obsession, panic attacks, alcoholism, addictions, and perfectionism.  
Mary: depression, alcoholism, any addiction 
Natalie: depression, anxiety, “mental instability”, “tendency to struggle and worry and stress” 
Rebecca: depression, anxiety, cutting, needing a “sense of control” 
Mireya: depression, anxiety, manic depression 
Alyce: depression, obsession, manic depression, addiction (all theorized to relate to 
serotonin) 
Gena: depression, cutting and other self-harm, different “debilitating pathologies”  
Olga: anxiety, depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder 
 
To take one example, Ingrid clarified her understanding of genetic contributions to AN as 
giving rise to multiple conditions, potentially. 
[A]norexia falls under the umbrella of two or three other mental illnesses. Depression. 
Manic depression. OCD. The attending illnesses as I said. They seem to work 
together. You can have one without the other. But, it seems to be that they all seem to 
interplay … I didn‟t mean it as a gene per se for anorexia. I meant that the mental 
illness as a whole. Anorexia included. (Ingrid, T-AN) 
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Ingrid theorized an “umbrella” category for “mental illness as a whole” that also included 
depression, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and AN. 
 Some theorized genes that gave rise to an unspecified, clearly undesirable and 
pathological state.  Some respondents already quoted referred to general problematic states of 
mind, as with a “hurting heart” or a “gap in my heart and my head” that drives an individual 
toward some kind of addiction. Gena, who had rooted her own eating disorder in depression, 
noted that “there has to be something in you that feels not complete.” Nell, who had spoken 
about AN as an addiction, offered a similar general predisposition:  “I don‟t think you can 
have – you have a gene for blue eyes. But I don‟t think you have a gene for anorexia. I just 
think you have a gene for „you‟re going to have some problems‟.”  A predisposition to 
“problems” allowed a large amount of room for non-genetic forces to shape an outcome. 
The general state of experiencing pain, incompleteness, and problems was attributed 
to a chemical imbalance by some people. I coded statements about chemical imbalance and 
neurotransmitters as examples of general psychopathology because a chemical imbalance is 
by definition abnormal but is not specific to a mental illness.  Brain chemistry was a logical 
entity that could link genetics to eating disorders and other conditions for several 
respondents.  
I think that it gives people certain structures in their mind. Certain ways that the 
chemicals fire. Or, neurons fire. Or, chemicals just sort of interact. Different levels of 
serotonin and dopamine. And, I think that that can actually probably set somebody up 
for a lot of different mental illnesses…  I think that if there is a genetic component 
related to eating disorders, it‟s probably going to be very similar to the genetic 
components for most other mental illnesses. If not identical to. Beyond psychotic 
disorders. (Gillian, T-AN) 
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Olga explained how a chemical imbalance could produce a general lack of wellbeing, with 
which a person might need to cope using an eating disorder. She spoke of brain chemistry 
producing a “generalized „something‟s wrong‟” feeling.   
[S]o if there‟s not serotonin in your brain, then you start to feel like you‟re – 
something‟s wrong. I mean that‟s the – serotonin is the feel good, everything‟s okay 
drug. So if you‟re not getting enough of that in there, then something‟s wrong. And 
that‟s where I see the anxiety coming in. And I don‟t know exactly what triggers the 
anorexia. But I know once you‟re in it there‟s a lot of anxiety about gaining weight. 
Getting fat. So you have to control something. Just like with obsessive compulsive. 
… [I] think that‟s where the genetics comes in. Just a generalized 'something‟s 
wrong'. And then you pick something to make you feel better about it. (Olga, R-AN) 
 
Without enough of the naturally occurring chemicals that cue a person that “everything‟s 
okay”, one must “pick” something in an attempt to feel better.  This was reminiscent of a 
theory already mentioned in which a predisposition to eating problems or depression could 
create a problem with which the person needed to find a way of coping. The specific style of 
coping was developed through experience over time. 
 If a genetic predisposition presented the person with a problem, non-genetic factors 
shaped the content of the problem and how to solve it, in ways similar to those already 
described above. In addition, some spoke of a genetic vulnerability to environmental 
stressors and triggers.  According to Barbara, environment could interact with a 
predisposition to general psychopathology was by altering one‟s sensitivity to environmental 
“triggers”, according to Barbara. 
I mean I learned a little bit in, like, a basic psychology class about how like, 
chemicals in the brain regulate like, emotional responses and things like that. And so I 
mean if there‟s something in your genes that controls, like, mental processes. If, like, 
something is off about those genes. Like, I could see how you could become pre-
disposed to that. It makes you more vulnerable to those societal triggers hitting home. 
(Barbara, R-AN) 
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“Societal triggers” are more likely to hit “home” for someone with a genetic chemical 
imbalance. Gena articulated a similar idea; she was predisposed to have some kind of 
“psychological crap” which made her more vulnerable to stressors: 
Like genetically the way that I‟m built, I‟m kind of pre-disposed to having some 
psychological crap going on. Like, my family history. And, with, like, small life 
stressors it doesn‟t take much for that to happen for me. (Gena, R-BN) 
 
Respondents thus found a variety of ways to incorporate genetics into their vision of complex 
causality and ambiguous agency.  Put very generally, respondents imagined genes to have a 
direct effect on the disorder, with other forces activating or shaping the outcome, or an 
indirect effect, in which genes led to problems that required coping.   
2.6 Genes “for” non-pathologized traits 
Well over half of respondents (n=33) also theorized genetic predisposition to 
personality types, temperaments and other traits that were not necessarily connected to 
mental illness. I separate them from general psychopathology because the genes are “for” 
something that is not inherently pathological, such as a need to feel in control, an 
achievement orientation, shyness, or a high level of sensitivity. I included traits like low self-
esteem even though they are usually seen as negative because they were not diagnosable 
mental illnesses and were often mentioned as a type of personality and temperament.  
Because one of my standard questions addressed the question of genes for temperament and 
personality, I have more information about whether and how respondents found this idea 
plausible.  Twenty-one people brought up the genetics of personality, temperament, or other 
traits without my asking about it, and more approved of the idea when I did (some also 
rejected it).  In this section I only include discussion of personality when it was connected to 
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genetics; many respondents discussed personality and similar traits in non-genetic terms as 
well. 
 Some respondents reasoned that their personality, temperament or other traits might 
be genetic based on comparisons with their family members. As with other genetic 
predispositions above, some respondents identified family members who shared similar 
traits, and drew the conclusion that the similarities reflected a genetic inheritance. 
Interestingly, others saw evidence for genetic contributions in differences between 
themselves and their siblings.  
I mean I think genes factor in your personality type. Because, like environmentally with 
the same parents and stuff you still have different personalities. Like, I have a different 
personality from both my sisters. And, we were made from the same two people. And, 
grew up in the same house. So, that‟s what leads me to think that genes have to be 
involved. (Mary, T-AN) 
 
I mean because again you look at my sister. She was raised in the exact same 
environment. And is totally different. So it‟s got to be something genetic. (Willa, R-AN) 
 
By this reasoning, if two people grow up in virtually the same environment, their differences 
must be attributed to genetics.  (Alyce, who was adopted, had used similar reasoning about 
the differences between herself and her adoptive family; differences were attributed to 
genetics. See “Positive about genetics” section.)  
 I identified three loosely-related groups of traits: those related to control, to low self-
assertion, and to greater sensitivity to the environment. I grouped perfectionism with control 
because respondents frequently spoke about perfectionism in terms of control over body 
weight or shape.  Most of what respondents said about personality and temperament could be 
fit into these categories, but some also mentioned impulsivity, recklessness, anger, and 
needing an independent identity as genetically predisposing themselves toward eating 
disorders.   
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 I defined control very broadly, to include respondents who spoke about rigidity, 
perfectionism, and being resistant to change. Because some respondents connected these 
themes to “type A” personality, achievement-orientation, high standards, ambition, and 
competitiveness I include these here too.  
Like, it‟s more about the sense of control than anything else. And like that that can be 
the stem. If you don‟t feel like you have control over other things in your life, you can 
control your eating or your cutting. Or like that gives you a sense of control. So I 
guess things similar to that maybe. (Rebecca, T-BN) 
 
Some theorized a “control gene” (Amy) or a “gene that, like, helps encode for, like, control 
issues. Like, a need for control or something in your personality”. (Hannah)  Some 
respondents linked control-related traits to AN specifically. 
Like, because a lot of the people who have eating disorders have similar personality 
traits. That‟s what people in (the day program) say…  Like rigidness. And, a lot of 
fear. And, desire to control your life. And, control what happens to you. And, like, 
perfectionism. And, I think that‟s more for anorexia… although bulimics I think 
sometimes do, too. (Claire, T-AN) 
  
Well, I think I had, like, a typical personality for somebody with anorexia nervosa. 
The type A perfectionism. Like, „always on the go‟ kind of thing. (Liana, T-AN) 
 
Some respondents said it was hard to change their control-oriented personalities, even though 
they wanted to at times.  
I‟ve always been a person who‟s very resistant to change. Very resistant to change. 
And, I don‟t want to be that way. It‟s just the way I am. So, I definitely believe that 
there‟s something genetic about that. (Beth, R-AN) 
 
I‟m definitely a perfectionist and type A personality. And I think a lot of that has to 
do with your genetics. I‟ve tried to be a type B. I‟ve tried. I used to teach stress 
management. And I used to be standing there thinking “Oh. I could never do this.” So 
I‟ve tried really hard. But I just have that personality. I can modulate it. I can make – 
I‟ve gotten a lot better over time letting things go. But I think that‟s just something 
that you‟re born with. I mean my mom said I was always like that. (Olga, R-AN) 
 
274 
 
The trait was resistant to change, something you were born with, not something you could 
control, and therefore compatible with genetic ideas. It could be “modulated” or managed, 
however. 
 Other respondents spoke about genetic traits that I gathered together as low self-
assertion. I included references to passivity, dependence, people-pleasing, taking the role of 
“victim”, not wanting to “take responsibility”, being shy, quiet, reserved, “low key”, 
“defenseless”, or “introverted”, as well as traits related to low self-esteem, low self-worth, 
feeling insecure, and internalizing criticism.  Respondents brought these up in response to the 
question about genetics of personality and elsewhere. 
If you have a passive aggressive personality. Or, if you have a personality that is self-
defeating. You have a tendency to hide behind physical symptoms. That I see. Such 
as being quiet and reserved. And, you let yourself be victimized so to speak. Or, 
“Why me? Why me?” And, you don‟t fend for yourself. You‟re more defenseless. 
And so, you take on the little role of the victim. And, you won‟t eat. Or, you do that. 
Versus say other people who are loud and raucous and so forth. The meat-eater types. 
(Ingrid, T-AN) 
 
For Ingrid, not eating went along with not asserting oneself, in contrast to “meat-eater types” 
who are “loud and raucous” and presumably more self-assertive.  Thelma offered that a 
“nervous” or “insecure” person would be more likely to care about his or her physical 
appearance than someone who didn‟t care, making an eating disorder more likely.  
…like if you were, like, a nervous person or, like, an insecure person. ... I mean 
because [by contrast] you definitely, like, meet people who just don‟t care. Like, it‟s 
just not something that‟s important to them. And that‟s partially environmental. And 
it‟s partially just, like, who they are. Like, part of their genetic make-up that makes 
their brain, like, operate in that certain way. And so you have that aspect. Whether or 
not it‟s important to someone. Whether or not they care at all. (Thelma, T-BN) 
 
Non-self-assertive traits accompanied control-oriented traits for some respondents.  Karen 
(T-AN) identified these traits as potentially genetic and making an eating disorder more 
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likely: “People who are perfectionists. People pleasers would be kind of the same way. 
People who don‟t like to take on responsibility. Who are more dependent upon others.”  
A third broad family of traits involved sensitivity to stressors and other environmental 
influences. Nell said that some people, like herself, are more “sensitive to stuff” and 
therefore need to find ways to soothe themselves. She also linked this to chemical imbalance 
and addictiveness, but by talking about sensitivity she also gave the trait a more neutral, less 
inherently pathological meaning.   
I mean the only thing I can really think of is the idea that your brain doesn‟t produce 
enough serotonin or something like that. And that would be… like, a way to – your 
body soothes itself. And if you didn‟t have – if I didn‟t have that. And probably my 
kid wouldn‟t have that either. And would therefore rely on some other something to 
get that soothing that most people get naturally. So that might be passed down from 
generation to generation. … And so you‟re so sensitive to stuff that other people just 
wouldn‟t be all that sensitive to. And so then you‟ve got to figure some way out to 
buffer yourself. And so then an eating disorder or something else could be a way. 
(Nell, R-AN) 
 
Nell‟s causal model resembles indirect models of genes causing problems that elicit coping, 
discussed earlier. Natalie also drew a contrast between herself and people who are less 
sensitive to the environment, those who “weather things perfectly fine”:    
It just seems some of us are just extremely more sensitive than other people. I think 
this deep sensitivity or being over-conscious – because, it‟s just like you‟ll find that 
these people are trying to be over-achievers with their lives. In some ways trying to 
do the right things with their lives. And it‟s like – And this is almost impossible 
sometimes. It‟s hard to make good sound decisions. And I think we‟re prone to worry 
ourselves so about it. To the point that it overwhelms us. And then, things begin to 
work on you mentally. And I think sometimes we‟re prone to just be real, real 
sensitive. (Natalie, T-AN)   
 
Natalie spoke of sensitivity in connection to depression and worry, but also noted that it can 
lead to people “trying to do the right things” and achieving, making this genetic trait not as 
necessarily negative as a genetic predisposition for a mental illness.  Referring to the death of 
a mentor, Selena (T-BN) said “There‟s something in my DNA that caused me to not be able 
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to get through things like that…”; her sensitivity to “really bad stress” impels her to turn 
toward bingeing and purging, because “it helps me cope somehow”.  Being particularly 
sensitive was contrasted to being “resilient”, “hardy”, able to “resist”, not succumbing to 
“pressure” from external forces. 
…some people are resilient. And, I think that would be a genetic type thing. They can 
– bad stuff can just kind of bounce off them. Or, they see it. And, it doesn‟t really – 
they just intrinsically know better. And, somebody who has this genetic risk factor 
would not necessarily know better. (Beth, R-AN) 
 
Well, I think it could make you more susceptible to environmental influences. Or, less 
able to cope with stress or something. …  Maybe just a gene for, like, decreased 
ability to cope with stressful life situations or something. What‟s that word? Not 
hardiness or something. Like, there‟s, like, some trait that people have that makes 
them more able to, like, resist. (Hannah, R-AN) 
 
Maybe someone that has a genetic susceptibility to, like, pressure from, like, our 
culture and the media. And, maybe, like, other people, like, their family or friends. 
And then, having, like, a low self-esteem. Those kind of could all fit together and 
equal bulimia. Or, anorexia. (Eva, T-BN) 
 
The environmental influence to which the person was sensitive could be general like stress, 
or content-specific, as with pressure from “our culture and the media” toward thinness. Stress 
here is not necessarily a trigger that activates an underlying predisposition. Rather, if a 
person is genetically “sensitive” to her environment, she could simply be more malleable and 
responsive to her environment;  the sensitivity need not become stress nor result in a 
pathological phenotype.  Usually, however, respondents spoke in terms of problems caused 
by such sensitivity.   
All three groups of non-pathologized traits were compatible with the complex 
compound causality and ambiguous agency described in Chapter 3, but they differed from 
the above theories in one important way: they did not presume pathology. In theories about 
control, low self-assertion, and sensitivity, respondents imagined genes that were not by 
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definition problematic or pathological. As with predisposition to addiction and depression 
and other conditions, environmental influence could channel a general genetic predisposition 
toward eating disorder behavior rather than something else. For example, Willa thought that 
her “intense” “type A personality” might have turned to obsessive studying or even cheating 
had she been raised differently, and currently she continues to have the same personality 
without having either problem (Willa). Arguably, what is important for theories about 
personality and the like is that  they are not inherently or by definition pathological; one can 
have the personality without having problems. Genes for a personality trait do not assume 
pathology in the way that genes for a psychiatric diagnosis do and may be easier to reconcile 
with recovery experiences because the genetic predisposition may theoretically be redirected 
toward non-pathological ends.  Willa explicitly preferred thinking of genes for personality 
rather than genes for mental illness and incorporated the ongoing influence of those genes 
even while recovered.   
I very much accepted the fact that that is the kind of person I am. I‟m very much a 
perfectionist. And very much ... achievement oriented. So I guess for me I just know I 
need to keep it in check and not have my identity come from that. So I think just 
because I‟ve owned it that doesn‟t bother me. (Willa, R-AN) 
 
Willa‟s non-medicalized view of AN is expressed in her theory of genetics for personality 
(Willa endorsed only one of the medical terms in the index, Chapter 4).  One of the 
objections to medicalization is that social problems come to be located in the individual body 
rather than in society (see Chapter 1, e.g. Conrad and Schneider 1992, Thompson 1994).  If 
genes are “for” a pre-formed entity that is diseased, there may be less room for the idea that 
complex developmental processes, environmental circumstances, and individual agency led 
to the disordered outcome; the person may seem fundamentally diseased or flawed.  By 
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contrast, genes for personality or sensitivity may be more compatible with the idea that one is 
not fundamentally flawed or diseased.
21
   
2.6  Genes “for” visible physical features 
A minority of respondents (n=8) theorized that genes for visible physical features 
might predispose people to eating disorders.  All theories described so far concern individual 
dispositions, pathologized and not.  As discussed in Chapter 3, enduring dispositions shape a 
person‟s reaction to diverse situations. In the material presented so far it is apparent that 
respondents find genetic influence plausible for many such dispositions. Although theories 
vary by how inherently pathologized the dispositions are (e.g., mental illness vs. personality), 
all involved individual psychological dispositions.  By contrast, seven respondents theorized 
something quite different: they speculated that genes might matter for eating disorders by 
affecting some visible aspect of the body: body size (six respondents) and female body (one 
respondent). Some held these theories in conjunction with theories about dispositions. For 
one respondent (Margaret), genes for the XX chromosome was a way to reject medicalized 
definitions of eating disorders in favor of feminist social understandings.   
Those who mentioned genes for body size reasoned that having a large or curvy body 
would be interpreted as a problem for which dieting or purging is a solution, thus setting the 
stage for an eating disorder.  Isabelle recalled, “One thing that contributed I think somewhat 
indirectly to my bulimia was my early experiences like in adolescence just feeling too big 
and feeling like I was so much larger than the other kids. And that‟s I think a very obvious 
genetic factor.” Melanie also stated that “people who are more prone to being larger or just 
naturally having a larger body mass. … Maybe they‟re more prone to an eating disorder like 
                                                 
21
 Unless those traits are disparaged; Joelle described herself as a “recovering introvert” which suggests quasi--
pathologization of introversion. 
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bulimia. So then your genes would be somewhat responsible for that.” With a large body, one 
might be “more likely to feel like that was what you needed to do is have weird diet things 
going on” (Joelle).  With a naturally thin body, one was less likely to attempt weight loss 
using methods that lead to eating disorders; such people are “born with the genes to make 
them skinny all the time. And they can eat whatever they want” (Carly, R-BN).  Someone 
whose “genes were such that she had slower metabolism and could put weight on at a 
younger age is much more likely to struggle with an eating disorder just because of that 
natural – suddenly you realize „Oh my gosh. Food affects my body shape.‟ ” Tammy (R-AN) 
spoke of having “fluffy genes” for overweight that, in conjunction with over-eating, led to 
obesity, which was central in her narrative of developing AN. Several who offered these 
theories nevertheless expressed uncertainty because they had met people with eating 
disorders who had never been overweight. The underlying model for a theory of genetic 
predisposition for large body size is quite indirect. For example, in a context with plenty of 
food available, a genetic predisposition for being large is more likely to be realized. If one is 
in a social context where having a large body is interpreted negatively by others, one is more 
likely to monitor one‟s body and seek ways of losing weight that work in one‟s social 
context.   
Most who spoke of genes for body type also mentioned genes for mental illness, 
personality, and other psychological dispositions. Thelma theorized an interaction between 
genes for body size and genes for personality.  She had theorized genes for being a nervous 
or insecure person for whom body image is important, and suggested that such a person who 
also tended to gain weight (as with hypothyroidism) would be more likely to develop an 
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eating disorder compared to the same kind of person who was naturally very thin (as with 
hyperthyroidism).   
Like, body image is important to you [because of a genetic predisposition toward 
nervousness or insecurity]. But you have a hyperthyroid. Then like, it‟s something 
you don‟t have to think about. It would never be an issue. But if you have, like, 
hypothyroid. And it was really important to you. And you could eat just as much as 
your friend sitting next to you… Then I feel like it would be, like, conducive. 
Because you‟d feel, like, cheated. Like, that‟s not fair. Like, I should be allowed to 
eat just as much. But I also don‟t want to be fat. (Thelma, T-BN) 
 
Purging one‟s food would make sense as a response to these two predispositions, according 
to Thelma. 
Some respondents pointed out that genes for a large physical size were only a 
problem in environments that valorized thinness.  Joelle specified that a larger body type 
could “pre-dispose [people] in this society to behaving in certain ways” (emphasis added). 
This suggests a gene-environment interaction, but as noted above the causal pathway would 
be quite indirect. Carly thought of eating disorders as closely related to goals for physical 
appearance, which she defined in societal terms.  Indeed, Carly could not imagine how genes 
for anything other than physical size could contribute to an eating disorder.  I asked her 
specifically about the idea of genes for something psychological, and she responded 
skeptically.  
I just don‟t see how it would relate to the psychological factor. Because I mean it 
used to be that you wanted to be fatter in society…. [T]hat was a way long time ago. 
But that‟s what people wanted to be like. And I mean if people had those genes now, 
they would be – everyone would be that size. ... I mean I just can‟t see how like my 
mom – like, her – if her brain is telling her to make herself throw up because she‟s 
not skinny enough. Like, I can‟t see how that would transfer over somehow. Like, 
something in her brain that is making her think differently of herself. I just think it‟s 
something that society has an influence on it. That society determines how you‟re 
supposed to look. (Carly, R-BN) 
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Carly was skeptical that there could be genes related to the attempt to achieve a particular 
physical appearance. If there were, she reasoned, those genes would be consistent across 
historical eras and there would not be fluctuations in ideal body size at different times.  
Although recovered, she is the only respondent who was neither treated for nor discussed her 
BN with a healthcare provider afterwards (and although she endorsed the terms 
“psychological problem” and “mental illness” to describe eating disorders, it sounded like 
she had only just begun to think that way).  
 One respondent, Margaret, asserted that genetic influence works solely through 
gender socialization based on sex chromosomes:  having female sex chromosomes (XX) puts 
one at risk for an eating disorder in a U.S. context because of gender socialization.  This was 
a self-conscious and explicit rejection of genetic theorizing, which she viewed as a challenge 
to the centrality of gender inequality in the development of eating disorders. Although before 
and after this section of the interview she said she thought genetics were relevant for her own 
AN, she balked when asked to imagine how genes might have influenced it. 
...So trying to think of how genes would play out. That‟s where I just stand on the 
other side and say “No. It‟s a ridiculous explanation. It can‟t play out. It won‟t. The 
only genetic component is being female. And it‟s the XX chromosome. That‟s what 
the cause is.” So that‟s how it plays out. You‟re born a female. And then you get 
raised here.… again I see it as social. How women are taught to be and see 
themselves and identify and become the kind of people that shrink (laughing) and 
don‟t weigh a lot. (Margaret, R-AN) 
 
Her theory of eating disorders is based on the idea that eating disorders are a “coping 
mechanism” and “a way of dealing with something in your life”, and that women are more 
likely to see it as an option or “model” for themselves; whereas for men “[i]t‟s not a coping 
mechanism that they‟re trained to see as something that they could just go do.”  Margaret‟s 
genetic “theory” was offered in playful resistance to the idea of genetic influence on eating 
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disorders and her tone of voice and laughter suggested that this was not to be recorded in 
earnest as a genetic causal model but as a rejection of genetic causal models.  Considering it 
for the moment as a genetic causal model, it resembles theories of indirect effects of genes 
for body size because much intervenes between genotype and phenotype. There is a kind of 
gene-environment interaction because genes that determine femaleness interact with cultural 
definitions of femaleness, but Margaret is not suggesting that all U.S. women have eating 
disorders.  Rather, this interaction is the foundation for other social processes that lead 
toward eating disorders, suggesting indirect causation.  Margaret alternated this resistance to 
genetic explanations with an apparent belief in them and an appreciation for how they would 
give women relief from the blame and stigma of eating disorders. (Margaret‟s interview will 
be discussed with more detail in Chapter 6 on implications.) 
For respondents who theorized genetic influence in terms of body size or sex 
chromosomes, these characteristics created a situation that had to be dealt with through 
dieting or purging, which made eating disorders more likely. Several stated that the situation 
was only defined as a problem in societies that valorized thinness.  By not theorizing a 
psychological genetic predisposition, Carly and Margaret in particular framed the issue as 
fundamentally societal. Arguably they preserved a space for an agent whose reaction is not 
defined or influenced by genetics. This agent is confronted with a genetically large body, 
whose value is determined by its context. Although her body has been influenced by 
genetics, her responses have not. A person whose reactions are not deemed to be genetically 
influenced may seem more free and agentic. By comparison with a genetically-influenced 
agent, her reactions may seem less like an outgrowth of pathology or idiosyncratic 
personality trait, and more like a reaction to social conditions. Furthermore, her reactions 
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have the potential to be justified, meaning they were appropriate or understandable given the 
situation, rather than excused or otherwise explained by what she brought to the situation. 
For Margaret in any case, theorizing genes for female sex chromosomes (as a joke or not) 
constituted a resistance to locating the problem in the person, which genetics threatened to 
do.  By locating the problem in the society‟s definition of acceptable body size, Margaret‟s 
agency, and the warrant for social critique, are augmented.  Genes for body size and sex may 
offer the most “room” for societal and choice-based explanations for respondents. Indeed, 
theorizing genetic influence on AN via sex chromosomes was for Margaret a way to resist 
genetic theories and place social construction of gender at the center of eating disorder 
genesis.  Body size and sex were theorized by respondents as predisposing only in particular 
contexts; in a society that values thinness, the larger body is a problem. In a different context, 
the same genes would not have propelled someone toward an eating disorder.   
 
 In summary, respondents offered diverse theories for how genetics might influence 
the development of an eating disorder.  Most theories could be fit into the seven categories 
above.  The categories varied in specificity (i.e., genes for AN or BN vs. genes for something 
more general), pathology (i.e., genes for psychiatric diagnoses vs. genes for non-pathologized 
traits), and body “location” (i.e., genes that referred to brain-based operations vs. visible 
physical features). I have described all of them as types of genetic theories, whether the 
genes are “for” depression, personality or female sex.  Some readers may argue that only 
genes specifically for AN or BN ought to count as genetic theories of AN or BN. If this were 
the case, only 6% of respondents (3 out of 49, discussed in the next section) endorsed such 
genetic theories.  However, researchers who study the genetics of eating disorders do not 
limit their search to the diagnostic category, and may theorize genetic influence on sub-
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categories of a diagnosis (e.g., AN with restricting only) or theorize genetic influence by 
defining AN or BN as part of a spectrum that includes other diagnoses or personality 
characteristics such as those mentioned above. Most respondents‟ views are compatible with 
those of genetic researchers who target personality, addiction, obsessiveness, anxiety, 
depression, and other conditions or traits without reference to AN or BN.  In the following 
section I examine whether respondents viewed a specific or general genetic influence as most 
plausible. 
3. NOT BY GENES ALONE: A PREFERENCE FOR COMPLEXITY AND 
INDETERMINACY IN GENETIC CAUSATION 
 
 I have described the content of respondents‟ theories, organizing interview material 
according to what genes are theorized to be “for.” For each category I provided examples of 
how genetic and non-genetic contributors to eating disorders were combined. There were 
many theories of an indirect, rather than a direct genetic cause for eating disorders, often 
powerfully shaped by diverse non-genetic factors. Many respondents held multiple theories 
simultaneously. In order to assess which theories they preferred, I now present answers to a 
question that permitted comparison across respondents, namely whether they thought a 
specific or more general gene was most plausible. I also provide a rank ordering of theories 
according to the role afforded to non-genetic influences (Figure 5.2).  
3.1.  Respondents preferred general categories and indirect causation 
 Most respondents speculated that if genes mattered, they would be genes “for” 
something more general than AN or BN. Respondents used multiple theories over the course 
of the interview but when asked, “what makes more sense to you, genes for [AN/BN] or 
genes for something more general that influences [AN/BN]”, 38 of 49 said that something 
general was more plausible. An additional three rejected the premise of the question (Carly, 
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Margaret, and Vanessa), leaving only eight who responded that it could be genes for AN/BN 
or both specific and general genetic influences. Of these eight, only three clearly preferred 
and believed in the idea of genes for AN/BN (Carol, Fran, and Selena).  Because there was so 
little variability in their endorsement of a general, rather than specific, predisposition, I did 
not statistically analyze relationships to other variables (such as those presented in Table 5.1 
on initial reactions to genetic ideas). 
 I turn now to respondents‟ more focused reasoning about why genes for something 
more general than AN or BN were more plausible. (For reasoning about why genes 
specifically for AN or BN made sense to some people, see the prior section where theories of 
genes “for” AN and BN are described.)  Reasons for skepticism about genes for AN and BN 
have been alluded to earlier in the section on “negative reactions” to genetics.  Arguments 
here echo and build upon themes presented there, particularly that genes “for” AN or BN did 
not adequately take into account powerful environmental forces.  
For many respondents, genes for AN or BN were antithetical to their conception of 
eating disorders as developing over time in interaction with other influences and with some 
degree of agency.  Genes for addiction, low self-esteem, depression, and other less specific 
conditions provided more conceptual room for the complex causality and ambiguous agency 
described in Chapter 3.  Eva responded to the question saying, “Definitely for something 
more general. I don‟t think there‟s like, a bulimic gene.” A “bulimic gene” implied too large 
a role for biology, and not enough for agency (behavior, choice, psychological issues) and 
environmental influences. Eva continued: 
I don‟t think – if there was a bulimic gene, then I think you‟d be able to like – I don‟t 
know. Because, I guess it starts out it‟s not, like, biological. It‟s more of, like, a 
behavior. And, I think for a lot of people they kind of like – there‟s, like, a reason 
why. And, it‟s usually, like, environmental. It‟s not something that, like, their body is 
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making them do. I guess it‟s like a conscious choice in the beginning. So, I don‟t 
think that‟s genetics.…it‟s not entirely like – that it‟s not, like, biological. Like, I 
think of it more as, like, a psychological issue. And, I just think it‟s a lot more 
complicated than just having a gene and that being, like, the sole cause of it. Because, 
I don‟t think – I mean if it‟s, like, a susceptibility. And then, not – it‟s like there‟s 
another part of it that has to go into the equation to equal that someone has bulimia. 
You can‟t say that it‟s all genetics. (Eva, T-BN) 
 
Eva had theorized that genes related to personality and sensitivity to the environment could 
have influenced her eating disorder, but genes specifically for BN sounded like a claim that it 
was “all genetics” with genes as the “sole cause of it”.  Liana similarly understood genes 
“for” AN or BN to be highly deterministic. 
R:  A gene for anorexia? No. 
I:  And, tell me why. Just explain it on the tape. 
R:  Because, there‟s so much more that goes into it. I don‟t think you can look – when 
I think of a gene – which I could be wrong. And, I hated chemistry anyway. 
(Laughter) But, I don‟t think you could look at a child‟s DNA and say that this person 
is or is not going to develop anorexia. 
I:  And so, that‟s what a gene for anorexia would seem to imply then. That it‟s 
definitely going to happen. 
R:  Yeah. (Liana, T-AN) 
 
Liana rejected genes for AN because they seemed deterministic, which she termed “DNA 
genetic”, but accepted a more probabilistic form of genetic influence, which she termed 
“personality genetic.” Genes for personality and addiction made more sense to her. Willa 
made a similar distinction between conditions that were “genetic” vs. those that were 
“genetically triggered.” Thelma and Rebecca both compared the idea of genes for BN to 
genes for obesity, saying that they were implausible because behaviors such as over-eating 
were far more important. As Rebecca put it, “Yeah. Maybe I‟m more likely to have bulimia. 
But that‟s not really why I‟m puking up my food.” (Implications for perceived responsibility 
will be discussed in Chapter 6.) 
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 Related to the idea that non-genetic factors were of great importance, several 
respondents said that AN and BN was defined by behaviors too specific to be potentially 
controllable by genes. It involved more cultural learning than a genetic disease would; as an 
analogy, Isabelle pointed out that there would not be a genetic predisposition for baseball. 
…ultimately I mean it‟s an illness that manifests itself in a behavior. And like, I don‟t 
– I think that there are very few actual behaviors that are genetically, like, pre-
dispositioned. People aren‟t more likely to play baseball over, like, basketball or 
something. It‟s, like, there are genes that, like, are going to make someone more 
athletic. But they‟re not going to determine which sport they do. (Isabelle, T-BN) 
 
I think a lot of it has to do more with your environmental factors leading you in that 
direction than it is something that – it‟s kind of like you don‟t - you learn life skills 
throughout your life. Like, you‟re not born knowing how to tie your shoes. And, 
you‟re not born knowing how to brush your teeth. I think [an eating disorder is] kind 
of one of the things that you learn. And, if you‟re born with a gene that prohibits you 
from eating. Or, something like that. Like, if there was some medical disease where 
you had a strange aversion to food. Or, like, caloric intake. Then, I feel like that 
would be something completely different than anorexia. (Gena, T-BN) 
 
Anorexia seems to be a really refined behavior. And very complex. And I just don‟t 
know that our genes are quite that good. And I just think there‟s cultural things and 
societal things. And I just – anorexia is caused by a lot more than just genes. Than 
just that. I don‟t think you can have – you have a gene for blue eyes. But I don‟t think 
you have a gene for anorexia. I just think you have a gene for you‟re going to have 
some problems….  Because I think that there are so many cultural variations that are 
required to be just right in order to get anorexia. And it just doesn‟t seem as though 
our genes are quite that specific. (Nell, R-AN) 
 
AN and BN were defined by complex, learned behaviors, which were unlikely to be encoded 
at a genetic level. 
 In addition, one respondent pointed out that because she had personally experienced 
both AN and BN, they were unlikely to involve separate, unique genes. 
Just because number one I think that a lot of people are like me. We see both eating 
disorders in the same person. Or people manifesting different anorectic behaviors as 
well as bulimic. I think that it would be – if there was a gene for anorexia and a gene 
for bulimia, it would be very odd that we would be having both. And then also – I 
don‟t know. Sometimes people are both concurrently. And it seems a lot of life 
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situation things that are – that interplay with which behaviors are manifested at which 
times. (Sarah, R-BN) 
 
“Life situation things” influenced the kind of behavior more than genes. 
To summarize, most respondents were skeptical of genes specifically “for” AN or 
BN, usually because such a theory appeared to deny the importance of environmental factors 
in shaping eating disorder behavior. If genetics are tied to eating behavior directly, as 
opposed to depression, addiction, or perfectionism, it suggests less of a role for non-genetic 
influences; the predisposition could have been channeled toward cutting, gambling, or 
scholarly achievement instead.  To be sure, theories of genes “for” AN and BN also involved 
non-genetic influences, but the AN and BN is pre-formed and “waiting” until the right 
environmental conditions are present. It may also imply less of a role for individual agency; 
the AN or BN is a pre-packaged entity rather than a collection of specific behaviors learned 
or adopted by an individual actor.
22
  
3.2. Making conceptual “room” for non-genetic influences  
Drawing on interview material and conceptual distinctions presented above, in this 
section I reflect on how respondents theorized genetic influences to work. I pay special 
attention to the relative roles of non-genetic influences.  I approach this goal in two ways:  
identifying ways that respondents combined genetic and non-genetic influences across the 
“genes for what” categories, and ordering the categories according to how much conceptual 
“room” they leave for non-genetic influences (Figure 5.2). 
Four general ways of combining genetic and non-genetic influences.  Respondents 
envisioned interplay between genes and non-genetic influences in a variety of ways, to which 
                                                 
22
 Perhaps the same applies to the conception of disease as opposed to choice. Sometimes the disease is 
conceptually divorced from the behaviors even though the diagnosis is based on the behaviors; i.e., when the 
eating disorder is “yelling” in one‟s ear but one tries not to listen nor obey.   
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I alluded as I presented the seven categories. I simplify and summarize the findings above by 
suggesting three broad conceptual groups: gun-trigger interaction models, general-to-specific 
manifestation models and indirect-effects models.  In addition there were indications of a 
fourth way of combining genes and non-genetic influences as independent factors because 
interplay was not mentioned.  
Table 5.3 Respondents‟ theories of gene-environment interplay 
Theoretical model Illustration of model 
Gun-trigger interaction model “Genes load the gun, environment pulls the 
trigger” 
General-to-specific manifestation 
model 
Genes for general addictiveness were shaped by 
environment to manifest as BN 
Indirect-effects model Genes led to something, and that something was 
defined as a problem or acted upon in problematic 
ways depending on environment 
Independent-effects model Genes and environment influence eating disorders 
additively rather than interactively  
 
The first general way of integrating genetics with non-genetic factors was by means 
of a gun-trigger interaction model. With regard to the first, a few respondents used variations 
on the metaphor, “genes load the gun, environment pulls the trigger.”  This metaphor has 
been widely used to explain how genetics and environment are important for complex 
conditions; in opposition to a deterministic genetic model, genes only become important 
under certain environmental conditions. Fran, quoted earlier, described such an interaction 
model: 
Take two girls with pretty much the same make-up except for their parents. Stick 
them both in a gymnastics class. Competitive. If you‟ve got one parent that‟s eating 
disorder. And, none on this one. This one‟s going to have a higher tendency to have 
an eating disorder. This one probably won‟t. (Fran, R-BN) 
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In the environment of a competitive gymnastics class, those with a genetic predisposition to 
an eating disorder are more at risk than others.  Petra used the gun-trigger metaphor to 
convey a similar idea:  
I‟ve heard it said many times. Genetics is the gun. Society pulls the trigger. And I 
believe that a hundred percent…. What it means to me is genetically I‟m already pre-
dispositioned to this disease because of the addiction cycle in my family. And I think 
society pulled the trigger. (Petra, T-AN)  
 
The metaphor suggests a predisposition to a specific disorder that only becomes activated 
when the conditions are right.  For Fran the condition is eating disorders, for Petra it is 
addiction.  
 The second kind of model, which I have termed a general-to-specific manifestation 
model, theorizes a broad theoretical predisposition that is shaped and channeled into a 
specific phenotype by non-genetic forces. This is also an interaction model in that non-
genetic influences are important in the development of the disorder, but differs conceptually 
from the gun-trigger interaction model in an important way. Whereas the gun-trigger 
interaction model explains whether a phenotype develops or not (e.g., specific phenotypes 
such as AN, or general phenotypes such as an eating disorder for Fran or an addiction for 
Petra), this general-to-specific model explains how a general phenotype takes the form of BN 
for Fran and AN for Petra. In a gun-trigger interaction model for AN, there is a specific pre-
formed AN “bullet” in the gun that will either be released or not when the trigger is pulled; 
the bullet represents AN, rather than eating disorders in general, or addiction, or another 
general condition.  Because my focus is on how respondents theorized genes to matter for AN 
and BN rather than other conditions, a gun-trigger interaction model for AN presumes a gene 
for AN, though respondents mentioned gun-trigger interaction models for more general 
phenotypes. I propose that a general-to-specific manifestation model is conceptually distinct 
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from a gun-trigger interaction model for this project.
23
 The idea that a genetic predisposition 
for a generic condition could “manifest” in a particular form enabled respondents to combine 
genetic influences with social and other forces in complex dynamic causation. Respondents 
who had a predisposition to a general condition such as addiction could “manifest” it with 
alcohol, gambling, or eating disorder behavior depending on environmental constraints and 
opportunities, norms and values, and personal preferences.  Respondents spoke of similar 
processes in connection with anxiety, depression and generic eating disorders; these were 
channeled, funneled, or molded into specific forms in ways compatible with complex 
causation and ambiguous agency featured in Chapter 3.   
A third way of combining genes and other influences was to theorize an indirect- 
effects model, in which genes create or contribute to a problem to which the individual must 
respond. Genes help create the problem, and the eating behavior is an attempt to solve it, 
which leads to an eating disorder (and yet more problems). The attempted solution is shaped 
by environmental influences and agentic processes interacting over time, and respondents 
described it in terms of learning, coping, self-soothing or gratification. This basic causal 
model was mentioned in most of the seven categories presented above, for example, 
Mireya‟s reaction to the “stimulus” of a cake, Gena‟s genetic depression, Nell‟s sensitivity, 
Joelle‟s curvy body, Margaret‟s sex chromosomes.  Unlike a simple interaction model, this 
indirect-effects model is a sequential, unfolding process:  genes create a problem which 
evokes a coping response which is repeated if it is gratifying, which in turn creates new 
problems to be coped with, and so on.  The genes are far more distant from the phenotype 
than genes “for” the eventual outcome.  
                                                 
23
 It is interesting that a general category like addiction or eating disorders could be “triggered” but not 
manifested in specific form, leading me to wonder in what sense it exists; is it a theoretical construct only or 
could it be detected with some effort, as with an endophenotype (see Chapter 1).   
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Fourth and last, some respondents spoke of genetic and non-genetic influences 
without attempting to integrate them into a single causal model: an independent-effects 
model. Here, genetic and other causal factors do not interact but exert influence 
independently. Such a model was harder to detect because respondents were unlikely to 
specify that two independent factors were non-interactive; this model is theoretically present 
when explicit talk about interaction or other interplay is absent.  Selena may have held such a 
model: she alternately spoke of traumatic experiences in her early childhood and having a 
“DNA defect” in her brain, without trying to reconcile or integrate the two. She had come up 
with separate theories for why she was more debilitated by stressful events compared to 
others, but did not integrate the two explanations. It is also possible that for Selena, causation 
was either genetic or environmental.
24
 
These categories do not exhaust the variety I encountered in these interviews, but 
describe several common ways of combining genes and environment.  These were present 
across multiple “genes for what” categories and provide a way of thinking more generally 
about the role of “individual” and “environmental” factors when genetics are also involved.  I 
turn now to another kind of overview across theories. 
Rank-ordering of theories.  Figure 5.2 illustrates a rank ordering of genetic theories 
according to the conceptual “room” for non-genetic influences.  All theories of genetic 
influence involved some kind of interplay with non-genetic influences, usually environment. 
                                                 
24
 For Fran, who thought both genes and environment were important and clearly described an interaction 
model (regarding a gymnastics class, see just above and section on “eating disorders in general”) it was not 
clear whether she applied the interaction model to her own life experiences.  When Fran stated the following, 
she may have been thinking either of an independent factors or an interaction model; it is not clear: “I would say 
my dad was the whole cause. From the genetics to his behavior towards me.” She discussed her father‟s own 
purging as evidence of his own BN, which she thought she inherited from him, as well as his monitoring of her 
body size when she was a child.  Both were important but the interaction concept was never applied to specific 
details of her life so she may have seen them as operating separately (despite articulating a theory of interaction 
involving gymnastics). 
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This ordering draws upon concepts relevant to diverse causal models (just described) as well 
as what the genes were “for”. I depict genetic influence as a blue arrow leading to five “genes 
for what” categories above, reduced from seven by combining the categories of specific 
mental illness, addiction, and general psychopathology into one category as “psychological 
problems.” To avoid the suggestion that respondents think that only genes are responsible for 
each category, I also depict other, non-genetic influences acting upon all five categories, as a 
green/checkerboard square and downward arrow.  The horizontal green arrows convey the 
essence of the graph: there is arguably more conceptual “room” for non-genetic influences as 
one goes down the list.   
Figure 5.2:  Room for non-genetic influences in genetic theories (Blue arrows = genetic 
influence, Green/checkerboard arrows = non-genetic influence) 
 
 
 
G                                                                                    AN/BN 
G                                                    Any ED                   AN/BN 
G                                       Psych. prob.                       AN/BN 
G                        Persnlty/temp.                                 AN/BN 
G              Body type/gender                                     AN/BN    
 
*These non-genetic influences interact with genetics (blue arrows) for all five categories.  
 
Theoretically, genes “for” AN or BN limited the amount of play possible in the final 
outcome; if genes are for AN or BN, many aspects of the behaviors are pre-programmed 
once the genes take effect.  Genes “for” a generic eating disorder allowed somewhat more 
play because environmental or other forces were theorized to shape the predisposition toward 
AN, BN, over-eating or other problems with eating.  Genes “for” psychological problems 
(e.g., depression, addiction, having problems) leave yet more “room” for those non-genetic 
Non-genetic influences* 
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influences that channel the person toward eating-related psychopathology.  Genes for 
personality or temperament leave even more room because they do not presume 
psychopathology; even if the genes are expressed, other forces determine if the individual 
will actually experience a problem. Last, genes for body type or gender may presume the 
least genetic influence of all, because even when they take effect, thoughts and feelings are 
not necessarily affected thereby. This figure is a very simplified version of respondents‟ 
theories, but useful as an organizational device.  Most respondents theorized in terms of 
“psychological problems” (n=37) followed by “personality” (n=33) (see Table 5.2 above for 
frequencies of other categories). 
4. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 5  
 In this chapter, I examined respondents‟ initial reactions to the idea of a genetic 
causal factor, and how they imagined genes could potentially influence eating disorders.  
First, I provided an overview of their “positive” and “negative” reactions, categorized 
according to positive-negative valence and perceived plausibility of genetic influence on 
eating disorders.  “Negative” viewpoints characterized genetic explanations as simplistic and 
deterministic, with an inadequate role for environmental causes.  “Positive” viewpoints of 
genetics often involved the perceived reduction of responsibility for the person with an eating 
disorder, as well as hope for scientific breakthroughs in the future, such as genetically-based 
treatments. People who already saw eating disorders in medicalized terms (Chapter 4 index) 
were more likely to hold “positive” views, as were people currently in treatment, and those 
who had received more treatment than others.  The appeal of genetic explanations may thus 
be greater for people already favorably inclined or experienced with treatment.   
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I then described how respondents imagined genetic influence to operate in eating 
disorders.  Their theories allowed a great deal of room for agency and environmental 
influence, with most respondents finding genes specifically for AN or BN less plausible than 
genes for something more general. I identified six more general categories: genes “for” 
general eating disorders or eating “issues,” specific psychiatric diagnoses or traits, addiction 
or addictive personality, non-specific psychopathology (e.g., not tied to a specific diagnosis), 
personality and other non-pathologized traits, and visible body characteristics (e.g., body size 
and sex).  In these more general theories, genes were not tied to eating disorder behavior 
directly, thereby leaving substantial room for agents to interact with environments over time. 
I identified several ways that respondents combined genes and environmental influence, 
including the following kinds of interaction, broadly conceived:  an environmental “trigger” 
metaphorically releasing a genetic disease bullet; a more indirect form of interaction in which 
a genetic predisposition for a general condition is shaped into a specific manifestation over 
time (to explain why a person turns to AN rather than alcoholism or gambling, for example); 
and a very indirect form in which genes simply create a wide range of phenomena (physical, 
emotional) that may or may not become a problem and to which agents may or may not 
respond by developing an eating disorder.  Finally, I condensed respondents‟ theories about 
genetics and environment into five categories organized in order of how much conceptual 
“room” they allowed for non-genetic forces to shape an outcome.  I concluded that theories 
involving genes “for” AN or BN left the least room for the play of social forces and agency 
over time, and indirect theories involving visible body characteristics left the most.   
Respondents‟ indirect and interactive genetic theories were compatible with their complex, 
dynamic explanations for the development of eating disorders, as described in Chapter 3 
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before genetics were introduced into the conversation. In these theories, external factors (e.g., 
beauty ideals, traumatic events) interacted with internal factors (e.g., personality, coping 
preferences) over time. Respondents were able to incorporate genetics into these 
developmental, meaning-rich narratives; genetic factors did not have to entail over-
simplification. Their theories of genetic influence were also compatible with those of 
genetics researchers, who may investigate genes “for” personality as well as genes “for” 
phenotypes as narrowly defined as AN-with-restriction-only.  But do such indirect theories 
encourage a more medicalized view of AN and BN?  What do respondents perceive to be the 
implications of genetic influence for themselves and others with eating disorders?  I turn to 
this topic in the next chapter.   
 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
“SOME SORT OF LARGER FORCE AT WORK”: 
PERCEIVED IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS FOR  
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
 In this chapter, I examine the implications of genetic influence for perceptions of 
eating disorders and their causation.  As should be apparent in the previous chapters, 
respondents were pre-occupied by the idea of eating disorders as a “choice.”  What effect did 
genetic ideas have on the perception of eating disorders as volitional behaviors, chosen or at 
least controllable by the individual?  The ubiquity of social factors in respondents‟ causal 
models leads to a similar question: Did genetic forces reduce the perceived importance of 
social forces?  In Chapter 1, I proposed a number of potential implications for the 
geneticization of eating disorders, including greater medicalization of eating disorders and 
impacts on perceptions of individual and social responsibility.  I examine these three in turn, 
beginning with medicalization.  
 I will focus on interview material from the last section of the interview to discuss 
implications, but draw from the entire interview as relevant.  When initially coding the full 
interviews, I had tagged material relevant to personal control, stigma, and good or bad 
implications. I drew on this previously identified material and supplemented it by reviewing 
the final section of the interview beginning with the question about a hypothetical media 
campaign.  This question was asked of 49 or 50 respondents, and usually framed in general 
terms: 
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Imagine there were a media campaign to publicize the idea that genetics play some 
role in [AN/BN]. What effects do you think that would have?   
 
Some respondents spoke about reactions by the general public, but all were asked how it 
would affect people with the eating disorder in question, and probed about potential good and 
bad effects.  Then I asked all respondents about a hypothetical genetic test, with wording 
guided and approved by a researcher who studies genetic influence on eating disorders (Bulik 
2008, personal communication):  
Because both genes and environment play a role, it‟s not likely that a genetic test 
could predict whether a person would get an eating disorder. There is no test like that. 
But, for a moment let‟s say you could get a genetic test to find out if your genes made 
you more likely to get an eating disorder. Would you want to know? 
 
Frequently I would refer to respondents‟ previous answers about the importance of both 
genes and environment when asking this question to reinforce that this test did not imply 
deterministic genes; (e.g., “Because both genes and environment play a role, just as you were 
saying about addiction…”).  After discussing why they would or would not want to know, I 
asked whether they would prefer to find out they had the genetic predisposition or not, and 
why.
1
 I followed up with questions about the good and bad things about knowing one had a 
predisposition, and whether it would change how they understood their experience, how they 
talked about it with other people, and how they thought about treatment, recovery, and 
biologically related family members.
2
  
                                                 
1
 These questions about genetic testing revealed whether respondents would prefer to think of their case as 
genetically influenced, not whether they would want to know about a predisposition in advance of developing a 
disorder. Those who responded as though the question were about predictive genetic testing were redirected to 
talk about themselves as they were at the time of the interview, with a known history of AN or BN. 
 
2
 At the end of the questions about genetics, I asked some respondents whether knowing genetics played a role 
would change how they viewed their own responsibility, and the idea that genetics could make the eating 
disorder seem less like the person‟s fault.  All respondents had already brought up the theme of control by this 
point, and this question did not redirect their thinking. 
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 Respondents reasoned about the implications of genetic ideas by drawing on simpler 
models of genetic influence than they had presented as most plausible (see Chapter 5). Even 
though respondents thought genetic influence was likely to work in an interactive and/or 
indirect way over time, with important roles for environment and individual agency, when 
they considered the implications of genetic ideas for people with eating disorders they used 
far simpler models of genetic influence. A few drew comparisons to simple, deterministic 
genetic explanations such as those for Huntington‟s disease. Most retained an important role 
for non-genetic influences and in general their models were somewhere in between such 
simple models and those they had described earlier. I interpret respondents to be (1) drawing 
on a cultural knowledge of what genes usually mean to the general public (particularly with 
the media campaign question), and (2) interpreting some questions to connote a simpler 
model of causation than theirs. The very existence of a media campaign could suggest a 
powerful genetic influence, otherwise there would be little warrant for such a campaign.  A 
genetic test of predisposition could suggest specific genes “for” AN or BN, a theory that was 
not adequate to capture respondents‟ complex, dynamic, and often indirect models of genetic 
influence (see Chapter 5).   
1.  “LEGITIMIZED AS AN ACTUAL DISEASE”: GENES HEIGHTEN THE 
MEDICALIZATION OF EATING DISORDERS 
 
If eating disorders are to some extent “contested illnesses”, despite their inclusion in 
the official listing of psychiatric disorders, do genetic ideas make them seem more like real 
illnesses?  Does geneticization beget medicalization? In Chapter 1, I proposed that genes 
could “heighten” or further the existing official medicalization of eating disorders, such that 
medicalization could continue even after inclusion in official medical classifications such as 
the DSM.  I elaborated existing models of medicalization in Table 1.1 by including biological 
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and not-clearly biological columns and argued that complete medicalization is the 
combination of biological and pathological components.  The geneticization of eating 
disorders places them in the biological column, but to provide evidence for the proposed 
conceptual model this biologization would have to increase perceived medicalization.  To 
assess changes in perceived medicalization of eating disorders, I developed two coding rules, 
one conservative and the other more expansive.  
To assess whether genetics made eating disorders seem more “medical”, I was careful 
to define “medical” in a way that first excluded then included biology and biological 
treatment (thereby creating the conservative and then more expansive criteria). Conrad does 
not explicitly define “medical” as “biological”, even though that is usually the connotation. 
As noted in Chapter 1, the move from “badness” to “sickness” can take place even if a 
disorder does not have a biological origin or treatment; inclusion in the official listing of 
psychiatric disorders is used as evidence of official medicalization even though that work is 
agnostic about causation (i.e., the de-medicalization of homosexuality was achieved by its 
removal from the DSM, and it is increasingly discussed in biological terms even though it is 
not medicalized).  For a conservative definition of medicalization, a respondent saying that 
genetic causation makes the eating disorder seem more biologically based or biologically 
treatable would not be sufficient evidence of perceived medicalization.
3
  Including biological 
causation or treatment could set too low a bar for medicalization because genes are biological 
phenomena and biological treatment would logically follow.  
                                                 
3
 Conrad left the term “medical” undefined in his definition of medicalization, relying perhaps justifiably on 
shared cultural knowledge for the contexts he researched: “Medicalization consists of defining a problem in 
medical terms, using medical language to describe a problem, adopting a medical framework to understand a 
problem, or using a medical intervention to „treat‟ it” (Conrad 1992: 211). Applying this definition to mental 
illness certainly connotes a biological basis to many readers, but I am concerned that it would constitute too 
easy a standard for medicalization. 
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On the other hand, as noted above, biological factors are the usual connotation for 
“medical,” so I therefore approach the definition of “medical” cautiously4 by using two sets 
of criteria corresponding to narrow and expansive definitions. An overview is provided in 
Figure 6.1 below. The narrow definition is based on two themes that do not depend on 
biological aspects: unambiguous medical language and concepts (e.g., words like “medical” 
and “disease”, and comparisons to uncontested disease like cancer) and the perceived 
importance of treatment by a healthcare provider of any kind. Most respondents (n=37, or 
74%) spontaneously brought up one or both of these themes.  These two themes correspond 
to concept of “sickness” as opposed to “badness” or another non-medicalized definition of 
eating disorders and loosely correspond to the pathologizing dimension of Table 1.1.  The 
expansive definition accepts as evidence for medicalization spontaneous mentions of 
biologically-based treatments in connection with genetics. Nearly all respondents mentioned 
one of these three themes (n=47, or 94%).  I illustrate the three criteria in turn and identify 
some countervailing themes pitting geneticization against medicalization. 
 
Figure 6.1: Genetics and the medicalization of eating disorders: Findings using two 
definitions 
Criteria used to assess medicalization 
 
1. Genetics inspire medical concepts and terminology 
 
2. Genetics locate problem in domain of health 
professionals 
 
3. Genetics suggest biologically based treatments 
 
Narrow definition 
 
74% (37/50) 
mentioned at least 
one of these two 
Expansive def. 
 
 
94% (47/50) 
mentioned at least 
one of these three 
 
                                                 
4
 I used a similarly cautious approach when developing the medicalized terminology index in Chapter 4. For the 
five-part index, the four terms that connoted medical terminology either connoted treatable disorders, included 
the words “disease” or “illness”, or both. Those terms were psychological problem, mental illness, brain 
disease, and physical illness. The other term in the index was “choice”, which was treated as a term that 
indicated non-medicalized viewpoints. 
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1.1 Genetics inspire medical concepts and terminology  
 Genetic explanations made eating disorders more like medical disorders to a majority 
of respondents. That finding makes it apparent that eating disorders are contested illnesses. 
Although my present focus is on medical concepts and terminology, many quotations touch 
on the theme of treatment, the second dimension of medicalization discussed in this section, 
and perceptions of individual choice or control, discussed in the next section on implications.  
I grouped material about medical concepts and terminology into these themes:  genetics 
make eating disorders seem more “legitimate”; more “real”; more like a “disease”; and more 
like specific, uncontested diseases (e.g., cancer).  Interview questions were framed very 
generally and did not use terms like “disease”, “illness”, or “medical” and thus did not lead 
respondents to consider medicalization.  (When presenting quotations in this section I 
italicize the relevant medical concepts and terminology; italics do not reflect respondents‟ 
emphases.) 
 Eating disorders as more “legitimate”. Several respondents thought genetic ideas 
could help convince others who did not see eating disorders as “legitimate” or “valid” 
disorders.  Against a background of contestation, in which the reality of eating disorders qua 
disorders is questioned despite official inclusion in the DSM-IV, genetics makes them more 
legitimate.   Melanie described BN and other mental illnesses to be “legitimized” as “actual 
disease[s]” if genetics were found to play a role. 
Well I think if you, like, look at different types of mental illnesses like bipolar or 
depression. I think it‟s, like, in the last twenty years it‟s been more, like, legitimized 
as an actual disease that people – at least a lot of people anyway recognize that if you 
have that, you can take medication for it. It‟s not something that you can just snap out 
of or something. I think that‟s – certainly everybody doesn‟t believe or get that or 
something. But I think it has helped some to talk about it as a clinical disease. 
(Melanie, R-BN, italics indicate emphasis added for all quotations in this section on 
medicalization) 
303 
 
 
“Legitimizing” BN as a disease involves the recognition by other people that it is “not 
something that you can just snap out of”, meaning it is not under the person‟s control so 
treatment is warranted (the second dimension of medicalization, discussed later).  Hannah 
also felt that if she knew she had a genetic predisposition, it would make it seem more like a 
“legitimate disease” to other people as opposed to being “crazy”, which apparently did not 
connote disease.    
Because, then I could explain it better to people who ask me “What happened?” And, 
… then, I could, like, be, like, “Well, I had this gene that made me more susceptible.” 
And then, I could add the other stuff. Whereas now it‟s just sort of like, “I don‟t really 
know why it happened to me and not to everybody else that went through hard stuff.” 
Because, I didn‟t go through that bad of stuff. Like, I don‟t know why other people 
didn‟t react the same way I did. So, that would help explain the story… I guess if I 
say it, it seems more like a legitimate disease. If I don‟t say it, then people are just 
like, “Hum. Is she crazy?” (Hannah, R-AN) 
 
Genetics would help to justify why Hannah developed AN even though she “didn‟t go 
through that bad of stuff” and might have been expected to escape it. Isabelle apparently 
thought that healthcare providers did not take it seriously enough: “And so when you talk 
about genes and biology, I mean, I think that‟s going to make the medical community pay 
attention to it a little bit more. And help maybe validate it in the eyes of medicine as well.” If 
eating disorders seemed illegitimate and invalid, genetic origins would shore them up and 
command attention. 
 Eating disorders as more “real”.  Several respondents thought genetics would make 
eating disorders more “real” to themselves and others, as though there were doubt about their 
existence. I interpreted these doubts to center about their reality as entities; if eating disorders 
are real then they are, by definition, disorders, as listed in the official DSM which reflects 
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their medicalization.  Lynn thought that people with a genetic version of AN would see it as 
“real” rather than the opposite, which was being “crazy” or a “bad person”:  
Well, then they‟ll say „Oh. I‟m just not crazy. It’s real. … And, that I‟m not a bad 
person because I‟m doing this.‟ Yeah. This is, like, not functional. But, it started with 
something real. (Lynn, R-AN) 
 
 Tammy also thought genetics would confer more reality on AN:   
I think it would [help people]. I‟m not a freak. I‟m not a control freak. This is 
something real. But the steps – knowing it‟s real or knowing it‟s a genuine disease 
process and not knowing it doesn‟t make treatment easy. (Tammy, R-AN)  
 
Natalie (T-AN) suggested that others would be more understanding if they saw it “as 
something that is maybe passed from one generation to the next. That it‟s, like, it’s there. It‟s 
something that does exist.” Delia (T-AN) said that her family would be “more accepting of 
the disease… Because, it‟s genetic. It‟s a genetic thing. I have no say in that.” She already 
saw it as a disease herself, but her family would accept it as one if they knew genetics to be 
involved. Zinnia‟s (T-BN) view of eating disorders would change from the idea that they 
were a collection of “behaviors” and a “symptom of something” to being “a causal factor as 
opposed to the end. The outcome.” Although she does not use terms like “real”, she conveys 
something similar with the term “causal factor”; rather than BN as a name given to describe a 
collection of symptoms, BN would be an entity with causal power rather than an effect or 
outcome. Olga thought genetics would be comforting because it was a “real reason” for 
developing an eating disorder and went on to explain that doubts about AN‟s reality were 
“something I fight with.” 
 I would feel like there was a definite reason. That it wasn‟t just me being stupid or 
silly or whatever. That I actually had a real reason…That‟s something I fight with. 
But I‟m pretty sure with the anorexia it’s real. It was real. I don‟t know. (Olga, R-
AN)   
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In the midst of uncertainty about the reality of AN, genetics helps make the case that it is real 
and the person with AN wasn‟t just being “stupid or silly.” If genetics are involved, eating 
disorders were in the body, not just “in their heads.” 
 From the opposite direction, finding out that one‟s own AN or BN was not genetic 
could suggest that it was less real than for those for whom it was.  Gillian was concerned that 
her own AN, which she did not think was genetically influenced, would come to seem less 
real if genetics were publicized as a causal factor for eating disorders.  Her reasoning reflects 
a similar understanding to those described above. 
I:  … what was your reaction to the idea of genetics as making – as playing a role 
somehow when you first heard about it? 
R:  Well, initially I thought “Well, no one in my family has it. So, does that mean I 
don’t really have it? And, it’s all in my head…. I would be very distressed. Because, I 
would think that meant on some level I was making it up. Which bothered me. 
(Gillian, T-AN) 
 
Victoria raised a similar concern: 
R:… And then if I found out that I didn‟t have the genetic make-up, then it would be 
like, “Well why do I have an eating disorder?” 
I:  What would it make you think?... Or feel.  
R:  That it was, like, all my fault. And this [BN] wasn’t even something. (Victoria, T-
BN) 
Someone without a genetic explanation seemed more open to the charge that she was 
“making it up” or that it was all her fault.  If it were genetic it seemed to have more reality: it 
was something, it existed, as opposed to being invented or caused by the person. 
 Eating disorders as “disease”, and people with them as “sick”. Respondents 
speculated that the involvement of genes would increase the perceived similarity of eating 
disorders to diseases or medical conditions generally.  Mary (T-AN) expressed that genetics 
would make her feel less responsible for her AN: “ Just that like any other kind of disease 
that it‟s always been inside me. And, there wasn‟t anything I could do about it. And, like I 
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said. For me everything just lined up perfectly to cause it….” Respondents said that genetic 
ideas would make others “more likely to see it as a mental disorder” (Joelle, R-BN),  a 
“mental defect or disease” (Selena, T-BN), or “more of a brain illness [or] mental illness.” 
(Helen, T-AN)  Fiona (T-AN) speculated that “it would make people more aware that these 
are people who need help and are sick”.  Carly (R-BN) imagined that “I would kind of be 
like, „Oh. It‟s not my fault. I mean it’s a disease I have. I can‟t get rid of it….‟”   
Claire and Karen noted that although genes could be expected to make eating 
disorders more medical to other people, it would not change their own thinking because they 
already saw them that way.  Their answers reflected a similar logic to other respondents.   
I:  And, does that idea of anorexia having a genetic causal factor change how you see 
anorexia at all? If it were true? 
R:  No. Because, I still think of it as something that‟s like is a disease. I think of it 
just like a physical disease. So, yeah. Either way. I mean some physical diseases are 
genetic. Some aren’t. (Claire, T-AN)   
 
I don't think it could change how I feel about the last ten years. Because, it’s a mental 
and physical illness. And, it just took control over me. (Karen, T-AN) 
 
These respondents assumed that conceptual change would be in a medicalized direction, even 
though their own conceptions would not change.  
Some respondents expressed concern that genetics would make eating disorders seem 
too much like a medical condition. They thus shared the belief that genetics would 
medicalize eating disorders but objected to such a change.  Sydney thought that genetics 
would make it more a “medical thing” and was concerned that this would ignore the 
complexity of the disorder, because “it is not just a disease”. Clearly, her concern stems from 
an expectation that others would begin to see it more like a disease. 
I think a biological link or sort of discovery in that field would make it more a 
medical thing. Which hopefully could lead to a drug or something that might be able 
to help it. So I‟m totally in favor of that discovery (laughing). But at the same time I 
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understand that it‟s very hard to separate out. Because it is not just a disease. It’s 
NOT a disease. It‟s a very complex cycle of mental and physical collection of 
symptoms. (Sydney, T-BN) 
 
While Sydney anticipated future pharmaceutical cures (with tongue in cheek, perhaps), Willa 
reasoned that genetics for AN would make it seem like an incurable “brain disease” and 
therefore implausible. 
I guess I really don‟t see it as that likely. Because to me then it‟s much more of like a 
brain disease like we were talking about earlier. It‟s something that can‟t be helped 
really. Can‟t be cured. Maybe you deal with the symptoms. But you can‟t really do 
anything about it. And I don‟t think of anorexia like that. (Willa, R-AN) 
 
When responding to earlier questions about the terms “mental illness” and “brain disease”, 
Willa had brought up genetics spontaneously: “I really don‟t think it‟s a mental illness. When 
I think of a mental illness I think of something that‟s more like genetic. Or like schizophrenia 
or mental retardation or something like that.” However, Willa did believe that her own 
genetically influenced “type A” and perfectionist personality contributed to AN. In Willa‟s 
estimation, genetics for AN specifically could medicalize AN, but not genetics for 
personality, suggesting the importance of the content of genetic theories for conclusions 
about medicalization.  Even if Willa herself does not find genes “for” AN plausible, others 
might, and if they did she evidently would expect them to perceive it in a more medical way 
than otherwise.  Wendy (T-BN) thought that if genetics were involved, others would 
unreasonably expect the person to recover quickly, “Because that‟s how medical, like, 
diseases that are, like, genetic and stuff like that are. Like, if there‟s a cure for a lot of 
diseases. Like, it‟s like a shot. You get a shot. And you‟re cured.”  Genes would make eating 
disorders too much like “medical diseases”, in Wendy‟s view. The overlap between medical 
terminology and medical treatment is apparent here, as in other quotes from this section. 
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Genetics increases resemblance of eating disorders to uncontested diseases. Genetic 
ideas also prompted respondents to analogize eating disorders to specific uncontested 
diseases. For Selena, genetics would make eating disorders seem more like cancer or 
diabetes. 
But I think if I realized that it wasn‟t just environmental. If it was really a disease like 
cancer or diabetes or something. I mean if you had diabetes, wouldn‟t you go and get 
treatment? Like, this one you think you‟re doing it to yourself… I just thought of it 
like, “This is a weight thing. This is not, like, a disease.” If it had that label. Like, I 
didn‟t have a choice. Like this just developed. I think I would be much more likely to 
go and seek treatment. (Selena, T-BN) 
 
Breast cancer and diabetes are in opposition to the idea that BN is “a weight thing” or 
something one is “doing” to oneself. Asked whether a genetic causal factor would change 
how Paula talked about it to people, she likened it to chicken pox: 
I can see it becoming something that is spoken of more in the terms of other just sort 
of things that you get (laughs). Like, diseases. Like, “Oh. I had the chicken pox when 
I was a kid.” “Oh. I had bulimia when I was a kid.” That societally might not be then 
associated with some kind of character defect… Sort of de-personalized. (Paula, R-
BN) 
 
Respondents also likened genetic eating disorders to how they or others would view 
gangrene (Lynn), schizophrenia (Fiona), Alzheimer‟s (Olga), autism (Zinnia), mental 
retardation or ADHD (Petra).  (Some who spoke in medicalized terms also compared it to 
non-diseases, like homosexuality, eye color, and musical skills, suggesting that genetics do 
not have a single meaning.) 
 Some respondents thought genetics made it seem more like a disease that had not 
been chosen than a disease that had.  Vanessa and Yvette made a distinction between 
diseases you choose and disease you do not. A disease that is not chosen more closely 
resembles uncontested diseases like cancer. Therefore I interpret this as evidence that 
genetics made eating disorders more like a disease.  
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If it‟s genetic, then I think that that would imply that the disease is not one that you 
choose. It would be viewed more like cancer. It‟s just you have no control over it. 
And yes – and I think people would be more apt to feel sorry for you and have more 
empathy for you or sympathy. Because you can‟t empathize unless you‟ve been 
through it. Have more sympathy for you if you have the disease than not. Because 
now I think when people find out you have the disease it‟s just they‟re not 
sympathetic to you. Because they feel like, “You chose to be this way. You can 
correct it. This is just you.” But if you say – if you prove it‟s a genetic thing, then it‟s 
not. It takes that away. (Vanessa, R-BN) 
 
I don‟t even know how you would go across trying to help out somebody with a 
genetic disorder. But I think it would just change their outlook of the disease in 
general. Whereas, like, when I was diagnosed with it, like, my outlook was “This is a 
disease that I chose to get.” Like, it‟s almost like if I knew someone had AIDS, I 
chose to sleep with them knowing they had AIDS so I would have AIDS. Like, it was 
kind of like, that‟s how I looked at it. Like, I‟m choosing to have anorexia. It‟s like I 
went and bought it. Now I have it. Like, and so I feel like it would change how they 
felt that they got it so to say. (Yvette, R-AN) 
 
The common sense meaning of a disease is that it is not chosen; this idea was articulated by 
Jackie and quoted in an earlier chapter.  To choose a disease would call into question the 
sanity of the person, underscoring this common sense meaning. 
Comparisons to disease sometimes focused on the idea that the eating disorder was 
something one has, rather than something one is.  The disease was something external to the 
person that ought to be resisted, rather than being a part of the self. This idea is clearly linked 
to ideas about individual control, as well as the logic of pursuing treatment from 
professionals if genetics are involved. As Melanie put it, if her BN is genetically caused then 
“I‟m fighting it. Not myself.” The disease is external to the person, not the person‟s fault nor 
part of the self.  
Well that [idea of a genetic causal factor] might be a positive thing. To have a kind of 
a focus… like if you have a certain type of breast cancer. If you have something. You 
can – I would think that you can put all your energies into doing everything you can 
to beat this cancer. Knowing that you can‟t control everything. And knowing that. But 
with the eating disorder maybe if you had this, could focus your energy. You know 
you have this gene. You can have more of a plan of attack. And have a more focused 
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way to deal with it… you could kind of put [it] outside of yourself. It‟s not myself 
I‟m fighting. It‟s this gene. (Melanie, R-BN) 
 
For Melanie, genetic origins made BN less like a part of herself, and more like a separate 
disease entity that she could not directly control but could fight against, like cancer. Yvette 
similarly linked genetics to the sense that AN was a disease that affects an individual, rather 
than the result of an individual‟s choice not to eat. 
I think it might help society‟s view of it. Like, that it is actually, like, a disorder and a 
disease and not just somebody‟s choice to not eat. So I think then people might start, 
like, worrying about it like any other disease (chuckles). Like, “Oh my gosh. I could 
catch that.” Like, “I could get that from my mom” (said in a dramatic, serious tone of 
voice). I don‟t know. I think that people would look at it differently in general… I 
guess, like, genetically I would view it as, like, Alzheimer‟s or something that you 
develop… Instead of like now it‟s like, I feel like people look at it like media caused 
this. Or the girl wanting to be thin has caused this. Like, so I think maybe it might 
take, like, some strain off of, like, negative attitudes towards it maybe. Towards the 
individual. Whereas they look at it as like a disorder and a disease that has 
AFFECTED this individual. (Yvette, R-AN, capitalization reflects respondent‟s 
emphasis.) 
 
If genetics are involved, AN can seem like a disease that powerfully affects the person rather 
than being the result of choices she made. 
1.2.  Genetics locate eating disorders in the domain of health professionals 
In addition to genetic influence making eating disorders seem more like legitimate, 
real diseases (the proposed first criterion of medicalization), it also made treatment for eating 
disorders seem more necessary (the second criterion).  Genetic causation suggested that 
professional treatment was more appropriate and necessary. In keeping with my conservative 
definition of medicalization, expectations for new biologically-based medicines or 
procedures were excluded, but featured later as part of the more expansive definition. Even 
though common sense says that such treatments are more “medical,” I excluded them in 
order to focus on the more general idea of whether genetics made eating disorders seem more 
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like a disease that needed treatment, regardless of the type of treatment. My interview 
questions did not lead respondents to associate genetics with professional intervention; they 
did so spontaneously.  Although I asked whether they would expect the discovery of a 
genetic influence to change treatments for eating disorders, this was not the first time I had 
brought up treatment.  In addition, when I asked about the hypothetical genetic test I did not 
specify a context, clinical or otherwise, that would necessarily tie genetics to medical 
conceptualizations.  The sub-themes described below overlap with each other and with 
material illustrating the first criterion.   
 Treatment is warranted.  Some respondents made general statements about the need 
for treatment. Isabelle stated that the idea of a genetic causal factor could “medicalize” BN, 
which she defined as “an illness that requires medical treatment” (similar to Conrad‟s 
definition). Viewing BN in this way would help reduce the shame people feel when it is 
interpreted to reflect a “personal flaw,” a theme I will return to when I broaden my analysis 
to perceptions of individual control and responsibility.  
R:  …. I think it could also actually help them to accept themselves a little bit more. 
Like, “Oh. This isn‟t like – this isn‟t, like, just due to, like, a personal flaw in me. 
Like, there are actually scientific reasons why I have this.” And I think it could, like, 
lessen the shame that people feel in regards to their own behavior. So I think in that 
sense it could be positive. And also whenever you talk about genetics I think that – I 
mean I do think bulimia needs to be medicalized a little bit more. 
I:  Can you say more what you mean by that? 
R:  Yeah. Like, I just think that it does more need to be looked at as an illness that 
requires medical treatment. And I mean that can be a variety of medical treatment. 
But I mean I think it involves treatment both from, like, MDs who also are, like, more 
like the psychologist or psychiatrist nature. But also I mean from, like, family 
physicians. I think it‟s really important for doctors, like, just more – less mentally 
inclined doctors to be aware of that as well. And so when you talk about genes and 
biology I mean I think that‟s going to make the medical community pay attention to it 
a little bit more. And help maybe validate it in the eyes of medicine as well. (Isabelle, 
T-BN) 
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If “genes and biology” are important for BN, it would “validate” it as something for 
healthcare professionals to treat and to pay more attention to, rather than to neglect as a 
personal failing (the implied alternative).  Joelle also said genetics can make people with BN 
see it as a “mental disorder” that needs to be addressed by a “professional” or “someone who 
knew more.”  Thinking of it as genetic would encourage someone to seek help, just as they 
would for another condition such as heart disease or cancer. 
…it might be good in some contexts for people to be able to know there was a root 
cause to this. And, that maybe they would actually be more likely to see it as a mental 
disorder and something they should see a therapist for…. I feel like when people 
think of things that are genetically pre-disposed, they think heart disease and cancers. 
And, those are the kinds of things that you put on forms. And, that are talked about. 
And, that you discuss with doctors. And, recognizing it as a problem that you have 
that is genetic I feel like would make it – I don‟t know. Somehow easier I feel, like, to 
discuss with a professional if you wouldn‟t have initially. (Joelle, R-BN) 
 
Melanie also thought that if BN were “legitimized as an actual disease” or “clinical disease” 
it would make it easier for people to “seek help”, rather than being expected to “just snap out 
of” it. 
Also asked to consider good and bad implications, Mireya linked “medical treatment” to 
reductive medicalization, in contrast to “holistic” and psychological conceptions of BN. 
I guess good is, like, if it was really genetic, then there‟d be, like, a huge surge of 
interest in it and research. And maybe there would be, like, medical treatment that 
could cure it. I don‟t know. And negative is like that you medicalize it and you think 
that you can cure it through medicine or through gene therapy or whatever. And you 
neglect kind of more of the mental psychological aspects of it.… Why it would be 
negative? To kind of neglect the psychological aspects of it? Because I don‟t think – 
because for me I don‟t think it‟s genetic. And I think it‟s a disorder that‟s very much 
individual by individual. And if you think of it as a genetic thing, then you kind of 
gloss over all of the different specific factors that kind of fed into for lack of a better 
word everyone‟s disorder which are very different from person to person. And I think 
in order to really, like, heal somebody with an eating disorder you really need to think 
of it holistically and not like as a medical disorder that‟s genetic. That‟s purely 
genetic. And so that‟s why. (Mireya, T-BN) 
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For Mireya the term “medical” implied a biological intervention like “medicine” or “gene 
therapy” as opposed to psychological treatment.  Wendy also thought it would seem less like 
something to talk about with friends and more the exclusive domain of doctors. 
I would probably bring it up less, honestly. Because I would feel like other people 
could help me less. Because if it was just this genetic part of me, I would feel like 
only doctors could help me. As opposed to being thought patterns whereas friends 
could help me. (Wendy, T-BN) 
 
Carly thought people with BN “would want to go to, like, a psychologist more to talk about 
it… To see what would – in their brain would cause them to be like that.”  If genetic, eating 
disorders would thus be in the domain of treatment professionals. 
 Help is justified because you cannot change it alone.  Several respondents reasoned 
that because genes were too powerful to overcome on their own; additional help would be 
needed.  Betty, in the inpatient unit for AN, said a genetic causal factor would help 
“rationalize” or “justify” the expense and trouble of professional treatment. 
R:  I mean I would be more accepting that I did have an eating disorder if I knew it 
was genetic. Or, could be. And, I would go get some professional help or the in-
hospitalization program. Because, I would not think that I could do it by myself. Or, 
not expect myself to be able to do it with no help…. 
I:  Can you say more about why something genetic would be harder to overcome on 
your own?... 
R: I just think it would be. I mean anything that you were born with that you didn‟t 
cause somewhere along the way. I think I would accept the fact that yes I do have it. 
But, shoot. My mother had it. Or, my daddy had it. And, maybe I better get some 
professional help. Maybe I can‟t do this by myself. Because, my coming here I 
thought “Oh, my goodness. I don‟t want anybody to pay that amount of money. Why 
can‟t I do this myself?” But, if it were genetic, I would think “Aha. I can rationalize 
or whatever. Justify going to this expense. Because, it‟s something that‟s definitely 
going to be a problem for me. Because, I‟ve inherited it. (Betty, T-AN) 
 
Obtaining inpatient treatment was easier to justify if the condition “were genetic” than if it 
was something she could “do” by herself.  Mireya also thought genetics encouraged a 
medical conception for people with bulimia.   
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R: They might think it‟s not in their will power or in their hands. That it‟s outside of 
their ability to change anything. That it needs to be treated. Because, like, a genetic 
disease or a genetic disorder or whatever. 
I:  So if you say genetics plays a role in bulimia, it sounds like a genetic disorder? 
R:  Yeah. Like, that it‟s outside of your ability. Like, it was outside of, like, your 
choice. It wasn‟t your choice. It was, like, in your genes that you were going to have 
bulimia. So therefore it‟s not your fault or it‟s not your – it‟s not external. It‟s within 
your make-up. Your genetic make-up. So I think people would think that they – I 
think if people think it‟s genetic, then there‟s, like, they feel like there‟s nothing that 
you can really do. Unless there‟s some real, like, medical treatment for it. (Mireya, T-
BN) 
 
There is nothing you the person with the eating disorder “can really do”; only “real” medical 
treatment can make a difference.  Fran, who recovered decades ago by treating BN as a bad 
habit and resolving to quit, just as she had quit smoking, thought that she would have turned 
to professionals if she knew she had a genetic predisposition.  
I would have probably sought more professional help. And, I‟d probably been 
digging into it a little more deeply. Going “Is there some kind of medication? Or, is 
there something I can do to stop these tendencies since it is genetic?” Instead of just 
diving into it and taking care of it myself. (Fran, R-BN) 
 
Yvette also imagined a greater role for doctors, which warranted coding under the 
conservative definition of medicalization. She also envisioned pills, injections, and an 
endless hospital stay, but these biologically-based interventions did not constitute 
medicalization under the conservative definition
5
 and so are discussed in the next section on 
the expanded definition. Rather, it is the more active role for healthcare professionals in 
treating eating disorders that suggests medicalization for the respondents just described, as 
well as in the following passage. 
I mean in my mind if doctors are trying to prove that it‟s genetic, then they would 
then turn to trying to prove to find some type of pill or some injection to have to cure 
                                                 
5
 As noted before, genetic causes logically imply biological treatment, but this alone does not constitute 
evidence of medicalization because that may be only a shift in the kind of treatment, not its appropriateness or 
quantity.  My conservative definition has focused on conceptions of the eating disorder and seeking professional 
help, but has excluded the seeking of biologically-based treatment because inclusion in the DSM constitutes 
medicalization but comprises both biological and non-biological causation. 
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it. So then I feel like it would not be so much of an active on the anorexic recovery as 
much as just passive while letting the doctors drug them or do whatever… So I guess, 
like, I feel like that‟s the type of recovery instead of like, “You need to look and 
mentally understand why you don‟t want to eat.” Like, I feel like it would be “You 
just need to go to the doctor. And they’ll handle it for you.” So I think that to me 
when I hear genetic that‟s what I think. That they‟re going to then try to find is a pill 
that cures it. (Yvette, R-AN) 
 
With genetics, the patient‟s role would be more passive than otherwise, and the doctor‟s role 
more active. Many respondents expressed skepticism about pills and other biologically-based 
treatments in ways that echoed Yvette‟s point.  Even those skeptical about medical and/or 
biological treatment clearly link genetic causes with more professional treatment, supporting 
the broader point that genetic causes help to medicalize a condition. 
 Support from others to seek treatment.  If it were genetic, one would expect family, 
friends, and even strangers to support treatment-seeking.  Selena said she would be 
encouraged toward treatment if her BN were genetic and therefore re-conceptualized as a 
“disease” by herself and others.  She speculated that if it were genetic, she would no longer 
view it as “just environmental” and a “weight thing” and neither would the people around 
her.   
But I think if I realized that it wasn‟t just environmental. If it was really a disease like 
cancer or diabetes or something. I mean if you had diabetes, wouldn‟t you go and get 
treatment? Like, this one you think you‟re doing it to yourself. You think you don‟t 
have a choice…. because, like, I had a friend who was seeking a treatment, like, in 
Texas for – it was, like, a cancer. But it was – there was some innovative treatment. 
And I was, like, “I‟m so proud of you for doing that. That‟s awesome.” But for 
myself I would – I‟ve never done that. Because I didn‟t think of it like that. I just 
thought of it, like, “This is a weight thing. This is not, like, a disease.” If it had that 
label. Like I didn‟t have a choice. Like this just developed. I think I would be much 
more likely to go and seek treatment. And to say “Oh. I have the gene that causes this. 
And I‟ve had a problem. And I‟m seeking treatment.” And I think people would be a 
lot more accepting of that. Because I‟ve found that even at work and school people 
when they find out you have an eating disorder are like, “Why are you doing that to 
yourself? It‟s not like you – why would you do that?” Like if you had diabetes. And 
you found out your co-worker had diabetes. You‟d be like, “Oh my God. Let me 
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help.” But people don‟t think of bulimia the same way. They think “Why do you stuff 
yourself and then throw up? That‟s so gross.” (Selena, T-BN) 
 
Selena expected people to be more supportive about seeking treatment for a genetic 
condition, again suggesting a link between genetics and professional intervention. Carly, who 
never received treatment for BN, imagined that her family would mobilize to support her to 
do so. 
I think that my parents‟ knowing and my, like, grandparents or, like, my brother 
knowing it would be more supportive. Because they would do everything possible to 
make it easier for me or for me to get help. (Carly, R-BN) 
 
Gena speculated that her parents might understand better that she “needed some help”, rather 
than accusing her of trying to get attention or pretending she was sick. 
But, I think that they [parents] would look at me differently… it might explain some 
things for them. Instead of them saying like, “She is doing something else.” Type 
thing. Like something else to gain attention. Something else to say that she‟s sick. I 
feel like it might explain some things for them. And, make it a little bit easier to 
understand that I might need some help. Or, that I might have needed some help. That 
they just kind of either neglected to see. Or, didn‟t want to see. I think that it might 
help them the way that they view me. (Gena, R-BN) 
 
Lynn, who had a non-medicalized view of AN and credited feminism in helping her to 
recover, imagined that if she knew AN were genetic she would be encouraging others with 
apparent eating disorders to get help at a hospital. 
But, I guess if I knew it, it might make me more activist. And, … not overlooking it 
in other people if I saw it…  Just it seems that makes it more serious. And, that‟s 
wrong that I would think that way. But, it kind of – it would make it more of a 
disease. And, it‟s like if you saw someone going around with gangrene, you would 
say “Hey. You need to get to a hospital.” (Lynn, R-AN) 
 
Lynn likened genetic eating disorders to something as visible and uncontested as gangrene, 
which would indubitably prompt her to urge them toward a hospital.  
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 More monitoring over a long period of time.  Some respondents specified that they 
would expect medical monitoring and treatment over a longer period of time if the condition 
were genetic, perhaps even for the rest of their lives.  
Especially if you‟re health minded knowing that you had a genetic pre-disposition for 
that may push you into some type of evaluation. Or at least some type of continued 
follow-up that kind of monitored your health. Much like diabetics need to go to the 
doctor every six months. And, like, they need to check their blood sugar. Is there 
some type of monitoring that could be in place that you would present with to your 
physician as, like, impending signs of a heart attack? Or left arm pain. Well do you 
find yourself not being able to eat at this time, this time, this time, and this time? If 
you do, maybe we need to investigate that. Have you lost more than ten pounds since 
the last visit? And there‟s no physical reason like diabetes or hernia or ulcer or 
something like that. So I think there could be cues for health care providers to act on. 
And I think that would be very helpful. (Tammy, R-AN) 
 
The motivation toward long-term monitoring was sometimes driven by fear of relapse; 
recovery was less certain if the condition were genetic. 
Well I think if the gene is there, there‟s always going to be those consequences of 
maybe going back to relapse very easily. I‟m thinking that if the gene is there, then 
they‟ll probably have to be monitored. Seeing a doctor on a regular basis or 
something just to keep it in check. It‟s just like diabetes or anything else. I think you 
need to be monitored. Be kept in check. (Natalie, T-AN) 
 
… I like to think that it‟s over and completely done. I guess there would be the 
concern for relapse. And there would probably be more attention on just maintenance 
– to just maintenance therapy and maintenance. Which probably isn‟t the worst idea. 
Because I mean people do relapse. Whether there‟s a genetic pre-disposition or not. 
People do relapse into their behaviors. But I think that if there were a definite genetic 
link, that we would worry more about not fully being able to recover. Because it 
would be this pre-programmed thin thing. (Sarah, R-BN) 
 
If it were genetic, these respondents would imagine seeking “maintenance” treatment, to be 
“kept in check” and monitored. This is not just a new form of treatment but more treatment 
over a longer period of time.  
 To summarize, genetic involvement in eating disorders prompted three-quarters of 
respondents (n=37) to bring up one or both themes from my conservative definition: (1) 
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medical concepts, terminology or comparisons to uncontested diseases like cancer, or (2) 
perception that treatment by health professionals would be more appropriate.  Respondents 
who brought up biologically-based treatments without these two themes were not included 
although it is clear from the quotes that biologically-based treatments were commonly 
mentioned as a consequence of genetic causality. 
1.3. Genetics suggest biologically-based treatments  
 Under an expanded definition of medicalization with three qualifying themes 
(medical concepts, health professionals, and biologically-based treatments), ten more 
respondents were added, for a total of 47 respondents (94%).
6
  Imagining pills or gene 
therapy to treat eating disorders may also support the idea that genes promote medicalization 
because only healthcare professionals could administer such treatments.  When Amy (T-AN) 
was asked about good or bad effects from the hypothetical media campaign, she immediately 
imagined new biologically-based treatments: “They would, like, probably try to produce 
more medications. Like, there‟s a whole line of meds for depression. A whole line of meds 
for bipolar and schizophrenia. They may try to develop one for anorexia.”  Some would have 
welcomed such a possibility: “Well, if they found a genetic link, then hopefully they could 
find some kind of treatment early on. Or, some kind of – I don‟t know. Gene therapy or 
something.” (Deena, R-AN)  Others were more cautious: “But, if it‟s genetic, I don‟t know. 
What are you going to – I guess you take a pill. I don‟t know. Or, you take out the gene. I 
mean I don‟t know. That‟s kind of scary.” (Irene, R-BN) 
1.4. Contrasting themes: How genetics might not medicalize eating disorders. 
 Several respondents who appeared to perceive increased medicalization also 
suggested genetics might counteract aspects of medicalization (e.g., whether an eating 
                                                 
6
 Amy, Rebecca, Thelma, Yolanda, Deena, Gena, Irene, Kathleen, Margaret, and Reba. 
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disorder could be treated at all if it were genetic). In addition, three respondents made no 
mention of anything that could be interpreted as evidence of perceived medicalization, 
whether under a narrow or expanded definition (Jackie, T-BN; Liana,T-AN; and Emma, R-
BN). It is possible these three would have endorsed the idea, if the question been posed.  
Here I briefly describe themes that mitigated medicalization by means of genetics.  
  Some respondents cast doubt on the idea that genetic causation would warrant more 
treatment. They specified that treatment was less likely to be pursued if eating disorders were 
thought to be genetic because the condition was permanent and the situation hopeless.  As 
will be seen in the section on the various implications of genetics for agency and control, one 
possible response to genetics was precisely the opposite of help-seeking: giving up on the 
attempt to fight or cure the disorder because it was seen as a permanent part of the self.  
Yolanda imagined that some might say, “it‟s part of who I am. So I‟ll just accept it.” Yet, 
when I asked her what she might say to someone who drew that conclusion, she made a 
comparison to genetically influenced cancer. 
I would say “If you got cancer, you wouldn‟t try and – you wouldn‟t just be like, “Oh. 
Well that sucks.” You would try and, like, go get chemotherapy and do what you 
could.” So, like, just because something‟s genetic it‟s still unhealthy. And you should 
still, like, if you can try and fix it. And there‟s plenty of people that have got – that 
have just, like, gotten over bulimia. (Yolanda, T-BN) 
 
If genetics prompted someone to give up, Yolanda would compare it to an uncontested 
disease that also involved genetics.  Despite articulating a theme that ran counter to 
medicalization, Yolanda also compared it to a physical illness.    
 Only one respondent clearly stated that genetics made BN seem less like a disease, 
not more.  The permanence of genetics made BN seem less like a disease and more like a 
part of the self to Wendy (T-BN):  “I would have no hope of getting better. And I would give 
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up. I would see it as a part of me instead of seeing it as a disease that can be fought.”  Her 
implicit model of disease seemed based on temporary infectious disease, caught from a 
source outside the body and expected to run its course and leave the body completely.  
Elsewhere in the interview she stated that genetics would make BN seem like something only 
doctors could treat, so she was counted among those who perceived greater medicalization. 
Wendy thus rejected the idea that genetics made BN more like a disease but did link genetics 
to medical intervention.    
For a few respondents, medicalization depended on what the genes were “for”; some 
genetic theories would not imply that eating disorders were more like a disease.  As noted at 
the beginning of this chapter, respondents often did not apply the theories they found most 
plausible when considering the effects of a media campaign and a hypothetical genetic test. 
Willa, quoted earlier (in the section “Eating disorders as „disease‟, and people with them as 
„sick‟”), thought that only genes “for” AN specifically would prompt her to think of it as a 
disease, whereas genes “for” perfectionistic personality would not.  
Some respondents seemed concerned that a focus on causal origins was counter-
productive because current treatment ought to be the focus, suggesting that genetics could 
distract from treatment.  For example, Jackie‟s (T-BN) initial reaction to the idea of genetic 
influence was “it doesn‟t really matter either way. I mean people either have it or they don‟t. 
So, it should be treated the same.” She used the words “illness” and “disease” to describe her 
BN, but also said that she struggled with self-blame and the perception others have that it is a 
choice. Although she stated that genetics would help others see that it as non-volitional, she 
did not say genetics would make it seem more like a disease (though she might have, if 
asked). It is possible that she was resisting this idea because it was so important for her to see 
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it as a non-choice that deserved treatment regardless of the cause; that genetics should not 
matter, even if they might to some people. This logic was similar to that of others who 
perceived medicalization. 
 
 To summarize, most respondents (74%) thought that genetics either increased the 
resemblance of eating disorders to other diseases, made treatment by healthcare professionals 
seem more logical, or both. Under an expanded definition that includes mentioning 
biologically based treatments, nearly all respondents (94%) thought geneticization would 
promote medicalization. As Joelle put it, “when people think of things that are genetically 
pre-disposed, they think heart disease and cancers. And, those are the kinds of things that you 
put on forms. And, that are talked about. And, that you discuss with doctors.”  This 
constitutes strong evidence for assertions in Chapter 1 that geneticization of eating disorders 
would encourage or heighten their perceived medicalization; respondents thought it would 
change their or others‟ perceptions in this direction.  Although respondents may have 
objected to medicalization, or felt ambivalent or skeptical about some aspect (e.g., pills for 
AN), genetic ideas nevertheless elicited such ideas. To engage more deeply with the 
underlying logic of medicalization for eating disorders, I now turn to the perceptions of 
individual control and responsibility. 
2. GENES VS. CHOICE: GENETICS AND PERCEPTIONS OF CONTROL AND 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR BEHAVIOR 
 
In Chapter 1, I speculated about several possible implications of genetic ideas for 
perceptions of eating disorders (summarized in Table 1.2), in addition to the possibility that 
geneticization could heighten medicalization. Which of these implications were important to 
respondents, if any, and how?  As several respondents articulated above in connection with 
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medicalization, genetics made the eating disorder more like a real, legitimate, valid disease 
entity that actually existed and less like something a bad or crazy person invented, or 
something for which she could be blamed.  This broad theme is certainly related to 
medicalization; indeed, the anticipated “bright” and “dark” sides of medicalization included 
relevant positive (reductions in blame and stigma) and negative effects (“dislocation” of 
responsibility) (see Chapter 1).  But I found that respondents spoke at greater length and with 
greater interest on the general theme of perceived control over eating disorder behavior than 
whether it seemed like a treatable disease. Their interest in perceived control and 
responsibility for eating disorder behavior went beyond medical concepts to include 
searching examinations of their own agency and responsibility for behavior that was 
alternately agentic, non-agentic and quasi-agentic (see Chapter 3).
7
   
 Many of the implications respondents identified were possible to organize using a 
two-by-two conceptual table organized around perceptions of control when genetics play a 
role. This table will be presented in the next section (Table 6.1). In this section I introduce 
themes that are important in order to understand the table, namely to establish the central idea 
that genetic influence implies reduced control over behavior; that people “can‟t help it” to 
some degree.  Many diverse implications flow from this general point, which the table will 
organize.  In this section I aim to establish that the central idea elicited by the possibility of 
genetic causality is that a person is less able to control her eating disorder behavior. If it is 
genetic, it is less controllable. 
                                                 
7
 I understand the reduction of perceived control conferred by genetics to motivate the perceived medicalization.  
Alternatively, medicalization could be at the root of the perceived reduction in control; if it is a disease then it 
must not be something I can control. Thinking about implications in terms of the broader category of control 
enables me to include alternatives to medicalization, which were often simultaneously held by respondents, 
including the idea that genetics implied that it was hopeless to treat the disorder, that genetics could seem like 
an excuse, and occasional comparisons to non-medical genetic explanations for homosexuality. Organizing my 
analysis at the more general level of control enabled me to make sense of diverse implications. 
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2.1. “Not something I chose”: Implications of genetics for perceptions of individual control 
and responsibility 
 
 Throughout the previous chapters I have discussed themes related to the broad 
category of control.  In Chapter 3 I discussed respondents‟ self-understandings of agency, 
lack of agency, and what I termed “quasi-agency”. I found that most respondents saw eating 
disorder behaviors as a complex product that could be controlled by the individual at 
different times or in different ways but could also be out of control.  In Chapter 4 I described 
respondents‟ reactions to the idea of “choice”, and presented several aspects of eating 
disorders relevant to control and responsibility: choosing to diet or purge initially, but not 
choosing to have it go out of control, choosing to refrain from a specific action at one 
moment, not being able to “choose” to stop, and feeling compelled to do it.  Genes could 
“validate” these assertions: a genetic predisposition made it go out of control, caused a 
behavior to become obsessive. Genes could even contribute to the problem to which eating 
disorders was a response or a coping strategy; in Chapter 5, several theories of indirect 
genetic predisposition held genes responsible for causing an initial problem, to which the 
eating disorder was a response.   
 Respondents‟ views should be seen as well-informed speculation about what people 
with eating disorders would experience if they found out about genetic influences.  All 
questions were phrased in hypothetical terms. Answers encompass respondents‟ ideas about 
their own reactions, those of other people with eating disorders, and a host of others (e.g., 
relatives, friends, general public, doctors).  Because the implications and consequences often 
hinged on what others would think genetics implied and whether they would “buy” the idea 
of genetics reducing responsibility, these data represent respondents‟ understanding of the 
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public‟s understanding of genetics.8  The socially shared meanings of genetics were 
inextricable from the imagined implications of genetics for respondents.  Even though 
respondents were able to apply non-deterministic genetic reasoning to their own histories, 
others might not be as savvy and so the specter of deterministic genetic disorders was alive 
and well (also because of their interpretations of my questions about hypothetical genetic 
testing and media campaigns,as discussed in the introduction to this chapter).   
 In this section I flesh out the idea that genes implied less control, responsibility, and 
blame for people, and the related perception that if genes are involved it makes an eating 
disorder harder to overcome.  Because I have already explored medicalized logics at length 
above, I spend less time on the latter, in the hope that it was adequately delineated there. 
Respondents thought the involvement of genes in eating disorders would be interpreted as a 
claim about the level of individual control over the eating disorder. Some did not think it 
ought to, but nevertheless perceived that it would. Genetics reinforced the idea that it‟s not a 
choice, and tended to encourage a redefinition of behavior from bad to sick.  The person was 
not being “selfish” (Jackie), is not a “nut case” (Deena), is not “crazy” (Hannah, Nell, Irene), 
and her problems were not simply one‟s own “disordered thinking” (Barbara) because they 
were something more than “just you” (Karen). 
 Although some respondents argued that blame was not or ought not be apportioned 
and some hypothesized that genetics could increase blame (alternative viewpoints are 
addressed at the end of this section), all spoke about the implications of genetics for 
perceptions of individual control. Most respondents thought that explanations that involved 
genetics would reduce the perceived responsibility of the person with an eating disorder, 
                                                 
8
 Thank you to Michael Lynch for this formulation; this is a study of the public understanding of science (PUS, 
an area of study in Science and Technology Studies) as well as a study of the public understanding of the public 
understanding of science (PUPUS: public understanding of the public understanding of science). 
325 
 
resulting in less self-blame and blame from others.  I organized interview material related to 
perceptions of individual control and responsibility into diverse interrelated themes and 
summarize them in Figure 6.2. Some respondents expected skepticism about genetic 
absolution from responsibility but nevertheless expected the claim would be interpreted 
along those lines.   
Figure 6.2  Themes related to genetics and perceptions of individual control and 
responsibility 
 “A harder case”:  Genetic disorder overwhelms individual control 
 “I‟ve got science to back me up here”: Defending against the presumption of choice 
 “More sure that I wasn‟t choosing to do it”: Less self-blame 
 “There are people who have a valid reason. And I‟m not one of them” (on not having a 
genetic predisposition when others do) 
 “Yeah, right”:  Public perception of genetics as an irresponsible excuse 
 
 “A harder case”: Genetic disorder overwhelms individual control. As alluded to in 
the section on medicalization, genetics made an eating disorder seem like something that an 
individual would need professional help to overcome. This need for help supports the general 
point of this section, that genes suggested less capacity for the individual to control her eating 
disorder behavior. In addition, the permanence of genetics suggested that the disorder would 
also be permanent, and there was nothing the individual could do about it.   
[I]t might make it seem harder for me to get over it than, like, more than anything 
else….  Just because, like, if it seems like you‟re battling a lot more. Like, I guess I 
can battle an addiction. And I guess I can battle these environmental factors. But, like, 
battling your genes sounds really hard (laughing). So I guess that‟s the only thing it 
would really change. (Rebecca, T-BN) 
 
I‟d rather find out that I did not have them. Because, I think that would make it easier. 
Make me know it will be easier to get over. Instead of thinking “Oh. This is such a 
tremendous thing. I don‟t think I can do it.” (Betty, T-AN)  
 
Well yeah. It would make me feel like I had a, like, not as good a chance for recovery 
if it was in my genetic make-up…  I mean if it‟s, like, in my genes, then that‟s 
something, like, that‟s always going to be in my genes. Even if I get better for a little 
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while. It might be something that, like, is always like a tendency to go back to. 
(Victoria, T-BN) 
 
Genetics made it seem like something one would always be returning to, against one‟s own 
wishes.   
I have this notion that it‟s harder to cure than – and, that may not be accurate. It 
probably is not accurate. But, that somehow this idea that it is genetic. You get it. 
Then, it somehow seems to me like it‟s going to be harder case. It‟s going to be 
harder to come out of it. (Lynn, R-AN)   
 
If genetics made it harder to overcome, those few who had recovered without treatment 
looked back and felt more impressed at their ability to do so, including Lynn who credited 
feminism.   
I:  And, would it change anything about how you view the importance of feminism in 
your recovery if you found out genetics had anything to do with it? 
R:  No. Because, I mean if anything, it would strengthen the idea of feminism. The 
idea that that philosophy – that world view gave me a motivation to change. (Lynn, 
R-AN) 
 
If I had it, I would be pretty impressed with myself for being able to stop without 
some sort of assistance or help or something like that. Because I feel like having it 
genetically you would – it would be really tough to stop yourself and have different 
images about yourself. (Carly, R-BN) 
 
Genetics thus connoted greater difficulty for individuals in controlling their thoughts and 
behaviors. Although only some respondents brought this up, I interpret this as essential to the 
underlying logic that genetics implies less personal control, and hence less responsibility and 
blame. 
 “I’ve got science to back me up here”: Defending against the presumption of choice. 
Genetics helped make the case to others that eating disorders were not choices. As 
demonstrated above, usually this meant they were more like diseases, but I focus here on the 
perceived effect of genetic explanations on blame from others.  Eva and Joelle thought it 
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would be easier to talk about with other people because they would understand that it was not 
something they should be held responsible for. 
I guess I might be more likely to bring it up. Just because I feel like that kind of 
places even more of the blame, like, off of you as a person. And, maybe just to kind 
of try to reinforce that, like, it‟s not something, like, I chose. And,, like, there is a 
genetic component. And, like, I think that maybe would help some people see that, 
like, it‟s out of your control. (Eva, T-BN)   
 
I feel like it would be an easier story to tell if you could start it off with “In my family 
genetically we have this problem.”… maybe I would worry less about people being 
judgmental. Because, even though there‟s definitely still that same element of choice 
and accountability, just being able to attribute it to genetics definitely would 
hypothetically be anticipating probably less judgment there. (Joelle, R-BN) 
 
Isabelle thought of an acquaintance who had expressed skepticism about her BN in the past, 
suggesting that it was merely a matter of willpower.  For this kind of person, genetics might 
help convince him. 
Like maybe a little bit less shame…. Like saying, like, to my friend who tells me that, 
like, it‟s just a matter of will power. “Hey. Here‟s this research. Like, look at this. 
Like, I‟ve got, like, science to back me up here. Like, don‟t be so judgmental.” I mean 
but again he‟s a really rare case. Like, there are not very many people I know like 
that. But to those, like, kind of skeptics in that sense I guess it [would] be validating 
to know that sort of thing. (Isabelle, T-BN) 
 
Science could “back me up” that it was not a matter of willpower. Similarly, Liana (T-
AN)felt it gave her “proof” that would be useful in explaining her situation to others; “I 
probably would bring it up and say „Well, I was genetically pre-disposed.‟ I mean it kind of 
gives me, like, a proof that it wasn‟t, like, a decision type thing.” Selena thought it would 
help her father and others understand that if she could stop doing it, she would.   
I think it would really help. Because I think that people – like when my father found 
out I had this he said “Well just stop doing it.” He said “Why would you do that to 
yourself?” I said “I don‟t know.” I mean I really wish I did know. Because I don‟t 
know why. And it‟s gross. I mean why would you do that? And then you hide it. But I 
think that people would understand it a lot more. Because just like with any other 
disorder. People think “Well you did something to yourself. You did something that 
made you have it. Either you had a bad lifestyle. Risky lifestyle. Or you did 
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something that caused you to have it.” But I can‟t think of anything I could have 
changed. And I‟m a very responsible person. So I‟m thinking “Well when people 
blame you for it. And they‟re like, “Well don‟t do it. Just don‟t do it.” Well if I could 
not do it, why would I?” It‟s gross. Messes up everything. I mean it‟s like I don‟t 
really feel that good. It causes me damage. I mean why would I do that to my body? 
Is it because I‟m depressed? Is it because I have anxiety? I don‟t know. I mean I‟ve 
tried everything. (Selena, T-BN) 
 
Similarly, genetics would bring “relief” to Petra because it would reinforce the idea that she 
was not to blame, in contrast to what others had repeatedly told her. 
Well I think that it would make a lot of anorexics happy. Because we would at least 
feel like we weren‟t totally responsible for being the bad person of the family. The 
black sheep of the family. Where we‟ve caused this on our own. I think it made a lot 
of us feel relieved too to know that we‟re not just totally crazy people. That it‟s 
something that we really truly can‟t help. Which is what we‟ve been saying all along. 
People just didn‟t want to believe us…  I think it would change the way society thinks 
about people with anorexia. I know people I work with – they don‟t – nobody 
understands. Nobody understands. And if they could post that up and say it was 
genetic, I think there‟d be a lot more acceptance of people who have eating disorders. 
Whereas now we‟re sort of shunned by it as sort of freaky…. So if it was posted up as 
being genetics, maybe they would understand “Well it‟s not their fault.” No more 
than somebody who had autism or mental retardation or dyslexia or anything like 
that. It‟s not their fault. Or ADD or ADHD. People tend to have a lot of patience with 
people that have ADHD. Because it‟s something not right in their brain. And they 
can‟t help it. Well if we could get it out that it‟s genetic, maybe then people would 
understand that it‟s not really our fault. (Petra, T-AN) 
 
Gena likewise felt pressured to explain her behavior, and thought genetics might make it 
easier for others to understand. She compared eating disorder behavior to punching a wall 
and imagined how genetic ideas could help someone understand it. 
… say if you punched a wall every day. People ask you “Why do you punch a wall 
every day?” “I feel bad. I‟m punching a wall.” They‟re like, “Stop it.” If you have a 
genetic pre-disposition to punch walls, then … They might understand more why you 
punch a wall. And, be more open to hearing and kind of understanding and trying to 
help you. Instead of more of like, just like, “Stop it. Just stop it. It‟s just simple. Go, 
type. Find something else to do.” (Gena, R-BN) 
 
Genetics would help explain the behavior to others in a way that conveyed the difficulty in 
controlling it; genetic influences sounded like irresistible forces. Liana (T-AN) put it simply 
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when she speculated that her parents might stop blaming her, and conclude that “this wasn‟t 
her choice. This was just part of her body.” As should be apparent in previous chapters and in 
the above material on medicalization, most respondents were concerned about how others 
judged and blamed them for their behavior.  Genetics provided evidence to convince others it 
was not a choice.  
 “More sure that I wasn’t choosing to do it”: Less self-blame. Respondents theorized 
that genetic explanations would reduce self-blame as well as blame from others. As noted in 
Chapters 3 and 4, there was a lack of certainty about agency; some aspects of the eating 
disorder could seem like a choice, choice was more relevant at certain times, choices may 
have been made as a way of coping, etc. Genetics could provide reassuring evidence for 
themselves that they were not choosing to have an eating disorder.   
Genetics would help defend people against others‟ judgement and blame, thereby 
helping to convince themselves.  The expectation of blame from others went along with 
respondents‟ own uncertainty about the extent of their responsibility for their eating disorder 
behavior; their self-interpretations were affected by those of others. Gillian linked this 
directly to blame from other people, reasoning that if people tell you your behavior is 
intentional, you might start to blame yourself.   
I think that people would start thinking that – they would stop doubting whether or 
not they chose it. They would stop doubting whether or not they‟re just doing it for 
attention. Because, after a while if so many people tell you that you‟re just – or, you 
hear so many times that people with anorexia are just seeking attention. You start to 
wonder if you are. I think that it would definitely alleviate a lot of those concerns. 
(Gillian, T-AN) 
 
Hannah illustrated the ambivalence of agency by performing it as two very different voices, 
one strong and adamant, the other weak and uncertain. By doing so, she conveys that she was 
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of two minds; sometimes she felt confident she was not choosing but at other times she had 
doubts. 
…my family thought that … a lot of the anorexia behaviors that I did were my 
choice. Which I alternated between being really angry about that. I mean (in a strong 
voice) “I‟m not choosing to do this.” And, feeling extremely guilty. And, being like, 
(in a soft insecure voice) “I am choosing to do this. Am I doing this? How come I‟m 
such a terrible person?” I feel like if there were a gene, I would be more sure that I 
wasn‟t choosing to do it. And, that would be good probably. (Hannah, R-AN) 
 
Hannah‟s ambivalence and self-doubt was linked to others‟ evaluations of her; genetics made 
her more sure that she was not “choosing” to have AN.  This self-doubt was linked to others‟ 
evaluations of her. 
 Respondents observed themselves judging others, and applied the same judgements to 
themselves.  Rebecca felt critical of a co-worker for smoking and being too “weak” to quit. 
She applied the same criticism to herself, but thought genetics might help her be less hard on 
herself. 
…I‟m really hard on myself. Like, “God. I‟m such a weak person.” Like, I don‟t 
know. Like, I worked with a woman who made really crappy money. But she would 
still buy cigarettes. And I was like, “Why don‟t you just quit smoking? Like, such a - 
money down the drain.” But so, like, I guess I viewed her as, like, a weak person for 
not smoke – for not trying to quit or not quitting. And I think I view myself in the 
same way sometimes. Like, why can‟t I just stop? So it‟d be nice to know that part of 
it was in my genes. But I mean it‟s still something I should definitely strive to get 
better. (Rebecca, T-BN) 
 
Evaluations by others, and one‟s own evaluation of others, informed one‟s own self-
evaluation as deserving blame or not.  
 Respondents also struggled with self-blame without mentioning others who blamed 
them.  Joelle was uncomfortable about the idea that her own choice was involved. She noted 
that choice did play a role at the beginning of the eating disorder, and hoped that the 
continuation of the eating disorder was not conscious, nor a mere habit.  Elsewhere in the 
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interview she had brought up the importance of being “accountable” about one‟s eating 
disorder. Genetics would remove “accountability” because it was “some sort of larger force 
at work”, beyond the individual. 
Accountability. I guess I don‟t want to be wholly accountable…. Because, I definitely 
feel like – it‟d be scary to think that – I don‟t know. Because, I definitely can 
pinpoint, like, making the choice to maybe initiate that behavior. I‟d hate to think that 
I was always consciously doing it or doing it out of habit. And, that no part of that 
was maybe – I don‟t know. Some sort of larger force at work. I guess. Who knows 
how the brain and body really work?  (Joelle, R-BN) 
 
Carly had blamed herself for causing the BN which in turn caused problems with her 
competitive swimming; if genes were involved she would not have expected she could stop 
bingeing and purging whenever she wanted to. 
I think I would feel better about myself. And I kind of would blame my poor 
performance in swimming and that time in my life on my genes. And yeah. I just 
wouldn‟t feel as bad about it about doing it…. Because I would – not knowing that I 
had those genes I‟d feel like I had more control over it. And I could have stopped 
whenever I wanted. I mean I had the choice of being able to stop whenever I wanted. 
But with the genes I was kind of – I know that I‟m, like, pre-disposed to it. And I 
have less control over it. (Carly, R-BN) 
 
Barbara and Irene spoke of the “relief” they and others would feel if AN or BN were thought 
of as genetically influenced. 
I mean it might be a little bit of relief. Because I think even myself after I recovered I 
realized – I was kind of like, “How did I do that?” Like, “What was I thinking to do 
that to myself?” type thing…. But just criticizing yourself for, like, leading yourself 
down that path. (Barbara, R-AN) 
 
Well, I think it would be very helpful to know that it‟s genetic. Because, if it does 
give them some relief. Less guilt. If they feel less guilt. That‟s part of the recovery. 
Feeling less stigmatized. Feeling less of a failure. Like, “I‟ve chosen to do this 
messed up thing. And, now I‟m a freak.” I think it would be helpful to them. (Irene, 
R-BN) 
 
According to Irene, only a “freak” and a “failure” would choose such a “messed up thing”; 
knowing that genetics played a role would be a relief.  
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 “There are people who have a valid reason. And I’m not one of them.” Some 
respondents speculated about what would happen if they took the test and found out they did 
not have a genetic predisposition. Theoretically, some people with AN or BN could have 
developed it without having the genetic predisposition that had been linked to it.  In this 
scenario, respondents maintained the belief that genetic predisposition confers less blame on 
those who have it, but examined the logical corollary: that those whose case is not genetic are 
to blame.  If eating disorders were understood to be genetic but one‟s own case was not, it 
could seem even more like a choice by comparison.  Most respondents (n=32) said that if 
they were to undergo a genetic test for predisposition in the future, they would prefer to find 
that they had the predisposition. (Eleven preferred to find out they did not have the 
predisposition and seven had no preference or could not choose.)  Of those who preferred a 
positive result, several thought that not having the predisposition would suggest that choice 
played more of a role in their case than for others.   
I don‟t know. I mean I suppose, like, it would be nice …  to have the pre-disposition. 
Because you‟d be able to say, like, “Oh. It‟s not my fault.” And then to not have it. 
Then they would just kind of – if they had identified it, then it would just kind of be 
like, “Well there are people who have a valid reason. And I‟m not one of them.” 
(laughing).  (Thelma, T-BN) 
 
My initial thought was “It would be better not to. Maybe I would be less likely to 
have problems in the future.” But, then I went back and thought “Well, what would 
that then mean for me having problems then? Would that mean that more blame 
should be placed on myself and my choices? Or, on environment?” And, I like to 
think that – I don‟t know. There was some internal mechanism at work to some 
degree. Even if it was all chemical and having anxiety problems and that sort of thing. 
So, yeah. I think I would rather it be positive.  (Joelle, R-BN) 
 
… the initial thought is almost the exact opposite of the good one. Thinking that 
“Well, what if it‟s not genetic for me?” And then, thinking that that means that it must 
be a choice for you. Despite whatever sort of experiences you‟ve had. (Gillian,R-AN) 
 
333 
 
… I think I‟d rather find out that I did have them. Because, if I didn‟t, then this is just 
something that‟s ALL stuff that I‟ve done to myself. (Jackie, T-BN; capitalization 
reflects respondents‟ emphasis) 
 
I think it would just be like a lose-lose situation. So I can‟t really say one or the 
other…. Just, like, not having a choice. And, like, knowing I was going to have an 
eating disorder or have a hard time not having an eating disorder. And then if I found 
out that I didn‟t have the genetic make-up, then it would be, like, “Well why do I 
have an eating disorder?”…  It would just make me think …That it was, like, all my 
fault. And this [BN] wasn‟t even something. (Victoria, T-BN) 
 
R:  It‟s funny. Because, I just took that information [about genetics] when I heard it 
and went “I have that genetic make-up.” So, I just took it and said “I do.” I had never 
thought that I might not have it. 
I:  Well, then it might be interesting to ask what – how would you react if you found 
out “Well, no.” You did not have that high genetic risk. 
R:  I think that‟d probably be a shock to me, too. Because, it has helped explain it to 
me why that happened….  I‟d probably feel like, “Well, damn. It was more my fault 
than I wanted to acknowledge.” After I found out it was genetics, I went “Ah. This 
helps explain it more.” (Fran,R-BN) 
 
If genes play a role in others‟ eating disorders but not their own, respondents would interpret 
that information to mean “more blame should be placed on myself”, “it must be a choice”, 
“that‟s ALL stuff I‟ve done to myself”, “all my fault”, and “more my fault”; others have a 
“valid reason” but not them.  I found this interesting because the availability of a “valid 
reason” for some people with eating disorders could increase suspicion of those without one, 
even more than if nobody had a “valid reason”.  The guilt-reducing genetic explanation 
would actually magnify guilt for people who arrived at their eating disorder by non-genetic 
means, even if their experience of the eating disorder was the same. It is as though once 
genetics enter the picture, there are no other plausible explanations for a loss of control. 
 “Yeah, right”:  Public perception of genetics as an irresponsible excuse.   People 
who saw eating disorders as under individual control and responsibility might reject the 
claim about genetics.  Indeed, talking about genetics might make the person with an eating 
disorder look like she was avoiding responsibility and making excuses.  Several respondents 
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examined the possibility that the genetic excuse might be seen skeptically and cause a 
“backlash” against people with eating disorders for trying to blame their problems on 
genetics.  
…the ideal family would be like, “Okay. How can we help you?” And, look for the 
best, like, geneticist, scientist, or whatever. To figure out what‟s the best treatment. 
Now, my family. They probably wouldn‟t care….  It would be like, “Okay. You‟re 
still making excuses.” (Amy,T-AN) 
 
I still think there would be some people that would be skeptical. “Oh, yeah. Blame it 
on something else.” Rather than the person taking responsibility for it. (Mary, T-AN) 
 
… I think it would be a tough sell. Like, I think people would be really skeptical. 
They‟d be like, “Whatever.” I mean I think so many people still do think it‟s a choice. 
And they‟d be like, “Oh.” People would be making comparisons like, “Oh. This is 
like saying that, like, because it‟s genetic reasons that people become crack addicts or 
whatever.” And I just think people would be like, “Yeah. Right.” (Isabelle, T-BN) 
 
Gillian thought that genetic explanations for complex conditions might have lost their 
effectiveness because they were perceived to be over-used; “some people would be like, „Oh. 
They‟ll say anything‟s genetic nowadays.‟…And, they would discount it.”  Claims of genetic 
contributions to alcoholism and obesity had been met with skepticism and even “backlash”, 
making some respondents cautious about such claims for eating disorders. 
Well, the way I‟m thinking about it is when they came out saying “Alcoholism is a 
disease. Alcoholism is a disease.” How did that work? Did that help? Well, maybe. I 
think some people kind of grudgingly said “Oh. He‟s drunk because he has a 
disease.” But, there was a huge backlash. “You shouldn‟t coddle those people. They 
don‟t have a disease.” …  I mean I think it worked both ways. There was definitely 
backlash. “Those people are just weak-willed and bad.” (Alyce. T-AN) 
 
R:  I think there‟d be, like, a lot of skepticism. But like also – I mean I guess 
skepticism is the best way to say it. Because I mean they have said that thing about, 
like, obesity. Like you can be genetically pre-disposed to obesity. I think people kind 
of were like, “Yeah. Well whatever.” (shrugging, half-laughing). 
I:  Can you say more about what you‟ve observed with obesity? 
R:  Yeah. Just like – I don‟t know, like, personally. Like, maybe you have a heavier 
build than people. But if you eat five hamburgers, you‟re still going to be fat. Like, 
maybe you don't have, like, the tall slender build. But I tend to think you‟re stuffing 
your face more than you should anyway. Like, that doesn‟t cause you to be three 
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hundred pounds. So I think people would say that about bulimia. Like, I don‟t know. I 
would say that about it if I heard that about bulimia. Like, “Yeah. Maybe I‟m more 
likely to have bulimia. But that‟s not really why I‟m puking up my food.” (Rebecca, 
T-BN) 
 
Genetics for obesity could seem like an irresponsible excuse for people who “eat five 
hamburgers”; so would genetics for BN. According to Irene, such explanations could seem 
particularly offensive to parents, who had already endured the hardship of their child‟s eating 
disorder and would resist the idea that they had passed along genes that contributed to the 
problem. 
I:  Imagine there were a media campaign to publicize genetic causes of bulimia to the 
general public. What do you think the effect of that would be? 
R:  (Gasp followed by laughter.) I could see mothers being like, “Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 
You‟re going to blame it on me.” All that stuff. Like, “It‟s not genetic. I‟m not going 
to take that, too. We have enough problems around your bulimia….”  (Irene, R-BN) 
 
Those respondents who anticipated skepticism about genetics still assumed that genetics 
would be taken as a claim of reduced control and responsibility, thereby supporting the 
general point that genetics would be interpreted in this way. 
 
 A few respondents articulated ideas in contrast with the prevailing expectation that 
genetics would reduce perceived responsibility.  If someone did not feel blamed to begin 
with, genetic relief from blame was not welcome, either because it seemed unimportant and 
irrelevant (several respondents) and could actually increase blame (for one respondent).   
Isabelle pointed out that others blame people with eating disorders out of ignorance, and that 
for them, providing a genetic explanation would be beneficial to reduce blame. 
… they may be likely to be “Oh. Well we can kind of, like, forgive this a little bit 
more now that we know that it has this genetic component.” It might make it a little 
bit more acceptable to them. But as far as people who have, like, a really good 
understanding of the illness and certainly myself, like, it wouldn‟t really make any 
difference at all. (Isabelle, T-BN) 
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Like Isabelle, some who felt they did not need genetic relief from blame recognized that this 
was the meaning of genetics likely to be understood by most others, whether they accepted it 
as true or not. For one respondent, Wendy, genetics could actually confer more blame by 
locating the problem in the individual with an eating disorder rather than an external source.  
Wendy understood her eating disorder to be a response to extremely restrictive and 
controlling parents, who did not allow her to express her emotions and frequently punished 
her unfairly. She understood the eating disorder as a way of coping with this harmful 
environment, and recovery as a process of re-learning how to handle emotions and value 
herself.  She did not see her BN as her fault. 
I:  And some have said that talking about bulimia as genetic helps make it less like 
the person‟s fault. What do you think about that? 
R:  I think of it opposite. 
I:  Tell me more about that. 
R:  I just – well I see it both ways. Like, I can see it from both ways. I could see how 
it would be less your fault. Because it would be less your fault if you were one of the 
people that are like, “Why don‟t you just eat? It‟s your choice.” Then genetically it 
would make it less your fault. But if you‟re a person like me who‟s like, “It‟s not your 
fault anyway. It‟s really complex. It‟s caused by the environment.” Then it being 
genetic would make it more your fault. Because it would make it more individualized 
and less due to the environmental factors. (Wendy, T-BN) 
 
As Wendy said, if the person is already being blamed, genetics may lessen the blame because 
they are not under her control. But if the person were not being blamed, genetics could 
increase the blame by locating the eating disorder in her rather than elsewhere.  Wendy was 
the only one to articulate this view, though others shared a similar view that genetics would 
not or should not matter to anybody who understood eating disorders; individuals with eating 
disorders should not be blamed in the first place, so genetics ought not make a difference.  
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 In summary, the vast majority of respondents perceived genetics to imply a reduction 
of individual control and responsibility for behavior. I found this general notion expressed in 
a variety of ways, beginning with the idea that a genetic eating disorder would be harder to 
recover from (“a harder case”), and less compatible with individual control, responsibility, 
blame and related themes.  Respondents focused on the reduction of anticipated blame from 
others, changes in how one might perceive one‟s own control and responsibility, expectation 
of more blame for those who do not have a genetic predisposition, and skepticism about 
genetic explanations as “excuses” to evade responsibility for behavior.  Whether genetic 
influence was a good thing or bad thing depended on whether it was seen as a valid or invalid 
excuse, and whether it was accurate to describe the case of a specific individual.   
2.2 Now what? Implications for agency and future action 
 
  Although respondents generally welcomed a decrease in blame and self-blame, they 
were concerned about the implications for agency related to eating disorders. What kind of 
agency did they have, if genetics were responsible for the eating disorder?  If genetics made 
them unable to control the eating disorder in the past, what did this mean for present and 
future action?  Does removing blame also remove some kinds of power or agency? I will 
explore other logics of action that have only been hinted at thus far, among them medicalized 
agency (e.g., treatment-seeking) and helplessness. 
 I began this chapter by showing that most respondents thought the geneticization of 
eating disorders could make them seem more medical (real diseases, calling for medical 
treatment). I then stepped back to consider the broader theme of genetic implications for 
individual control and responsibility, because all respondents spoke about it, often at length, 
and frequently without explicit reference to medical concepts or terminology.  Now I build 
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on the idea of control as the basis for a classification of the diverse implications identified by 
respondents, focusing on implications for agency and future action (Table 6.1.)   I define 
agency loosely, as before in Chapter 3, to mean the individual exerting control, making 
decisions, choosing, or taking action, as opposed to being the passive receiver or product of 
other forces. I use the word agency interchangeably with control, choice, and volition, to 
convey the capacity for voluntary action (Marshall 1998).   
 To introduce the themes of the table, I focus for the moment on Gena, whose repeated 
use of the phrase “can‟t help it” revealed the diverse meanings this claim can have for agency 
and action.  The inability to control could be both positive and a negative because it removes 
blame but also power over one‟s own behavior, or the perception of that power.  Gena 
illustrated how the phrase “can‟t help it” could be used in these different ways. Here she 
suggested that people might “give up the fight”. 
I think obviously it‟s going to be different for everybody. I think the worst thing that 
could happen would be that people would give up the fight. That they would say 
“This is how I‟m always going to be. This is the way my body is. And, this is just 
kind of the way it‟s going to happen. And, I can‟t help it.” (Gena, R-BN) 
 
Genetic explanations might make people think “I can‟t help it”, lose hope and stop trying to 
overcome the disorder. The logic of action here would be fatalist: why try at all if it is 
impossible.  However, if there were things a person could do, saying “I can‟t help it” could 
become an excuse that people “use” to avoid hard work.  
I think that the thought pattern [is] something you might not be able to help. 
However, the behavior choices you can learn to help. And, I think that the negative 
outlook would say that “I can‟t help it. So, I‟m going to keep throwing up. And, I‟m 
going to keep doing this excessive behavior or this extreme restrictive behavior. 
Because, I can‟t help it. And, I‟ll use that as an excuse.” (Gena) 
 
The logic of action implied by genetics as an “excuse” is that the person can control some 
aspect of the disorder but they are “using” genetics to avoid that responsibility.  Gena also 
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envisioned that “I can‟t help it” could be a way to counteract expectations that the person 
“change it today”; it would inspire compassion and refigure the eating disorder as something 
for which help and patience, rather than blame, was appropriate. This meaning of “I can‟t 
help it” supports a logic of action that seeks help for one‟s disorder.   
If you want to go extreme positive. It would help people understand…  that at least 
the thought pattern is something you really can‟t help. And, it won‟t be this extreme 
[expectation] like, “Well, this is something you can just change. Change it today.” 
Like, some people, like, that I‟ve talked to. They‟re like, “Sorry. Like, I‟m telling you 
you‟re beautiful. So, what‟s the problem?” And, if there was this media campaign 
pushing the idea that there was more of a genetic link. I‟m like, “This is something 
genetic. I can‟t help it. Please understand that it‟s not something that I‟m doing on 
purpose. Help me try to correct my behaviors. But, as far as the thought, know that 
this is something that I can‟t do anything about.” (Gena)    
 
Gena is careful to separate which components of the eating disorder are legitimately her 
responsibility and which are not.  She deemed genetic relief from responsibility negative if it 
wrongly excused people from legitimate responsibility, or if it led to hopelessness about their 
condition. Genetic relief from responsibility was positive if it encouraged a view of the 
person with an eating disorder as deserving of help.    
I found that many of the perceived negative and positive implications of genetics for 
people with eating disorders were possible to organize in the conceptual table below. 
Respondents‟ concerns or appreciation for the idea of genetic causality depended on  (1) 
whether eating behavior actually could not be controlled by an individual in reality and (2) 
whether a person believed it could not be controlled. The columns correspond to the first; the 
rows to the second.  Within the cells of the table there are positive and negative implications 
depending perhaps on whether there is an alternative entity (i.e., a healthcare provider) who 
can control it, but I do not use this dimension to organize the table.  
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Table 6.1.  Implications for direct control over behavior given a genetic influence 
 If eating behavior CANNOT be 
controlled 
If eating behavior CAN be 
controlled 
And a person believes 
it CANNOT be 
controlled 
 
 
 
Individual correctly believes and 
behaves as though she cannot 
control her behavior   
 
1. MEDICAL CONTROL  
 
2. PARADOXICALLY-
IMPROVED INDIVIDUAL 
CONTROL  
 
3. ADJUSTING TO 
HELPLESSNESS  
 
Individual wrongly believes and 
behaves as though she has less 
control than she actually does   
 
4. LOSING CONTROL 
THROUGH 
OVERVALUATION OF 
GENETIC POWER 
 
5. USING GENETICS AS AN 
EXCUSE TO ABANDON 
CONTROL 
 
And a person believes 
it CAN be controlled 
 
 
Individual wrongly believes and 
behaves as though she has more 
control than she actually does.  
 
BLAMED UNJUSTLY FOR 
LACK OF CONTROL 
Individual correctly believes and 
behaves as though she can 
control her behavior. 
 
USING SELF-CONTROL TO 
KICK THE HABIT 
 
 
 
I present results for the types of agency listed in the first row of the table (numbered 1-5); the 
second row is implied by the first and will become clear by contrast. In the top left cell, 
corresponding to an individual correctly believing and behaving as though she cannot control 
her behavior, I placed medical control, paradoxically increased individual control, and 
adjusting to helplessness. With (1) medical control, the individual recognizes a true inability 
to control her behavior and seeks medical help.  With (2) paradoxically-improved individual 
control, the person recognizes a true inability to control her behavior but finds that this belief 
paradoxically enables her to better control the behavior. This individual control could take 
place outside of treatment but was usually talked about in connection to treatment; less self-
blame enabled more ability to work on the problem in treatment.  (3) Adjustment to 
helplessness referred to an individual recognizing a true inability to control her behavior and 
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adjusting to this idea by giving up on medical treatment and/or individual effort because 
there was no hope of recovery.   
 Implications in the top right cell differ from the left because they assume that genetics 
do not actually remove control to the extent believed by the agent. The respondent describing 
such an implication is skeptical about the actual power of genes in this regard, and assesses 
the implications of an agent‟s belief in that power with the background assumption that the 
power has been overvalued.  If the individual actually can control her behavior, but believes 
or behaves as though she cannot, she might abandon efforts she could have made toward 
controlling the eating disorder, thereby (4) losing control through an overvaluation of genetic 
power; a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Such a person genuinely believes herself to be helpless, as 
with #3, but the difference is that she is not helpless in actuality; genes don‟t really have that 
kind of power. This wrong belief discourages her from action that might have helped.  Using 
(5) genetics as an excuse is similar to #4 but involves a professed belief  about helplessness 
in the face of genes, a belief that may not be genuine. Those who heard about genes might 
use them as an excuse to avoid working on a difficult issue; behaving as though genetics 
make her helpless, but she is not in reality.  This table captures variation presented by 
respondents and my attempt to make theoretical sense of it. The next five sections will 
illustrate these consequences of beliefs about genetics and control (all from top row of Table 
6.1). 
2.2.1. Medical control (1) 
 In this form of agency, the behavior is redefined as a disease, the person is sick and 
cannot be held responsible, therefore the logical action is to seek help from qualified 
professionals. Even if a person lacks direct control over her behavior, she may gain indirect 
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control by seeking professional help. Similarly, within a treatment context or 12-step group, 
patients might be held responsible for how they respond to their disease and behavior, as with 
the responsibility to “challenge” thoughts in CBT, to earn privileges in an inpatient setting 
and to continue coming to Overeaters Anonymous meetings.  Agency is re-focused toward a 
different goal – seeking professional help, challenging self-destructive thoughts, avoiding 
situational triggers – because the agent is no longer deemed capable of direct control over 
behavior. Results presented earlier to describe medicalization are relevant to describe this 
form of agency or action, but below I present additional quotations to illustrate the 
conceptual reworking of agency and responsibility, as well as the new forms of treatment 
respondents imagined.  
 Genetics removed responsibility for eating disorders, which could encourage 
treatment-seeking. If the person was no longer responsible for the behavior, she could seek 
treatment without feeling ashamed or wanting to hide her behavior.   
…there was a lot of blame. And it was an impediment to me getting treatment. 
Because I felt like, “I should be able to overcome this. I should be able to fix this. I 
know what I‟m doing wrong. I just need to stop doing it.” So I guess that if there were 
[a genetic causal factor] – and I don‟t think that there is one. I guess I should preface 
it. But if there were. … I think it would take away a lot of the blame and maybe the 
shame and reach more people. (Sarah, R-AN)  
 
Well it could be a positive thing. I think that‟s happened somewhat with alcoholism. 
That people get a message that this is part of someone‟s genetic make-up. They 
always – they‟re more pre-disposed to that. And I think that‟s – I think that that‟s 
helped in terms of people who struggle with alcoholism. Maybe it‟s lessened their 
guilt or something. Or helped them feel less guilt. And hopefully they would feel 
more open to solutions or to alternatives. And maybe that would be the same for 
someone struggling with an eating disorder. It would say “Oh. Maybe this isn‟t all my 
fault. So let me lighten up a little bit and see if I can get some help or something. And 
not be so secretive.” It might help with secrecy. (Melanie, R-BN) 
 
Respondents who were not to blame for the disorder would be more likely to seek help. If 
they saw themselves as agents who could and should control the disorder, they would not 
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take action to seek help because it was their responsibility and it would expose them to 
judgement from others. But if they saw their agency to reside in the seeking of help, rather 
than the enacting of eating disorder behaviors, it would make sense to take action by seeking 
professional help. Indeed, like Selena‟s friend who sought innovative treatment for cancer, 
others might even be proud of them for doing so.    
 Several respondents envisioned new forms of medical control as a result of genetic 
discoveries, including pills, injections, and even gene therapy. Several disparaged the idea of 
medication for AN or BN as implausible “magic potions” and “magic pills”, but others 
appeared sincerely to hope they would one day be available.  Whether the treatment was 
biologically based or not, the concept of medical control offered a role – the sick role – for 
respondents, whose agency could be exerted by seeking treatment, but not by directly 
controlling the behaviors themselves. These forms of treatment were occasionally rejected 
for implying too passive a role for the “patient”, as Yvette had attested when she imagined 
eating disorder patients becoming “just passive while letting the doctors drug them” 
(presented earlier in section 1.2). 
2.2.2.  Paradoxically-improved individual control (2) 
 Another form of agency respondents envisioned involved improved individual control 
over behaviors, despite the importance of genetics for those behaviors.  I have termed this 
“paradoxical” because conceiving of a behavior as out of one‟s control seemed to confer 
greater control, yet this was not due to a relocation of control as with medicalized forms of 
agency, described just above. Several respondents thought their agency to control their 
behaviors would be enhanced by thinking of them as genetically influenced. The removal of 
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guilt and blame reduced stress and bad feelings, and eliminated the need to prove the validity 
of one‟s eating disorder, making it less necessary to engage in the behaviors. 
 Less guilt and blame mean less reason to turn to eating disorder behaviors.  Several 
respondents said that the removal of blame would reduce stressors and bad feelings that made 
the behaviors worse.  Feeling guilty about the disorder gave Paula “even more reason to” 
engage in her eating disorder. 
I think that, like, I‟ve talked about this for the societal view of it and the sort of 
stigma that goes along. I think the misconception that it is a choice. And sort of even 
a stubborn choice. Of children and women choosing to do this horrible, hurtful thing 
to themselves and their families. It‟s a little difficult not to internalize some of that 
and feel that you are at fault for not being able to stop. Or stop earlier. Or not have 
adopted behaviors in the first place. And of course then it‟s just a catch twenty-two. 
Because those – that just gets bundled into the bad feelings you already have. Like, 
sort of after my parents found out that I had the eating disorder. Then it was like, “Oh 
my God. Now I‟m really – I‟m disrupting the family. And they‟re all unhappy. And 
so I have even more reason to.” So I mean I think it might help in those cases for 
someone to hear. “Okay. This is not your fault that this is happening.” (Paula, R-BN) 
 
Helen and Tammy also thought that self-blame contributed to the eating disorder. 
I:  Some have said that talking about anorexia as genetic helps make it less like that 
person‟s fault. 
R:  I can see that. 
I:  What do you think about that? 
R:  I would probably agree with that. Because if you‟re obese, it‟s your fault. If 
you‟re skinny, it‟s your fault. If you‟re obese, you eat too much. If you‟re skinny, you 
just don‟t eat enough. You got to eat these kinds of foods. So our society is always 
kind of doing that. If you don‟t make enough money, obviously it‟s your fault. Not 
the fact that you have to support other siblings. Or if you don‟t have the money to do 
the things that you want. So our society I think as a whole is so quick with the fault. 
And we need something to blame sometimes to have a better feeling for ourselves. 
'It‟s not really my fault.' But if your perception of yourself is very, very, very, very 
negative, I think there could be some healing with knowing that some of your 
problem was by design. (Tammy, R-AN) 
 
I think it would help a lot of people. I think it would just strengthen their recovery. 
And, realize – it would take – it would help them more. Because, they would not 
blame themselves so much. I think a lot of people with eating disorders have a 
tendency to blame themselves. And, I think there would be a lot less of that if they 
saw in the media this actually might have genetic components…. if you don‟t blame 
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yourself, then you‟re not angry at yourself. It lessens the degree of just that discontent 
you feel towards yourself. It frees you to then question “Okay. Well, where did this 
stem from? It‟s not my fault.” It takes away that blame. And so, I think people are – 
they‟re encouraged to think a little more outside of what can be the other reasons for 
my eating disorder. And, just help them a little more on their path to recovery… 
could have a lot of effects. I mean if it‟s really a genetic – if there is a genetic 
component, then I think it just liberates them a little more. They might be at more 
ease with themselves. And, maybe even it might have the effect of them being able to 
connect with family and friends more. So, that‟s how I see it. (Helen, R-AN) 
 
If the eating disorder were a way of coping with stress, guilt and blame from others about 
that method of coping were a secondary source of stress.  Genetics could reduce that 
additional source. 
I think I would have a more positive sense of recovery. Because again it would 
relieve a lot of my guilt. Which would relieve me. Take a lot of stressors off of me. It 
would make me less frustrated maybe. Because I would know that it‟s not really my 
fault. Whereas I still feel like it‟s my fault no matter who tells me it‟s not my fault. I 
just think it would – it‟s just like somebody pre-disposed to breast cancer. They didn‟t 
ask for it. It‟s not their fault. I think it would make people more compassionate 
toward me rather than frustrated with me. And that would give me a lot more support. 
And the more support I had, the easier it would be to recover. (Petra, T-AN) 
 
Relationships with others could be improved if it was clear that the person was not to blame, 
thereby relieving some of the pressure of the eating disorder.  Claire thought that the idea of 
genetics could inspire her toward working on recovery.  The type of work she envisioned was 
not simply going to a medical provider to passively receive treatment, but the kind of 
treatment (or in her case, Overeaters Anonymous) that required individual effort, of the kind 
that might (paradoxically) suggest that the person did have some control over the behavior.   
R:  It‟s comforting because it helps to support that 'this isn‟t all my fault' feeling…. 
It‟s like people with obesity can work on themselves and put effort forth. And, know 
at the same time and gain inspiration at the same time from knowing that part of it for 
a lot of people is genetic. And, not a question of will power or inability to do certain 
things like some people say it is. Yeah. It‟s just thinking of it again as not all the 
person‟s fault. 
I:  And, you said with obesity that people can still work on it. 
R:  Yeah. It‟s not like it should give you an excuse for like, “Oh. It runs in my family. 
What are you going to do?” But, like, you still got to work on it. Because, it‟s still 
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your disease to handle and get over. But, you can draw inspiration from thinking like, 
“But, this isn‟t all my fault.”… Inspiration to get well. (Claire, T-AN) 
 
 Another reason why thinking about the eating disorder in terms of genetics could 
paradoxically enhance control was that it would let the person ease up on trying to prove that 
the disorder was real.  Only one respondent articulated this view, but it seems conceptually 
important.  Genetics would provide validation and legitimacy, as discussed earlier, allowing 
the individual to stop trying to prove that it was real by becoming dangerously thin. 
R: … Because, then they feel more validated in what they‟re feeling. And, it‟s not – 
it‟s almost not as competitive anymore. Like what I was saying about the DSM-4 
criteria. Feeling like you had to fit the anorexia criteria. If those criteria weren‟t there, 
it wouldn‟t be so much of a rat race to see who could be the sickest. (Both laugh) 
I:  Is it a rat race? 
R:  Well, I know that when I was in in-patient, it seemed like a rat race. [The day 
program] not so much. But, in-patient everyone was trying to eat the littlest. Take the 
longest. Cut the food in the smallest pieces. And, it was just frustrating and triggering 
for everybody. And, I think the most progress definitely gets made in [the day 
program]….I think that people would just realize that it‟s not something that they 
thought “Oh. Well, I‟m just going to be anorexic now.” That there were other things 
contributing to that. And, that if it‟s genetic, then that girl who‟s sitting next to you 
cutting her food up into little bits has a genetic cause, too. And, you have a genetic 
cause. You all have genetic causes. So, you don‟t have to battle for who has the worst 
genetic cause… I mean it‟s almost like an equalizing factor. Like, yes, it will still be 
the competition in terms of who‟s thinnest and who eats the least. That competition is 
not going to go away in the atmosphere where you‟ve got more than one anorexic in a 
room. But, I think that it will be an equalizing factor… Equalizing in that you realize 
that you all have this one thing in common beyond the fact that you have the eating 
disorder. It‟s, like, that you can‟t start thinking “Oh. Well, that girl has a real eating 
disorder. And, mine‟s fake. Because, I‟m not as thin as she is.” You all have real 
eating disorders. Because, it‟s genetically caused. It‟s not that you‟re making yours 
up and she‟s not because she‟s thinner than you. (Gillian, T-AN) 
 
Gillian postulated, based perhaps in part on her experience of a healthcare worker telling her 
she did not look thin enough to have AN, that extreme thinness indicated a more valid and 
real problem and that it was desirable on the inpatient unit to have a real rather than a fake 
problem. In a context where AN and BN are contested illnesses, visible life-threatening 
emaciation provided proof of their reality. Genetics could also provide such proof, in a way 
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that was less harmful to a person‟s health. Gillian‟s eating disorder was apparently 
exacerbated by a need to prove that it was serious; if it did not have the reputation as a 
“shallow disorder” (her words), she would not be driven to prove otherwise.  Thus, a 
reconceptualization of her agency as genetic paradoxically would improve her ability to exert 
her agency, because an important motivation for the behavior would be removed. 
2.2.3. Adjusting to helplessness (3) 
If genes meant a person “can‟t help it”, she might lose faith in any form of effective action. 
The extended quotes from Gena that introduced this sub-section on agency and action 
pointed to this possibility.  Respondents offered fatalistic hopelessness as a possible reaction 
to genetics in eating disorders; if it were genetic, there was little reason to exert agency in 
connection to the eating disorder at all.   
Well because it‟s sort of, like, I imagine this media campaign goes out. I don‟t know. 
Maybe also on the part of some young girls they just might think “Well.” If they are 
already actively bulimic, then “Shrug my shoulders. I can‟t do anything to change 
this. Because this is again a pre-determined thing.” (Paula, R-BN) 
 
Genetics would make the eating disorder seem permanent; no recovery was possible and the 
behaviors would never stop. 
R: … just that you maybe wouldn‟t ever be able to fully recover…  I mean maybe if, 
like, I had a genetic pre-disposition, just kind of there‟d just be something that I 
would never be able to, like, get out of my head completely… it‟s always something 
that I‟d, like, constantly think about the rest of my life. 
I:  You‟d be thinking about having the genetic pre-disposition? 
R:  Or, just like the other thoughts with bulimia. Like, about, like, body image and, 
like, weight concerns. And, I don‟t know. I guess I feel like then if I did relapse, it 
would – I would maybe just kind of attribute that to genetics. And, maybe it would 
make it even harder to, like, get back on track. Because, I‟d just be like, “Oh. Just 
another thing. Like, I don‟t know if I‟ll ever be able to, like, stop.” Type of deal…. I 
guess that was just kind of one example of maybe something that maybe you couldn‟t 
change [thoughts about body image, weight concerns]. I guess that‟s kind of one of 
those things that I feel like is going to be the hardest to overcome. And, that‟s one of 
the things I feel like will stay with me for the whole – like definitely the longest. 
Probably the rest of my life anyways. But, I just feel like it kind of maybe, like, 
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removes some hope that, like, you can get rid of all the symptoms and get, like, 
completely better. That, like, if you do have a genetic susceptibility that like – 
because, there‟s some kind of thing, like, engrained. Something engrained in your 
mind that, like, makes you think those thoughts. Or, makes you think in a certain way 
that you‟ll never be able to change. (Eva, T-BN) 
 
Although Eva expects to continue working on it, genetics might make her give up hope that 
the thoughts will stay with her “for the rest of my life.” Some compared it to genetic diseases 
about which nothing could be done. 
R:  Well, good things would be like I said. Feeling a little less crazy. And, like it 
wasn‟t as much my fault. And, not the fault of the environment as much. Although it 
is the environment. But, it would also make me feel a little helpless. And, vulnerable. 
I:  Any more about that? 
R:  Well, just like people who everybody in their family has had a certain disease. Or, 
they‟re pre-disposed to something. It makes you just feel like out of control a little 
bit. Like something bad. You‟re not healthy. And, you can‟t do anything about it. So, 
that‟s not – that wouldn‟t be a good feeling. (Beth, R-AN) 
 
… makes me think of the Huntington‟s chorea. People have wanted to know so that 
they could plan their life. And this person who is in her early forties I think in New 
York went against her mother‟s and family‟s wishes and had this genetic testing done. 
She has Huntington‟s chorea. She has that strong gene. And it‟s a worse type than her 
mother has. So instead of helping her live her life to the fullest she‟s developed, like, 
depression and this kind of thing. But anorexia I think can be avoided with the right 
recipe. So who is it that would be successful in taking the right approach to anorexia? 
When you think of the reality TV shows like Intervention. With some of those folks 
there‟s, like, no help for them. There‟s no hope for them. I might as well give up. I‟m 
genetically pre-disposed. Because they‟re not going to hear. It‟s like obesity. We 
don‟t hear those other factors. We‟re going to hear “This is what I‟ve got.” So it 
depends on where you fall in the spectrum of the disease process I think as to what 
your reaction would be. Would you live a healthier lifestyle? Or would you just get 
depressed and say “I‟m damned anyway.” I think that you would see both extremes. I 
think that you would. (Tammy, R-AN) 
 
Lynn thought that even if some cases were significantly influenced by genetics, it might be 
better not to publicize this fact, because it could be applied too broadly.  She thought people 
tended to be “helpless” when confronted by genes. This might be appropriate for people with 
“super serious” genetically-influenced eating disorders, but not for others, whom she 
speculated would constitute the majority.   
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Well, if it really is genetic, it is genetic. But, if we don‟t know, then I wouldn‟t want 
to see it publicized. Or, wouldn‟t want there to be campaigns about it being genetic. 
Or, if it‟s genetic for a very small number of people but not the majority of people. 
Because of this idea that in the face of our genes. Sometimes people in the face of 
their genes think they‟re helpless. And, in some ways too once you say it‟s genetic, 
somehow that makes it really more serious. And, it‟s not super serious for everyone. 
It‟s not going to rob you of years of your life or rob you of your life for most women. 
I think it‟s something that a lot of women come out of it. (Lynn, R-AN) 
 
Lynn suggests that some people might wrongly believe it was genetic and interpret 
themselves to be powerless when really they might have recovered.  This idea introduces 
themes for the next two types of agency I examine, in which genetics are wrongly believed to 
exert influence over behavior, leading to negative consequences.   
2.2.4.  Losing control through overvaluation of genetic power (4) 
 Believing that genes were powerful forces in controlling one‟s own behavior could 
have its own effects, regardless of their actual power. In this sub-section and the next, I focus 
on the top right cell of Table 6.1, implications for action and agency that reflect an 
overvaluation of genetic power:  believing that control was diminished when this was not the 
case.  For this concern to make sense, there had to be skepticism by the describer about the 
actual power of genetics to reduce individual control, even if the excuse were accepted by 
others (i.e., the right column).  Respondents were concerned that beliefs about the power of 
genetics could discourage people from trying to exert what control they could, leading to 
more eating disorder behavior, according to respondents.  This could be an honest belief (this 
sub-section) or a dishonest excuse (next sub-section), but either way the result was more 
eating disorder behavior.   
 Genetics threatened to redefine agentic behavior as non-agentic, thereby changing 
beliefs about what could be accomplished, according to respondents. If eating disorder 
behavior is an uncertain mix of volition and non-volition, and genetics strengthens the sense 
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that it is non-volitional, it could change expectations about what is possible for individuals to 
do.  If they did not expect to be able to control some aspect of the eating disorder that they 
probably could if they tried, they might not attempt to do so.  If others no longer expected 
them to be able to control it, and genetics became an acceptable “excuse,” that would also 
lead to more eating disorder behavior (examined in the next sub-section).   
 The idea that genetics played an important role in one‟s eating disorder could make 
eating disorder behaviors seem more non-agentic than before.  Some respondents expressed 
concern the respondents would forego control over things they could have controlled 
successfully.  I introduce these ideas by focusing on one respondent in particular, Fran, 
because she expressed this idea most vividly.  Other respondents shared similar views to 
some extent and are presented afterwards.  The sense that the behavior is re-defined as less 
agentic was also true for the three sub-sections above, on medical control, paradoxically-
enhanced individual control, and helplessness, but here and in the next sub-section this 
redefinition is deemed by respondents to be unwarranted; in reality genes do not remove as 
much control as suggested.  These respondents were concerned that genetics could 
mistakenly diminish agency. 
 Looking back on her recovery from BN, Fran said that if she had known genetics 
were important, “It would have been harder for me to have stopped it. There‟s not a doubt in 
my mind. Because, I would have locked in on that thought. That I can‟t stop this. I can‟t 
prevent it. This isn‟t me doing it. This is genetics.” (Fran)  Genetics would make the behavior 
seem determined, such that efforts to stop or prevent it are misplaced because she is not the 
agent: “this isn‟t me doing it. It‟s genetics.”  However, Fran said she had recovered without 
treatment by viewing her BN as a bad habit, like smoking, which she had already quit “cold 
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turkey”.   She had spontaneously mentioned genetics while talking about her “decision” to 
stop bingeing and purging, before I had introduced the topic.  
[I] just decided “I‟m not going to do this anymore.” Had I known as much back then 
as I do now. That it‟s genetics.… But, had I known all that playing against me, it 
would probably have been more difficult to have stopped the behavior…. Because, if 
it‟s a habit, I‟m extremely strong. Strong willed. Stubborn. My husband would tell 
you. Because, I‟m mulish. Stubborn. And, if you tell me I can‟t do something like 
breaking a habit, I‟ll prove you wrong. So, I was able to stop that. (Fran) 
 
Fran understood herself to have recovered by thinking of BN as a habit, and said she would 
not have attempted if she knew she had genetics “playing against me.” I asked her to 
elaborate on this idea later during our discussion of genetics, and she compared stopping BN 
to avoiding weight gain after surgery.  
If I had thought – if I‟d known that it could be from genetics, in the past I would have 
probably said “Well, I can‟t change.” But, because I knew at the time that it was a 
habit, I could break a habit. Damn it. I‟ll show you. I‟ll break a habit. But, if it‟s 
genetics, what are you fighting against? Something that you can‟t change? Or, it‟s 
kind of like when they tell you after a surgery. “Well, you‟re going to gain weight.” 
Okay. That explains why I am [gaining weight]. So, it‟s a little easier to swallow. But, 
it also is a little bit of an excuse, too. It makes it a little easier to accept it. So, you 
keep putting on a few pounds. Whereas, like, I remember when I had a hysterectomy 
when I was forty-one. And, somebody said “Well, of course you‟re going to gain 
weight after a hysterectomy.” And then, I read “No. Not necessarily. You can if you 
don‟t do what you need to do to prevent it.” Okay. So, if I gain weight, it‟s my own 
fault now. It‟s not the surgery‟s fault. So, I nipped it in the bud and got it back under 
control. But, if you give me a good excuse for why something‟s happened, I can fall 
back on it easily. Like somebody with a thyroid problem. Well, you can‟t help it. 
You‟re going to gain weight. But, then when you give them the meds. And, explain to 
them “Okay. This will help you.” But, then they don‟t have – it‟s not giving a total 
green light. It‟s saying “Hey. We can pull some of this back.” (Fran) 
 
Fran theorized that in order to achieve something difficult, a person has to believe that it 
were possible or she would not try.  According to Fran, if people are told after surgery to 
expect weight gain, they will not try to avoid it as much as someone who was told that she 
could “nip it in the bud”. If weight gain is “my fault”, the person is expected to rise to the 
challenge. If it is framed as “the surgery‟s fault”, or a thyroid problem, or genetics, it runs the 
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risk of giving the person “a total green light” to relinquish control.  Fran theorized that by 
defining the behavior as a bad habit, she was able to control it.   
 Having introduced the themes of this sub-section, I now turn to other respondents 
who articulated similar thoughts. I have grouped them according to shared sub-themes to 
highlight conceptual distinctions, though these sub-themes also overlap. All are connected by 
the idea that genetics help to redefine agentic behavior as non-agentic, thereby changing what 
people actually do. Their conceptions of agency change the actions they would take, 
according to these respondents. 
 Too hard to stop if it’s genetic. Several other respondents also noted that genetics 
might discourage people from making the effort to overcome their eating disorders because it 
seemed too hard. Eva said that genetic ideas would “give them, like, one less reason to try to 
get better”, and “not work as hard at recovery as they could.”   
… maybe the people would maybe feel, like, kind of helpless if they had it. And, 
maybe would give them, like, one less reason to try to get better. Because, they 
wouldn‟t feel like there was anything they could do. Like, it was their genetics. And, 
maybe not work as hard at recovery as they could. Just kind of discredit that. And, 
think that they‟re, like, terminally ill. And, they were never going to get better…. I 
don‟t really think it would do me any good to know. And, I think it would do – I 
guess it might do more harm than good. Because, I feel like it would just be one more 
reason to kind of give up on getting better. I just think that I was never going to get 
better. Because, now I know that I have the gene for it. There‟s nothing I can do to fix 
that. It‟s just kind of like set in stone. Because, I guess you can kind of change, like, 
your behavior patterns. But, you can‟t change your genetics. (Eva, T-BN) 
 
“Giving up” meant not doing the “work” needed to accomplish recovery. In this passage, Eva 
suggests that there is work people could do, and genetics would discourage them from doing 
it. This sentiment is different from the helplessness she expressed about overcoming eating 
disorder thoughts (described above). Such reasoning was shared by others who talked about 
helplessness, and the need for professional intervention.   
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 Less responsibility if it’s genetic. Like Fran, several other respondents thought 
genetics would remove responsibility for choices and reduce the motivation to work on them. 
Victoria said it took “all the responsibility off of us”, and that because her BN started as an 
“active choice”, her recovery would need to as well; “you have to want to” recover. 
R:… I think it would have a negative effect. Because I mean I guess if you try hard 
enough, you can probably trace anything back to genetics. And it takes, like, all the 
responsibility off of us. And, like, the choices that we make. Or having responsibility 
for our actions in our life … 
I:  And so responsibility is important in what ways? 
R:  I mean just that the choices we make. I mean when I started having an eating 
disorder it was, like, a very, like, active, like, choice. I mean and so I think even, like, 
recovering from an eating disorder – like, you have to want to. And you have to, like, 
make different decisions. And to do that you have to, like, I mean take some 
responsibility. I mean whether or not – I mean at this point I do feel like it‟s a little bit 
of, like, an addiction and a pattern. But I know there‟s still things I could do. 
(Victoria, T-BN) 
 
Petra was similarly concerned about the removal of responsibility. Indeed, she said that her 
BN was prolonged because she thought it was “biological” and “in my genes” and therefore 
could not control her bingeing and purging.   
I:  And, how did you feel when you first started to think of it as biological? Not just 
the environment. But, genetic and biological. 
R:  Well, that kind of made it easier for me to continue doing it. Because, then it took 
the blame off me. And, say “Oh. I can‟t control this as much. Because, it‟s biological. 
It‟s in my genes. So, therefore I can‟t control it.” 
I:  So, do you think it affected your disorder? Your behavior? 
R:  I think it prolonged it…. when I became bulimic. And, started to learn more and 
more about how the genetic factor lied in there. I kind of felt like, “Well, I don‟t have 
to give up binging and purging. Because, it‟s biological. My mom‟s addicted to pain 
killers. She didn‟t stop. Why should I? I don‟t have to. It‟s in our genes. My brother‟s 
on heroin. He doesn‟t stop unless he‟s locked up. Why should I work on myself?” So, 
it kind of made it – prolonged it. I think if I would have thought to myself “You can 
do this. This is something that you can turn around. You may have developed it 
biologically. But, that doesn‟t mean you have to live with it forever.” If I would have 
known that years ago, I think I might have worked harder at getting better. (Delia, T-
AN) 
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Delia said that she would have fared better had she understood biology as contributing to the 
development of her BN, rather than as a permanent aspect of herself. Like Victoria, Delia 
said it would be better to think of BN in volitional rather than biological terms  “if there were 
no genetic factor, they might think „It‟s up to me to get better.‟… [B]ecause it‟s a behavioral 
attitude. It‟s you did it yourself. You kind of produced it yourself. So, therefore you can 
make it go away yourself.”   
 More likely to repeat the behavior if you know it’s genetic. Redefining the behaviors 
as non-agentic could also make it easier for occasional eating disorder behavior to be 
repeated and then turn into an eating disorder.  Melanie said that if people began to believe 
that their body‟s natural tendency was toward purging, they might just accept it as inevitable. 
Well I think you could also have somewhat of a negative effect in terms of people 
wondering if they have – I don‟t know. People maybe who would, like, [who] tried 
that a little bit. I hasten to say tried. Like dabbled in that a little bit. And then they get 
this message that well they would hear as “Well if you tried it, you‟re probably a 
bulimic.” Or “You‟re more pre-disposed to that.” Or “It‟s in your genes. So you 
might as well go ahead. Because you‟re naturally to do that.” I don‟t know. That 
sounds really hokey. But it could have a negative impact like that…. Kind of 
reinforcement message that they‟re going to do that anyway. (Melanie, R-BN) 
 
The idea that the behavior was genetically influenced could make it seem like evidence of an 
already-existing disorder even before the disorder had developed.  Like Melanie, Thelma 
thought people might self-interpret the behavior as non-agentic:  “if I‟m doing it, then it‟s out 
of my control”.  If “it‟s just something genetic” then people would struggle less about the 
“decision” to purge, which is also related to the theme of responsibility described just above.   
R: I think one possibility would be that “Well it‟s not my fault. Therefore, like, if I‟m 
doing it, then it‟s out of my control. Like, this isn‟t a decision. This is just something 
that – like, I can‟t help it.” And I think, like, removing that element of accountability 
would definitely, like, be negative…  I think, like, it would make more people do it. 
Because it wouldn‟t be their fault. It wouldn‟t be a decision that they were making to 
engage in this activity. It would be something that was out of their control. And 
without that element of choice. Because I mean it‟s a difficult choice to make. 
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Because you just have to – I don‟t know. It says a lot about, like, the way you think 
about yourself. And what, like, your – what‟s important to you. And if it‟s not your 
fault, then you don‟t really have to worry about that as much. 
I:  So you‟re saying it‟s a difficult choice to purge? Or it‟s a difficult choice to not? 
R:  Yeah. It‟s like a – yeah. It‟s a difficult choice to decide that this is something that 
you‟re going to do like a habit or an act. Like it‟s – yeah. It‟s a hard decision to make. 
Because of all, like, the connotations and implications that we talked about earlier… 
Because I mean if you don‟t have to think about it as a decision. Like, as you sit down 
and think about it. Like, if you don‟t have to say “Should I do this? Or should I not do 
this?” If you don‟t even have to think about that. It‟s not like whether or not you 
make the choice. It‟s just something genetic. You‟re genetically pre-disposed to do 
this. It‟s out of your control. Like you don‟t have the option of making this choice. 
(Thelma, T-BN) 
 
If purging were no longer a decision but something thought to be out of one‟s control, people 
might stop thinking about it and just do it.   
 Predisposed people will expect to develop an eating disorder. Several respondents 
also volunteered that people who had never had an eating disorder but found out they were 
predisposed would also be more likely to develop one because the behavior seemed like 
something one could not control.  I did not ask about predictive testing, and these ideas came 
up in response to questions about finding out one‟s genetic predisposition after the eating 
disorder had already developed. Betty said it might make children feel “pre-destined” and 
“accept” that they would develop AN. 
Well, if I had everybody tested. If there were a test. And then, one of my 
grandchildren thought “Well, I‟m just pre-destined to have this thing.” And, they 
might accept it. And, just go on off and do anything they wanted to. Whereas if they 
didn‟t know, I think they would grow up more normally and not worry about it. 
(Betty, T-AN) 
 
Victoria imagined that it could encourage agency related to medical control (represented in 
Cell 1) or might “put the thought in my head” so she was “succumbing to my genetics”. 
It could have been helpful. Because I would have, like, been more aware of being 
susceptible to an eating disorder. So made different decisions. But on the other hand it 
might have just, like, put the thought in my head that I might develop an eating 
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disorder. And I might still go down that path just knowing – just, like, succumbing to 
my genetics I guess. (Victoria, T-BN) 
 
Barbara thought a teenager who knew about her predisposition to AN and wished to lose 
weight might be more likely to restrict her diet because she thought it would be “easier” for 
her than others. 
But as a teenager they say “Oh. Well you‟re genetically pre-disposed to anorexia.” If 
someone‟s dissatisfied with their weight, they could be like, “Oh. Well maybe that‟s a 
quick fix. And maybe it‟s easier for me to lose weight. Because I already, like, have 
that genetic pre-disposition to restricting my calories.” And I could just see that 
spiraling out of control. (Barbara, R-AN) 
 
Believing one‟s body to be capable of extreme caloric restriction might encourage behavior 
in that direction, according to Barbara.  
 Expect relapse if genetic. Recovered people might feel more at risk of relapse, thus 
making a relapse more likely, according to some respondents.  If the behaviors were 
redefined as non-agentic, people might be more likely to treat them that way, such that their 
expectations about relapse led to a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
I think knowing that I would maybe down the line if I had like a – like those urges 
came back. And they were really, really strong. And I couldn‟t do anything about it. I 
would kind of be like, “Oh. It‟s not my fault. I mean it‟s a disease I have. I can‟t get 
rid of it. I can do it for a little bit.” … I mean I could start doing it just a little bit. And 
like, “Oh. I‟ll get better in a little bit. I‟ll just do it for a couple days or a couple 
weeks. And it‟ll go away like a cold.” And stuff like that. But then it may go down a 
different route. And I wouldn‟t be able to stop it. It would just be too strong. (Carly, 
R-BN) 
 
This idea is similar to the theme of helplessness, but here respondents are assuming that the 
person could have exerted some control and are not actually helpless.  Some respondents said 
that knowing their eating disorder had genetic contributors would make them feel stressed 
and “at risk”.  This theme is indirectly related to the redefinition of agentic behavior as non-
agentic; if you are “at risk” and “vulnerable” to a behavior it made some people think you 
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might be more likely to do it.  Feeling at risk could generally add stress as well as 
specifically “plant the idea” of relapse, thereby leading to eating disorder behavior.  Barbara 
thought it would add to her stress and make her focus on and interpret her thoughts and 
behavior as early signals of a relapse, rather than ignoring them or seeing them as normal.  
R:  It would concern me a little bit. Because I would like – right now I‟m relatively 
confident that I don‟t ever have to worry about a relapse. And that would maybe 
make me more cautious again. And make me – just add more stress when I get really 
overwhelmed and I start to, like, be a little concerned about weight. Then I‟d be like, 
“Oh my gosh. Like, I really hope this isn‟t happening.” Which doesn‟t happen. And 
I‟m stressed. I just know I‟m stressed. And it‟ll be fine again. But [if] I knew I had a 
genetic pre-disposition, I‟d be probably a little bit nervous about kind of crossing that 
threshold that triggers it again. Whereas right now I think that I‟m relatively 
emotionally recovered. And so, like, I think it‟d have to be really, really incredibly 
extreme circumstances to get me down that path ever again. 
I:  So you‟re saying that it might make you worry more about it. Do you think it could 
change whether you actually do relapse to start thinking of yourself as having a 
genetic pre-disposition? 
R:  I think it might. Yeah. Like, I mean just planting the idea in my head that it‟s 
easier, like, could make me start thinking like … I mean I think it would yeah just 
concern me. Because I‟d be worried about if I started to think about it too much if I 
would start leading myself down that path. And just, like, knowing that it might be a 
genetic pre-disposition would make me worry about it more when I was worrying 
about all these other things. And I‟m already under an incredible amount of stress. 
And now I‟m thinking “What if I relapse?” And all of a sudden, like, I‟m not hungry 
one day. And I think that I‟m relapsing. And I just, like, basically lead myself into 
that cycle all over again. (Barbara, R-AN) 
 
Barbara speculated that her self-management as a recovered person would be disrupted by 
the knowledge that genetics had played a role.  She described how it would increase her 
worry about AN and cause her to “lead myself” toward AN again. Emma also thought it 
would “make me stressed out about now,” it would “be on my mind more.” 
It might give me a little bit of – just ease off a little bit on “You did something you 
shouldn‟t have been doing.” So, like, there‟s a reason or whatever. Not that there 
wasn‟t a reason. But, somehow kind of justify. But, it would make me stressed out 
about now. Because, I still – not that I act on it. But, I feel vulnerable to food. So, that 
would stress me. It would make me feel at risk. And so, like, thinking about it‟s going 
to happen more. When now, I don‟t think about it‟s going to happen as much. Like, I 
don‟t think – it would be on my mind more. (Emma, R-BN) 
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Emma implies indirectly that genetics could make her more likely to act on the behaviors, 
she would be more “stressed out about now” if genetics threatened her with relapse.  For a 
different reason, Vanessa thought that “re-opening” the “closure” she felt about her BN 
would threaten her with relapse as well: “I think it would be a blow. It would be a mental 
blow to some. It would be a stressor. It would be a stressor that could ultimately lead you 
back down that road. I really would feel that way.”  
2.2.5.  Using genetics as an excuse to abandon control  (5) 
 Genes could be used an excuse to justify persistence in eating disorder behavior, even 
if there were something that could be done about it.  As has been described, respondents 
brought up genuine hopelessness, which was represented in Cell 1 when that hopelessness 
was a reflection of a real inability to control the eating disorder, and in Cell 2 when it was a 
mistaken interpretation that caused the person to forego action that might have helped.  Now 
I turn to a related concept, consciously “using” genetics to pretend to others that one is 
hopeless in order to avoid hard work: genetics as an excuse.  Here, respondents raise the 
possibility that people with eating disorders would “use” genetics to convince others, and 
perhaps themselves, that change was impossible and efforts were futile.  Several point out 
that having genetics available as a plausible excuse could discourage them from trying.  
 There is much overlap with themes described in the sub-section above, but here I 
focus on using genetics as an excuse, in which the person with an eating disorder is figured 
as someone who is trying to convince others, and maybe also themselves, of a dubious 
proposition. They are behaving as though they do not have control, though they may not 
believe this as much as those just above. Using genetics as an excuse implies that some part 
of the behavior is in the person‟s control, and genetics provides a cover for it, thereby 
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enabling the person to slack off in her efforts. Gena alludes to the idea that having an excuse 
makes it “easier to explain” – an idea shared by those who welcomed genetics‟ ability to 
relieve blame – but could also “add to an excuse” for “essentially killing myself” with the 
eating disorder.   
Like with the media campaign … I can‟t lie and say that there‟s a little part of me that 
would make it a lot easier to explain. If I didn‟t always feel like I was justifying 
myself to everyone. That I can say “Look. This is the way I‟m made. I can‟t fix it. 
Deal with it.” But, that‟s also – I mean I can‟t lie and say that that wouldn‟t make my 
life a little easier. But, at the same time it also would add to an excuse that I have to 
be essentially killing myself. (Gena, R-BN) 
 
Fran‟s observations above about weight gain after surgery play on a similar theme. If weight 
gain is the “surgery‟s fault” then she will not try to avoid it, but if it is “her fault”, she will 
make the effort. Having an excuse available for use could affect one‟s action; if one is 
uncertain about one‟s ability to do something, the availability of an excuse could make the 
difference between action and inaction, particularly with a difficult task.
9
   
 Having an “excuse not to get better” reduces blame but also discourages hope; the 
excuse could disempower, according to Delia.  
…knowing that you‟re not to blame like I said would give most people an excuse not 
to get better. Because, they wouldn‟t be able to control it. But, they have to believe 
they can control it in order to get better. So, it‟s tough. I don‟t know that one. I don‟t 
have an answer for that. (Delia, T-AN) 
 
Rebecca thought the removal of blame could be “freeing”, but at the same time be “very 
rationalizing”, meaning that it could justify throwing up to herself and others. 
                                                 
9
Fran theorizes the “green light,” which is signaled by others, to affect one‟s actions. She theorizes an actor who 
responds to cues about what is possible from others around her, suggesting a reflected agency. If everyone else 
treats it as objectively true that weight gain after surgery is inevitable, or that genetically-influenced eating 
disorder behavior is impossible to control, the actor will believe this too and act (or not) accordingly. This could 
be called the “Dumbo effect”, after Dumbo the elephant who can fly only with a feather in his trunk (I am 
borrowing an analogy to a similar phenomenon from Watters 2010).  This is a good example of the social 
construction of reality because treating something as possible or impossible affects what people actually do, 
which only strengthens the sense that it is possible or impossible.  
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It might be kind of freeing for people…. It might be, like, easy for people to say 
“Well, like, I do have an eating disorder. But, like, part of it – like, it‟s not all just 
coming from me.” Like maybe it wasn‟t entirely my choice to start throwing up my 
food. So that might be kind of freeing. But I think it could, like, also be, like, very 
rationalizing. Like, “It‟s in my genes I‟m going to throw up my food. All right.” 
(raised shoulders and arms to indicate helplessness as though saying, “what could I 
do?”)…  Yeah. So I can see it having both those effects. (Rebecca, T-BN) 
 
Similarly, Victoria said she knew “there‟s still things I could do” so talking about genetics 
would be like saying, “ „Oh. It‟s not my fault I have an eating disorder. It‟s genetic. I can‟t 
help it.‟ Like, I just think that‟s a little bit of, like, a cop out.” Gillian thought some people 
could “just stop trying to recover. Because, now they have an excuse to be sick forever.” 
Cop-outs, excuses, rationalizations, and crutches imply a person who is self-indulgently 
choosing not to work on a difficult task.  Sarah used the metaphor of a “crutch”, where 
genetics would let people say “this is the way I am,” rather than working hard to change.   
I would hope that it wouldn‟t – I mean I just would hope that it wouldn‟t make people 
– allow people to just put it all on “It‟s genetic. And this is how I am.” And not even 
think for recovery. And not even try for recovery. But I guess I would worry that that 
could be a potential harm. That people would not even try to get better. And it would 
be kind of a way to just say “This is the way I am.” Because it is hard to change once 
you‟re in those patterns and have those behaviors. It is very hard to stop. So I would 
worry that people might use that as a crutch and not try to make those difficult 
changes. (Sarah, R-BN) 
 
Several respondents thought that people who already wanted to give up would use genetics to 
justify doing so. Amy envisioned people “choosing” to have AN and feeling bolstered or 
reinforced by the idea that genetics play a role: 
.. if people know that there‟s a genetic link, they may just say – if this is a person 
that‟s going to choose to have anorexia anyway. So, they would just say “Okay. I‟ve 
got the link. So, why not just go for it all the way?” (Amy, T-AN) 
 
Carol said people might “use” it if they wanted a “reason why they should die”. 
R:  If people used it as “Oh. Well, it‟s my genes. There‟s nothing I can do about it.” 
And, either didn‟t seek help. Or, refused help. And, used it … to be as self-destructive 
as possible… [S]ince people die from this, I can see that if you truly want to die that 
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you will – and, if you‟re going to do it in this slow drawn out way. That sure. I could 
see some people wanting more, like, reason why they should die…. 
I:  Like, what would the logic be? 
R:  Well, this is who I am. This is my genetic make-up. So, this is my destiny. I‟ve 
started this journey. And, I‟m finishing it this way.… I think we take every situation. 
And, we use it in some way that works for us. Whether it‟s helpful or destructive….  
Saying “Well, there‟s nothing I can do about this.” Using it as a death wish I guess. 
(Carol, R-AN) 
 
Carol theorized an agent seeking death who “uses” her situation and genetic ideas “as a death 
wish”. Fran, quoted at length earlier, thought that the availability of genetic ideas as a way to 
explain behavior could provide a “green light” for the person and “ammunition” against 
caregivers who want them to change their behavior. 
It might give somebody a green light to “I can‟t help it.”…  If it‟s a patient that 
doesn‟t have the desire to improve, it would give them their ammunition against a 
caretaker trying to help them. “I can‟t help it.”  (Fran, R-BN) 
 
Having the ammunition available made it possible to use against a caretaker; a resistant 
patient would presumably draw upon whatever was in her repertoire. Genetics would add to 
that repertoire. Tammy also thought it would give people a way to shift the blame. 
We‟d all have a reason to – we‟d all have something to blame. Because we‟re always 
looking for something to blame. Instead of trying to address – it‟s, like, obesity is 
McDonalds fault. Anorexia – it‟s my genetic pre-disposition. So don‟t try to help me. 
It‟s my genes‟ fault. So we‟re looking for something to blame instead of addressing 
some of the issues that impact causation. Yeah. McDonalds is not the best place to 
eat. And I don‟t even call it real food. But I don‟t have to go in there and eat 
everything either. They do have healthy choices. (Tammy, R-AN)
10
 
 
Respondents who are concerned about excuses fear that genetics could change what counts 
as an acceptable explanation for behavior, what kinds of accounts can be honored.  They 
perceive danger in loosened standards of accountability and responsibility, though many also 
perceive a welcome relief from blame at the same time.  Changes to the socially agreed-upon 
norms of accounting for unusual and problematic behavior loosen the constraints under 
                                                 
10
 Tammy also criticized society for always trying to blame people in a quote presented above; I interpret her to 
be conflicted about how much responsibility people have for over-eating. 
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which people are operating, with negative consequences according to these respondents.  
With regard to eating disorder behavior, some feared it would make people more likely to 
engage in the problem behaviors due to reduced constraints.   
That would probably give me that crutch. Or, that excuse. “I can‟t help it.”… I think 
it would have been an enabler for me. I wouldn‟t have stopped the behavior. Because, 
I would have thought I couldn‟t. I would have seen that as the reason I couldn‟t. That 
I didn‟t have control over it. (Fran, R-BN) 
 
Vanessa, responding to the question about whether she would want to know the results of a 
genetic test for predisposition, clearly linked genetic predisposition with excuses that would 
encourage more of the behavior. 
No. [Laughing, and the 'no' sounds very definite and almost reproachful or 
surprised.] I wouldn‟t want to know that. Because I think I would use it as an excuse 
to go back more easily. I could say “Oh. Well I have the gene for it, now.” And so I‟d 
use that as an excuse to do it. And so no. I wouldn‟t want to know that. (Vanessa) 
 
Respondents described in this section were concerned about the effects on behavior of the 
availability of genetic accounts. The availability of genetic excuses seemed to give a “green 
light” to behavior that ought to be seen as a problem. This suggests that stigma has a positive 
side: it is a form of social control that discourages problem behavior.  
 
 To summarize, genetic forces were perceived to reduce responsibility for people with 
eating disorders. If their condition were influenced by genetics, they had less individual 
control and ought not be blamed for the behavior. The meanings of genetics for eating 
disorders varied for respondents, but all were operating in a context where people with eating 
disorders were often held responsible for their behavior, and genetics connoted powerful 
determinative influences rather than minor contributors to a dynamic multi-layered causal 
story.  It is not surprising in this context that genes would provide a way to communicate the 
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lack of control, agency, and volition that most respondents experienced.  The perceived 
implications take into account others‟ potential skepticism about genetic claims (e.g., when 
genetics seems like an illegitimate excuse, or other examples from the right column of Table 
6.1); as we have seen in Chapter 5, respondents were themselves critical of specific powerful 
genes “for” AN or BN. Because genetic relief of past responsibility had potentially troubling 
implications for future agency, I examined five implications for agency or action regarding 
control over eating disorder behavior in Table 6.1.   
 Based on the perceived implications for future agency vis-à-vis eating disorder 
behavior, I conclude that care should be taken about what kinds of behavior are defined to be 
genetic and thus uncontrollable, as these affect expectations about what is possible to do and 
what actions are likely to be taken. In a context where respondents are held responsible and 
blamed for a complex behavior that feels non-volitional at times, emphasizing a factor that is 
clearly not in the individual‟s control provides a defense against blame. My respondents 
interpreted genetics in this way, though at other historical times and in other places 
something else might have served (e.g., the media, spirits, bad mothers, traumatic 
experiences, etc.). The effectiveness of genetic explanations as tools to reduce the perception 
of control and responsibility depended on whether genetics were perceived to be powerful 
enough to reduce individual control over eating disorder behavior.  Genetics were not the 
only factors beyond individuals‟ control; environmental factors played a role in every 
respondent‟s account of eating disorder causation. Were environmental factors insufficient to 
counteract blame in respondents‟ social settings? I now consider the perceived implications 
of genetic explanations for the role of environmental factors.    
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3. GENETICS VS. ENVIRONMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL CAUSATION  
 
If eating disorders are a complex product of social forces, individual agency, and genetic 
contributors, overemphasizing genetic sources threatens to minimize social explanations as 
well as choice-based explanations. In Chapter 1, I had speculated that geneticization, like 
medicalization, might make social and political problems seem like individual problems 
located in the body, with the effect of diverting attention from important environmental 
causes.  Did respondents identify this as a problem too?  Did they consider the effect of 
genetic explanations on social explanations? If so, what were the consequences? While most 
respondents spoke at greater length about the implications for perceptions of individual 
responsibility, several nevertheless identified both positive and negative implications of 
genetics for environmentally based understandings.   
3.1 “You can kind of choose to ignore culture”: Environmental causes less powerful than 
genes  
 
Several respondents were concerned that environmental explanations were not 
honored by others as legitimate accounts for their eating disorder behavior.  Several used the 
term “real”, just as above when speaking about genetic explanations making AN and BN 
more real, legitimate, and valid as disorders.  Here, I interpret “real” to refer not to the status 
of eating disorders as disorders, but to the status of environmental forces as powerful and 
clear, rather than “squishy”, “foo-foo”, or “soft science.”  
… [genetics is] possibly the least effective of all causes to target in terms of public 
awareness. But, it‟s also the simplest. People will accept it. It‟s genetic. It‟s research 
based. It‟s real. It‟s scientific. And, they won‟t accept something foo-foo like gender 
roles or something squishy. (Alyce, R-BN) 
 
I think I would talk more openly about it. Because I think that thinking that genetic 
explanations just carry more weight and legitimacy to them…. I think I think of it 
similar to, like, homosexuality is a choice or is it biology? But when we talk about 
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sexuality as biology instead of social or something that you choose. That you‟re off 
the hook. You don‟t have to explain anything. So I think the same with eating 
disorders. (Margaret, R-AN) 
 
I‟d just feel better knowing that there was more of a cause than just environment, 
surroundings, and the way I was – [that I] had to go through what I did with my dad. I 
think it would just make me feel better to know that there is another cause. (Karen, T-
AN) 
 
… I guess the good thing would be just the certainty of it. I don‟t know. I guess things 
just seem more concrete if they have some sort of basis in genetics that‟s almost 
reassuring….  Because, I feel like with psychology the flaw in psychology is the 
theoretical part of it … the definitions change. There‟s a lot of debate on 
environmental causes versus genetic causes. That‟s where the soft science bit comes 
in.
11
 So, I feel like there being a genetic link just makes psychology a little bit more 
real. (Joelle, R-BN) 
 
Some respondents thought individuals were held responsible for their reaction to 
environmental factors, making environmental explanations seem like unconvincing 
rationalizations for individual choices for which the person was responsible.   
Well, you can kind of choose to ignore culture. But, if it‟s genetics, it‟s a little bit 
harder to ignore. (Fiona, T-AN) 
 
It would probably make me feel more guilty [if I did not have a genetic 
predisposition].…  Because, if I didn‟t have a genetic cause, then I could have been 
more in control of my environment… I guess just not being influenced by all the 
dieting and media. (Mary, T-AN) 
 
…[I]t would just be nice to say “Okay. This wasn‟t just me reacting really crazily to 
the environment. I actually had a pre-disposition to it.” (Willa, R-AN) 
 
R: …Because, if it‟s not all environment, then I don‟t have to blame myself for the 
environment I was in. Because, many times I‟ll think “Oh. Suppose I lived in a 
different country. Would I still develop the eating disorder?” But, if that genetic 
component was present, then yeah. Probably I would have. And, I think so in that 
way, yeah. It probably would be a little easier for me. 
I:…  It sounds like it feels better to think of it as “Well, it‟s genes that I couldn‟t 
help.” Rather than “It‟s environment that I couldn‟t help.” 
                                                 
11
 Earlier Joelle had talked about stigma surrounding psychological problems but also psychological 
explanations themselves: “My mother and my father actually both a little wary when I told them I was going to 
major in psychology. Like there‟s still that sort of not really seeing it as branching off into more of the hard 
science that it‟s becoming. Like to them it‟s still a whole lot of Freud and silliness and sort of being – I don‟t 
know. What‟s the word? Self-indulgence. I feel like there‟s an element of self-indulgence.” 
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R:  Yes…  Because, I think with environment to some extent you can control it. I 
mean you can leave one place. And, go to another. And, see how things work in that 
sense. But, with the genetics I mean that‟s always present. That‟s always going to 
remain a part of you. So, that‟s a little easier for me. (Helen, T-AN) 
 
These respondents theorized that individuals could “ignore” culture, stop themselves from 
being “influenced by” media, and “control” their environment by moving away from it.  If 
they were reacting “crazily” to their environment, that was their fault, not the environment‟s.  
This implies that genes are uncontrollable, but environment or one‟s reaction to environment 
is controllable. 
3.2. Consequences of removing focus from environmental factors 
Some respondents discussed negative, positive, and ambiguous consequences for shifting 
blame from society and family to genetics.   
3.2.1. Bad to remove focus from environmental factors: Society and family “off the hook” 
A small but conceptually important minority was explicitly concerned about genetic 
explanations distracting from social factors, such as media representations of women and 
abuse by family members.  Genetics would remove focus from harmful social forces, 
resulting in less collective responsibility for and pressure upon these forces to change. 
Margaret (R-AN) spoke at length about the importance of keeping environmental 
factors in mind and provides a good introduction to these themes. She appreciated the 
capacity of genetics to remove individual blame, which “comes from seeing it as something 
you dreamed up yourself and as something that you created for yourself.”  However, genetic 
explanations are not “good in the long-term”, because they do not address “the bigger issue” 
and will “keep us from dealing with what I see as the more relevant explanation. Which is 
that it‟s a social problem.”  A genetic explanation would be “too easy”, and a “way of getting 
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around” gender inequality.  I quote her at length because her analysis is so directly related to 
the themes of this chapter. 
I think that anything that takes the pressure off of women to blame themselves for 
this, to feel like they themselves created this problem, is good to them personally…  
But I think it‟s a sorry substitute for dealing with it as a social problem. And that the 
way we construct gender and what it means to be a woman and all those things – that 
that‟s what needs to be dealt with. And so I think for society at large it doesn‟t help. 
But for individual women it probably does help to give them some other explanation. 
Because we don‟t have the other explanation. We don‟t have this treatment of eating 
disorders as a social problem. If we had that, then I would say that we don‟t need the 
genetic explanation. And publicizing it I think makes it too easy to ignore that it‟s a 
social problem. (Margaret) 
 
Like those respondents described just above, Margaret did not believe the social explanation 
of eating disorders is widely accepted; “we don‟t have the other explanation” available as a 
cultural tool, perhaps, so in that vacuum genetics are an inadequate and “sorry” substitute.  
Ignoring social responsibility for the problem could make the problem worse, 
according to Margaret and others. She and others spoke of the importance of keeping society 
on “the hook” and under “pressure” to change.   
But I think that the negative effects are that it takes us all off the hook. We‟re off the 
hook for trying to see this as a social problem that we all contribute to every time we 
buy a magazine that shows women in bathing suits or shows – whoever - Nicole 
Ritchie. “Look. She had a baby. And now she still weighs a hundred and two 
pounds.” But those things that keep focusing our attention on women and their 
shrinking bodies. Or bodies that should be ever-shrinking. Having these genetic 
explanations makes it too easy to ignore what I feel is the bigger problem. Which is 
that we are socializing women to shrink. They think they‟re supposed to shrink. And 
it takes our attention off that bigger problem. (Margaret) 
 
I think some people would – it would kind of take the pressure off, like, other causes 
like the media. And, I think some people would just be like, “Oh. It‟s just genetic.” 
Like there‟s nothing else we can do. Like they‟re going to get it no matter what they 
hear or see on TV. Or, anywhere else. Like, what anyone tells them. Like they‟re 
going to get it no matter what. I think a lot of people would think that. And, just 
maybe not focus on some of the other things they could do to try to prevent it or 
decrease frequency. (Eva, T-BN) 
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…I feel like that takes pressure off of society to change. Just kind of it has nothing to 
do with the fact that we idealize thinness. It‟s just these girls are screwed from the 
beginning. Then there‟s no responsibility there. (Willa, T-AN) 
 
Genetic explanations suggested that social forces were irrelevant or at less important than 
otherwise, thereby threatening to remove social responsibility, including individual 
responsibility to resist harmful social forces, with the result of decreased pressure to change.  
Paula also noted that a decreased awareness of the “choppy waters” through which 
adolescent girls must swim would prevent parents from doing what they could to support 
their daughters. 
On the one hand I would be happy that some sort of stigma and weight of these myth 
type things would be lifted. On the other hand I would worry. Because I do think that 
there are these other factors that come into play. I would worry that parents 
everywhere would just breathe a sigh of relief and think “Great. We don‟t have to 
worry about this. Because it‟s all pre-determined because it's genetics.” It‟s like eye 
color…  I guess I still feel like adolescence is sort of this, like, choppy waters that 
need – the girls need help navigating their way through. So hopefully that media 
campaign [about genetics] would be combined with “Oh. And by the way there‟s still 
– we‟re still figuring all this out.”…  the hazard is still there. I wouldn‟t want parents 
to think that it‟s not. (Paula, R-BN) 
 
To navigate around “the hazard”, one needed to be aware of it; awareness of harmful social 
factors thus not only helped to ameliorate them but also to prevent their negative 
consequences. 
Genetic explanations also ran the risk of drawing focus away from abuse or trauma 
from family members.  Alyce was concerned that in addition to letting society “off the hook” 
for the increased prevalence of eating disorders, it could also let parents “off the hook” for 
abusing their children.  
…it would also neglect so many causes that need it. Other factors that I think need 
attention as well. And, almost let them off the hook. “Well, you can molest your 
daughters. It‟s genetic that they have bulimia.” Because, I‟m not making this up. I 
have sponsored a lot of people [in Overeaters Anonymous]. And, sponsor means you 
lead them through the steps. And, you talk to them a few times. And, they start to 
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come out with their sexual abuse. And, if you say “Oh. It‟s genetic.” You just let a 
whole slew of things off the hook. I think. And, you don‟t answer the question of 
“Why are one out of three or whatever college women bulimic now?” When in other 
cultures and other times this was not the case. (Alyce, R-BN) 
 
If genetics are important, then “you can molest your daughters” and ignore other social 
factors.   
Genetic explanations could disrupt and unsettle respondents‟ understandings about 
the work they had done as part of treatment or recovery. Irene stated that genetic ideas would 
change how she talked about her BN with other people by making the abuse less central.   
I think in fact if anything it would make me feel less good about telling them about 
my bulimia. Because, I think it‟s a very graphic, dramatic way to explain the 
awfulness of my childhood. “It resulted in this.” But, if that is genetic, it takes away 
from the drama of explaining everything that happened to me. (Irene, R-BN) 
 
Vanessa thought genetic ideas would disrupt the closure she felt about her experience with 
BN (she was briefly quoted above as well). 
I mean with me thinking I started this because of … my peers or my friends. I started 
this because I was labeled as big in comparison to my mom. I started this – and then 
after all of these years I‟ve done all this healing and closure with these things. This is 
why. This is why. And then you come over here and tell me “It‟s because you‟re 
genetically disposed.” Well that means I got to go back and re-open all of that stuff 
again and try to get closure and re-think all of it all over again. That would be me. I 
was like, “Okay. That‟s not fair.” (Vanessa, R-BN) 
 
Vanessa thought the disruption of “closure” could be a “mental blow” and a “stressor that 
could ultimately lead you back down that road.”  Carol, whose account of childhood AN was 
centered on the dismal prospects for growing up female in her family, thought genetics 
would be troubling.   
I have worked really hard over my life at trying to make sense out of and deal with 
and create a life that worked for me and the whole issues of being female and that. 
And so, would I want to say that all my hard work could be in vain? (Laughs.) No. I 
wouldn‟t want to say that. (Carol, R-AN) 
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Wendy also thought a genetic explanation could jeopardize the work she had done in 
treatment, particularly in relation to her parents, who created an environment that led to her 
BN as a coping strategy.   
I:  How do you think family members would react to the idea that you had this 
genetic pre-disposition? 
R:  They might be glad for a simple explanation. 
I:  How would you feel about that? 
R:  I would probably roll my eyes at them….  It would just be, like, defeating of all 
the work I‟ve done to conquer it. It would be like, minimizing all my efforts. (Wendy, 
T-BN) 
 
The work of overcoming eating disorders would seem to be “in vain” or minimized if 
genetics were an important factor.  In many ways, then, genetic explanations would remove 
focus from familial and social explanations in ways that were harmful. 
Some thought genetics would lead to less talk about social causes and about their 
eating disorder with other people. This is directly related to the idea that genetics removes 
focus from social causation, and indirectly related to the idea that awareness of eating 
disorders as a social problem is important. It removes eating disorders from the realm of 
social awareness and conversation because it seems to be in the domain of science and 
professional care providers.    
I think people would be a lot less curious about it…. Because they would just say 
“Okay. It‟s another scientific thing that I can‟t really understand.” Whereas, like, I got 
lots of questions from friends about it whenever they found out about it. (Barbara, R-
AN) 
 
I would probably bring it up less, honestly. Because I would feel like other people 
could help me less. Because if it was just this genetic part of me, I would feel like 
only doctors could help me. As opposed to being thought patterns whereas friends 
could help me. (Wendy, T-BN) 
 
The geneticization of eating disorders would remove it from public discussion and relegate it 
to expert domains, according to these respondents. 
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3.2.2.  Good to remove focus from society and family 
Respondents also identified good consequences for removing blame from family 
members and shifting focus from societal explanations.  Talking about media causation felt 
like a way of stigmatizing eating disorders by trivializing them and stereotyping people with 
eating disorders as preoccupied with their looks, rather than suffering from a disease.  
It would make it more valid of a disease…. Just that it‟s not some stereotyped White 
girl disease. That there‟s actually a cause of it. And, again that I didn‟t choose to have 
it….  Yeah. I think that‟s, like, what people think of and what media portrays. And, 
you even see stuff in movies about – like in Mean Girls they show the girls at the 
popular table. And, they were sitting eating, like, six Skittles. And, that was their 
lunch with a diet Coke. And, they were the popular girls that were cheerleaders. But, I 
already feel like for me I‟m not the typical stereotype. And, I developed it when I was 
older. So, I already feel like the exception…. I always feel like I have to explain. I 
never felt like I was conceited or anything like that. Or, thought I was better than 
anybody else. But, that‟s kind of like the stereotype. (Mary, T-AN) 
 
Instead of like now it‟s like, I feel like people look at it like media caused this. Or the 
girl wanting to be thin has caused this. Like so I think maybe it might take, like, some 
strain off of, like, negative attitudes towards it maybe. Towards the individual. 
(Yvette, R-AN) 
 
In addition, several respondents welcomed the idea that genes could lessen parental blame. 
 
I think that my family would have an easier time not blaming themselves. Because, I 
mean you can‟t help what genes you pass on to people. I mean you can choose not to 
have children. But, you can‟t really, like, pick and choose your good ones. So, I think 
that would be helpful to my family to really feel like you really didn‟t do this to me. 
(Jackie, T-BN) 
 
I think it would give people peace of mind. I mean it would take some of the blame 
off certain people. Because I know my mom felt like am I going through this because 
of something she did? And for her to hear a scientist on a radio campaign or on CNN 
say “Oh. We‟ve now determined that bulimia is due to a genetic gene in a person.” It 
would alleviate stress from people. It would switch the blame. Because nobody wants 
to feel responsible like they‟ve done something to cause a person to fall into anorexia 
or bulimia. (Vanessa, R-BN) 
 
I think my mom would be relieved actually. I think she would sort of be like, “Oh. 
Good. There‟s a reason why this happened. And, like I wasn‟t a bad mother. I didn‟t 
cause this.” Because, I think that she wondered a while. Like, “What did I do wrong? 
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Why is my daughter doing this to herself?” Which I explained to her many times. It‟s 
like, “Mom. It‟s not you. It‟s just me.” (Hannah, R-AN)  
 
….  it would be nice for parents I guess. Because I feel like for parents who are 
thinking “Oh my gosh. What did I do wrong?” it would be kind of nice to know “Oh. 
Okay. I actually didn‟t do anything. My daughter was already – had the genes for 
this.” And so I think it could be good in that way. But also really frightening. Because 
then parents start to feel like, “Oh my gosh. Well then does this mean she‟s not going 
to recover?” (Willa, R-AN) 
 
Genes removed blame from parents not only because their treatment of children seemed less 
important, but also because their treatment of children might also have been caused by the 
genes they passed on.
12
   
… we can maybe see environmentally that parents maybe behave a certain way 
towards `food or diet. Or, have problems. And, think of them as having issues with 
choice and making bad choices and showing bad behaviors for their children. But, it 
takes a completely different element if they too are – have something that they can‟t 
help going on. Which I think is nice. Because, I feel like it‟s – I don‟t know. A little 
easier to correct [with medication] (Joelle, R-BN) 
 
Joelle is certain that her BN was improved by medication, and because her mother and 
grandmother also benefit from the same medication, she hypothesizes a genetic link between 
them.  For Joelle, maternal “slip-ups” that contributed to the eating disorder may be partly 
due to her mother‟s own struggle with genetically-influenced psychological problems. 
3.2.3.  Ambivalence about removing focus from parents  
Some respondents were conflicted about whether removing focus from parents was 
good or bad.  On the one hand, parents ought to take some responsibility, on the other hand, 
they might feel overly guilty. 
… my first reaction was I thought “Oh. Well that will be my mother‟s reason for my 
being anorexic is that it‟s genetic. And that she won‟t take any responsibility for her 
part in it.” That‟s what I thought. And then I kind of got over that quickly and said 
“Well maybe I do feel some relief that it‟s not all about the ways that I was raised.” 
(Reba, R-AN) 
 
                                                 
12
 This is called passive gene-environment correlation (Jaffee and Price 2007, p. 2). 
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Although Reba is concerned her mother might not take responsibility for her role in Reba‟s 
AN, she apparently values getting “over that”; responsibility is not supposed to rest there.  
Sydney also felt her mother played a role, but did not want her to feel guilty.   
My mother would probably be resistant. Or she‟d be really guilty. She would totally 
feel guilty about it. “Oh my God. I gave you this.” Which that‟s totally what 
happened (laughing). Now that I think about it. But I think – but at the same time if I 
was able to logic and reason with her. “This is not something you gave me mom. This 
is something you couldn‟t control. This is something.” So it might absolve guilt for 
some people. Yeah. I think it depends on the family. (Sydney, T-BN) 
 
Sydney laughed when she pointed out, “that‟s totally what happened”; though she does not 
want her mother to feel guilty about genetic influence, she does think her mother‟s behavior 
contributed. Earlier she described her mother‟s own apparent AN and “disordered eating” as 
important in the development of her BN.   
Selena is poignantly ambivalent about whether it is OK to see her parents as part of 
the problem; after all they did the best they could. Earlier she had spoke about her mother‟s 
illness and death as a traumatic experience, and the emphasis placed on appearance by both 
parents, particularly her father. On the one hand, she would welcome a genetic explanation to 
remove guilt from her father. 
Well I would love to think it was completely genetic. And that because my parents – I 
think my father especially has felt very guilty about did he do something to me? Hurt 
me or something. Because I mean he‟s like, “God. I mean I can‟t imagine why.” So 
he‟s thought – he‟s said to me openly “I think I was too hard on you. I think I pushed 
you too hard.” So I think he in his older years feels like he‟s responsible for me, like, 
having this problem. So I think it would help to know that it‟s just something in your 
DNA. (Selena, T-BN) 
 
On the other hand, she does think parents can contribute to their child‟s eating disorders, and 
that if it‟s simply a genetic condition for which medication can be taken, parents might not 
change their problem behaviors.  By discussing her father in this context, it is clear that she 
sees him as part of the problem.   
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Well if they thought they could just take a medication or something, maybe they 
wouldn‟t alter their parenting style. And I do think that my dad – no matter what the 
genetic factors are. He certainly made it worse. Because I‟m not saying I blame him. 
Because I think he did the best he could. But just the way he is about women. And the 
way he is about his controlling nature. I mean he didn‟t help. I can tell you. I mean he 
didn‟t help me in any way. But in his mind I think he thought he was helping.… Like, 
my parents put me on a diet when I was five years old. That was a little rigid. That 
was a little bit strange. And I think to myself “Maybe if they just let me alone, I 
probably wouldn‟t have gotten as bad.” I don‟t know. But there was so much focus on 
food and size and appearance and all this outward stuff. Recitals, pageants, and all 
that stuff. It‟s like, why didn‟t they just let me be? Just let me be a normal kid. 
(Selena) 
 
It is a challenge to see parents as flawed and responsible for some part of the eating disorder, 
and Selena would “like to get them off the hook” and genes would help her do that. 
I would think that if there was a genetic link, I probably would have it. Because I just 
feel like my problem has been so severe. That if there is any kind of defect, I‟ve got 
to have it. Because I do think my parents tried. I would like to let them off the hook. I 
mean not that I do blame them. But I would. Because my mom couldn‟t help that she 
got a disease [and passed away]. She couldn‟t help that. And my dad couldn‟t help it 
that he had to raise a family. I mean so it‟s like, nobody did anything wrong. 
Everybody did what they thought was best. (Selena) 
 
Irene also displayed some ambivalence. She would like to see her mother‟s abusive behavior 
as stemming from a mental illness, whether genetically-influenced or not, which would 
enable her to feel better about the relationship. 
3.3. Brief reflections on genetic explanations for agency and future action regarding 
environmental factors  
 
There were a number of interesting logics of action that stemmed from shifting 
responsibility from society and parents to genetics. As seen above, the idea that genetics 
played a role led most respondents to think that seeking professional help was a logical 
action, particularly if biologically-based treatment were available.  If environmental factors 
were of primary importance, it was logical to try to change the environment.  Margaret and 
others touched on some of the logical actions that flow from the idea that cultural and 
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familial factors matter: raised awareness of how one contributes to the problem, talking about 
one‟s own history with others, keeping people and institutions “on the hook” if they are 
responsible.     
But if it was purely genetic and something that was out of your control. And you 
could just take this pill and be better. Then I think that‟d be great. Like it‟s – I don‟t 
know. Maybe, like, comparable to treatment of depression. Like, sometimes people 
are depressed because their lives are terrible. And they need that to change. And then 
sometimes people are depressed because of off body chemistry. (Rebecca, T-BN) 
 
On hypothetically finding out she did NOT have a genetic predisposition, Alyce said, “I 
would feel much more optimistic in some way. Like, “Oh. If everything that caused me to do 
that was social and familial and cultural and whatever, we can change those things.” (Alyce, 
R-BN)  It seems obvious, and is supported by earlier excerpts, that if environment were 
thought not to matter, it would no longer make sense to do these things. Indeed, they might 
seem like forms of denial that the illness is serious, ways of stereotyping and stigmatizing 
people with eating disorders, and to wrongly blame parents.   
 For many respondents, even if genetics were of primary importance it was also 
important to change the environment.  Perhaps surprisingly, some thought the idea of a 
genetic causal factor would inspire more attention to the environment.  When considering the 
idea of genetic testing, many expressed that if they found out they had a genetic 
predisposition they would be even more careful to provide an environment that did not 
promote eating disorders for their children. Some spoke of counteracting harmful social 
forces and being careful about what they communicated to children. 
Well, I mean genes are only one part of the equation. Like, the environment definitely 
still matters. And so, like, if you know you have that risk factor, then, like, I think the 
only real reason you would want to know that is that your parents or whoever or you 
can make sure your environment is as conducive as possible to not developing it. So, 
you can make sure not to read those magazines. And, to be careful to make sure that 
when you‟re stressed out, you are still making sure you sleep enough and eat enough 
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and get proper amount of exercise and everything. Take care of yourself. I feel like 
you still have to take care of yourself. Even if you know you have a risk factor for 
something. It‟s the same. I mean yeah. (Hannah, R-AN) 
 
… there‟s probably a lot of people that assume that it‟s something teenage girls do 
because of X and Y. Who would benefit from the knowledge that it goes a little 
deeper than that…. It might be beneficial for parents to be able to maybe examine 
themselves a little bit more closely. And, maybe recognize risky behaviors before 
they turn into problems. I don‟t think my mother ever realized that I took to heart 
some of the things that she told me. (Joelle, R-BN) 
 
Knowing that eating disorders had a genetic contribution also involved changes to the 
environment in the form of awareness of and monitoring for early signs of eating disorders, 
as part of a medical logic of action.   
Well, there‟d be more discussion about it. People might look at people they know. 
And, say “How are you doing? What‟s going on with you?” If there were adults in the 
household who had been anorexic, maybe they‟d take more care with their children 
on this issue. (Lynn, R-AN) 
 
Amy thought that a genetic causal factor could inspire social change beyond the family 
context. Publicizing the idea of genetic contributors to AN could change how modeling and 
athletic competitions were conducted because officials would endeavor to prevent AN deaths 
by relaxing their focus on weight. 
… to me it would make sense if they were to say “Okay. We‟ve identified a disorder. 
A genetic link to a disorder that could potentially end up in a mass amount of deaths 
so to speak.” And so, they would want to do everything in the world to try to prevent 
that…. it would be like in some countries. You have to be a certain amount of weight 
to participate in runway shows. You have to maintain a certain amount of weight to 
even stay in competition for sports and things like that. And, not that coaches or 
people in industries would know who or who doesn‟t have an anorexia gene. But, it 
would be a generalization to where they would say expect for everybody when 
they‟re younger to kind of have it. And, the comments wouldn‟t be like, “Well, if you 
lost maybe five pounds, you would look a lot better in this act.” (Amy, T-AN) 
 
I perceive in the above a logic of action that connects genetics to environmental 
change via medicalization. If genetics matter, then eating disorders are a disease that ought to 
be taken seriously, so all contributors including environmental factors should get more 
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attention too.  This was compatible with the idea of gene-environment interaction.   Again, I 
am basing this on hints in the interviews and to understand this better, future research would 
need to be more systematic about asking if genetic contributions would be likely to change 
how people think and act upon environmental factors.  There is a lot of evidence that genetic 
factors would encourage people to see eating disorders as something for professionals to 
handle and therefore seek treatment. Many respondents spoke about biologically based 
treatments – a pill, gene therapy, an injection, an operation – as logical to expect if genes 
played a role, as far-fetched as many of them thought this to be.  Genetic contributions also 
encouraged treatment even if there was no biologically-based intervention, probably because 
of the above logic.  Helen (T-AN)described cognitive behavioral therapy as working on the 
environmental factors. I asked her to explain why: 
It‟s environmental in that the change comes when you start looking at your life in a 
different way. When you start looking at those thoughts. And, you recognize you can 
control the way you act. And, you can control what you do with those thoughts. So, I 
think when you just have that awareness, that really does make all the difference. 
(Helen) 
 
“Looking at your life” is looking at your environment, presumably, and becoming aware of 
your thoughts and actions. 
Similarly, it was possible to justify “environmental” treatment if one‟s condition had 
genetic origins.  Selena had spoken repeatedly about her father and others who “love her to 
death”, and suggested that they might be adding to the problem, though she did not want to 
blame them for her BN.  Seeking intensive treatment for her eating disorder would get her 
away from people who “enable” her BN but this seemed like something she should be able to 
do by herself.  If BN were reconceived as genetic she could receive treatment without feeling 
guilty, just as though she were receiving treatment for cancer or diabetes. Yet, the treatment 
378 
 
she described was recommended because it would change her environment. Therefore, 
reconceiving of the eating disorder as genetic would help Selena justify seeking treatment 
that focuses on her environment.  
Well in the crises that I‟ve had each time somebody would say to me “You need to go 
to, like, Renfrew or somebody, like, here and just stay. Because the structure of that 
will help you. And the people in your life who love you to death somehow probably 
enable you. Maybe they don‟t try to. They try to help you. But maybe the structure of 
going and doing that would help you.” And I‟ve never really been open to that. 
Because I thought “I can do this. I don‟t want to be away from my own setting. My 
own life.” But I think if I realized that it wasn‟t just environmental. If it was really a 
disease like cancer or diabetes or something. I mean if you had diabetes, wouldn‟t 
you go and get treatment? Like, this one you think you‟re doing it to yourself. You 
think you don‟t have a choice. (Selena, T-BN) 
 
If it is just her environment, she believes “I can do this”. But if it is genetic, then she 
reconceives it as a disease that was not in her control, which enables her to get help with the 
environmental factors. Paradoxically, it is the very conceptual exclusion of environment from 
genetics that enables this respondent to seek treatment that addresses the environment 
precisely because her problem is reconceived as genetic. 
  
 In summary, although environmental factors were ubiquitous in respondents‟ causal 
stories, they were a less central preoccupation than individual agency when genetics were 
considered.  Some respondents held themselves responsible for being affected by their 
environment, and some could identify reasons why de-emphasizing environmental factors 
might have good effects. A conceptually important minority spoke at length about the 
troubling consequences of getting society and family “off the hook.” Some respondents said 
genetics could actually prompt more preventive attention to the environment, because of a 
theorized gene-environment interaction, or even just because genes made the condition seem 
more serious and commanded attention to all potential causal factors, environment included. 
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4. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 6 
In these interviews, the involvement of genetics promotes a more medical conception 
of eating disorders in a social environment that contests their reality as illnesses.  More 
generally, genetic ideas prompt consideration of the line between individual responsibility 
and irresponsibility for behavior that is complex and difficult to explain. Genetics are a 
metaphorical tool to convey the non-volitional aspects of eating disorder behavior.  Genetic 
accounts may or may not be honored by others, but they are taken to mean that individuals 
are less able to control and therefore less responsible for their behavior. Respondents 
perceived genetic ideas to have consequences for action, from propelling people toward 
treatment to providing a handy excuse for getting out of treatment. If an eating disorder is an 
irreducible mix of factors that feels non-volitional at times, genetics is helpful in conveying 
non-volitional aspects but may artificially narrow conceptions of contributing factors and 
how to stop having an eating disorder. Reducing stigma may, ironically, threaten active 
attempts at recovery. Letting environmental factors “off the hook” seemed disturbing and 
counter-productive for some respondents, but reassuring and helpful to others. Genetics 
works as a cultural tool to convey a need for compassionate help in respondents‟ social 
contexts, but it may have negative side effects, such as decreasing a sense of agency or 
control in combating the disorder and de-emphasizing environmental forces.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The principal aim of this study was to understand the meanings and implications of 
genetics for people with eating disorders.  No previous study had examined what people with 
eating disorders thought about the idea of genetic influence on AN or BN.  In this chapter, I 
will summarize the main findings, identify their implications more generally, note some of 
the limitations of the study, and suggest future directions for this research. 
In Chapter 1, I set out several interrelated research questions, all revolving around 
perceptions of genetic influence and its consequences.  I wondered whether genetic ideas 
would make eating disorders seem more like medical diseases, and whether respondents who 
already saw eating disorders as medical diseases would welcome the idea of a genetic 
influence.  What were the positive and negative aspects of highlighting the role of genetics in 
the development of eating disorders, and did they resemble those I identified before 
conducting this research (as summarized in Table 1.2 of Chapter 1)?  Did respondents 
already think of eating disorders in genetic terms?  Did they find the idea of genetic influence 
plausible, and if so, what role did they imagine genes to play (if any)? My study illuminated 
all of these questions. 
1. Summary of the main findings  
To summarize, I integrate across chapters to identify three over-arching findings:  
geneticization and medicalization appeared to reinforce each other, respondents perceived 
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genetics to have implications for individual responsibility and future action, and respondents 
imagined genes to work in complex, dynamic ways that went beyond “simple” and even 
“complex” models described in Chapter 1.  
1.1 Geneticization and medicalization reinforce each other in eating disorders 
In the introduction, I proposed that conceiving of eating disorders as genetically 
influenced would heighten their perceived medicalization.  Eating disorders had already been 
officially medicalized by their inclusion in the DSM, but I argued that if medicalization is a 
continuum, the perception of biological causation could heighten or intensify it.  I found that 
additional medicalization of eating disorders was possible, given the variation in 
endorsement of medicalized terminology described in Chapter 4.  I presented strong evidence 
for the idea that geneticization promoted medicalization in Chapter 6: when discussing the 
implications of genetic ideas, three-quarters of respondents spontaneously mentioned one or 
both of my criteria for a narrow, conservative definition of medicalization (i.e., disease 
concepts and warrant for treatment) and nearly all (94%) spontaneously mentioned these or a 
third criterion (i.e., biologically-based treatment).  Respondents thus thought that the idea of 
a genetic influence would prompt themselves or others to conceive of eating disorders in 
more medical terms and to act on them accordingly.  Thus, geneticization promoted 
medicalization.   
I also found that medicalization promoted geneticization, meaning that people who 
already viewed eating disorders as a disease were more likely to respond favorably to the 
idea of a genetic influence (Chapter 5).  In addition, people who had received more treatment 
and those currently in treatment were more likely to endorse medicalized terminology and 
react positively toward genetics.  Indeed, the medicalized terms “mental illness” and “brain 
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disease” frequently connoted biological causation to respondents (though some rejected the 
terms precisely for this reason) (Chapter 4).  
1.2 Perceived implications of genetics for respondents resemble those mentioned by experts   
Respondents‟ perceived implications largely resembled those I identified in Chapter 
1. Like the experts I cited, they had concerns about reductionism, distraction from social 
causes, and fatalism (though few respondents anticipated additional stigma). They hoped that 
genetics would make others take eating disorders more seriously, treat them with greater 
compassion, and recognize their need for assistance.   
I found that respondents were particularly preoccupied by the meanings of genetics 
for personal responsibility, volition, and agency as perceived by others and themselves. This 
focus on responsibility was shaped by existing understandings of eating disorders as 
“contested illnesses,” in this case, more like choices than medical diseases. In the view of 
respondents, genetic influence reduced the culpability of the person with an eating disorder 
(and, to a lesser degree, culpability of her family and society).  Respondents‟ interpretations 
of genetics were tied up with what others thought eating disorders involved and what genetic 
influence might mean to them.  As anticipated and described in Chapter 1, respondents took 
into account their social context where eating disorders were perceived to be volitional – 
people asked them, “why don‟t you just stop?” – rather than diseases the affected person 
could not control. The presumption of volition was troubling to respondents, and in Chapter 3 
I noted that most ideally wanted others to think of the eating disorder with sympathy as a 
sickness or as a struggle.  In Chapter 6 I highlighted the perception that genetics implies a 
person with an eating disorder “can‟t help it,” with implications for how the respondent was 
perceived by others, as well as how she perceived herself.  
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The difficulty of understanding and describing their own role in eating disorder 
behaviors clearly informed their interpretation of genetic influence; genetics provided a way 
of conveying that the behaviors were not simply volitional.  In Chapter 3, I explored the 
multiple, perhaps contradictory, ways respondents spoke about their own agency in eating 
disorder behavior, distinguished “agentic,” “non-agentic,” and “quasi-agentic” language, and 
found that all respondents who used “agentic” language also used one of the other kinds.  
Thus, for respondents, eating disorder behavior was not simply a choice and their language 
implied that choice was either constrained or non-existent in some ways and/or at some 
times.  In Chapter 4, I showed that respondents struggled to define the ways in which AN and 
BN were and were not volitional “choices,” with some rejecting the term entirely and others 
rejecting certain interpretations of the term.  By articulating the “finer points of choice,” (see 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4) respondents revealed the complexity of agency, and the potential appeal 
of genetics as a way to explain behavior that felt out of control. 
Genetics enabled respondents to identify “some sort of larger force at work,” a force 
larger than themselves that prevented the free exertion of their agency. As they considered 
the implications of genetic influence for themselves and others with eating disorders, much 
turned on the idea that genetic influence conveyed the idea that one “can‟t help it,” as 
described in Chapter 6.  Genetic ideas had the potential to reframe the agent from “bad” to 
“sick”; rather than perversely “choosing” to harm herself with an eating disorder, with 
genetics she could be a healthy, normal agent grappling with an illness.  As was seen in 
Chapter 4 (particularly Figure 4.1), respondents thought “choices” were by definition in 
pursuit of good rather than bad and self-destructive ends.  If eating disorders were contested 
illnesses, they could not confidently assert that they were under the control of an illness; 
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sickness would not be accepted as an explanation for self-destructive behavior. However, if 
genetics could make eating disorders seem more like illnesses to other people, some 
respondents appeared to think they might be able to retain a sense of their healthy agency 
despite the illness. The transformation from “bad” to “sick” would be accomplished if others 
in her social context began to perceive eating disorders as an illness, which respondents 
thought would be encouraged by genetic ideas (see above on medicalization).  (Genetics 
were not the only way to accomplish the rehabilitation of agency; as suggested in Chapter 4 
respondents could also rehabilitate their agency by describing past choices as botched or 
impaired attempts to seek the good.)  
If respondents sought to explain their behavior by attributing it to “some sort of larger 
force at work,” genetic forces were apparently “larger” than social forces. Although 
environmental influences were ubiquitous in interviews and virtually all agreed that it was a 
“social or cultural problem” (Chapter 4), these influences apparently did not adequately 
convey that people “can‟t help it.”  Indeed, some felt additionally blamed by social 
explanations because they seemed to reflect their individual weakness, vanity or extreme 
conformity to cultural ideals; a better person would not have succumbed.  Social and other 
“environmental” forces did not seem to pose a challenge to the idea of eating disorders as 
“medical”; respondents who cited morally charged environmental causes (trauma, abuse, or 
injustice) or who spoke more than others about gender-related issues, were no less likely to 
endorse medicalized terminology (Chapter 4).  Even Margaret, the respondent who explicitly 
resisted genetic explanations because of their potential to remove focus from gender 
inequality, thought that genes were more effective in her social context for removing blame, 
even though she wished it were not so.  Even if environmental explanations were not helpful 
 385 
 
for removing blame, they were nevertheless valuable and central to respondents‟ narratives 
about eating disorder causality, and several respondents were concerned about letting these 
forces “off the hook” if genetic explanations were foregrounded. 
 Given that genetics promoted medical conceptions of eating disorders and reduced 
the perceived responsibility of the individual and social forces, it is not surprising that 
respondents identified changes in what kind of actions one could or should take toward 
eating disorders.  Genetic loss of control (i.e., the idea that genetic involvement made people 
less able to control their behavior) could be seen either as a plausible and justified 
understanding (an accurate, reasonable conclusion to draw from the idea of genetic 
influence) or an implausible and unjustified understanding (because the genetic influence did 
not preclude individual control over behavior). If genetic loss of control seemed justified, 
respondents speculated that people with eating disorders would be more likely to take 
medical action, or to become hopeless, or (paradoxically) to gain greater control over the 
very behaviors that genes were supposed to control.  If genetic loss of control were 
implausible and unjustified, claiming a genetic loss of control could seem like an excuse 
given to evade responsibility for controlling behavior, or a mistaken belief that discouraged 
attempts to do so.  People might genuinely believe they were unable to control their behavior, 
or they might cynically pretend they were unable to, with the same result for both: further 
entrenchment of the eating disorder when it might have been stopped.  These implications for 
action are shaped by the taken-for-granted knowledge that eating disorders are often 
considered to be choices; otherwise the idea of an “excuse” would not make sense. Thus, the 
idea of genetic loss of control elicited from respondents a wide array of desirable and 
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undesirable potential consequences for future action, especially with respect to treatment 
seeking and efforts to get well. 
1.3 Beyond “simple” and “complex” genetic models 
In the introductory chapter, I described “simple” and “complex” genetic causal 
models, and wondered which kind respondents might hold, if any. I found far more 
complexity and dynamism than was captured in my description of “complex” gene-
environment interaction models.  As briefly noted in Chapter 5, most respondents (37 of 50) 
spontaneously mentioned genetics in connection to eating disorders.  However, respondents 
spoke about the development of eating disorders in ways that could not be reduced to a gene-
environment interaction (what I had referred to as “complex” in Chapter 1), much less 
Mendelian causation (what I had referred to as “simple”).  By speaking about causes such as 
the valorization of thinness (Chapter 3) – in which physical body size, its social meanings, 
and efforts to control it by individuals coalesce into a single irreducible compound causal 
factor – respondents far exceeded the complexity of gene-environment interaction models.  I 
was not surprised that environment would be important even if genes were involved, but the 
centrality of a temporal dimension (in coping and the repetition of behaviors) implied a more 
developmental perspective than I had seen in discussion of the genetics of eating disorders.  
In addition, I found respondents were able to incorporate genetics while also leaving 
significant room for themselves as agents interacting over time with environments (theories 
of interactive and indirect roles for genes described in Chapter 5). Indeed, I believe that their 
discussions of genetic testing indicated that the “gene-by-environment interaction” version of 
complexity actually constrained their imaginations, probably because it seemed to imply 
genes “for” AN or BN.  However, simpler models of genetic causality were also on their 
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minds, and in their initial reactions to genetic ideas (Chapter 5) and discussions of public 
perceptions of a media campaign or the implications of genetic test (Chapter 6), they 
expressed concern about reductionistic interpretations of genetic causality that could exclude 
environmental influence, agency, or the temporal dimension.  Diverse models of genetic 
influence co-existed as respondents imagined implications of genetics for their self-
conceptions, others‟ self-conceptions, and others‟ evaluations of them.   
2. Contributions 
These three findings contribute to scholarship across multiple disciplines.  I focus on 
contributions to literature on geneticization, medicalization, and the classic theory of 
accounts in ways that are relevant to both social psychology and sociology of culture.  
Results also inform the following areas but I do not discuss them here: stigma for mental 
illness, health behavior change, recovery narratives, and public understanding of gene-
environment interaction.  
2.1 Medicalization and geneticization 
 My findings provide empirical support and individual-level detail for the argument by 
Shostak et al. (2008) that geneticization for a condition that has already been medicalized 
encourages yet more medicalization. Shostak and colleagues argued this on the basis of a 
case study comparing the different effects of geneticization of depression, homosexuality, 
and susceptibility to environmental toxins.  As noted in Chapter 1, the idea that 
medicalization might be heightened even after official adoption has not received much study.  
My findings suggest mechanisms for this process: physical origins rather than moral 
responsibility for behavior, expectation for new treatments (“genetic optimism” as described 
by Conrad 2001), and perception of increased severity of the disorder that warrants 
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biologically-based treatment (supporting Phelan 2006).  By focusing on a medicalized 
condition defined by behavior, this project also illuminates potential limits to medicalization 
when compared to conditions such as depression; some respondents were resistant or 
skeptical about genetics and expected others to be too.  
My findings on medicalization add to the study of medicalization as a continuous 
process and illuminate aspects of negotiation processes “on the ground” for individuals.  
Genetics seemed to promote medicalization, and likewise medicalization seemed to promote 
geneticization.  Taking a step back, and considering geneticization as something that may or 
may not happen for a given condition (Cox & Starzomski 2004) there were factors that 
promoted and discouraged thinking of eating disorders in genetic terms.  On the side of 
promotion, genetics helped combat the perception of volition and resultant stigma 
surrounding eating disorder behavior by providing a way to convince others and themselves 
that it wasn‟t simply a “choice.”  Alternative explanations for why eating disorders were not 
simply a choice, such as culturally-based and feminist explanations, appeared less powerful 
to respondents; social explanations did not counteract the accusation of choice and for some 
seemed to add yet more blame and stigma.  Armed with a genetic explanation, some 
respondents felt more able to expect compassion from others and to justify treatment, even 
treatment not based on genetic information. Alleviating parental guilt via genetics also 
appealed to some respondents.  Other factors militated against geneticization.  Respondents 
were concerned that blaming genetics would seem like an irresponsible excuse to others. 
Respondents were also cautious about the potential for some genetic explanations to ignore 
environmental factors. Last, because there is no genetic test nor genetically-guided treatment 
there are limits to the geneticization of eating disorders.   
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In general, I expect that my findings of mutually-reinforcing medicalization and 
geneticization, along with some resistance and skepticism, are likely to be relevant for other 
quasi-medicalized problem behaviors such as addiction to alcohol or substances, over-eating, 
gambling, or conduct disorder. Genetics may provide a way of explaining the development of 
these behaviors and the difficulty of stopping, and strengthen claims about the medical status 
of deviant behavior as behavioral disorder rather than choice or habit.  Eating disorders are a 
good case from which to generalize, for three reasons. First, many respondents thought of 
their disorder as a form of addiction, so their reasoning might be used by those with other 
addictions.  Second, the diversity of behaviors in eating disorders map well onto diverse 
other behaviors, both those that involve taking things into the body and those that do not: 
bingeing involves such consumption and may therefore be conceptually similar to over-
eating and consumption of an addictive substance; purging and restricting do not involve 
taking things into the body and may have some conceptual overlap with “addictions” to other 
such behaviors (e.g., gambling or shopping).  Third, there is diversity within eating disorders 
with regard to the sense of control and stigmatization of specific behaviors: for respondents, 
restricting connoted more self-control than bingeing, and less embarrassment than either 
bingeing or purging.  If a genetic explanation could be applied to a behavior like restricting, 
it seems even more likely to be applicable to other behaviors that feel out of control or 
shameful.   
My findings show that for laypersons, geneticization may happen in different ways 
for a single condition, because respondents theorized diverse genetically-influenced causal 
pathways. Genetic influence on AN or BN is not tantamount to genes “for” AN or BN, 
neither for genetics researchers (Kendler 2005) nor respondents.  Some researchers studying 
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genetic influence on eating disorders have conceptualized it as part of a more general 
phenotype relevant to multiple diagnoses, such as “negative emotionality” or 
“obsessionality” (Bulik et al. 2007). Such theories are compatible with respondents‟ ideas 
about personality and general psychological problems. 
I found that respondents‟ theories of genetic influence ranged from genes specifically 
“for” AN or BN to quite indirect causal pathways, genes “for” outcomes that were 
unambiguously pathological or not, and genes “for” physical attributes as well as 
psychological characteristics. Respondents seemed to care how the genetic causal pathway 
was specified, not only because some pathways were more plausible than others but also for 
what they meant about the disorder and recovery.  
By focusing on eating disorders, this study draws attention to important distinctions 
among types of geneticization for diverse medicalized conditions, whether behavioral or not. 
Studies that focus on testing for predisposition for single gene disorders (e.g., Novas & Rose 
2000, Marteau and Richards 1996) or predisposition for disorders that involve both genes and 
environment or risky behavior (e.g., Senior et al. 1999, Marteau and Weinman 2006, Harvey 
2009) are different from my study because they involve specific genes known to contribute to 
the condition, individual knowledge of personal genetic information, and address 
predisposition before a condition has developed rather than afterwards. In my study, all 
respondents already had a diagnosis, there was no concrete information about personal 
genetic predisposition, and the claim of genetic involvement in eating disorders was based on 
twin studies, with no identification of a particular stretch of DNA (Hedgecoe‟s 2002 
definition of geneticization).  Yet, even in the absence of personalized genetic information, 
most respondents used genetic ideas to talk about their disorder and its development even 
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before I introduced the topic, suggesting that geneticization is relevant here too.  My study 
helps map a less-explored territory, somewhere between these studies of people with known 
genetic risks and studies of the general public‟s understanding of genetics (e.g., Condit 2006, 
Shostak et al. 2009, Phelan 2005, Singer et al. 1998); my respondents are applying genetic 
ideas to their diagnosis without concrete personalized information.
 1
  It makes sense, then, to 
study genetic ideas even in the absence of clinical information simply because respondents 
are using them and, as my study shows, they can be part of complex negotiations about 
medical status, individual responsibility, and social responsibility.   
By focusing on how people already diagnosed with eating disorders think about 
genetics, my study considers ideas about responsibility and agency -- familiar themes in 
studies of geneticization -- from a novel vantage point.  Many studies of geneticization 
suggested or showed that new responsibilities and obligations came with identification of 
one‟s own genetic risk for a disease (e.g., Lippman 1991 and 1998, and later Novas and Rose 
2000, Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2008).  The susceptible person had new ethical obligations, 
including responsibility for managing health and reproductive behavior in light of new 
information.  For example, Lippman (1998) was concerned that in the context of prenatal 
testing for Down syndrome, this redirection of agency and responsibility seemed to offer 
more choices but would in the end constrain mothers‟ choices and hamper public health 
efforts.  Novas and Rose (2000) also observed that information about genetic predisposition 
for Huntington‟s disease created new responsibilities and prompted particular kinds of action, 
which they contrasted to previous expectations of passive resignation to a genetic fate.  
Harvey (2009) and Marteau and colleagues (2004) examined diseases that also involved 
                                                     
1
 Some research has addressed the perceptions of people with high familial rates of depression (Laegsgaard et 
al. 2010), bipolar disorder (Meiser et al. 2005, 2007, 2008). I plan to do a more thorough literature review to 
identify whether there have been studies similar to mine for other physical and mental health conditions.  
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genetic predisposition but could be exacerbated or prevented through individual diet and 
exercise behavior (e.g., hypercholesterolemia). Unlike monogenetic disorders, where 
individual action could not prevent the outcome, in these more complex conditions individual 
agents were not limited to preparing for, managing, and preventing future generations from 
inheriting the condition; through changing their behavior they could plausibly prevent or 
alleviate the condition. These more complex conditions bring to the foreground different 
concerns about responsibility and agency in relation to a known genetic predisposition 
because one‟s own behavior can influence the outcome.   
My study concerns yet a third kind of condition, for which individual behavior is 
incorporated into the definition of the condition and thus suggests a different relationship 
between genes, behavior and responsibility. The criteria for diagnosing AN or BN include 
behaviors as well as the results of behaviors. In AN, the “refusal to maintain bodyweight” 
(emphasis added) is listed along with its results, very low bodyweight and absence of 
menstrual period. In BN, most of the criteria involve behavior, namely binge eating and 
“inappropriate compensatory behavior” (e.g., vomiting).  By contrast, a diagnosis of heart 
disease is not defined by current over-eating and under-exercising even if these behaviors 
may have contributed to the outcome. In heart disease, over-eating and under-exercising 
would be categorized as “lifestyle” behaviors that individuals can control, not part of the 
disease.  If genes play a role in a condition that is defined in part by behavior, it suggests a 
third potential relationship between genetic predisposition and individual agency. Figure 7.1 
provides an overview of my reasoning about three kinds of conditions, simplified to focus 
solely on genetics and behavior rather than more complete causal models. 
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Figure 7.1  Genes, behaviors, and responsibility in three different kinds of conditions 
Causal factors Outcome Responsibilities of the agent 
Genes  Monogenetic disease Managing, preparing for, and 
preventing inheritance of disease 
by future generations 
Genes 
 
Behavior 
Complex disease with 
genetic component 
Changing behaviors to prevent 
disease (e.g., diet, exercise) 
Genes             Behavior A 
 
Behavior B 
Complex disorder 
defined by behavior and 
with a genetic 
component 
Sort out responsibility by 
identifying which behaviors are 
“genetic” or “non-genetic”  
Manage “genetic” behaviors 
Change “non-genetic” behaviors 
Hybrid forms of responsibility 
 
If behavior is the very problem that is explained by genes, one cannot think of behavior and 
responsibility in the same way as for solely genetic diseases, or for diseases where behavior 
influences but does not constitute the outcome.   
My study sheds light on how respondents make sense of genetics and responsibility 
for what I argue is a third category of disorder.  If genes influenced their behaviors, that 
meant that to some extent they “couldn‟t help it,” and thus had less responsibility for causing 
or controlling the problem.  Yet they were also held responsible for behaviors by themselves 
and others, despite genetic influence.  The implications of genetic influence identified in 
Chapter 6 resemble responsibilities in both simple monogenetic diseases and complex 
diseases in which behavior contributes to the outcome. As with a monogenetic disease, my 
respondents identified a responsibility for seeking professional assistance to manage the 
disorder (though they also thought some might resign themselves to genetic fate) (see Table 
6.1). And as with a complex disorder in which genes and behavior contribute to the outcome, 
respondents spoke of the potential for genetics to be used irresponsibly as an excuse to 
persist in unhealthy behaviors, implying that behaviors could be controlled. Arguably, 
respondents also identified a hybrid form of agency that corresponds to this third category of 
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disorder: the improved ability to stop a behavior precisely because one is no longer blamed 
for it.    
2.2  Changing cultural repertoires of accounts 
In order to understand the conceptual inter-relationships of responsibility, agency, and 
genetics in eating disorders, I place them in the context of historically changing cultural 
repertoires of accounts.  In their classic article on accounts,
2
 Scott and Lyman (1968) theorize 
an account as “a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward 
behavior” (46) which helps to maintain social order.  
An account is a linguistic device employed whenever an action is subjected to 
valuative inquiry. Such devices are a crucial element in the social order since they 
prevent conflicts from arising by verbally bridging the gap between action and 
expectation. Moreover, accounts are „situated‟ according to the statuses of the 
interactants, and are standardized within cultures so that certain accounts are 
terminologically stabilized and routinely expected when activity falls outside the 
domain of expectations. (46) 
 
Accounts
3
 are provided when behavior is unexpected or deviant and they are standardized 
within cultures, suggesting that they may be different in different places and times.  Scott and 
Lyman note that variation across time and cultures ought to be expected not only because 
behaviors that are questionable in one culture may not be in another, but also because 
different communities will use and accept different accounts.  As suggested in the 
                                                     
2
 According to a review of the theory of accounts (Orbuch 1997), newer writing on accounts places “far less 
emphasis on the construction of accounts to justify unexpected or disrupted social interaction” (p. 456) than 
earlier writing, broadening the concept to include stories generally. I am using the theory of accounts in the 
narrower, older way, as do some contemporary sociologists who deal with “excuses” (e.g., Throsby 2007, 
Arribas-Ayllon et al. 2008).   
 
3
 This is not the only framework that could be used. Recent work by Boltanski and Thévenot (1999) on regimes 
of justification is relevant, as are several older theories (e.g., C. Wright Mills (1940) on vocabularies of motive, 
Weber on motive, Sykes and Matza (1957) on techniques of neutralization, Hewitt and Stokes (1975) on 
disclaimers).  Biological accounts can be fit into other sociological literature as well, including medicalization 
(Conrad and Schneider 1992), stigma (Link and Phelan 1999), and the sick role (Parsons 1951).   
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introduction, genetic ideas are relatively new additions to a cultural repertoire or toolkit, 
specifically a repertoire of accounts. 
 Respondents imagined genetic accounts to be useful for explaining behavior that they 
and others were troubled by in order to restore a sense of themselves as acceptable, healthy 
members of a social order.  My study calls attention to the historically changeable repertoire 
of accounts – genetic accounts have been available only relatively recently – and how that 
repertoire may affect individual action. Historical changes in repertoires of accounts – that is, 
the set of accounts honored in a particular place and time – connect macro-level cultural 
change to micro-level interaction and negotiation about behavior and action.  Scott and 
Lyman note that among mid-20
th
 century Italian-American male immigrants, “uncontrollable 
sexual appetite” was accepted and expected as an excuse for extramarital sexual behavior, as 
well as avoidance of being alone with a female relative (Scott & Lyman  1968 citing Gans 
1962). It is easy to imagine the availability of such accounts would enable and constrain 
some kinds of behavior.     
Based on my findings, I suggest ways that genetic accounts are important not only for 
maintaining social order, but also for action and conceptions of agency.  If honored, genetic 
explanations can smooth conflict by accounting for undesirable behavior, but also produce 
social expectations that constrain or encourage new actions.  According to respondents, the 
availability of genetic accounts for behavior would affect their behaviors, by changing 
expectations of what was possible to do without medical help, for example. Most interesting 
to me was that genetic accounts for behavior were capable of changing self-conceptions of 
agency.  Knowing that an account would be honored made it easier or more acceptable to 
engage in the behavior, according to those who spoke of “excuses” (right column of Table 
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6.1).  With an account at the ready, some actors might “get away” with behaviors more 
easily. Interestingly, the availability of an account also made it easier for an actor to stop the 
behavior, according to several respondents.  Some who felt blamed and guilty about the 
disorder thought that a genetic account would enable them to re-interpret their behavior as 
non-volitional and themselves as less culpable, which would enable a more positive self-
conception that appeared to confer the ability to act differently.  Perhaps the account worked 
internally, to restore an internalized version of social order in which they were acceptable 
members of society rather than stigmatized, deviant outcasts who were “bad” or chose to be 
sick.  Once redeemed, they were able to take action, as though the account were a way of 
rehabilitating their agency.     
 Extrapolating from my findings and reflecting on other cases of geneticization outside 
medical contexts, I perceive a growing potential for genetic accounts to re-categorize what 
people do from agentic “action” to biologically-based “behavior.”  Behavior is thus 
somaticized,  (to borrow a term from Rose 2007
4
), manageable by an agent but not willed or 
volitional.  This transformation applies to not-currently-medicalized phenomena as well. The 
idea that homosexuality is genetic has been used to fight against the idea that it is a chosen 
deviant lifestyle that can and ought to be “cured” (Brookey 2002).  The idea of genetic 
influence on political attitudes has been suggested as a way to resolve conflicts, or “to mute 
societal divisions” between conservatives and liberals (Alford, Funk & Hibbing 2005: 165) 
by re-categorizing differences not as moral but as temperamental and genetic: “Recognizing 
that our political antagonists probably have a different genetic predisposition to people, life, 
                                                     
4
 Rose (2007) argues that the self has been “somaticized” from a psychological to a neurochemical self: “… 
over the past half century, we human beings have become somatic individuals, people who increasingly come to 
understand ourselves, speak about ourselves, and act upon ourselves – and others – as beings shaped by our 
biology. And this somaticization is beginning to extend to the way in which we understand variations in our 
thoughts, wishes, emotions and behavior, that is to say, our minds” (p. 188). 
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human nature, and politics may serve to ease frustrations and, eventually, to improve 
communications across the chasm…. [V]alue exists in recognizing that intransigence is not 
the result of willful bullheadedness but, rather, genetically driven differences in orientation” 
(p. 165).  I am curious about (and disturbed by) the geneticization of political commitments 
and behaviors, not only because (1) differences are framed as permanent and biological, but 
(2) conflicts are framed as potentially resolvable precisely through recognition of this 
biological permanence.  I see a similar theoretical move with eating disorders, and wonder 
what the effects of such thinking are, in social interaction.  
3. Limitations of the study 
My study is limited in a number of ways.  I cannot generalize findings from this 
convenience sample to the broader population of people with eating disorders. The sample 
over-represents college graduates and current college students compared to the U.S. 
population.  The sample excludes people with current eating disorders who are not in 
treatment, primarily to ensure that if non-recovered people found genetic ideas disturbing 
they would have ready access to a treatment provider.  Respondents in treatment for eating 
disorders may have been disproportionately aware of genetics because they were drawn from 
a hospital-based program at a research university, as opposed to a private therapist or 
Overeaters Anonymous group.  
In addition, the comparison between people in treatment and people who had 
recovered was not ideally achieved by my sample.  Most people in treatment had been 
through more treatment than those who had recovered (see Table 2.4, Chapter 2). Therefore I 
was not confident that I could disentangle separate effects for current involvement in 
treatment compared to lifetime experience with treatment. I did not attempt multivariate 
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analyses for this small sample and opted to interpret current treatment as relevant to overall 
treatment experience. 
Because I presented hypothetical scenarios and asked respondents what they or others 
might do if genetics were widely publicized or a genetic test were available, I have little 
knowledge about what they would actually do.  A longitudinal study of respondents‟ 
reactions to individually tailored genetic information, or of their changing understandings 
following a publicity campaign about genetics over time, would better address the actual 
effects of genetic ideas on behavior. Similarly, an ethnographic study involving observation 
and interviews with respondents at more than one time might have afforded a view of actual 
behavior, rather than reports on hypothetical behavior. 
My study is also limited because I am not certain which understandings of genetic 
influence go with what implications. When respondents spoke about implications, they drew 
on simpler models of genetic causality than when they imagined how genes could most 
plausibly influence an eating disorder.  These simpler models were not always explicit and I 
only rarely probed about them and their connections to their more complex models (which 
they had described first). I do not know if the implications of the simpler genetic models also 
applied to more complex models. Maybe some implications only matter if genes “for” AN or 
BN are theorized, rather than genes “for” depression or personality. To answer this question 
in future research, it would be helpful when asking about hypothetical scenarios to ask 
respondents what kind of genetic theory they believe is implied by the scenario, and whether 
they find it plausible.   
Another potential weakness of the analysis is its focus on segments of the interview 
rather than each interview as a whole. Taking the interview as a whole might have led to 
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identification of respondent “types,” differences, and resistance to ideas rather than 
descriptions of the central tendency and range of themes brought up during a segment.  I 
divided my analysis by interview segments because the interview guide introduced 
progressively more specific content that shaped what respondents spoke about.  While this 
approach might be seen as a weakness, its advantage was to distinguish clearly between 
spontaneous conceptions of causality and elicited thoughts about genetics, to name one 
example.  These content “landmarks” provided the boundaries for each of the four chapters: 
Chapter 3 included material that appeared before their reactions to specific terms for eating 
disorders (e.g., “mental illness”); Chapter 4, material before I brought up genetics; Chapter 5, 
material prior to questions about how genetic influence might work; and Chapter 6, material 
preceding the introduction of hypothetical scenarios (i.e., media campaign and genetic 
testing).  Through statistical analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 I linked material across interview 
segments, but additional synthesis will have to await future analysis. 
4. Directions for future research 
 
In the future I hope to analyze these existing data more broadly and deeply. I would 
like to focus on how respondents conceive of environmental influences on behavior: gender-
related environmental influences, resistance to genetic explanations as distractions from 
social factors, the idea that some people may be genetically more sensitive to environmental 
influence, and the responsibility some felt for having been influenced by their environments.  
An examination of these themes would tie well to theories about geneticization as a force that 
individualizes responsibility for health and removes it from collective responsibility 
(Lippman 1998, Conrad 2007) and to recent genetic theories about “plasticity” genes that 
make individuals more susceptible to both enriching and harmful environmental influences 
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(Belsky et al. 2009). A more focused and detailed comparison of respondents‟ 
understandings of environmental and genetic influence with frameworks used by social 
scientists and biomedical scientists would identify the nature and extent of overlap, which 
would contribute to studies of science communication.  Future analyses could also interpret 
the full diversity of perceived implications, beyond those centered on individual and social 
responsibility, to respondent expectations for future treatment, genetic testing, and stigma.  
Finally, I could assess whether the main findings of this dissertation vary by respondents‟ 
diagnosis and treatment experience (current treatment and extent of treatment).  
Future research on genetic accounts would benefit from ethnographic, observational 
methods to study people with eating disorders in interaction with others, such as clinicians 
and relatives.  The implications of genetics for eating disorders had much to do with guilt, 
stigma and blame, which necessarily imply other people‟s judgements.  Observing genetic 
account-giving and identity negotiation in “real” time and space would provide a fuller 
picture.  Respondents provided information about their own perceptions of others‟ 
understanding of genetics, but without observing interactions with others and the meanings 
of genetic explanations for them, it is difficult to assess actual effects.  How do nurses and 
other care-providers make sense of genetic explanations and do they apply them to their 
patients or clients?  How do genetic accounts fit with different treatment models and 
philosophies?  Especially important, how do friends and relatives interpret genetic accounts, 
particularly those biologically related to the person with an eating disorder?   
Family understandings are potentially important not only for learning about how 
genetics are understood in an important social context, but about how parents‟ 
understandings of genetics may affect children. Research on gene-environment interaction 
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for anti-social behavior (e.g., Caspi et al. 2002, Frick and Viding 2009) suggests the 
possibility that children might one day be genotyped for the purpose of intervening to 
improve their environments, thereby preventing problem behaviors or conditions.  Even 
without a testable genotype there could be genetic or gene-environment interaction concepts 
that affect parents and how they think about and act upon their children‟s problem behavior.  
Research will be needed to illuminate parents‟ understanding, acceptance, and adaptations to 
such ideas, the consequences of new conceptualizations over time, and how to communicate 
ideas about genetics in ways that avoid some of the pitfalls my respondents identified. 
Longitudinal ethnographic and interview studies would be ideal for identifying changes in 
genetic understandings and their effects over time for families. 
Longitudinal follow-up with respondents in this study of eating disorders would also 
shed light on the future of medicalization and geneticization for this complex condition. It is 
possible that specific genetic contributors for eating disorders and related conditions will be 
identified in the future.  Will such a finding further promote medicalization for eating 
disorders? If genetics are found to be relevant only to one subtype of eating disorders, how 
will this be understood by respondents with various diagnoses? It is also possible that 
specific genetic contributors will never be identified.  Will there be a subsequent re-
invigoration of social causal attributions, i.e., greater environmentalization as opposed to 
biologization? How will future findings or non-findings about genetic influence on eating 
disorders be presented in the media and interpreted by people with eating disorders and those 
who treat them?  Studying such developments over time would enrich and extend this study 
and I look forward to continuing this line of research.  
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APPENDIX 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
The interview guide for respondents with a current diagnosis appears below. The guide for 
recovered respondents included the same questions but was edited to reflect past diagnosis 
and is not reproduced here. Guides for men and people with binge eating disorder were 
identical to the guide below. 
 
Introductory Script  
 
 Review purpose: To understand how people diagnosed with an eating disorder think 
about eating disorders, including the causes and risk factors, how much control 
people have over it, and what kinds of treatments make sense. There are no right or 
wrong answers, I just want to learn how you personally think and feel about these 
issues. 
 This interview should last about 1½ to 2 hours, including a questionnaire that I will 
give you to fill out at the end. 
 Can skip questions if you feel uncomfortable answering. 
 The interview will be audio-recorded and transcribed only with your permission. 
 The transcriber will not know your name and will not put proper names and other 
potential identifiers in the transcript. When I write about these interviews I will take 
out any remaining identifying details and give you a different name.  
 I am not a clinician but if you become distressed I will help you get to one. Here is a 
list of resources that I’m giving everybody to keep in case it’s useful at some point 
(Give list of resources) 
o (For UNC) I am not affiliated with UNC Eating Disorders Program. I do not 
have access to your medical record and I will not in the future. I will not talk 
to providers about your treatment nor attend meetings about your treatment. 
 I will keep your name and contact information separate from any information you 
give me in this interview or follow-ups.  
 Do you have any questions?  
 You can decide about re-contact now or at the end of the interview. 
o Recontact:  At the end of the consent form there is information about 
recontacting you in the future. You don’t have to agree to that in order to do 
this interview; they are two separate things 
 Sign Consent Form.  
 
OK to begin the recorder now?  (Begin recorders) 
 
First I’ll ask a few easy questions about yourself and then more open-ended questions about 
your experiences and opinions about eating disorders. Then I’ll ask you about how causal 
factors for eating disorders including some specific causes. Again if you are uncomfortable 
answering any of the questions please just let me know and we can skip them.  
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1. BACKGROUND 
 
First, I just want to ask some quick background information and then we’ll turn to your 
experiences and thoughts about eating disorders.   
 
How old are you? 
How would you characterize yourself in terms of race and/or ethnicity? 
How many years of school have you completed? (degrees) 
What is your marital status? 
Do you have any children? How many? What ages? 
Do you have a job?   
(If not, or in full-time treatment program) what was your last job/ job title? 
(If so) What is your job/ job title? 
 
And just to confirm, when we talked earlier I think you said you had been diagnosed with 
[DSM term]… is that right?   
(If not recovered) Is that your current diagnosis?   
Have you ever had another diagnosis? Which one? 
 
2. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH ED 
 
What is your current understanding of [E.D.: relevant eating disorder]?  (What it is) 
 
CAUSE   
Going back to the beginning, can you tell me how it started?  
What are some causal factors that you think led to your [E.D.]? 
 Causal factors, Risk factors, contributing factors   
Why do you think it started when it did?  
Why do you think you developed it as opposed to other people you knew? 
Do you think it could have been prevented in some way? 
Has it come and gone or been pretty steady? 
Are there things that make it better, or worse? 
 
[If time is short, skip to BMI questions.]  
Can you walk me through how you first got diagnosed and treated?  
 Age 
 Context – voluntary seeking treatment or something else? 
 What kind of treatment (e.g., what kind of care provider and facility) 
(If unclear) What was the goal of the treatment – what kinds of behaviors did it 
address? 
Subsequent treatment  
 Age, Context, What kind 
 
BMI Questions 
Have you ever been hospitalized for an eating disorder? Number of times? 
(If AN): what was your lowest weight for your height?  
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3. PERCEPTIONS OF EATING DISORDERS  
 
How do you feel about having [E.D.]? 
How do you explain it to other people, if you do?  
Thinking about others who know you had [E.D.], what kinds of reactions have you gotten? 
Are there reactions you don’t like? What are they? 
How would you ideally want someone to understand [E.D.] 
All in all, do you feel like [E.D.] has been a problem for you?  
What are the main ways it has been a problem? 
Have you always felt like it was a problem? 
Did you ever see your eating issues as something other than [E.D.]?  
 
4. REACTIONS TO SPECIFIC IDEAS ABOUT EATING DISORDERS 
 
Now I would like to ask for your reaction to a few different ways of thinking about [E.D.] 
How do you react to the idea of [E.D.] as a  
psychological problem 
mental illness 
brain disease 
physical illness  
choice  
lifestyle 
problem with our society or culture 
So, besides the ways I listed (read back list), are there other ways you think make sense to 
look at eating disorders? 
Thinking about all these ways of looking at eating disorders, how do you see [E.D.]? (How 
would you choose between them or combine them?) 
Have your ideas about what [E.D.] is changed over time? How? 
 
How about [AN/BN], would you describe that any differently from [E.D.]? 
 
5. SPECIFIC CAUSES 
 
I just want to go back to causal factors for a moment.   
Are there any other factors you can think of that can help cause a person to develop [E.D.], 
even if they don’t apply to you? 
Are some kinds of people more likely or less likely to develop eating disorders? How does 
that work?  
Why do more women and girls have eating disorders than men and boys? 
Do some situations, settings or environments make people more likely or less likely to develop 
eating disorders? (Explain) 
 
Now I want to shift gears and ask for your reaction to some more specific causal factors. 
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Some say there are social or cultural causes for [E.D.]. This would mean that something 
about our culture made you more likely to have [E.D.].  
 
Why do you think that more women and girls develop [E.D.] compared to men and boys? 
 
Some say there are biological causes for [E.D.].  This would mean that something about a 
person’s body or brain could make them more likely to have [E.D.]   
Have you heard this before? 
If YES  What have you heard?  
 
Some say there are genetic causes for [E.D.]. This would mean that something about a 
person’s genes could make them more likely to have [E.D.] 
Have you heard this before?  (How or where did you hear about it?) 
What have you heard?   
 
The rest of the interview will be about your ideas or impressions of genetics in particular 
(best guesses, off the top of your head) 
 
What is/was your reaction to the idea of a genetic causal factor?  
Was your reaction more positive or more negative?  
Does it seem relevant or not for you personally?  Why/why not? 
 
Now I have some questions about how genes could influence or help cause [E.D.]?  
I just want your best guess, your imagination, something off the top of your head  
Would everyone with those genes develop [E.D.]? (explain) 
  Does everyone who has [E.D.] have those genes? (explain) 
What makes more sense to you - genes for [E.D.] specifically, or genes for something 
more general that in turn influences [E.D.]? (explain) 
One idea is that genes affect temperament or personality, which in turn can make 
[E.D.] more likely. What do you think of this idea? What comes to mind? (kind of 
personality/temperament) 
If there is a genetic cause, do you think other causes would still matter?  
Thinking about the different causal factors, which is/are the most important? (Not 
consistently asked) 
 
6. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 1: MEDIA CAMPAIGN 
 
Imagine there were a media campaign to publicize genetic causes of [E.D.] to the general 
public. So this would be something like posters or advertisements saying “Genes 
matter for [E.D.]” or “[E.D.] has genetic causes”  
What effects do you think this would have?   
Thinking specifically about people with [E.D.], what kinds of effects do you imagine? 
 Could it help people with [E.D.] in any way? 
 Could it have bad effects for people with [E.D.]? 
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7. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO 2: GENETIC TEST 
 
Because both genes and environment play a role it is not likely that a genetic test could ever 
predict whether a person will have [E.D.].  BUT for a moment let's say you could get a 
genetic test to find out if your genes made you more likely to have [E.D.].   
(Clarify: I’m talking about you, as you are right now: you have already had an eating 
disorder so I’m not talking about predicting one ahead of time. This is about whether 
you would like to know that you were genetically susceptible or not.)  
Would you want to know? Why? Why not? 
Which would you rather find out: that you had those genes or that you did not? Why? 
 
Let’s say you found out you had the genes.   
What are the good and bad things about knowing this?  
Would knowing you were genetically susceptible change how you think about ...? 
 ...Your experience with [E.D.] 
 ...What kind of treatment makes sense for you? 
 ...Your recovery 
 ...Family members who are genetically related to you? 
 ...Children, raising them 
 
How do you think family members would react to the idea that you had those genes? 
Would it change how you talk about [E.D.] to other people? 
(Would you be likely to mention/not mention your genetic results?) 
 
Some have said that talking about the genetics of eating disorders helps make it less like the 
person’s fault. What do you think about this?    
 
IF EXTRA TIME:   
Why do some men develop [E.D.]?   
Do you see [E.D.] behavior in so-called normal people 
 
8.  CLOSING QUESTIONS 
 
If you were giving advice to someone with your eating disorder about how to think about it, 
what advice would you give?  Why? 
 
Do you have any advice for scientists who are researching eating disorders? (what to focus 
on, what not) (Even though you are not yourself a researcher) 
 
Do you have advice for therapists or others who try to help people with eating disorders? 
 
Is there anything you expected me to ask that I didn’t? 
  
Were any questions surprising or uncomfortable? 
 
 Administer  EDE-Q and give $40 incentive 
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